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ABSTRACT
Gender and Political Theory:
Masculinity as Ideology in Modern Political Thought
September 1984
Christine Di Stefano, B.A • r Ithaca College
M.A University of Massachusetts
Ph. D
- i University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain
In this feminist reinterpretat ion of modern political
theory, the works of Thomas Hobbes, J. S. Mill, and Karl
Marx are analyzed with a view to uncovering the gendered
dimensions of their thought. I argue that Western
political theory, as a male-dominated discipline, is also a
gendered phenomenon. Psychoanalytic object-relations
theory is invoked and used to provide the model for
masculine gender identity, which is treated as a
historically and culturally specific form of human
identity. Masculinity is found to have had a significant
impact on modern Western political theory. Masculine
subjectivity is seen to operate as a privileged but
unacknowledged standpoint which effectively writes women
out of many of the substantial concerns of political
VI 1
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theory. It is analyzed as an ideology operating at a
latent level in the discourse of political theory, which
embodies, expresses and reproduces particular interests. I
invoke the term "world view" to analyze masculinity as an
ideology characterized by a set of systematically
interconnected beliefs and attitudes which have a
wide-ranging influence on the concerns of political
theory. Several key issues emerge as points of focus: the
political theorist's treatment of nature, necessity and
freedom, his intellectual style, his methodology, his
assumptions about human nature and social relations, and
his prescriptions for the "good society". This work
concludes with the argument that masculine ideology poses
significant obstacles to feminist efforts to situate women
within political theory. Such efforts, if they are to
succeed at all, will have to be cognizant of the "masculine
imagination" in the discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this dissertation began as a hunch that
first took shape during the final months of my preparation
for the comprehensive examination in Contemporary Social
and Political Thought in the spring of 1979. As I began to
"put it all together"—to look for useful points of
contrast and comparison between the great social
theorists— I began to wonder about this tradition as an
essentially male-dominated one. Surely, I thought, there
must be ramifications which extend rather deeply and
un-selfconsciously in such a tradition. What were they?
How might I go about finding them? To what extent was my
own work and identity as a political theorist already
implicated in them?
My hunch began inchoately. Gradually, it assumed a
more definite shape, thanks to the critical resources of
social and political theory itself, along with the virtual
explosion of published work in Women's Studies and feminist
theory. As I read and re-read the texts of political
theory, my identity and commitment as a feminist took
firmer and more complex shape as well. Much of this was
due to the developing and myriad attempts by women to
develop specifically feminist analyses of and responses to
1
various issues: significantly, the international arms
buildup and the threat of global nuclear devastation, U.S.
imperialism, and domestic social welfare issues, including
racism, violence against women and children, unemployment,
environmental degradation, and social service cutbacks. I
must also mention the Women's Pentagon Action, a group to
which I have been tangentially and vicariously connected,
as an important shadow presence in this work. 1
With the benefit of hindsight, I can now say that I
have been engaged in a feminist hermeneutic of sorts. That
is, I have approached the texts of modern political theory
with a view to interpreting them in a way that reflects
both my own historical and social identity as a "woman" and
what the texts themselves have to "say". I have been
simultaneously active and passive in this process:
"listening" attentively, "interpreting", and "talking
back". I would like to characterize what follows in this
dissertation as a "conversation"—sometimes playful and
teasing, often deadly serious—with the brothers and
fathers of a tradition to which I am deeply and
irreversibly attached, even if uncomfortably so.
The claim put forth here is a modest and circumscribed
one. It does not address directly many of the urgent
questions confronting social and political theory.
Nevertheless, this claim does seek to promote a new
interpretation of political theory which has potential
3longer range implications for our casting of issues,
problems, and their solutions. Specifically, this work
aims to enhance the critical self-understanding of those
who engage in the discursive practice of political theory
by highlighting the issue of gender, a phenomenon in which
we are all deeply implicated.
This study looks to the intersection of gender and
modern Western political theory with a view to uncovering
and elaborating a distinctive standpoint in that
2discourse. I call that standpoint "masculine" and also
refer to it as an "ideology". The latter term is used to
highlight the partial and determinate nature of this
outlook, in addition to its deleterious effects on women.
Its determinate nature, I argue, is located in
gender-differentiated patterns of human development.
"Masculine" is used to underscore the gendered aspects of
this mind-set. (There is no such thing as "male"
thinking.) It is also intended as a historical label of
sorts. This study of gender and political theory, which
begins with Hobbes, is deliberately confined to that
segment of political theory labelled as "modern", produced
and inhabited by a subject who is conceived as the agent of
his fate.
This work is, like any other, susceptible to a number
of criticisms. Some of them must remain as outstanding and
unresolved problems, at least for the present, either
4because of my own limitations, or because of the
necessarily circumscribed nature of this project. Others I
hope to be able to address, at least in part, if not to the
full satisfaction of potential and actual critics.
Insofar as I can make out, criticisms of this work are
likely to cluster around the following two issues. The
first is the charge of formalism. The other is the charge
of reductionism. Each criticism is formidable and
substantive. I do not take either lightly. While I cannot
hope to meet all of the objections which issue out of a
concern with these perceived interpretive tendencies, I do
aim to meet them at least part way and to keep the door
open for future revisions of this work in the light of such
cr i ticism.
The charge of formalism is compelling and serious.
This work may well be too engaged with the "text", to the
exclusion and detriment of a historical appreciation of its
embeddedness in social, political and cultural phenomena.
The tendency to ignore history is one of the constitutional
hazards of the trade for those of us who do not do "the
history of political theory" per se. That is, those of us
3
who approach political theory as a "living tradition" do
not read these texts for their historical interest only, or
even primarily. We do not compare and contrast them simply
with respect to their historically-specific contents and
meanings. Rather, we set up "conversations" between
5theorists that never in fact existed, and we appropriate
and apply various problematics and insights from these
works to the contemporary landscape as we see it.
Sometimes we try to imagine how a Machiavelli, or a
Rousseau, or a Hegel would respond to the issues and
dilemmas of our time. "Historically" speaking, this is an
absurd exercise. Why do we do it? Because we have to.
Because we cannot help but establish generational links
with the thinkers of old. Because we need to understand
who we are in relation to who we think they were. This kind
of activity in political theory also enables a sense of
perspective and multiple vision that would otherwise be
unavailable to us. It continues a conversation that is,
strictly speaking, undoable, because the old boys are dead
and long gone. But it contains the promise of newly
discovered perspectives on our own historically-specific
"ways of seeing". It may also engender a more developed
historical appreciation for the roots of our political
thinking in the present, and for the peculiarities of our
vision. Whether or not he intended to do so (and, of
course, he did not), Hobbes has something to say about the
socio-political aftermath of a nuclear war. His state of
nature lurks in that scenario and enables us to ponder its
horror with additional clarity and fewer illusions than we
might otherwise have. There is nothing "historical" about
this appropriation of Hobbes (unless we wish to work out
6the parallels between the England of the Civil Wars and a
post-nuclear war world), but it is, I would argue, a
legitimate and useful one.
What are we doing when we go back to the texts of
political theory? This is a complicated question.
Certainly, we can read them as "historically specific"
primary source documents. This is edifying and important
work; certainly we need to take account of it. But this
approach does not exhaust the full range of possibilities.
We can, indeed we must, give these texts contemporary
readings, readings that could not possibly have been
available to the original theorists. 4 When we do this,
we are simultaneously attempting a reading of the text "on
its own terms", even as we are judging the "quality of the
5
effects, in us as readers". Those of us who are
feminist readers are "stuck" with this approach. We can do
no other. The only alternative (and it is an alternative
that some feminists have chosen) is to ignore the
discursive male-dominated traditions of our culture. This
alternative flies in the face of our structurat ion as
"women". It is an idealist flight of fancy.
All of this is a roundabout way of getting to two
points that I wish to make in response to the charge that
this work is formalist. The first is that I am not at all
sure what would be gained by invoking and reiterating the
historical background of the political theorists under
7consideration in this study. Of course this background is
important to understanding their work. I am aware of it
and often cite such material in my chapters. On the other
hand, I have sought to highlight the gendered aspects of
each theorist's imagination and work. There is nothing in
the explanatory claims of my approach which is exclusive.
As I argue, this is one way, among others
, of interpreting
these theorists. The historical background which is most
appropriate to this line of analysis is that of family
history and relations between the sexes along with any
intellectual history that highlights the gendered aspects
of intellectual frameworks. To date, the former offers
more tangible information than the latter. While family
history has certainly undergone changes in the period we
could roughly characterize as 1600-1900, this period is
also cohesive in many respects. Significantly, it
witnessed the emergence and solidification of the modern
nuclear family and scientific "rationality".
When we look at Western history as feminists, we are
faced with two wildly divergent possibilities for
analysis. On the first view, it is tempting to view that
history as an unbroken sequence of sexism, misogyny and
patriarchy. When we view the treatment of women in ancient
Greece (both actually and in the hands of the
philosophers), for example, it is difficult to resist the
temptation to situate such treatment on a line of continuum
8that extends into the present. On the second view, our
sensibilities as women may incline us to look for the
varieties and particularities of "different" experiences on
the basis of cultural, ethnic, historical, religious and
other factors. We know what it feels like to not be
understood on our own terms, and we hesitate to foist grand
interpretive schemes onto others. The dangers of the first
view are obvious: it flattens out the significant
diversity and complexity of human experience. The second
view, however, issues in another problematic: the
inability to theorize about meaningful patterns of human
interpretation, belief, behavior and action.
Based on my reading and interpretation of history to
date, gender between 1600 and 1900 in the West constitutes
a meaningful enough pattern to be used in fairly constant
ways. While they share many significant differences,
Hobbes, J.S. Mill and Marx share a gendered imagination.
This is what my interpretation seeks to illuminate. The
historical terrain upon which this interpretation is based
is, I admit, a contested one. As such, and to date, it is
no less secure than the position of those who call for a
periodization of gender that is significantly different
from the one which I employ.
My second point has to do with the interpretation of
texts. Do texts exist independently of their readers? Is
there "a text"? My definitive answer is: yes and no.
Certainly, the text can be said to exist independently of
its readers. On the other hand, we can only know it
through the interpretations that we and others bring to it
and that it appears to elicit on its own. I would suggest
that while "the text" can admit of a multiplicity of
readings, this is not to say that all interpretations are
always equally valid. We need to be able to judge the
adequacy and helpfulness of interpretations. I would agree
that it is fundamentally incorrect to view the text "like
an autonomous and functionally fully competent
organism." 6 On the other hand, it is not simply an
amorphous collection of words. We need to respect
authorship. I do not ally myself with those who think that
authors can be dispensed with as the inconsequential
conduits of the text. Writing is simply too arduous, too
labor-intensive, to admit of this approach. This does not,
however, mean that the activity of "reading into" or
"rereading" is illegitimate. To understand something on
its own terms is often to condone it. For feminists, among
others, the injunction against "reading into" is both
deceptive and overly restrictive: "But if we do not
reread, we shall go unread, bees who drone on while spiders
7
spin their webs."
What does all of this mean for the charge of
formalism? I do focus on the texts (and, to a lesser
extent, on the authors of those texts.) In many ways,
10
these texts have taken on a life of their own in the
discursive activity of political theory. As I argue, these
texts have some interesting things to tell us. They
display what I believe is a gendered imagination. And why
not? All are situated in the context of modern gendered
Western society. All are written by "men". If this is
formalism, so be it. I am offering a textual
interpretation that certainly admits of a more direct
linking up with history. But this dissertation is a finite
limited project, like any other. If history or biography
is less developed here than some would like, its absence
does not pose a fundamental, devastating criticism of the
legitimacy of my interpretation. Instead, I would assess
such criticism as an invitation to further development and
explorat ion
.
And now for the charge of reductionism. This is, of
course, one of the hazards of applying psychoanalytic
theory to anything that is larger than the individual
patient. I am certainly not the only one to have found
this theory compelling and full of explanatory power,
particularly with respect to the entrenched power and
pervasiveness of gender. However, there are many who do
not find this theory compelling, or even mildly
interesting. This gap is one that, for the time being
at least, is intractable. I do not expect to convince
anyone of the appropriateness or usefulness of
11
psychoanalytic theory in this work. Instead, I use this
theory in a heuristic fashion. It provides the
taken-for-granted starting point of this analysis. As
such, psychoanalysis is the "blind spot" of my
interpretation. To engage systematically with all of the
criticisms of this method would make the analysis itself
impossible. We must all start somewhere; and our starting
points do not admit of perfect, airtight certitude.
Something must be taken for granted somewhere, if we are
going to get started at all.
I believe, and am prepared to argue, along with Sandra
Harding and a multitude of others that "of all social
characteristics, gender is the earliest to be solidified in
the individual, the hardest to change, and the most
inextricably connected with how we conceptualize and relate
9to ourselves, to others, and to nature." When I invoke
gender as a necessary constituent of identity and thought
in the modern world, I do not mean that it produces
predictable and virtually similar outcomes in gendered
subjects. For example, I can acknowledge the power of
gender in my own sense of identity, even as I do not fit
the standard mold of the "feminine personality". What this
means is that all individuals interpret, mediate and even
transform the substance and constructs of identity in
particular and sometimes unique ways. On the other hand,
we do not do this in wildly divergent ways. To a
12
significant extent, we are embedded in "ways of life" that
set practical and cognitive limits on our abilities to
'fight the system'. The terms of opposition and collusion
are necessarily colored by the substance of our revolt or
acquiescence. Why is it reduct ioni st ic to suggest that
Marx's intellectual style contains traces of the self-other
oppositional stance between male child and mother? Or that
his account of class relations, like that of Hegel's Master
and Slave, sounds an awful lot like a particular stage of
separation-indi viduation that inclines to a dualistic view
of radically opposed yet connected entities? I am
certainly not advancing this interpretation at the expense
of all others, e.g., a historical study of the notion of
"dialectics". I do not claim any kind of exclusive or
primary explanatory power for my interpretation. It is, I
would argue, one among a number of interpretive accounts
that we can and must utilize.
The terrain that I have attempted to map out here is a
complex one. If I have put blinders on, confining myself
to textual interpretation and a psychoanalytic
understanding of gender, it has been in the interests of
securing some foothold in the location of the intersection
of gender and modern Western political theory. To suggest
that such an intersection must exist is not implausible.
To go looking for it is something more than a wild goose
chase. What turns out to be almost incomprehensible and in
13
need of some explanation is that we have failed, until
recently, to reflect on the possible modalities and
implications of such an intersection.
Finally, I should like to point out that this work is
not intended to be a specific substantive contribution to
feminist theory. That is, the aims of the work are
modestly confined to the intersection of gender and modern
political theory in the work of three political theorists.
As such, many issues are left unaddressed. All I am
attempting to do here is a documentation and substantiation
of the claim that modern political theory is a gendered
phenomenon. I would hope and expect, of course, that this
analysis will help us to produce better feminist theory and
better political theory in the future.
The organization of the dissertation is as follows: In
Chapter I I explore the issue of sexual and gender
differences with several aims in mind. I want to establish
the plausibility and significance of gender-differentiated
experience and consciousness. I want to locate my
position on the female-feminine side of that divide. And I
want to tentatively explore the hazards and promises of a
focus on "difference". A feminist politics of difference,
confusing and problematic as it is, has been the impetus of
this work.
Chapter II is an elaboration of the notion of
masculinity as ideology. It provides the theoretical and
methodological foundation, drawn in large measure from
psychoanalytic theory, for the subsequent examination and
interpretation of Hobbes, J.S. Mill, and Marx. Chapters
III, IV and V are devoted to each theorist, respectively.
Finally, in Chapter VI I sum up the main insights of the
previous three chapters and seek to apply them to the topic
of gender and political theory. Many of these ideas are
necessarily speculative and open-ended. They require
further practice and application.
Material which is relevant and suggestive for the
analysis of masculinity as ideology in modern political
theory, but not amenable to direct inclusion, has been
organized into two Appendixes. The first provides an
examination and anticipation of some of the theoretical
trouble-spots associated with the attempt to read gender
back into history. It provides a background defense of the
analysis of gender and political theory developed in the
main body of the dissertation. Those who are immediately
sceptical of my enterprise for historical reasons, or
because of a distrust of psychoanalytic theory and
psycho-history, are urged to begin with this first
Appendix. In the second, I explore several attempts on the
part of some French feminists to articulate a theory and
politics of difference. This material is fascinating,
unorthodox and eclectic. I believe that it offers tangible
clues for a more creative use of language in political
ee
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theory. While I am not yet ready to integrate the
stylistic and substantive aspects of this unique discours
into my work as a political theorist, I want to acknowledg
its powerful presence in the "subconscious" of this study.
The evaluative criteria which may and ought to be
applied to this interpretive study are necessarily complex
or "mushy", depending upon one's epistemological
standpoint. Clear-cut demonstrations of proof or empirical
invalidation will not work here. There is no way in which
the analysis to follow is susceptible to evaluation in
terms of air-tight, exclusionary proofs. In any case, I
have no desire to proffer a singular explanation which
excludes or supercedes all others. Instead, I would invoke
the criterion of "plausibility", defined by Richard Sennett
as "a matter of showing the logical connections among
phenomena which can be described concretely." 10 My aim
is to provide a reasonable analysis, one capable of
highlighting a hitherto unexamined dimension of political
theory—an ideological standpoint constituted in terms of
gender. 11 Criticism of this work ought to be capable of
accounting for the interpretation offered here in terms of
an alternative logic (and even this type of criticism would
not necessarily undermine the validity of my
interpretation), or of indicating that the interpretation
does not merit attention because its implications are
inconsequential for the proper and contemporary concerns of
political and social theorists. For reasons that ought to
become obvious in the course of this analysis, if they have
not been made so in this introduction, I believe that this
study touches on many of the most gripping problems that we
face
.
As this work nears completion, several political
developments merit brief mention: the defeat of the Equal
Rights Ammendment for women; successful and growing
attempts to curtail reproductive freedom; the stubborn
intransigence, if not escalation, of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and national chauvinism; an increasingly
aggressive, arrogant and destructive foreign policy in
Central America (otherwise known as "our back yard"); and
an impending Presidential election that threatens to turn
the democratic "choice" of the American voter into an
absolute farce. Now more than ever, it seems, the
political pessimism of the Frankfurt School, especially
that of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, has been
vindicated. Few glimmers of hope exist. We must nourish
them for all that they can yield. Feminism, I believe, is
one such glimmer. I hope that this work will enable it to
shine a bit more brightly.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE:
TOWARD A RADICAL COMPARATISM
Throughout history people have knocked their heads
against the riddle of the nature of feminity ....
Nor will you have escaped worrying over this
problem— those of you who are men; to those of you who
are women this will not apply—you are yourselves theproblem
.
Sigmund Freud, "Femininity"
To blunder over the fundamental problem of 'man and
woman', to deny here the most abysmal antagonism and
the necessity of an eternally hostile tension, perhaps
to dream here of equal rights, equal education, equal
claims and duties: this is a typical sign of
shallow-mindedness
, and a thinker who has proved
himself to be shallow on this dangerous point—shallow
of instinctl—may be regarded as suspect in general,
more, as betrayed, as found out: he will probably be
too 'short' for all the fundamental questions of life,
those of life in the future too, incapable of any depth.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
It would seem to follow as an indisputable fact that
"we"—meaning by "we" a whole made up of body, brain
and spirit, influenced by memory and tradit ion—must
still differ in some essential respects from "you",
whose body, brain and spirit have been so differently
trained and are so differently influenced by memory and
tradition. Though we see the same world, we see it
through different eyes. Any help we can give you must
be different from that you can give yourselves, and
perhaps the value of that help may lie in the fact of
that difference.
Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas
The enigma of sex differences, baffling and haunting in
its persistence through the ages, is also centrally related
to the enigma of Woman. Both share a history of treatment
19
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marked by powerfully ambivalent attitudes, ranging from
contempt and fear to inspiration and desire. Each has also
been the product of a male imagination. In most cases,
sexual difference is predicated on Woman's distinctiveness
from the male norm. Commenting on "the peculiar
epistemology of sex differences" in the contemporary
literature on sex role research, Sandra Wallman writes, "it
is as though membership in the female sex class constitutes
a role, but membership in the male sex class does not." 1
Simone de Beauvoir made a similar observation in her
Introduction to The Second Sex
, where she wrote: "the fact
of being a man is not a peculiarity"; "it goes without
2saying that he is a man." Man as man has not qualified
for enigmatic status, persistent dilemmas of the human
condition notwithstanding. Freud's reference to the
"riddle" of Woman is an apt and powerfully tangible
3expression of this phenomenon. Yet, even as the riddle
persists, Freud has been proven wrong on at least one
count: the riddle is now pondering herself.
The specific form that the formulation of the problem
of sexual difference has taken in the West indicates on the
one hand the currently acknowledged and criticized equation
between the generic and the masculine, and on the other,
women's generalized status as the Other. In the words of
de Beauvoir: "Woman thus seems to be the inessential who
never goes back to being the essential, to be the absolute
Other, without reciprocity." 4 It is the specter of
Woman—unique, different and mysterious, in the eyes of
men—that prompts questions of differences and riddles in
the first place. Thus formulated, the question of
difference overtly protects, even as it covertly threatens,
the male subject as an "absolute human type."
The remarkable tenacity of the theme of sexual
difference—a persistent strain throughout various
historical chronicles of human culture— is worth noting,
along with its frequent thematic cohort, the Dangerous
5Woman. Anthropologists have recounted myths of
primordial single-sex tribes from which men and women
subsequently living together in an uneasy alliance are
regarded as the direct descendants. We read of
elaborate rituals and taboos highlighting cross-sex
pollution dangers, along with accounts of social
organization which often segregate men from women and young
7
children. The sexual division of labor, of course, is a
persistent feature of nearly all forms of socio-economic
organization. Several myths pose an authoritarian and
whimsical matriarchy as the original ruling structure,
subsequently overthrown by men who must preserve their
fragile rule through secrecy and careful dealings with
o
women. Themes of difference and danger lurk behind
proposals for safe and harmonious social arrangements
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between the sexes. All of which suggests that concern with
sexual difference is a basic and powerful feature of the
human condition.
Jumping ahead to the contemporary fling with androgyny,
we might invoke the adage "where there's smoke, there's
fire," to note the persistence of concern with issues of
sexual difference in our own age. In the realm of
contemporary literature, creative fiction accounts of
all-female societies, androgynous worlds, and sex-change
experiments attest to this recurring preoccupation. 9
Informed by a related set of what if . . . ?-type
questions, these literary forays play with imaginative
possibilities that strain the limits of credibility as they
provide unique critical pespectives on the
taken-for-grantedness of sexual arrangements in modern
everyday life. And the words of one feminist
protagonist— "Men and women live on different planets,
professor," 10— signal an important new trend within
feminist inquiry, as they hark back to those earlier myths
of primordial single-sex tribes.
Originally the bugaboo of the "Second Wave" of the
feminist movement in the United States, difference has been
reinserted into the vocabulary of feminist discourse; it is
no longer a dirty word. While the manipulation and gross
exaggeration of sexual difference was correctly perceived
by many feminists of the 1960 's and early 70 ' s as a central
problem, the corresponding political and theoretical
impulse to abolish difference altogether was misconceived.
Many of the proposed feminist solutions to the problem of
sexual inequality, construed as being identical to the
issue of difference, were crudely simplistic and
dangerously instrumental. In the hands of Shulamith
Firestone, for example, the problem of di f ference-as-
inequality was reduced to the biology of reproduction and
"resolved" through future projections of the technological
appropriation of pregnancy and childbirth. 11 Liberation
became a vision of denatured people. Such is the likely
outcome of a conception of equality posed in opposition to
difference-as-inequality-on-the-basis-of biology.
In the attempt to give up difference, feminists almost
lost a crucial critical tool for analysis and practice.
For a time, the reigning assumption was that women should
emulate men. Little thought was given to how the social
order might or ought better accomodate women. Policy
prescriptions were oriented toward minimizing those
liabilities that women as women tended to shoulder. And
feminist sex role research was designed to prove that
difference was nothing more than culturally contrived
attempts to keep women from competing with men. The
"anything you can do I can do better" theme caricatures the
revolt from difference that inspired much research,
designed to reveal the ultimately arbitrary nature of sex
differences. What was lost in the flurry of research and
rhetoric, however, was any sense of or interest in the
uniquely critical role that women, in the name of
difference, might be able to assume.
Still, it is worth reminding ourselves of the still
powerful equation between difference and hostility to
women, exemplified in the Nietzsche excerpt above. 12 His
articulated fears of "betrayal" and "exposure" were indeed
well-founded. The mistake, however, would be to take him
at his word. (Nietzsche, I believe, is trying to provoke
us here, by rendering explicit a misogynist attitude in
Western philosophy of which he was acutely and brilliantly
aware.) Ironically, it has been precisely through the
investigation, rather than the denial of "that abysmal
antagonism" that masculine standards have been rendered
more open to criticism. A significant shift has been
effected from the desire to emulate men to a calling into
question of the masculine paradigms of success, excellence,
identity, and "deep" thinking. Some feminist critics have
gone so far as to analyze masculinity as an outmoded and
1
3
perhaps even dangerous construct. It is this
possibility, embedded within Nietzsche's observation, that
signals in part the new critical import of a return to
difference. He understood all too well the fragility of a
masculine identity premissed on the repression and fear of
women. The critical question for feminists today is
whether such repression and its parade of symptoms are to
be undone through the denial or articulation of difference.
While these issues are significant within the context
of the development of contemporary feminist theory in the
West it would be mistaken and arrogant to presume that
today's feminists are the first to have grappled with the
theme of difference. Margaret Fuller's Woman in the
Nineteenth Century, written in 1844, is an important
historical touchstone in this respect. Her observation
that "the idea of Man, however imperfectly brought out, has
been far more so than that of Woman, 1,14 could have, and
perhaps did, serve as the guiding inspiration for the
Women's Studies programs developed in the 1970 's. While
arguing for equality in non-negotiable terms— "We would
have every path laid open to Woman as freely as to
Man," 15 — she also demonstrated a faith and pride in what
she termed "the feminine side". Eschewing "the hard
intellectuality of the merely mannish mind," 16 Fuller
celebrated those uniquely feminine attributes which she
named variously as "poetical", "intuitive", "electrical",
and "magnetic". "Let it not be said, wherever there is
energy or creative genius, 'She has a masculine
1
7
mind 1 ." To have the same rights and opportunities did
not, for Fuller, mean that women should or would want to
emulate men. Invoking a nature that "seems to delight in
varying the arrangements, as if to show that she [sic] will
1
8
be fettered by no role, " Fuller was comfortable with
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difference, between and among the sexes. In spite of her
crudely formulated—as she herself admitted—dualistic
classification of Energy/Harmony, Power/Beauty, and
Intellect/Love, signifying the twofold growth of the human
being as a creature with masculine and feminine attributes,
she was insistent, as Freud subsequently was, that these
characteristics were not symmetrically and strictly
distributed between the sexes. "Male and female represent
the two sides of the great radical dualism. But, in fact,
they are perpetually passing into one another. Fluid
hardens to solid, solid rushes to fluid. There is no
wholly masculine man, no purely feminine woman." 19
Above all, her reflections on the unique contribution
that a feminine sensibility might offer the heretofore
male-identified intellect are subsequently echoed in the
works of various feminists pondering the unique
contributions of women to culture. We are reminded of
Margaret Fuller in the works of Virginia Woolf, Adrienne
. . 20Rich, and Julia Kristeva, to name a few. The following
passage, for example, describes a typically feminine way of
seeing and knowing which has more recently resurfaced as an
inquiry within social science research and psycho-
analytically-based theorizing. Fuller here is describing
the "field dependent" woman of social science studies, the
psychoanalytic female subject (often characterized as a
narcissist) with more loosely constructed ego boundaries,
V27
who is more closely attuned to the intersub ject ive nuances
of her environment:
b^n
e
^i ri£a1 ' ^ ma9netic element in Woman has nevereen fully brought out in any period. Everythinq miaht
This is commonly expressed by saying that herintuitions are more rapid and more correct. You willoften see men of high intellect absolutely stupid in
links wi? ^
atmOSPheric changes, the fine invisiblehich connect the forms of life around them,while common women
. . . will seize and delineate thesewith unerring discrimination.21
Her insistence on the mutual enrichment of the
intellect and the emotions, in vital dialogue with each
other, bridges those infamous Mind/Body, rational/
irrational divisions that, in collusion with assertions of
sexual difference, have been so instrumental in legitimizing
the social and intellectual inferiority of women with
22respect to men. "Nature provides exceptions to every
rule .... She [sic] enables people to read with the top
of the head, and see with the pit of the stomach." 23 In
her acknowledgement of a rich multiplicity of ways of
seeing and knowing, including the cravings of the heart and
the vision of the stomach, Fuller celebrates "unison in
variety, congeniality in difference." Above all, her
work carries the hope that the claim to difference need not
exact the price of social and political equality.
Fuller's work, however, is the exception to a more
pervasive rule, one which appears incapable of invoking
difference without summoning the specter of inequality. In
the contemporary vein of social scientific inquiry, most
accounts of sex differences fall into one of two
explanatory modes: nature or culture is identified as the
singular cause/precipitating factor of such differences.
This binary habit has served to distort the issue at hand
in the search for overly simple and neat answers. It also
plays into and out of the very style of thinking which has
rendered difference so troublesome for women.
The most glaring shortcoming of the nature/culture
dichotomized construct is that it fails to deal with the
nagging fact that what is called nature is itself a
construct of culture and that there is nothing inherently
unnatural about culture. As the philosopher Mary Midgely
points out in her exploration of conceptions of human
nature, culture is eminently natural in the sense that all
2 5human societies create culture. Additionally, social
scientific attempts to distinguish between the methods and
subject matter of the social and natural sciences have
resulted in an inflated dependence on the concept of social
role, to the near-exclusion and detriment of biology, the
life of the body, and inherited psychosomatic dispositons.
If naturalistic explanations for women's "inferiority"
relative to men smack of a barely disguised transition from
magico-relig ious to pseudo-scientific explanation, overly
socialized explanations fail to do justice to an
understanding of the human creature as an embodied, carnal,
29
desiring and sometimes irrational being. Clearly, such
accounts also fail to grant human agency significance.
Furthermore, and in an ironically reversed twist,
oversocialized conceptions of human beings, their histories
and cultures, yield a deeply pessimistic account of human
2 G
events. This is particularly troublesome in the
attempt to understand the widespread devaluation and
oppression of women. For the oversocialized account of the
history of relations between the sexes leaves us with two
unsatisfactory and ultimately unsocial socialization
accounts: Either men function predominantly as brutes, or
women tend to be wimpy victims. This brings us full
circle, back to a natural accounting.
Overly socialized accounts of sex differences,
motivated by an interest in breaking the stranglehold of
ostensibly naturalized and therefore powerfully entrenched
versions of sexual differences, may be assessed as
responses to the perceived and popular equation of
difference as inequality. The feminist response to
difference construed in these terms takes one of two
forms: Difference is denied; or it is reappropriated to
27the tune of "different is better". Both examples
indicate the ways in which difference acts as a powerful
/
entree to the discussion of equality and relations of
rights and obligations between men, women and the societies
which they inhabit.
This persistent association between difference and
inequality-used by feminists and misogynists alike to
justify women's superiority or inferiority relative to
men— suggests that contemporary Western culture has
terrific difficulty with the category of difference. it is
as if everything must be categorized and then placed on an
abstract continuum of rank with respect to some central
2 ftanchoring point. Difference as such cannot be
accomodated, or even left alone, but must instead be
transposed into some evaluative frame of reference.
Several thinkers have probed this issue and themes relating
to it with a marvelous blend of intuitive and analytic
insight. Their mistakes are as instructive as their
achievements. We will explore the work of Simone de
Beauvoir, the grand theoretician of women's otherness in a
male-dominated world, and then move on to consider an essay
by Robert Paul Wolff which raises more questions that it
answers about the inability of liberal political theory to
accomodate difference. Mary Midgely's philosophical
inquiry into human nature conceptions will be used as a
critical counterpoint to de Beauvoir and Wolff. The
purpose of this examination is to flesh out some of the
issues at stake in the difference-inequality association,
along with several critical attempts to effect a divorce.
Mary Midgely's philosophical inquiry into human nature
conceptions in Western philosophy and the social sciences
31
probes the rarely questioned positive definition of human
beings in contrast to negatively conceived animal life. We
are "after all, a primate species, not a brand of machine
or disembodied intellect," protests Midgely. 29 According
to Midgely, the man-as-opposed-to-animals construct turns
on a major feat of denial—our own animal i ty—and leads to
a skewed version of human dignity and worth, established in
contradistinction to the realm of Nature. In contrast to
de Beauvoir's invocation of existent ially conceived human
action and dignity residing in the arena of Transcendence,
Midgely asserts that "Our dignity arises within nature, not
30against it." She has taken a clear stand against
philosophical and moral accounts which seek to sever the
"essential" man from the "inessential" contingencies of
everyday life, otherwise known as brutish existence or, in
Sartre's term, as the realm of Immanence. For Midgely,
"we cannot dismiss our emotions and the rest of our
non-intellectual nature, along with the body and the earth
it is fitted for, as alien, contingent stuff. We have
somehow to operate as a whole, to preserve the continuity
31
of our being
.
This continuity is evinced as much in language and
ethics as it is in parenthood or sexuality. "Speech makes
sense only for a species that is already constantly
32
communicating by expressive movement." The deep and
evident relationship between words and the way they are
spoken prompts Midgely to conceive of language in terms of
a meaning system rather than as the printed and abstract
word. A too abstract notion of language obscures the
continuity of language with other ways of communicating,
which, by the way, we can also observe in other animals.
And she locates the basis for morality in the "weak, but
genuine" instinctual inhibitions, which include self
-and
species-preservation and empathy for fellow creatures. In
contrast to the man-as-opposed-to-animal and
-nature
foundation for morality, Midgely argues that "the claims of
reason must be made good, if at all, within the boundaries
of human life itself." 33 This terrain of human life
necessarily embraces the life of the body, including those
regenerative activities that keep bodies healthy and happy
and meet our needs for emotional care, security and love.
"We are not, and do not need to be, disembodied
intellects. We are creatures of a definite species on this
planet, and this shapes our values." 34 The exclusive
identification of a "real" self with soul or intellect,
those faculties apparently absent in animals, has produced
limited and skewed versions not only of human life, but of
animal life as well. Furthermore, such definitions come to
resemble a kind of unsteady holding pattern: the realm of
the irrational and the carnal—dangerous, evil and
especially unpredictable
—
persistently threatens and
encroaches from the outside. One cannot fail to note the
33
parallels between depictions of this irrational realm and
cultural treatments of women and the feminine in the West.
Not surprisingly, they have often issued in portrayals of
women as being intellectually and morally deficient
relative to men. It is precisely these parallels that de
Beauvoir's genius identified and sought to render explicit.
The Second Sex is an important, brilliant work that is
simultaneously shot through with unresolved problems. A
measure of its continuing importance to feminist theory is
the critical attention that it elicits from feminist
scholars thirty years after its publication. 35 At the
heart of its problematic genius is a bundle of dilemmas and
contradictions which can be located in two aspects of the
work: the first is de Beauvoir's use of Sartre's
existentialism, a method and outlook that is ultimately
hostile, as we will see, to her feminist enterprise; the
second is the very ambivalence of the subject under
consideration. The formulation of Woman as Other, while
capitivating and exceedingly useful, persistently begs the
question, Other than what? It turns out that the
"what"—male subjectivity and existence— is easier to grasp
than its otherness. As the Other, woman is negatively
implicated in "the transcended ground of the ontology of
the individual male existent." Unfortunately, de
Beauvoir fails to scrutinize this ground sufficiently.
"[H]umanity is male and and defines woman not in
herself but relative to him," 37 wrote de Beauvoir. While
this is a potent and critical observation, it fails-as
does the work as the whole-to consider whether women might
not have unique modes of defining themselves which elude
male observation and definition. Woman as such does not
exist in her own right within de Beauvoir 's frame of
analysis. We can only know her, grasp her as the Other,
for "She is defined and differentiated with reference to
man and not he with reference to her; she is the
incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential.
He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the
38Other." De Beauvoir's critical acuity was to plumb the
depths of this pervasive otherness, to pursue it
relentlessly; her failure was to prematurely resolve
feminine negativity into the existing masculine terms of
positive identity and subjectivity.
Sartre's existentialism, especially as we find it in
Being and Nothingness
, depicts an ethics that is
super-individualistic, transcendent, anti-slime, and
rationalist. These key concepts play a powerful role in de
Beauvoir's work and ultimately undermine her feminist
project. Here is Sartre attempting to define the symbolic
relationship between certain physical qualities and their
moral counterparts:
The slimy is docile. Only at the very moment when I
believe that I possess it, behold by a curious
reversal, it possesses me. Here appears its essential
character; its softness is leech-like
.
.It is a soft, yielding action, a moist and ' feminine
TJ^lll ^vllve ?. obscurely under my fingers, and Isense it like a dizziness; it draws me to it as thebottom of a precipice might draw me ... . slime is
revenge!??
6
°
f ^ In " itself ' A sickly-sweet, feminine
This language and mind-set has clearly had its impact on
The Second Sex, particularly in de Beauvoir's use of the
concepts of Transcendence and Immanence. We also find it
in her discussion of female biology, where the revenge of
the In-itself takes its full toll on women.
The problem, as de Beauvoir sees it, is that women have
been unfairly consigned to the natural realm of Immanence.
Woman are immured in natural processes, whereas men
transcend brute existence through feats of projection.
Transcendence is the activity which purportedly creates
uniquely human values. Notice that this existential frame
poses an essential dualism of the human condition, torn
between "mere" existence, which we share with animal life,
and a loftier Being-for-Itself
. De Beauvoir assumes this
dualistic and hierarchical frame and then goes on to point
out that men and women occupy opposing sides of the
polarity. Her complaint is that women have been denied
their full share of transcendental humanity. Women have
become stuck in a pattern of co-starring as Other to man's
Subject. De Beauvoir's critique is ultimately aimed at the
gendered differentiation of the dualistic frame;
however, the frame itself is retained as a constitutive and
36
unproblematic feature of human consciousness and
distinctively human life:
Every subject plays his part as such specificallythrough exploits or projects that serve as a mode oftranscendence; he achieves liberty only through a
^n-oTV?^ 119 °Ut tOWard oth« liberies? There
° 3UStlflCatl°n f° r P"*ent existence other than
1expansion into an indefinitely open future. Everytime transcendence falls back into immanence, Y
stagnation, there is a degeneration of existence intothe en-soi--the brutish life of subjection to givenconditions-and of liberty into constraint and
tZ* Ivl*™?'
Th±S downfa11 represents a moral fault ifhe subject consents to it; if it is inflicted uponnim, it spells frustration and oppression. In bothcases it is an absolute evil. 40
Because the Sartrian conception of a feminized arena of
Immanence has not been subjected to sufficient critical
scrutiny, liberation for women becomes a helter-skelter
flight from that realm, a one-way exodus towards
Transcendence. In spite of herself, de Beauvoir has
unwittingly depicted biology as the grand culprit. Even
though she rejects a naturalized biological explanation of
sexual inequality— for it would accord poorly with the
existentialist maxim that "existence precedes
essence"—biology, under the guise of a slimy, feminized
Immanence, becomes the effective bogeyman of the account.
The accepted equation between Immanence and the feminine,
along with the unquestioned radical opposition between
Transcendence and Immanence prevents de Beauvoir from
exploring two critical possibilities: transcendent moments
within, or dimensions of, those activities associated with
the realm of Immanence; and the question of the
desirability of Transcendence as a mode of being that
necessarily defies and denies the givens of natural
existence, even as it requires that these givens be
mediated by somebody.
An additional problem related to de Beauvoir's use of
existentialism concerns the emphasis laid by existentialist
ethics on individual respons ibli ty for fate, which poses
serious problems for the conceptualization of the
oppression of women. De Beauvoir is caught in a serious
bind: how to account for the historical and cultural
breadth of women's oppression, within an ethical account of
ultimate and total individual responsibli ty? Are women
totally responsible for the mess they are in? No, says de
Beauvoir, although she grants that women have complied to
some extent in the conspiracy to name them as Other.
Woman's complicity in her oppression is explained in
existential terms as the flight from freedom and
responsibli ty, which invariably tempts members of both
sexes. Transcendence, after all, is hard work. But an
additional mixture of our natural proximity to the realm of
Immanence and the insidious influence of cultural myths and
internalized oppression must also be brought into the
account, argues de Beauvoir, along with the more tangible
features of econimic and political organization designed to
maintain women's secondary status.
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It is on the terrain of culture that de Beauvoir's
analysis works most successfully. As the theorist of the
culturally fabricated and not simply self-created woman, de
Beauvoir is at her best. In breaking out of the
existential ethical frame, she reveals and depicts the
variegated and related ways in which the idea of woman is
developed within Western thought. In her exploration of
that "whole world of significance which exists only through
woman,"
41 de Beauvoir initiated an inquiry that continues
to enrich and expand the horizons of feminist inquiry most
especially in the area of cultural criticism.
Before moving on to a consideration of this world of
significance in all of its ambivalence, it is worth noting
several apparently unintended but nonetheless critical side
effects of her analysis. For example, the play of
contradiction surrounding her initial use of the
existential categories of Immanence and Transcendence
backfires in some provocative ways that have not gone
unnoticed. In the course of documenting the horrors of
Immanence and the lofty heights of Transcendence, de
Beauvoir unwittingly reveals the sham at the core of a
transcendence premissed on man's repudiation of his natural
42
contingency. The ontological and moral pretentions of
men who must project unto women all that they fear or seek
to avoid is rendered strikingly transparent in her account,
despite the fact that she supports the transcendental
39
impulse. She even suggests at one point that women's
vantage point in the swamp of Immanence may confer special
ways of knowing and observing, that women are in a position
to see through the sham in ways that men are not. 43
Nonetheless, she never explicitly subjects the transcendent
ideal to the criticism that it obviously warrants.
Presuming that the sub ject /object
, immanence/ transcendence
construct will continue to prevail in human relations and
activities, her hope is that men and women can take turns
playing the Other and tending the home fires of Immanence
when necessary.
Finally, the Second Sex reader can hardly fail to
notice that while de Beauvoir argues for an existential
historical materialism as a method, denying universal and
cross-cultural truths that stand over everyday life
practices and beliefs, she seems at times to be revealing a
misogynist moment in Western civilization itself. Over and
over, she documents how the civilizing impulse, rationalist
ideals, the conquest of nature, and achievements in the
arts have been conceived and executed at the expense of
women
,
as both flesh and blood and symbolic creatures. The
implicit suggestion here is that women have a far more
critical role to play in the Transcendent project, perhaps
going so far as to reconstruct the civilizing/tran-
scendent impulse itself. Indeed, what woman would not,
after reading The Second Sex , find something quite
40
distasteful about the project of Transcendence? The
contemporary feminist reappropr iation of the previously
misogynist notion of woman's deep-seated disloyalty to
civilization bears witness to this side-effect of de
Beauvoir's presentation. While she sought to explain
women's antipathy or apathy towards project-world
achievements as a problem requiring a solution, several
latter-day feminists embrace this relation as a starting
point for a critique of Western civilization itself.
"Disloyal to civilization" is the new rallying cry for a
feminist politics that embraces otherness. 44
If de Beauvoir's framework has operated overtly as an
impediment to a more critical stance towards a
transcendence that is deeply dismissive of women's
traditional activities, most especially those related to
motherhood and the work of nurture, it carries a more
critical covert message. It is this tension and spill-over
of meaning which helps to account for continuing interest
in The Second Sex as a work that challenges and stimulates
feminist thinking. An added strength of the work is, as
already suggested, de Beauvoir's exploration of Woman as
cultural artifact and symbol, to which we now turn.
"It is always difficult to describe a myth; it cannot
be grasped or encompassed; it haunts the human consciousness
without ever appearing before it in fixed form. The myth
is so various, so contradictory, that at first its unity is
41
not discerned
. . .
^ Here is de Beauvoir at her most
critical acity. The enigma of Woman, within the dualistic
frame of male-as-subject/female-as-ob ject
, is tracked down
and explored in all of its vicissitudes, ambigui t ies , and
ambivalences
:
She is an idol, a servant, the source of life, a powerof darkness; she is the elemental silence of truth, sheis artifice, gossip and falsehood; she is healingpresence and sorceress; she is man's prey, hisdownfall, she is everything that he is not and that helongs for, hi s negation and his raison d'etr e , . . hP r
ambiguity is just that of the concept of the Other: itis that of the human situation insofar as it is definedin its relation with the Other ... the Other is Evil;but being necessary to the Good, it turns into theGood; through it I attain to the whole, but it also
separates me there from; it is the gateway to theinfinite and the measure of my finite nature. And herelies the reason why Woman incarnates no stable concept;
through her is made unceasingly the passage from hope
to frustration, from hate to love, from good to evil,
from evil to good. Under whatever aspect we may
consider her, it is this ambivalence that strikes us
first . ( Italics mine. " ~~
If we understand that part of de Beauvoir 's project was to
give voice to the symbolic ambivalence of Woman, rather
than to resolve it in some neat formulation, we can
appreciate the work in a variety of appropriate ways. If
we agree with this portrayal of the stubborn pervasiveness
of the conception of Woman as Other— in a necessarily
dialectical relationship with Man as Subject— ; if we
approach the notion of the feminine as a projection and
construction rather than unmediated natural expression,
then it is in the spirit of necessary complexity and
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ambiguity, rather than of simple cures aimed at resolving
easy discrete facts, that criticism of the The Second Sex
ought to take place.
Even as a presentation of lived female experience, The
Second Sex, while less successful on this ground, often
strikes a dramatic and tension-filled pose towards feminity
as both true and false experience. For what woman has not,
at some point in her life, experienced that alienated sense
of Otherness with respect to men and male-dominated
culture? experienced and perhaps internalized the cultural
distaste for the arena of immanence? known too the
seemingly contradictory elevation and romant icizat ion of
that sphere? experienced her body as a constraint? felt
helpless in the face of unwanted pregnancy? known that the
project-world does not accomodate life-world obligations
and rationales? felt confused in the face of a shifting
and elusive ground of feminity that is perpetually beyond
tangible reach? De Beauvoir's accomplishment was to stake
a new exploratory claim on woman's "double and deceptive
visage." As "all that man desires and all that he does not
attain," woman occupies a symbolic netherworld that is
neither here nor there, this nor that, in spite of its
seeming rootedness in the natural arena of Immanence.
Within de Beauvoir's account, woman's position is
remarkably similar to that of Hegel's slave. Indeed, the
symbolic dialectical interplay between man as subject and
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woman as object bears the unmistakable imprint of Hegel's
dialectic of self-consciousness in the master-slave
parable. 47 "The category of the Other," writes de
Beauvoir, "is as primordial as consciousness itself
Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought." 48
While otherness is not necessarily attached to sexual
distinctions, the sexual casting of self/other,
subject/object has taken on a persistent and unchanging
meaning in the West. Acknowledging her debt to Hegel, she
continues, "we find in consciousness itself a fundamental
hostility to every other consciousness; the subject can be
posed only in being opposed—he sets himself up as the
essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the
..49object." And yet, as Hegel and de Beauvoir both
understood, there is an essention tension at the heart of
the dynamic whereby the other is depicted as the
inessential. As Hegel wrote, "self-consciousness exists in
and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for
another; that is, it exists only in being
acknowledged. 1,50 The Other cannot be so inessential that
it fails to acknowledge and confirm the Subject. On the
other hand, it cannot be so essentially like the Subject
that it fails to provide a contrasting ground. Hence,
women must simultaneously and alternatively embody
essentiality of the highest order, as well as a brutish and
trivialized animal-like (non-human) existence:
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She is the good mediatrix between propitious Nature *nri
counter tTlA 8 te^tation of -conquered Nature!o all goodness. She incarnates all moralvalues from good to evil, and their opposite^ she isthe substance of action and all that ifan ob u 11it, she is man's grasp on the world and hisfrustration; as such she is the source and origin ofall man s reflection on his existence and of whateverexpression he is able to give to it; and yet she worLto divert him from himself, to make him sink down insilence and in death. She is servant and companion?
and tl cn
P
f
CtS alS
° t0 bS MS audience and crTt co on irm him in his sense of being; but sheopposes him with her indifference, even with hermockery and laughter. He projects upon her what hedesires and what he fears, what he loves and what hehates. And if it is so difficult to say anything
specific about her, that is because man seeks the wholeof himself in her and because she is All. She is all
°?i
the Plane of the ^essential; she is all
'
the Other. 01
De Beauvoir's success, it may be argued, was to give
voice to that host of cultural constructs and mixed
messages concerning women, and to resituate these as
uniquely male constructions rather than as strict
derivatives of womanhood. While she had the courage and
wisdom to plumb the complicated depths of culturally
articulated difference between the sexes, she must be
criticized for coming up for air too quickly. Above all,
she failed to pursue the dialectical logic and interplay of
the subject/object relationship to its more distant and
critical reaches. Authentic existence for women becomes an
imitative act; rather than confronting and struggling with
masculine subjectivity as an otherness, feminine otherness
is to be shed so that women may assume their rightful and
. r
.s
human status as subjects for themselves. Unfortunately,
subjectivity and transcendence have not, in this account,
been visibly transformed through interchange with thei:
repressed counterparts. De Beauvoir's liberation boil £
down to the specter of universalized masculinity. And yet,
if the dialectical and relational logic of the constructs
of masculinity, transcendence, and subjectivity continues
to operate, who or what shall serve as the Other? Even if
de Beauvoir had succeeded in transposing the subject/object
interplay into a new and presumably non-sexual ized arena,
the question of what comes to stand for the Other is a
critical one. In an age of nuclear weaponry, endemic
racism, national chauvinism, diminishing natural resources,
and crises of meaning and confidence among certain
populations of the industrialized West, the Other stands
ready to embody the problem or to legitimize the solution
aimed against it. As Jew, Nigger, Witch, Nature, Homo,
Pinko, Lezzie, Enemy, the Other will continue to stand for
what we simultaneously fear and desire, for that which is
the ground of and threat to our particular construction of
identity
.
Difference entails a radical disregard of the Other,
even as it posits the Other. De Beauvoir responded to this
feature of the problem and effectively proposed the
elimination of gender differences. What she failed to
consider in the longer run is, as Josette Fe'ral argues,
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that the denial of difference also entails a fundamental
disregard of the Other. This failure, i n turn
, is relat£d
to de Beauvoir's uncritical adoption of the existing logic
and terminology of difference. Fe'ral describes this iogio
thus :
the slave's duplicity fun I master confronts
presence confro L tL^T^ th\™it, «dbeen construed and perceived t fference has always
oppositions that leS^^'SSfaS iS^l™*difference set outside of the established system. 52
The possibility of such an authentic difference never makes
its way into The Second Sex. Women's otherness, correctly
perceived by De Beauvoir as masculine-derived, is
nonetheless constrained by this analysis:
Thus a woman does not become the Other but his Other
th! ^?nSC1°^' hiS rePres^d, and she geti^faugh? ine endless and enduring cycle of his representationEnmeshed in man's self-representat-7^7 ™I \° 'o^iw ocxj. j. epresentat ion, woman existsnly insofar as she endlessly reflects back to him theimage of his manly reality. 53 n n
De Beauvoir's solution to the problem conceived in these
terms was to argue forcefully for the end of women's
enforced and acceded-to status of the Other. What de
Beauvoir did not consider, however, was another possiblity,
more recently articulated by a new generation of French
feminists, of theorizing and acting in the name of a more
critical and re-evalua tional heterogeneity, "in the name of
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its own inner diversity":
referenceV^ C??teXt iS n0t Sim^ defin^ by
Bill it wou?An°rj::the masculine norm-whose negatives de ould be while remaining inscribed within the
of t* n^
ld6ntlty
"
Rath6r
'
diff^ence is to be thoughtas other, not bounded by any system or structured
There is a final critical note that requires
attention. In attempting to answer the deceptively simple
question "what is a woman?" de Beauvoir sought to
articulate two very different aspects of the modern Western
female condition. Two womanhoods are the subject of The
Second Sex
: womanhood as cultural fabrication and
womanhood as concrete lived experience. As we have seen,
the work often succeeds in providing a host of critical
observations on the masculine construction of femininity,
with the significant result of portraying masculinity
itself in critical terms. Unfortunately, however, de
Beauvoir fails to develop a competent or useful analysis of
feminity as lived experience. This is especially true of
her depiction of sexuality and maternity. Mary O'Brien's
important criticism of de Beauvoir centers especially on
these themes:
De Beauvoir shares the masculine evaluation of
sexuality and sexual freedom as having value superior
to reproduction, thus accepting the measuring of an
individual existent' s experience in the light of
another's values, even where it contradicts the
experience of the individual existent in question, the
experienced reality of procreating women. This is, by
definition, bad faith. This core of bad faith is the
negative component of de Beauvoir 's important legacy to
feminist thought. 55
De Beauvior has become so caught up with feminity as a
second-level order of experience that she cannot deal with
it in substantive, experiential terms. This failure is, I
would argue, integrally bound up with her failure to
consider difference "in the name of its own inner
diversity." Otherness, along with the realm of Immanence,
devalued as the repressed terrain of Transcendence must,
according to the logic of her account, be repudiated by
feminists. De Beauvoir never stops to consider the wisdom,
pleasure and critical vantage-point that might inhere in
uniquely female activities and biology, in spite of, or
beyond the reach of, the hierarchical and dichotomous
structuring of a male-dominated world.
In sum, de Beauvoir 's failure was her inability to
transcend the terms of the problem as they were initially
presented to her in the form of myths and intellectual
frameworks. Mary Midgely's critique of the
identity-through-di f ference-as-oppos ition construct
provides a plausible sense of an alternative approach.
Exchewing mono-meaning, she argues for a psychic and
intellectual pluralism that can do justice to the complex
structure of human feeling that is the rock-bottom basis
for ways of life. In contrast, de Beauvoir flees this
female-identified sphere. Like de Beauvoir, Midgely takes
on explicitly the problems of equality and difference as
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they ramify on women in male-dominated culture. In
contrast to her, she opts for difference and opposes the
conflation of equality with sameness, an issue that de
Beauvoir did not address. Arguing that the unique and
important issues in women's lives can't be meaningfully
addressed via a notion of equal i ty-as-sameness
,
Midgely
suggests that the attempt would be "like trying to dig a
garden with a brush and comb. The tools are totally
unsuitable." 56 For a variety of reasons, women are
significantly different from men, says Midgely. De
Beauvoir, in a fashion, agreed, when she noted the absurdity
of insisting that "a woman is a human being, just like a
man." But de Beauvoir sought to articulate this difference
in the hopes of eliminating it, whereas for Midgely,
difference is not the problem. The problem is what we make
of it.
For Midgely, the preemptive power of the category of
Equality, like that of man-as-the-measure-of-all-things
,
against which animals, the realm of nature, and women are
differentiated, evaluated, and then found lacking, is
centrally related to our culture's inability to see the
world of nature as an end-in-i tself . Women are indeed the
victims in a world that establishes and ranks male-de-fined
difference. But their repudiation of difference in the
name of equal i ty-as-sameness plays into the hands of a
destructive and limited mentality that is ultimately at
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odds with their interests as women and as human beings.
For these interests can only be ranked against those of
men, if equal i ty-as-sameness is to reign. Elizabeth
Wolgast, writing in a similar vein, notes: "Sex
egalitarianism leads to sexual uniformity and this means
the suppression of whatever does not conform to some
neutral or masculine norm." 57 Wolfgang Lederer, in his
historical survey of myths depicting the fear of women,
goes so far as to suggest that sexual egalitarianism is but
another attempt to tame the dangerous-because-di f f erent
woman: "Under the cloak of 'equal rights' we attempt to
deny the specifically feminine." 58 (As we will see in
Chapter IV, Lederer 's analysis is strongly substantiated in
the political theory of J.S. Mill.) Sarcastically invoking
that mode of Reason-in-contras t-to-Ins t inct that Midgely
has criticized, Lederer describes the current state of
knowledge concerning women and the limits of that
understanding
:
We are living in a very enlightened age. We live by
reason and therefore we know less about women than
almost any other age. . . . The proposition 'Woman'
has never been so securely in hand . . . yet it would
seem that we have 'forgotten' more than we permit
outselves to know. 59
What we have forgotten, for the sake of psychic
convenience and comfort is, according to Lederer, fear of
women inspired by their difference from men as perceived by
men. As various psychoanalytic accounts have argued, the
prototype for this fear-through-difference construct can be
located in the mother-infant relationship, which also
frames the early identity-through-difference experience.
This topic will be given expanded treatment in Chapter II.
For the time being, we should simply take note of Lederer 1 s
analysis of the evident cultural denigration of women as a
mere 'surface' phenomenon, a symptom, in the Freudian
sense, of this deeply entrenched and repressed fear. For
this suggests that the liberal claim to and interest in
equality may have an other than transparent impulse. For
the contents of the repressed never go away. The apparent
suppression of sexual differences might be no more than a
temporary measure. Culture's revenge against nature, gone
haywire, becomes instead the revolt of nature. And
Midgely's observation that "The trouble with asceticism
notoriously is that what you sling out at the door comes in
through the window, in a worse form," 60 gives some pause
for sobering reflection on the longer range implications of
a social movement or order hell bent on eradicating all
traces of sexual or gender differences, most especially
when such a task requires the de-naturalization of human
bei ngs
.
Echoing Midgely's concern with "the contemptuous
dismissal of the biosphere," Robert Paul Wolff explores his
uneasiness with a "traditional political theory [that]
simply does not take seriously the dominant facts of human
life, namely birth, childhood, aging and death." 61 m
the specific case of liberal political theory, the
public-private division has effected a split and ranking
such that in its own higher ranked realm, that of the
public political sphere, "no account shall be taken of the
facts of the private world." 62 Shoving "out of sight and
out of consideration, everything that makes a human being
and not merely a rational agent," 63 liberal political
theory has progressively eliminated "from the public realm
all pre-liberal traces of the differences and inequalities
of those facts of human life which theory relegates to the
64private realm."
Wolff's dilemma is twofold. On the one hand, he is
plagued by two contradictory versions of the human
subject: man as rational agent, with its voluntarist
overtones; and man as embodied and biological creature,
with its naturalistic and determinist echoes. He does not
think that it is possible to embrace one version without
giving up the other. But he is unwilling to give up
either. On the other hand, his sense of justice is
offended by the systematic ignoring of private world
differences in the public realm, even though the liberal
state's involvement in these differences makes him justly
nervous. What is to be done? If human dignity can only be
based on the presumption of sameness, and if the variegated
texture of private life threatens such sameness, then
differences threaten to upset the liberal cart of rights.
In the face of differences, precepts of fairness become
notoriously difficult to apply, except when they are
intended to undo such differences.
Is he as stuck as he supposes? Wolffs dilemma,
appealing and provocative as it is, appears to be a false
one. While he has rebelled against the particular
hierarchical form that the public-private dualistic frame
assumes, feeling neglected, for example, as a father,
husband and son, he has not subjected the dualistic frame
itself to sufficient critical scrutiny. Nonetheless, he
has done a splendid job of articulating a wide spectrum of
felt experience and analytic difficulties produced within
this frame of mind, specifying many of its problems even if
he does not or cannot correct them.
Wolff has smuggled into his account the unquestioned
everyday opposition between rationality and embodied
subjectivity, taking this opposition at face value as an
unproblematic or self-evident construct. When he invokes
"two equally plausible and totally incompatible conceptions
of human nature—on the one hand, of man as essentially
rational, a-temporal, a-histor ical ; on the other of man as
essentially time-bound, historically, culturally,
biologically conditioned," (italics mine ) 65 he gives
expression to a classical set of dichotomies that Midgely
would have us carefully re-appraise. These include:
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Nature/Culture, determinism/voluntarism, Immanence/
Transcendence, Ins tinct-emot ion/Reason, and Body/Mind.
(Notice, too, that Female/Male is implicated in each set.)
These dichotomies provide stereotypic versions of competing
and mutually exclusive ways of being in the world. Soaring
above the petty constraints of this-worldly existence,
rational man extends the transcendent chain of being
established by the Greeks from Pythagoras on. Immanent man
would appear to be stuck in the finite muck of his time-and
body-bound existence with few, if any, cross-cultural and
trans-historical links to his fellow men, because of an
over-identification with or investment in the banal
particularities of his own existence.
But these conceptions of man (and they are of man) are
neither equally p lausible nor totally incompatible.
Neither version, considered separately, is particularly
plausible. Each, in fact, borders on the absurd. And such
absurdity is brought closer to home once women are
introduced to the scene. For they embody and nurture the
life of the body, without which the mind would have no life
of its own to contemplate, even as these nurturing
practices exhibit and require morality and
66
rationality. From this perspecive, the portrayal of
man in either/or terms—either essentially rational, or
essentially natural— is quite implausible. The inclination
to view human beings as sexless (and consequently to
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proceed as if they are male) is related to the scheme which
Wolff invokes and protests against in that both rely on a
disdain for and ignorance of what counts as animal and
Physical about us; significantly, this includes a sense of
a clearly demarcated separation between animal and human
existence. Wolff, it would seem, wants to critically
question such disdain, but cannot envision an alternative
to the separation between the two views. Midgely has
provided one version of a safe exit in suggesting that
those activities commonly perceived as the hallmark of
distinctively human, as opposed to merely animal,
functions—language and morality—do not reside in a neatly
differentiated arena, are not governed by abstract
promptings of disembodied intellects, but have their
origins in bodily and instinctual life, which we may, on
occasion, continue to share with fellow creatures of the
animal kingdom. Viewing intelligence, along with forms of
social life, on a continuum model rather than in terms of
strictly differentiated arenas, attitudes and functions,
Midgely offers Wolff the means of extending his critique of
liberal political theory. Notably, this approach would
call for a conception of humanity and politics capable of
accomodating difference. Something else would have to take
the place of our cherished Everyman, that ideal and
universal being "possessed of a higher part, a rational or
spiritual part, which is unaffected by sexual identity."
The androgynous ideal, of course, comes smack up
against the call for a recognition of differences. What
makes androgyny such a potent ideal? According to Robert
May, the existence of two sexes is an insult to the
narcissistic image of ourselves as self-contained and
complete beings. (This image, of course, is part of the
rationalist conception of man as well.) This may help to
account for the remarkable persistence and longevity of
androgyny as an ideal. On this view, notions of androgyny
are rooted in ambivalent wishes and irreconcilable hopes,
for they minimize the importance of our bodies, overlook
the tenacity of individual histories, and externalize evil
(e.g., the oppression of women) onto 'society'. 68
Androgyny heaven is the panacea for all of those earthly
ills associated with or projected onto sexual difference.
"The difficulty and sheer frustration of finding a way to
talk and think sensibly about men and women makes it
tempting to cut the knot with one sharp thought: we will
no longer speak of men and women but rather of human beings
who can be either masculine or feminine, or both . . .
I 69 Like liberal egal i tar ianism, May observes, "The New
Androgyny aims at enshrining free will and leaving bodies
behind.
"
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Rohrbaugh provides one of the many standard definitions
of androgyny which can be found in pyschology textbooks:
"Derived from the Greek andro for man and gyne for woman,
androgyny denotes an integration of positive masculine and
feminine behaviors or traits." 71 What is most peculiar
or noticeable about theories of androgyny is that they
begin by repudiating a rather frozen stereotypic sex-typed
account of sex differences, taking roles as the sum total
of sexual or gender identity and difference, and then
propose a solution in the form of mixing these frozen and
separated masculine and feminine attributes together.
Theories of androgyny often seem to be reactions to
cultural images rather than real-life experiences,
instances of a one-dimensional or false negativity that
fails to transcend the terms and terrain which it is
obstensibly criticizing. In this case, theories of
androgyny, mistakenly building their opposition to rigidly
defined sex role prescriptions on a conception of sex
differences that has been s implistically reduced to
behaviors or roles, end up preserving these crudely
fashioned distinctions. Masculine and feminine traits,
served up in "positive" combination and subsequently
referred to as "androgynous", are still identifiably
masculine and feminine traits. We are no closer to
understanding why they are associated with two different
sexes; androgyny simply proposes that we must now serve
them up gumbo style. The solution to the perceived
arbitrariness and injustice of sex role "assignments" boils
down to one of redistribution and rearrangement.
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Along with a stress on absolute personal freedom
understood as the absence of impediments to the securing of
our desires, several other themes are identifiable in the
androgyny literature. 72 They include: a basic sense of
the arbitrariness of culture, a plastic view of human
nature, the notion that gender and sexual identity
(conceived in crude biological terms) are totally
irrelevant to personal identity, and that the body
functions as a constraint and must, therefore, be minimized
as much as possible. Androgyny fabricates "the Person for
All Seasons, the individual who combines the best of each
of us and has no apparent blemishes or even
7 3limitations." in short, androgyny is a near-perfect
expression of Sartrian transcendence.
The identifiable and disturbing attempt to minimize, if
not totally expunge the body from conceptions of human
identities, relations, and social organization reaches its
apex in modern-day transsexual technology, where bodies are
discarded and surgically re-made within a culture that
cannot tolerate confused or complex gender identities which
threaten the dualistic stereotypes. Transsexualism,
appearing on the surface as the repudiation of androgyny in
its apparent overvaluation of the body, is actually the
flip side of androgyny' s carnal denial. Transsexualism,
like androgyny, belies bodily integrity. 74 Each
formulation and its accompanying set of practices evinces
one of the two available responses to a dualistic
Mind/Body, Culture/Nature formula. Only in a culture
informed and structured by such dualistic reasoning could
some unhappy man (and its is predominantly men) conceive of
himself as occupying the "wrong" body and needing a
different one. 75 Theories of androgyny, in their denial
of the body, and theories and techniques associated with
trans-sexualism, in their overvaluation of the body, are
the two polar responses elicited by a crude and
reductionistic account of the body. Both flee the body as
over-valued source of impediments and constraints within a
starkly dichotomous formulation. in both accounts, the
existing body is the source of trouble, denied within
androgyny and reified within trans-sexualism, where a new
body will solve the problems posed by the old. Androgyny
flees the fetishized body of trans-sexualism;
trans-sexualism is heir to the crudely stereotypic notions
of masculinity and femininity ostensibly repudiated—yet
preserved—by androgyny. Transsexualism enacts the return
of the body repressed by androgyny. Both schemes are
caught in the grip of a conceptual framework that is deeply
flawed and especially injurious to women. For transsexual
operations
—
performed predominantly by men on males who
wish to become females— signify the ultimate in male
technological appropriation of the female body, including
its procreative abilities, while androgynous formulations
of "personhood" nourish the liberal Everyman of market
society, who stands to win out over any identifiably female
or feminine characteristics. The totalitarian tendencies
of androgyny and trans-sexual ism culminate in the
over-integrated view of society, a desideratum world with
no ripples to mar the surface of smooth functioning: a
world where the insipid and only apparently genderless
smile button serves as mascot.
For those who find androgynous and transsexual
treatments of the human body to be deeply troubling-part
of the problem rather than a solution to the unjust
treatment of women and the general unhappiness of the
age—the task at hand would seem to be simultaneously
linguistic and conceptual. in re-thinking the body we also
require a language that does not surrept iously reproduce
hierarchically related dichotomous constructs, but rather
critically invokes them for careful reappraisal. To begin
with "the recognition that in the beginning i^s the
76body_, " and to disallow a biological determinist
interpretation of such a standpoint; to repudiate the
"social man" vs. "natural man", Culture vs. Nature, Mind
vs. Body, Reason vs. Instinct formulas is the challenge.
To invoke women's experiences and sexual difference in
critical opposition to these dichotomies—which constitute
the substructure of prevailing difference conceptions— is
an added, related challenge. For the problem of difference
raises the specter of the body, just as re-considerations
of the body resurrect the concern with difference.
Theories of androgyny and transsexualism bear witness to
the internal relation between conceptions of the body and
conceptions of sexual difference, as well as reminding us
of the dangers of an un-sel f
-consc ious acceptance of such
dichotomies. When we venture to ask: What is the nature
of the boundary line between the sexes? In and of what do
sexual differences consist?—we are forced to confront the
living body in its powerful presence, complex psychological
and cultural articulation, and singular immediacy as felt
experience. We are compelled to come up with a language
that can do justice to this complexity. In its repetitive
and rythmic biological processes and functions, and
sometimes erratic demands, the body invokes not only the
sense of individual identity and difference but also calls
up the image and sense of collective species-life, spanning
historical, poltical and cultural boundaries. As the root
source of our singular sense of selfhood and shared
humanity, the body invokes and produces a multiplicity of
truths and meanings. Sexual difference, invoking sameness
and difference simultaneously, partakes of this complex
phenomenology
.
When we invoke "difference", however, we must never
lose sight of the important fact that sexual difference is
created by and embedded within gender, the cultural
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construction of sexual identity.
"Difference" is a kind of
short-hand expression for this more complicated notion. To
forget this is to play into a misplaced sense of
origins. 77 That is, while sexual difference is
experienced as a natural, biologically-based
differentiation, the differentiation itself has already
been produced within an ideological universe that defines
the difference which is then used as the 'ground' for
gender. Androgyny and transsexualism each fail, for shared
and different reasons, because they have not grasped the
ground of their revolts. "Difference", then, must
ultimately be related to gender.
The "call of difference" prompts the renewed and
critical examination of culture in terms of gender. in
posing the sexually specific question of "who is
speaking?", difference invites us to pay attention to two
related issues. The first is that we must insist on the
legitimacy and importance of asking what—of a specifically
woman-derived or/-identif ied nature—might be missing from
particular chronicles of social inquiry. Secondly,
difference encourages a concerted focus on the question of
how those renditions of society, including methods of
description and explanation, which have predominantly been
the work of men, might bear the gendered imprint of their
creators. It is the second question which will be
substantively explored in this critical study of political
theory
.
This choice of focus, designed to promote a practice of
"radical comparatism" in order to engage with the
masculinist assumptions of modern political theory, 78
should not be construed as implying a misleading sense of
neat separation between the masculine and feminine
dimensions of experience and their cultural elaboration.
Masculinity and femininity, with all of their accoutrements
and connections to other cultural categories, are
dialectically related in mutually constitutive ways. Each
throws the other into vivid and definitional relief, while
neither can be isolated in abstraction from the other. it
is literally impossible to think one without reference to
the other. As lived experience and complex cultural
products, masculinity and femininity comprise an intricate
£as de deux which, when reduced to its constituent
elements, has lost essential qualitative, and not merely
quantitative, aspects of itself.
Also worth noting is the fact that it would be
impossible to even formulate the notion of a particular and
specifiably masculine or feminine rendition of reality
without some tangible sense of existing alternatives. Such
a repertoire of alterntives exists within the framework of
everyday life, in men's uneasiness with the impossible
standards of masculinity, in those tangible features of
women's lives which elude, even if only partially,
ideological structuring even as they are shaped within an
ideology of sexual difference and female inferiority. The
following focus on the masculine as a partial rather than
inclusive expression of the modern human condition in the
West is also made possible by the burgeoning literature on
women's lives which has made available for scrutiny and
reflection detailed studies of women's heretofore hidden
and often publicaly unexpressed experiences. 79 In spite
of the overwhelming pressures and contrary to de Beauvoir's
pessimistic rendering of the female condition in the West,
women have been subjects for themselves and each other.
They have not submitted blindly to the sexism and misogyny
of Western culture but have instead elaborated, with and
like those men and women of other specific oppressed
groups, complex interpretive schemes and social
arrangements by which to live their lives. 80 That such
arrangements are often invisible to the (white male)
beholder who is situated in his dominant and ail-too
comfortable paradigm has, of course, obscured much of the
concrete substance and significance of women's lives. 81
The following attempt to tease out and reflect on the
dimensions of this paradigm, in the name of a difference
that has been simultaneously fabricated and avoided, should
be understood as an effort to rectify in all-too-skewed
balance of power and vision in Western political theory.
As such, it offers the help of a different perspective, as
envisioned by Virginia Woolf in her essay on women,
education and pacificism, Three Guineas : "Any help we
give you must be different from that you can give
yourselves, and perhaps the value of that help may lie
the fact of that difference." 82
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CHAPTER II
THE MASCULINE EXPERIENCE: MASCULINITY AS IDEOLOGY
... the existence of two sexes does not to beqinwith arouse any difficulties or doubts in
children. It is self-evident to a male child thata genital like his own is to be attributed toeveryone he knows, and he cannot make its absencetally with his picture of these other peopleSigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theorv ofSexuality 1 1
Representation of the world, like the world itselfis the work of men; they describe it from their ownpoint of view, which they confuse with absolutetruth.
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex
The real intellectual wealth of the individualdepends entirely on the wealth of his real
connect ions
.
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology
It is no secret that Western political thought is
overwhelmingly male-dominated. Less obvious and more
interesting, however, are the wide-ranging dimensions and
implications of this phenomenon which, over the last decade,
have received increasing critical attention from feminists.
What are we to make of this diverse collective expression of
male hegemony in Western culture's various attempts to
establish the possibilities, limits and contours of
political life? How much of this tradition is potentially
useful to feminist critiques and visions of political
arrangements? How much of it is deeply flawed and hence,
practically irretrievable for emancipatory feminist
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purposes? To what extent does the critical excavation and
perusal and the male monopoly in Western political theory
illuminate deeply entrenched and inherited features of
contemporary political discourse?
These sorts of questions have both motivated and been
generated by several recent feminist reappraisals of Western
political theory. 1 In other fields as well, most
especially psychology, feminists have been re-thinking the
significance of gender differences while criticizing the
unequivocal valorization of male experiences at the expense
2
of female. Such work has contributed to our critical
understanding of the ways in which 'human' standards of
identity, behavior and development have reproduced
(deliberately and unwittingly) Everyman standards that deny
and denigrate female experiences. 3 De Beauvoir's earlier
claim concerning the confused and mistaken identity between
male points of view and absolute truth has received
4extensive substantiation.
Her insight may also be extended to the terrain of the
sociology of knowledge. For those feminists who argue that
knowledge is materially situated in particular ways of life,
the issue of the genderic dimensions of knowledge becomes
5especially salient. As Jane Flax has argued: "Knowledge
is the product of human beings, for whom knowing is only one
form of activity. The history and life situation of the
knower cannot be completely different in kind from the form
75
and content of the knowledge that this subject produces." 6
Bruce Mazlish has made a similar point in arguing that
"there is really no sharp dichotomy between universal theory
and practical politics, political ideology and personal
identity
. . . .
"
:
c1^\So S 2 SSSa? S °n P°litical science frequentlylaim t offer universal knowledge, transcending anyparticular society, and are as frequently perceived bytheir readers as primarily contributions to pressingpolitical problems of the moment .... It is lessusual, however, to view a treatise on political scienceas also being based on the person of the author, on theway his pressing problems and needs shape the way he
conceives and perceives the political world. 7
Even less usual is an explicit appreciation for and
accounting of the gendered person of the author. For it is
this person, as will be argued, who experiences particular
problems and needs as pressing even as he fails to see and
feel others.
We have reached that point in the development of
feminist consciousness, practice and theory where it makes
sense and becomes possible to explore the notion that male
hegemony in political theory inhabits and structures that
body of knowledge in a multiplicity of complex and
significant ways. The simultaneous appreciation of male
dominance, gender differences, and the material rootedness
of knowledge lends itself to the interpretive frame of
analysis which will be developed in this chapter and
implemented in the body of this work. This analysis may be
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understood to enact the intervention of gender differences
in the process of reading political theory "through an optic
which reveals submerged structures otherwise invisible." 8
As such, it aims at the identification and exploration of
masculinity as an ideological structure with specific
perceptual tendencies. In short, this interpretation aims
to take gender seriously, as it seeks to bring males under a
type of scrutiny they have all too rarely undergone. As
David Morgan has argued in his exploration of masculinity
and the process of sociological inquiry, "taking gender into
account is 'taking men into account' and not treating
them—by ignoring the question of gender— as the normal
subjects of research." 9
In treating masculinity as an ideological form, this
study takes a cue from Marx's and Engels' analysis of
ideology which stressed the material and experiental
underpinnings of knowledge:
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends
from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to
heaven .... The phantoms formed in the human brain
are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material
life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound
to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics,
all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms
of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of
independence .... Life is not determined by
consciousness, but consciousness by life. 10
One can, I believe, utlize this notion of ideology without
resorting to the claim that ideology is necessarily "false"
or simply epiphenomenal . That is, one can retain an
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appreciation for Marx's and Engels' insistence on the
material underpinnings of knowledge without counterpos ing
ideology to non- ideologi cal knowledge. On this view, all
knowledge is to some extent ideological; ideology does not
necessarily render knowledge problematic. As it is being
used here, the feminist quarrel with masculine "ideology" is
that is seeks to totalize its version of identity and
experience and that it is based on an unacknowledged and
unconscious fear of women which issues in the need to
dominate them. This is very different from a simplistic
labelling of masculine ideology as "false." As it is being
used here, "masculine ideology" is understood to reflect,
produce and constitute social relations between and among
men and women (including our interpretations of those
relations.) It is simultaneously "real" and "false".
In describing masculinity as an ideology I have in mind
three notions which, taken together, will comprise the
meaning of the term as it will be utilized here. My biggest
debt is to the notion of ideology as "world view". 11 To
this will be added an aspect borrowed from the notion of
1
2
"standpoint". Finally, I will invoke the image of "deep
structure" as a descriptive aid. From the notion of
"standpoint" I wish to invoke the claim that material life
structures understanding. Standpoints in this sense are
vantage points establisheed and secured on the basis of
material life conditions. They have profound
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epistemological and ontological consequences. 13
From the notion of ideology as "world view", which I am
utilizing in full, two important claims are implied:
1) Western males (from at least 1600 on) qualify as a
cohesive grouping of human subjects characterized by 2 ) a
bundle of beliefs, attitudes and goals which have some
coherence and a characteristic structure. This bundle need
not include all beliefs ever held by all males. It is
rather, an identifiable subset of all such beliefs.
Ideology in the sense of world view has the following
properties, which I am taking the liberty of borrowing from
Raymond Guess's very helpful schematic outline:
a) elements in the subset are widely shared among
agents in the group
b) elements in the subset are systematically
interconnected
c) they are 'central to the agents' conceptual scheme'(Quine)
d) elements in the subset have a wide and deep
influence on the agents' behavior or on some
particularly important or central sphere of action
e) the beliefs in the subset are 'central' in that
they deal with central issues of human life or
central metaphysical issues 1 ^
For the purposes of this study, engagement with the
political theory enterprise will be taken as a 'central
sphere of action'. The major texts of Hobbes, J.S. Mill and
Marx will provide the material of our focus. For obvious
reasons, behavior will be much less salient as a focus of
inquiry.
Finally, I intend to explore and utilize the claim that
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masculinity as ideology operates at the level of deep
structure. By "deep structure" I mean that masculinity is
an ideology comprised of systematically interrelated
elements which do not necessarily manifest themselves at the
surface of theoretical discourse, although they do exert a
powerful influence on that discourse. Identifying such an
ideological structure requires an interpretive method akin
to that used in psychoanalytic explanations of symptoms and
outward behavior which look for the hidden systems of meaning
and logic embedded in their outer manifestations. 15
Having set out, but not yet demonstrated the validity of
my methodological framework of interpretation, I am now
going to turn to gender identity as explored by several neo-
and post-Freudians. This material should provide support
for the rationale of this framework, as it fills in the
substance of masculine ideology. Psychoanalytically
understood masculine gender identity formation provides the
material underpinnings of masculine ideology, helping us to
ground this concept in developmental processes, human
relations, and corresponding modes of perception and
cognition. It also introduces the unmistakable parallels
between masculine identity formation and prevailing
conceptions of sexual difference which take the male as the
unref lecti vely assumed norm. This sustained focus on
masculine identity formation is also designed to render more
visible the particularity and partiality of a man-made and
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-intepreted world that de Beauvoir, among other,, would have
us critically reassess.
Thanks to the work of many post-Freudians, identity
formation processes, especially those occuring during the
pre-Oedipal stages of development, have been creatively and
painstakingly explored. An overview of this material, as it
applies to the analysis of masculinity which follows in
forthcoming chapters, will be presented. while the main
focus will be on masculine identity, aspects of the feminine
identity-securing process will be introduced at certain
points for purposes of comparison and highlighting. We will
begin with the account of identity formation that traces the
first months of mother-infant interaction, regardless of
sex. Where specific sexual differences in the process of
identity formation begin to emerge and to constitute gender
as such, we will focus specifically on the masculine
rendition of that developmental process.
Several revisions and criticisms of Freud's original
formulation of gender acquisition have been made which merit
brief comment. Where he believed that the formation of
gender identity coincided with the phallic phase, more
recent studies indicate that gender awareness exists before
the second year. 16 In fact, it would seem that gender
identity, the awareness of being male or female in a culture
that values, organizes and defines reproductive biological
characteristics as constitutive of personal identity,
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coexists with the early awareness of being a separate and
unique individual. 17
One, especially if she is a feminist, cannot utilize
Freud these days without being called on to defend or attack
his theory of penis envy. The notorious formulation of
penis envy as the distinguishing feature of the tortuous
attainment of feminity and point of origin forthe many
psychological disturbances of women has been extensively
criticized since Karen Horney first took up the
challenge. 18 This is not the place to review the various
disputes and engage deeply in this issue. Since it is not
central to the focus on pre-Oedipal experiences and
masculine identity formation to be examined here, I will
only go so far as to suggest that penis envy is not a
crucial concept within the frame of psychoanalytic
19
explanation. That is, the integrity of the
psychoanalytic method can be retained without the penis envy
thesis. Those who choose to do without it are not guilty of
deeply heretical behavior; nor can they be accused of trying
to have their cake and eat it too. As an explanatory
concept, "penis envy" does not share the crucial import of
other psychoanalytic notions such as "repression",
"instincts", and "unconscious" thought processes. It may
also be a specifically culture-bound descriptive concept
whose time will eventually run out. However, those who
choose to build on and utilize a psychoanalytic psychology
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without the penis envy formulation must be wary of
underestimating the injuries to the developing egos and body
images of little girls coming of age in male-dominated
societies. We should all be able to agree on one thing,
however: that there is no automatic or self-evident
preferability (aesthetic, functional or otherwise) of the
penis in comparison with the clitoris. Unfortunately,
Freud's language often conveys the impression that there
is. Freud may be at least partially vindicated on this
score if we interpret his words as describing, from the
boyJ_s point of view, his experience of his body and emerging
identity.
Finally, the question of the Oedipus Complex and its
dynamics as universal features of gender and identity
acquisition rather than as specific psychological
accompaniments to the more specific structure of the modern
nuclear family form still rages on. Malinowski's attempts
to debunk this aspect of psychoanalytic theory by uncovering
anthropological counter-examples has given way more recently
to the anti-Oedipus and anti-psychiatry movements, which
identify psychoanalysis as one of the major guilty culprits
in a socio-cultural order that over-represses its people in
2 0the name of a falsely singular and unified ego. While
the universal istic claims of any social theory ought to be
justly suspect, the methodological question of the
applicability of psychoanalytic conceps to different
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cultures and historical periods is an open and complex one.
(For a more developed examination of some of these issues,
see the first Appendix.) Since this study will begin with
the political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), our
burden of defense against charges of a historical
misapplication of modern concepts is not a large one. In
his important study of family history and the emergence of
"affective individualism", the historian Lawrence Stone
locates the emergent and detectable features of modern
nuclear family life within the very time span of Hobbes 1 s
... 21life.
In spite of the critiques and revisions, some potent and
well-placed, while others are grossly ignorant of the
tenets, methods and critical import of psychoanalysis, the
psychoanalytic approach continues to be the most fruitful
method for the study of sex differences and gender identity
in modern Western culture. What itmay lack by way of
speculative and creative ventures into alternative familial
and sexual forms, it more than makes up for in its
descriptive acumen and explanatory power. For those
interested in a sexuality and psychology of the here and
now, as biological, psychological, cultural and political
phenomena, no other theory can do the job as well as
pscyhoanalysis. What Marx is to the onging analysis of a
capitalism that has understandably developed beyond the
vision of his limited life span, Freud is to the study of a
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modern Western psychology that works in the service of a
reality principle and pleasure principle that are
dynamically related and perhaps evolving in ways that
psychoanalysis in its formative stages could not be expected
to have anticipated. 22 m spite of the criticisms
levelled against pschoanalysi s , some valid and other grossly
misplaced, the theory continues to provide powerful and
useful insights on the contemporary construction of gender
identity in a sexually divided world where we are all,
regardless of the outcome, forced to deal with dichotomous
and hierarchical genderized categories of identity. 23
According to contemporary psychoanalytic accounts, the
formation of identity begins at birth and continues
throughout life. Margaret Mahler, D.W. Winnicott, and
Melanie Klein have, among others, enriched our understanding
of the pre-Oedipal experiences of identity formation, an
arena left mostly untouched by Freud, although he
anticipated its importance towards the end of his life. 24
Erikson's work, focusing on the life-long process of
identity-formation, has broken the orthodox stranglehold of
a conception of identity fullyformed with the resolution of
2 5the Oedipus Complex. The net effect of this work
simultaneously underlines Freud's insistence on the crucial
importance of childhood experiences while it opens up the
temporal parameters of investigation into the pre-Oedipal
and lifelong processes of human development.
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The most important aspect of the process of identity
formation for both sexes, albeit with different
implications, seems to be the attainment of separation from
the original and highly charged mother-child unity. This
primordial experience of unity is simultaneously the ground
of and threat to viable identity as we know it. While the
mother-child dyadic unity provides a sense of security and
unity that first enables the child to think of itself as an
entity, failure to separate from this unity spells disaster
for future abilities to develop relationships with others
and to develop a specific individual and sexual identity.
In the first month of life, the infant inhabits a foggy
and delusional world with no awareness of the mother as a
separate person. Receiving care under the delusion of its
self-nourishing omnipotence, it does not yet perceive that
the satisfaction of its needs depends on 'something
outside'. This awareness begins in the second month; mother
(whoever is the primary care giver) is gradually added to
what the infant now perceives as a dualistic, but still
self-contained and omnipotent universe. Margaret Mahler
described this state from the infant's point of view as a
symbiotic union of mother and child.
As the sensory apparatus develops, the infant becomes
more attuned to the stimuli of the world and begins to
realize a demarcation of its body from the rest of the
world. This markes the beginning of the end of that
86
nirvana-like "oceanic feeling" described by Freud as the
repressed memory of and desire for wholeness, sometimes
re-enacted in religious yearnings. 26
As the mother's face gradually takes shape in the
infant's developing repertoire of perceived objects, the
infant comes closer to recognizing that something outside
itself is satisfying its needs. At this stage, however, it
has still not differentiated "I" from "not-I". Self and
mother still constitute a dual symbiotic unity in which the
infant is magically omnipotent. With the emergence of a
specific (as opposed to undifferentiated) preferential
response to the mother—often seen in smiling
patterns—observers infer that the infant is developing and
experiencing the rudiments of identity formation. This is
initiated through that interactive process, taken for
granted by generations of mothers, and brought to
fascinating light by clinical observations on the part of
Mahler and her colleagues, in which the mother "mirrors" the
child to itself, imitating its facial gestures for the child
to see and respond to. If this mirroring exchange is
impaired or absent, distinct and often tragic consequences
may ensue for the child's identity formation process.
The mirror process offers an early clue to the complex
identity that is formed out of relations of mutual
reciprocity rather than simple differentiation.
Identification of one's self as a self depends on the
87
mother-caregiver's imitation of the infant for it to
literally behold as well as on the infant's growing ability
to identify with and eventually introject the images of
itself that have been offered by the mother. These early,
complex dynamics of inter-subjective relational trust and
reciprocity lay the foundations for future social relations,
especially those that require empathy, the ability to
identify with the position and feelings of another
27person
.
Through play with the mother-caretaker, the child is
helped to move from primitive identification with whatever
presents itself to selective identification, premissed on
the explicit desire to be like a particular object among
available others. These selective identifications with
various objects in the infant's immediate surrround help to
promote a compromise between the contradictory desires for
symbiotic fusion and independence. Selective
identifications (from blankets and stuffed animals to
people) promote the secure sense of fusion even as they bear
witness to an expanding repertoire of object choices. This
process helps to further create a particular sense of self
and identity as a subject-object in a world among others.
D.W. Winnicott's work on the role of aggression in the
differentiation process highlights the delicate structuring
of mother-child interaction as it aids in the psycho-analysis
2 8
of adult versions and cultural forms of violence. The
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child's search for self-other boundaries begins with
fantasies of destruction that begin to confirm the
independent existence ot the mother-caregi ver . This
original attempt at mastery, not to be confused with our
adult sense of mastery as the attempt to impose the will of
the self on another, is greeted with clear-cut relief on the
part of the infant when it fails to "destroy" the
mother-caregi ver. Early aggressive fantasies result in a
beneficial and welcome collision with the resistance of the
maternal other. The establishing of the independent
presence of the mother portends the independent existence of
the self. if the mother fails to provide a tangible sense
of resistance, if she fails to "survive" the infants'
s
"attacks", a void is established that threatens
boundlessness because she has failed to provide the infant
self with the necessary touchstones for differentiation.
Frustration in the face of an overly yielding maternal other
promotes increasing rage and heightened violence on the part
of the infant in its quest for evidence and assurances of
its effect on the mother figure. The child is desperately
searching for a mirror image of its physical efficacy in the
world.
One response to the failure of the mother to provide a
sense of boundary against which the differentiation drive
can be simultaneously checked and thereby acknowledged is
for the infant self to provide its own substitute
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boundaries. This involves a process of false
differentiation whereby the idealized and untested version
of the maternal other becomes introjected. This now
objectified (m) other, against which the self must
differentiate, promotes a brittle and dualistic ego
organization that bears the tragic marks accompanying the
absence of vital interchange with the primary other. The
danger of merger becomes all the more seductive and
terrifying (and it is terrifying enough under more normal
circumstances) because it has not been successfully tried
and resisted. The only defense is an ob jectif icat ion and
instrumental ization of the dangerous-because-unknown other.
Such an experience exaggerates the already troubling dynamic
between recognition and differentiation. These two needs
press for satisfaction in tyrannical and rigid ways that
structurally undermine the possibilities for their
satisfaction. The logical and practical outcome is a
relentless and repetitive search for recognition that
proceeds by way of domination.
The noted ambivalence surrounding the conflicting
desires for fusion and independence is situated at the core
of the miracle, or near impossibility, of thoroughly
"successful" (in clinical terms) identity formation. For
most of us, this primal ambivalence experienced in relation
to a female mother who is part of and external to the
maturing neonate, is never fully resolved or incorporated
90
into consciousness. Instead, it simmers restlessly in the
unconscious, an easy target of re-evocation in adult
relationships of intimacy that invariably recapitulate
emotions originally experienced with the first love object.
This primal ambivalence is also central to the vexing
tension that we experience in the classically conceived
self-other, individual-community relationships in which we
strive simultaneously for autonomy and recognition from
29
others
.
The theme of conflicting desires for fusion and radical
independence also converges explicitly in de Beauvoir's
assessment of the powerfully ambivalent functions of the
feminized Other in relation to a masculine subject. As
Jessica Benjamin points out, we also find this ambivalence
at play in the practice and imagery of sado-masochistic
eroticism which invokes the violation of the boundaries of
the Other as confirmation of the mastery of the Self in its
rituals and roles. How and why this infantile experience
shared by children of both sexes becomes culturally
elaborated in gendered terms such that men tend to assume
the stance of mastery and boundary violation while women are
subjugated is an important question. It will be addressed
. . . 30
shortly.
Even with the "best" of all possible mothering, the
anxiety of separation is unavoidable. It seems to peak
during the second year of life, identified as the
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next-to-last stage of separation and individuation. As the
child gradually realizes that s/he pursues independence at
the cost of magical omnipotence and fusion with the mother,
an alternating strategy is employed whereby the child flits
from the impatient desire for independence to the passionate
yearning for re-fusion. Periodically, the mother is
rejected as a suffocating presence, only to be clung to in
desperation at some later moment. The observed activity of
clinging to/pushing away the mother is the behavioral
evidence for this flux of contradictory emotions and desires
that the child must struggle to accomodate and resolve. The
mother-caregiver at this point must walk a fine line between
solicitous behavior that the child may interpret as
instrusive and a letting go that puts traumatic and resented
distance between the child and its support world.
Understandably, the separat ion-indi viduat ion process is
easily subverted or subjected to temporary setbacks. When
this happens, clinical observers have reported regressive
attempts on the part of children and sometimes mothers to
re-establish symbiotic union.
This is the point at which the father's role becomes
crucial as a new source of support against reengulfment into
maternal union. Around the eighteenth month, the father
becomes significant as a facilitator of separation from the
mother. Bearing none of the messy and primordial
attachments, fears and desires experienced by the infant in
relation to the .other, he is a stable fi gure who embodies
the seductive appeal of an external reality that is not
maternally dominated or influenced. This account differs in
some important ways from Freud's portrayal of the father who
enters the scene only later on during the Oedipal phase as a
threatening figure to the boy and seductive object for the
girl. Dorothy Dinnerstein
' s portrayal of the father as
providing safe exit for children of both sexes from conflict
experienced in relation to the mother and, in so doing,
aiding and abetting a process in which the ambivalent
feelings toward the mother may be psychically preserved
rather than resolved, adds a complicated twist to the story.
In the best of all possible mother-child relations
within the modern nuclear family setting, the child will
eventually learn to negotiate between the poles of
ambivalence surrounding separation from the mother figure.
S/he will be able (hypothetically or ideally) to maintain a
mental image of the mother as a primary love object and as
increasingly distinct from the child's mental representation
of him or herself. If the attachment to the mother as a
separate object can be developed and then preserved, a
coherent sense of identity and well-developed capacities for
social interaction are like to result. If this attachment
to the mother takes, instead, the form of an identification
that blurs the boundaries between the child and her,
identity formation will be "disturbed" in some ways. The
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ego may be too fragile, overly susceptible to environmental
disturbances, and become either too fluid or overly rigid.
(Human development and identity are never this neat, simple,
perfect, or pathological, of course. It is better to think
of these characterizations as qualitative tendencies rather
than as fixed pronouncements.) 31 Finally, the ability to
unify the good and bad aspects of the maternal image into
one whole representation is important if the child's
self-image, vitally related to what s/he is introjecting
from the maternal object, is to develop "wholistically"
. m
other words, split maternal images contribute to split self
images and to a host of complicated projective and
introjective activities which may keep the self divided and
unable to function in the world. 32
For the purposes of the analysis of masculinity to be
offered here, the most important revision in orthodox
psychoanalytic theory involves a shift in focus from the
male child's relationship to his father during the Oedipal
phase to that prior relationship with the mother . This
relationship, in the child's eyes, is already marked by a
complicated series of ambivalent emotions, which begin with
powerful yearnings for the prior forms of satisfaction,
along with the first rage of aggression against a
ther-world that inevitably frustrates desire. In the
rds of Melanie Klein: "The baby's first object of love
and hate—his [sic] mother— is both desired and hated with
mo
wo
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all the intensity and strength that is characteristic of the
early urges of the baby." 33 it is against and within this
primal emotional backdrop that the struggles of separation
and individuation take place. Overlaid on this complicated
ambivalent dimension is the more specific struggle over
gender identity. That these struggles and ambivalent
desires are first experienced in relation to a female mother
is now acknowledged by those operating within psychoanalytic
(especially object relations) discourse and theory to be the
source of the crucial differences between the identity
formation processes of boys and girls in modern Western
Societies. This approach confirms Freud's insistence on the
asymmetrical patterns of masculine and feminine development,
whereby a primal poly-sexuality that is originally
undifferentiated with respect to object choice, must
subsequently conform to the heterosexual prescriptions of
sexual conduct, object-choice, and identity. These
prescriptions make asymmetrical demands on males and females
who must become men and women. Aspects of separation and
individuation take on special and different significance for
boys and girls in relation to a caregi ver-love object who
is, in nearly all cases, female. 34 Coppelia Kahn
summarizes the difference, explicated most extensively by
Nancy Chodorow and Dorothy Dinnestein, this way:
For though she follows the same sequence of
95
symbiotic union, separation and individuation,identification, and object love as the boy, her
fe^whn^ £riSSS ir\ relati°n t0 a P^son of the samesex, w ile his masculinity arises in relation to a~~^person of the opposite sex. Her femininity isreinforced by her original symbiotic union with hermother and by the identification with her that mustprecede identity, while masculinity is threatened by thesame union and the same identification. While the boy'ssense of self begins in union with the feminine his Ysense of masculinity arises against it. 35
On this view, the critical threat to masculinity is not
that of castration, but rather the threat of maternal
3 6
reengulfment. Minimally, we can say that the latter
precedes the former and might, therefore, carry more weight
in the overall struggle to achieve masculinity. The boy is
faced with the awesome pre-oedipal task of breaking his
identification from the mother ( di s- identi fying) 37 and
setting up a counter-identification with the father. The
double lesson of this experience is that masculine identity
is bound up with the experience of dis- juncture and confluct
and that it contains an unmistakable ascetic dimension.
Masculine identity requires a massive repudiation of
identification with that all-satisfying/all-terrifying
maternal source. A logical outcome of this difficult
process, particularly in cultures which promote a strict
sexual differentiation in gender identity and social
functions, is the "mummification" of a split maternal image,
one that simultaneously promises the blissful ecstasy of
total satisfaction as it threatens the primal nightmare of
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annihilation. Against such a backdrop, the father's
implicit promise to the boy in the later Oedipal drama of a
future mother/lover as recompense for his willingness to
give his own mother up as a sexual love object is like the
promise of store bought icing to top a delectable but
temporarily poisonous cheesecake that mustn't be eaten for
several years. On the one hand, it fails to address the
boy's first wish, which was to be a mommy. 38 On the
other, the Oedipal drama plays out and helps to preserve the
association between women and danger. 39
The basic ambivalence of children towards the mother is
heightened for boys because of the need to define
masculinity in contrast to maternal feminity. This
requirement might also understandably be interpreted by the
boy child as a betrayal of the mother, likely to incur her
dangerous wrath. This logical fear, in turn, intensifies the
prior fear of maternal re-engul fment . And this fear of
annihilation, traumatic for children of both sexes who must
disengage to some degree from the mother, becomes attached
in the boy's psyche not simply to some general and neutered
version of selfhood, but to masculinized selfhood.
Hence, issues of self and gender are more closely
intermingled in the separation-indi vidua tion period for the
boy than for the girl. In contrast, the girl's struggle for
selfhood is not so tied up with a traumatized version of
sexual and gender identity, for it is much more easily
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secured in relation to a mother-caretaker who is
anatomically "like" her daughter. Chodorow argues that the
girl's struggle is .ore likely to be over individualized
selfhood and independence and that it takes place during
adolescence. if this more protracted period of
identification with the mother spells unique identity
problems for the girl seeking to disengage from the mother
as an individual, at least the struggle for selfhood is
overlaid on an already secure sense of gender identity.
Freud, it would seem, underestimated the difficulties
encountered by boys in gender acquisition.
An important feature of masculine development as
outlined in this psychoanalytic literature, well worth
noting for the analysis to come in following chapters, is
the negative articulation of masculine self-hood visa vis
the pre-posited maternal-feminine presence. (As a boy, I am
that which is not-mother.) The rudimentary building blocks
of the boy's struggle to understand what it is that makes
him a "boy", a masculine subject and agent in a genderically
organized and differentiated world, consist of negative
counter-factuals garnered through comparison with the
mother. Minimally, we can imagine that there is some
comfort, some sense of tangible definition in the
assertation that " what I am is not mother/female/feminine."
Within family settings (certainly nuclear, but others as
well) where the father is not likely to be available
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consistently as a positive source o£ substantive information
on masculinity, proceeding by way of negative comparison is
a sensible strategy. An additional feature of the absent
father phenomenon is that overdependence on a maternal
figure may require an even more vigorous and aggressive
response on the part of the boy who is struggling to achieve
his sense of identity.
His society may help him by providing elaborate and rigorous
rituals with which to mark his entrance into manhood. 40
In cultures and families that put a high value on sex
differences which are hierarchically favorable to men, the
boy exhibiting effeminate behavior learns quickly that
"sisiness" is a big no-no. For all the studies that have
been done on the horrors on sex role socialization directed
at girls, there is still little comparison to the distaste
and moral opprobrium levelled against effeminate boys in our
culture. Tomboys are tolerated and sometimes even
encouraged, especially in families that are fearful of and
for heterosexually precocious girls. The taboo against
effeminate boys, on the other hand, suggests a powerful
brand of horror at the mixing or confusion of cherished and
41
vulnerable categories.
This material suggests that there are significant,
internal links between masculinity as an achieved and
precarious identity and negatively conceived femininity as
represented by the mother. The prototypical Self-Other
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relationship which so consumed de Beauvoir's analysis, and
which she believed to be an immutable feature of human
consciousness, may have its roots in the self/not-self
definitional process which the boy is forced to engage,
contra the maternal figure, in his quest for identity.
The horror of identification with the feminine, the
strictness with which masculinity is defined and established
in opposition to femininity, suggest a pairing of rigidity
and vulnerability in masculinity. Because the defining
parameters of masculinity are so strictly set, they are all
the more susceptible to identity-threatening
phenomena. This adds a new critical perspective to
classically conceived masculine ego "strength", compared
favorably in the psychological literature on sex differences
(until recently) to women's notorious ego boundary
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"problems". Indeed the flip side of such strength may
be a brittle rigidity, the diminished ability to accomodate
a shifting and unpredictable environment inhabited by
independent fellow creatures and an enigmatic nature. 43
Nancy Chodorow sums up her reconstruction of the origins and
ramifications of masculinity in a manner that bears directly
on the themes being explored here:
. . .
the division of labor in childrearing results in
an object i fication of women— a treating of women as
others, or objects, rather than subjects, or
selves— that extends to our culture as a whole.
Infantile development of the self is explored in
opposition to the mother, as primary caretaker, who
becomes the other. Because boys are of opposite
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?I^J?«
fr°m their others, they especially feel a needto differentiate and yet find differentiationproblematic. The boy comes to define his self more inopposition than through a sense of his wholeness orcontinuity He becomes the self and experiences Sismother as the other. The process also extends to histrying to dominate the other in order to ensure his
?
elf
*
SUCh dorainat ion begins with mother asthe object, extends to women, and is then generalized toinclude the experience of all others as objects ratherthan subjects. This stance in which people are treatedand experienced as things, becomes basic to male Westernculture. Thus the "fetishism of commodities," the
excessive rationalism of technological thought, the
rigid self-other distinctions of capitalism or ofbureaucratic mass societies all have genetic andpsychological roots in the structure of parenting and ofmale development, not just the requirements of
product ion. 44
Chodorow's analysis here, which has much in common with
the work of Dorothy Dinnerstein and Jean Baker Miller,
brings to mind the problem—art iculated with passion and
sensitivity, but no solution, by Adorno and Horkheimer—of
the domination of Nature. 45 It is not farfetched to pose
some of the apparent links between masculine psychology,
Baconian science and post-Enlightenment forms of
rationality, even if such links do not provide a causal or
ultimately satisfactory form of explanation. 46 Like
variations on a theme, all share a rigidly conceived
universe of strictly set meanings secured by the principle
of non-contradiction and the exclusion of ambiguity. The
unmistakably sexualized tenor of a macho reason set in
opposition to a feminized world of natural mystery that can
be decoded if it is properly tamed is especially suggestive
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of important connections. 47 The seemingly bizarre
characterization of Western culture as necrophilic by
American and French feminists, notably Mary Daly and Helene
Cixous, might also be more firmly grounded in this
48material. if the maternal presence as our primal
natural surround and corporeal awakener-caretaker-f rustrator
comes to be associated with women and Nature in a social
world that operates within a masculinized Culture/feminized
Nature symbolic framework, such links begin to make exciting
and profoundly distrubing sense. 49 Nature, like Woman,
simultaneously feared and desired as the dual ground of and
threat to masculinized identity and "humanized" Culture,
must be dominated, de-clawed and tamed for the safety and
pleasure of an ego that would be king.
And yet, an overly subdued Nature-Other, as de Beauvoir
saw in her Hegelian fashion and as Benjamin relates in her
discussion of infantile aggression, threatens identity as
dangerously as an uncontrolled one. For if the tension
between the Self and Other is lost, if the Other becomes
totally absorbed by the Subject, that Subject has nothing
external to itself by which to gage its own identity. The
thrill and necessary panic engendered by the antagonistic
self-other relation requires an ongoing process of attempted
but only partially successful appropriation of an object
that must elude total domestication. The feminist charge of
necrophilia as characteristic of masculine culture
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identifies this extreme logical and behavioral tendency
embedded in a masculinized Self /feminized other relationship
projected onto and perhaps also constituting the
culture/nature relation, although it underestimates the
interest in keeping such tension alive and well. As the
self-styled feminist-ecologists active in the contemporary
anti-nuclear weapons movement are well aware, the
realization of a dead or tamed Nature/Other would bring the
dynamic to an abrupt halt, with horrendous implications for
the very future of life on this plant. 50
When we juxtapose the early experiences of
masculinity-in-development to the sexual-social arrangements
of adult life which must ensure biological and cultural
reproduction, the life-long tasks associated with
maintaining and protecting a masculine self appear to be
overwhelmingly demanding. The boy who had to disengage from
the mother as his ground of identity and love object in
order to secure a masculine version of identity, who has
spent a good portion of his adolescence bonding with other
boys, must as an adult reunite with a woman. While Freud
rightly pointed out how the girl's problematic shift from
mother to father spelt unique difficulties for her future
relationships with men, he was less perceptive of the
difficulties in the boy's case. When we place adult
heterosexual relationships against the backdrop of
separat ion-indi viduat ion from the mother, a previously
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hidden aspect becomes strikingly salient. As Dinnerstein
points out, the man-to-woman relationship is more like to
re-kindle unconscious memories of satisfaction and terror
than the woman-to-man relationship. Not only does the man
enjoy direct access to the body of a woman, thereby
rekindling earlier memories of his relation to the maternal
body, but his previous relation to that body become the
negative ground of his struggle to achieve masculinity. m
other words, the man's emotional and sexual experience of a
woman in heterosexual relationships is likely to reignite
fears and struggles associated with his prior quest for
masculine identity.
Within a patriarchal society, which characterizes
preindustrial social and familial organization more
adequately than contemporary social structure, marriage was
the means for men to fulfill their social roles and gain
access to patr iarchally based political power. 51 Hence,
within a patriarchal environment that gives men power over
women and access to power as designated heads of households,
such power can only be assumed in the name of the father.
To become fathers, men need women. Such an arrangement
recapitulates the earlier relationship to the mother: both
make men dependent on women for the validation of their
manhood and for the exercise of masculine prerogatives. And
while this dependency is easily masked by the very tangible
political domination exercised within patriarchal settings
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that deny women citizenship, socio-political participation
in the public arena or much choice concerning their marital
fate, it is nonetheless at the vital center of the
patriarchal works.
What highlights the dependence and potential
vulnerability of men and masculinity within a patriarchal
setting and to an admittedly lesser extent within modern-day
society is the specially important but also problematic cast
of paternity. The definitive answer to questions of
paternity ultimately lies in the hands of women. Natural
(i.e., biologically based) difficulties in ascertaining
paternity have led to some of the most oppressive practices
levelled against women, practices designed to keep them
within the strictly set boundaries of the household and to
punish them severely for sexual infract ions— real
,
possible, and imagined, of their making and not. 52 in a
system where lineage and inheritance of property are
established through the line of the father, whose only
biological role in reproduction in insemination, a female
sexuality that is not naturally bound by identifiably
restricted periods of fertility and sexual receptivity must
be rigidly supervised. This supervision has, as we know,
been carried out on the bodies and psyches of women. The
vestige of the sexual double standard, still in operation
today within a social order that no longer requires it in
strictly functional terms, bears witness to the powerful
tradition of male control of female sexuality and
reproductive powers. It also suggests that the male desire
to control female sexuality and reproductive powers link up
in direct ways with the ambivalence associated with the
maternal object, the (m)other.
What is of special interest here is the question of
whether the human relationship to and experience of
reproduction is genderically differentiated. Thanks to the
work of political theorist Mary O'Brien, male reproductive
consciousness has been given sustained treatment as an
important ground of distinctively masculine experience. 53
Her analysis provides important insight on adult masculinity
which will be used in conjuction with the psychological
discussion of early life presented above.
In her analysis of the Western political theory
tradition, The Politics of Reproduction
, O'Brien pinpoints a
special concern with principles of continuity which, she
argues, reflect a uniquely male concern with and attempt to
mediate a problematic and uncertain relationship to
paternity. The identifiably masculine search for principles
of continuity outside of natural continuity, which is
perceived as being untrustworthy, bespeaks attempts to deny
female maternal knowledge and power and to establish new
grounds for knowledge, identity and control outside of the
maternally controlled parameters of reproduction.
Arguing that men experience a biologically-based alienation
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in relation to the experience of the "lost seed" and the
nine month gestation period of the fetus, of which they have
no direct bodily experience, O'Brien believes that this
experience generates the need to create alternative modes of
continuity-with offspring, fellow human beings, past ages,
and a nature which has excluded males from one of its most
vital functions:
The creation of a patriarchate is, in every sense of thePhrase a triumph over nature. The notion^? man asNature s master is often regarded as a product of themodern age and the development of science. This is toolimited a view. Men did not suddenly discover in thesixteenth century that they might make a historicalproject out of the mastery of nature. They have
understood their separation from nature and their needto mediate this separation ever since that moment indark prehistory when the idea of paternity took hold inthe human mind. Patriarchy is the power to transcend
natural realities with historical, man-made realities.
... We cannot say categorically that paternity wasthe first historical development of the concept of
right. We cannot say categorically that man's discovery
of the problematic freedom embedded in his reproductive
experience was his first notion of the concept offreedom. We cannot say categorically that the discovery
of the ability to rearrange Nature's more problematic
strictures was man's first taste of potency and power.
What we can say is that, if these things are true, then
the history of patriarchy makes a great deal more sense
that it otherwise can. (pp. 54-55)
O'Brien's work is important for a number of reasons.
Heading the list is her valiant attempt to take on the
troublesome mind-body relation. She takes biology and
corporeal experience seriously, although she is in no sense
a biological determinist. Rather, O'Brien takes the
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biological as an important ground of experience and seeks to
trace out the ways in which human beings respond to and
shape meaning out of this experience. Of special note is
her unique rendition of the ways in which certain biological
processes display a dialectical rationale. Re-formulating
Marx's rendition of the Hegelian notion that dialectical
thinking is essentially correct because it reflects the
dialectical patterning of reality, O'Brien looks to the
biological process of digestion as an illustration:
Let us think back from the need to produce to the hungerwhich produced the need, and consider the process ofdigestion and how it is experienced. This particularprocess is not usually used in an exemplary way, for as
a product', human excrement is not regarded as a higher
stage of anything nor as a suitable object ofphilosophy. The honourable exception is Freud . .From our own digestive processes, we are conscious of'abasic structure of process, our own participation in the
opposition of externality and internality, and of the
unification and transformation of objects .... All
that is argued here is that human consciousness
apprehends the living body primordially as a medium of
the opposition of internality and externality, of
mediation, of negation and of qualitative
transformation. (pp. 38-39)
Her focus on "the dialectical structure of our biological
functions" prompts an examination of the reproduction of the
self and of the species as the two most basic of human
experiences, ontologically and exper ientially prior to
Marx's detailed focus on the activity of productive labor
and Freud's expanded treatment of sexuality. She finds the
failure to take reproduction seriously in the history of
philosophy and social theory a notable flaw (Hegel is an
108
55important exception) ; but it i«»^ , u u s also a provocative
pattern of denial in need of explanation.
O'Brien's argument is that the history of social
theorizing ignores the reproductive arena of human
experience and practice precisely because that man-made
history reflects the male's unique attempts to mediate those
experiences and to deny their originally felt expression.
Because the male experiences a problematic and questionable
sense of relation to the process and product of reproduction
male theorizing often reflects men's attempts to resolve
issues of reproductive biology onto second-level and more
abstract arenas. Hence the creation of patriarchy as the
theoretical and practical expression of the male's socially
(as opposed to naturally) defined right to "his" children.
Hence the creation of a variety of social forms (notably,
marriage) emerging from a complex series of mediations
created by man. (This does not necessarily imply that women
have never developed or taken part in such mediations.
Clearly, there are circumstances in which women tend to
benefit from acknowledged paternity, particularly if
subsistence resources are scarce.) Hence the creation of
artificial modes of continuity in response to the mysterious
patterning of biological time during the gestation period.
O'Brien names the rationale which governs the creation of
the social forms and ideological expressions of male mastery
the "potency principle". The potency principle
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incorporates, as it seeks to transcend, the biological
paternal experiences of estrangement and uncertainty,
alienation and exclusion. These experiences make up "the
soft core of the potency principle." As such, the principle
is inherently vulnerable and must be carefully protected
with negative counter-assertions. 56
O'Brien's discussion of the potency principle
illuminates the often intuited relation of masculinity to a
psychology of conquest and domination. And the material of
its soft core—an intransignet sense of alienation—might
also relate to "the persistent dualism of male modes of
understanding," suggest O'Brien. The parallels in the
patterning of masculine experience, first in relation to
one's (m)other, and next in relation to the wife-child dyad,
suggest a recapitulation and further strengthening of
patterns of experience established during the early months
of life.
Turning our attention to Western culture and its
philosophical legacy, we notice multiple examples of various
treatments of the problems of alienation, the separation of
man from nature, and the separation of man from continuous
time. O'Brien locates these problematics in the male
consciousness of reproduction. She argues that these
persistent philosophical problems are especially reflective
of the realities of male experience. Her discussion of
genderically differentiated time consciousness is especially
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provocative. Arguing that the maternal mode o£ female ti,
is continuous, while paternal male time is discontinuous,
she identifies a "familiar ambivalence" in the male sense of
discontinuous time:
• . . .
it frees men to some extent from the continopnr,,of natural cyclical time, but deprives them of
9 Y
experienced generational continuity. Historical! v m0 nhave clearly felt compelled to create p c j Jcontinuity, principles which operate in the public realmunder male control and are limited only by men'screative imagination. (p. 61)
While not seeking to disqualify 'time separated from its
biological roots' as a worthy philosophical problem, O'Brien
is concerned about philosophy's failure to consider this
problem as genderically specific to male experience. This
is another expression of de Beauvoir's concern with a
masculine rendition of the human condition that poses as the
whole truth, which fails to think the experience that woman
live, and thereby presents a distorted view of things. Such
distortion is amplified by the human tendency to redescribe
reality in such a way as to deny the original versions of
our fears and disappointments.
The philosophical problem of continuity over time,
transposed into the political problem of the state, reflects
in significant measure a male-derived problematic. 57
Hence, the search for principles and means of transcending
individual life spans, which are capable of doing
so in self-regenerative ways, while a compelling and
Ill
familiar issue to men and women alike, is also uniquely
reflective of the male's solitary experience of self and
problematic sense of regenerative contribution over
generations. The time lapse between copulation and
parturition, which exacerbates the uncertainty of paternity,
suggests that it is this experience, along with the more
generalized human trauma associated with mortality, which
constitutes the foundation for the idea of time as an
enemy: "The shadow of lapsed time is the separation of men
from the destiny of their seed. Paternity is, in a real
sense, an alienated experience in abstract time: for men,
physiology is fate." 58 Whether and how alternative means
of experiencing time and articulating continuity might be
derived from the maternal standpoint is a question that
merits serious attention. 59
The fundamental alienation at the heart of male
reproductive experience is also manifest in those
formulations of human nature which
predominate in the Western philosophical tradition. When
placed against the backdrop of a puzzling and elusive
paternal experience, the persistent amplification of a
second nature which magically bypasses biological categories
and imperatives takes on a specifically masculine cast.
What has been initiated in relation to one's own mother is
recapitulated in relation to all potential mothers, i.e., all
women. The denigration and repudiation of biological first
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nature sets the tone for an exaltation of a refined "human"
(male) nature bound by no natural or sex-specific limits.
On the other hand, these conceptions of "human" nature end
up penalizing women for their sex-specific experiences. The
denigration of biological first nature is the logical
outcome of ideologies which can only justify and glorify a
masculine rendition of the human condition at the expense of
the female.
Mary Midgely's perceptive critique of a human nature
posed in opposition to an animal nature that is viewed as
necessarily limiting and degrading takes on added
significance within the frame of O'Brien analysis. We could
say that the posing of animal vs. human, first vs. second
nature initially appealed to a creature motivated to mediate
a confusing and problematic biological experience and to
master a situation that eluded his control. Those theories
in which "the individual is constituted abstractly without
ever getting born," 60 populated by what Clifford Geertz
has termed "bloodless universals", bear the fruit of the
wish to deny maternal origins and the female reproductive
contribution. Re-evoking infantile omnipotence, that primal
sense of self-sufficiency which we have all tragically lost,
second nature conceptions go on to embody the adult
masculine desire for a self- and species-generation that can
be self-consciously willed, created and controlled. The
failure to systematically think both the humanly biological
113
and distinctively female components of human experience
reflects, at least in part, the male's attenuated and
problematic experience of reproduction. 61
If we consider O'Brien's analysis of gender-differen-
tiated reproductive experience in conjunction with
psychoanalytic accounts of pre-Oedipal identity acquisition,
we become especially sensitive to the suggestion that
mothers occupy privileged positions within vital arenas of
human experience. in both frameworks, maternity threatens
males in identifiable ways. The denial of and attempt to
appropriate such threats become, in turn, constitutive
features of distinctly patterned ways of interpreting and
acting in the world which may be called "masculine". 62
Thus, patriarchy may be understood as a version of men's
attempts to overthrow female control over reproduction,
while masculinity embodies a fundamental turn away from the
mother. In both scenarios, maternal power is denied even as
it poses the ultimate threat. Its denial, in fact, serves
to make it even more threatening.
It is no secret that the classic bifurcations in Western
rationalism—mind/body, culture/nature, freedom/determinism,
reason/emotion—make little sense on the terrain of female
63 , .
experience. This is not simply because the denigrated
and feminized depiction of the latter halves of these
dichotomies violate women's sense of human dignity. We must
also consider how female reproductive experiences and the
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host of activities entailed by them constitute a different
ground for articulating the human condition. On this
ground, Nature is simultaneously part of us and external to
us, articulating itself in the rhythms and cycles of
reproductive biology. Pregnancy and parturition partake of
the experience of a nature over which we have little control
even as we "labor" as active partners with it. Encountering
nature in our unsocialized children, we must simultaneously
accomodate it and mold it to the imperatives of
64
civilization. The female reproductive experience
provides a tangible sense of connection to biological
species-life and to the species through time, it facilitates
a sense of generational, social and historical continuity.
The experience of self in relation to biological offspring
who partake of parental flesh and blood even as they come to
assume autonomous lives undercuts a radically dualistic
sense of self /not-self
. Likewise, the daughter's quest for
identity and separation from the mother who is both like and
not like her mitigates against an overly strict sense of
differentiation. ("A woman is her mother/That's the main
thing"—so wrote the poet Anne Sexton.) And an experience
of time with such biological roots calls into question the
hegemony of linearly structured time that proceeds as if the
seasons, cycles and vicissitudes of nature and human needs
65
were irrelevant.
The material presented thus far constitutes an attempt
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to trace out some of the distinguishing features of
masculinity as identity, life experience, and ideological
standpoint. Two key features of human development and
social life have been scrutinized as important arenas for
the production and experience of a masculinity with wide-
ranging ramifications-infancy and early childhood, as well
as paternity. Gender-specific adult experiences in relation
to biological reproduction seem to recapitulate the earlier
relationship to the maternal (m)other. Such recapitulation
would seem to be differentiated along the lines of gender.
That is, adult male and female relations to offspring tend
to reinforce or to reinvent the earlier sex-specific
relation to the mother. These parallels are not simply the
products of a psychic repetition of earlier experiences;
they are also induced by the biological and social
circumstances attending and constituting reproduction.
Hence, women, who as daughters experienced a more protracted
period of identification with the mother figure are also
more likely to identify closely with their babies, to
experience a curious confounding of bodily and ego
66boundaries. This is a result of the biology of
pregnancy, parturition and lactation as well as of their
cultuiral elaboration within a social framework that
specifies a sexual division of labor in chi ldrear ing
.
Within such a context, men are presented with the infant
child as a fait accompl
i
.
67 They have had no immediately
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tangible or firsthand experience of the creature until it is
born. And the biologically dictated lack of guaranteed
airtight claims to paternity can, under particular
circumstances, increase the psychological distance between
father and child. To top things off, men have an identity
that is more strictly differentiated and are thereby
additionally less likely than biological mothers and women
to experience a melting of ego boundaries in relation to
infants and "significant others". 68 Finally, the social
facts attending the sexual division of labor, making women
more immediately responsible for the early care of the
young, reinforce the relative male distance from offspring
under these circumstance. 69
The central linchpin of contemporary psychoanalytic
arguments which seek to account for gender-based differences
in psychology and personality centers on the differences by
which boys and girls separate from the mother. The dynamics
of the separation process already presume a sexual division
of labor in parenting arrangements such that mothers occupy
a privileged place on the site of separat ion-indi vidua t ion
dynamics. This point merits strong emphasis. Without it,
accounts of gender differences are vulnerable to charges of
biological reduct ionism. At the risk of being redundant, I
am going to summarize these differences, since they will
occupy the backdrop of and be invoked to support the
analysis of the following chapters: Where the dynamics of
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mother-daughter separation tend towards a 'failure' to
differentiate completely, masculine identity is secured by
means of an over-emphasis on ego boundaries. Difference and
separation from a female (m)other characterize the boy's
quest for self within a social setting significantly
organized in asymmetrical and hierarchic gendered terms. A
concomitant aspect of this process is that the (m)other
poses a significant threat to a masculinity acquired in
rigid opposition to her. The masculine process of
individuation and identity formation, understood in these
"ideal-type" terms, is susceptible to a process of "false
differentiation" whereby the maternal other is strictly and
unrealistically objectified in split versions rather than
vitally engaged with and at least partially accomodated in a
more complex manner. False differentiation is potentially
capable of becoming the ground of neurotic outlooks and
activities. It can lead to a sense of unreality and lack of
connection to the surrounding object world which must be
held at safe, manageable, and non-instrusi ve arm's length.
For some, it qualifies as a "world view", which:
. . .
emphasizes difference over sameness, boundaries
over fluidity. It conceives of polarity and opposition,
rather than mutuality and interdependence, as the
vehicles of growth.
That is, it does not tolerate the simultaneous
experience of contradictory impulse: ambivalence.
Finally, this world view does not grant the other person
the status of another subject, but only that of an
object. By extension, this object status is granted to
the entire world, which, from early on, was infused with
the mother's presence. In these psychic tendencies, the
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basic elements of Western rationality take shape-
S5iSi:iS.% ff#r#Btutioni duaiity - ^S<: -
This "male stance of over-differentiation, of splitting
off and denying the tendencies towards sameness, merging and
reciprocal responsiveness," 71 characterized by a
dualistically patterned posture (me/not-me) in relation to
the world of nature, feminized others, and "fellow" human
beings, seems also to be organized and enacted within
patriarchal politics and in relation to the experience of
paternity. Paternity and masculine differentiation partake
of a fundamental alienation and dualism. If "men have
always sought principles of continuity outside of natural
continuity," 72 this may reflect the attempt to mediate a
primal di s-connect ion from one's mother as well as from the
process of procreation. Estrangement and undertainty mark
the processes of masculine ego boundary acquisition just as
surely as they typify the felt experience of paternity.
Masculine identity and paternity also share in a conspiracy
of silence and over-compensation in relation to this
power lessness
.
Hence the relation of masculinity to a
73psychology of conquest.
The relationship between the problematic cast of
paternity and the institution of patriarchal politics also
raises the question of the relationship between Western
masculinity and aggression. This is a difficult issue,
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easily susceptible to gross reductionism (i.e., testosterone
level counts) or to shrill denouncements of macho politics.
Why do masculine sexuality and identity appear to be so
bound up with an ethos of aggressive domination? We have
already noted the ways in which infantile violence functions
as an early attempt to address and resolve issues of
autonomy and recognition. The fact that our earliest
aggressive stirrings are invariably directed against a
female is significant. The specifically masculine rendition
of these experiences is tied in with that aspect of
differentiation which ideally involves the discovery of the
maternal person's self, but which tends to be reduced to a
process of establishing dissimilarity and difference from
the (m)other. The overemphasis on self boundaries in the
early securing of masculine identity and its adult version
of an insistence that others (including, and especially
women) relinquish their own, harks back to that earlier
process of separation. In the historical elaboration of
paternity in the West, it would seem that father-right
proceeded at the expense of mother-right, although this is
by no means entailed as the singular logical outcome of
claims to the benefits and responsibilities of paternity.
The failure of Western men to devise a notion of paternity
that might also accomodate maternity is one of the singular
tragedies of Western history. That a paternity conceived
74
along such lines could only be maintained by force is a
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logical and strategic outcome of a dichotomous either/or
approach to the originally problematic experience which
seeks to reverse, as much as possible, the terms provided by
the initial interpretation of biology.
This material on masculine identity formation and
reproductive experience suggests that there are ways in
which masculine experience and identity yield certain
cognitive proclivities, tendencies which structure
perception and proceed to interpret, create and reproduce
the social world along those perceptual lines. 75 Such
perceptual tendencies, I want to argue, may be thought of as
comprising an overall ontological and epi stemological
framework, or world view, organized around the primacy of
the masculine subject. This primacy is reflected not only
in those substantive and easily identified arenas of
masculine privilege and power, including what is now
identified and explored as the sexism of Western political
and social theory 76
, but also operates at the more obscure
level of overall perceptual and cognitive organization. We
are entitled at this point to suggest with some confidence
that a masculine cognitive orientation may well inhabit the
terrrain of modern political theory and enjoy a wide-ranging,
if obscure (i.e., implicit), influence. This is not to say
that all men or all male political theorists think alike, or
even that all such men think in identifiably masculine
ways. To suggest that gender is necessarily constitutive of
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identity, that it is an unavoidable ground of experience and
thought, is not to say that it determines personality or
intellectual creations in some simplistic or linear
fashion. On the other hand, those of us who take gender
seriously as a constitutive feature of our way of being in
the world, find it difficult to proceed as if we are just
"people" thinking "human" thoughts. Thinking and knowledge
issue out of a complex process of reflection on and response
to experience. While the mediation of experience can take a
variety of forms, like the varieties of human accomodation
to and revolt against the prescriptions of gender, such
mediation must already be colored by the substance of its
departure or acquiescence.
Turning our attention in the following chapters to the
political theories of Hobbes, J.S. Mill, and Marx, we will
examine their work with a view to discovering whether a
gendered substratum can be found in their theories. Taking
a cue from Marx's and Engels ' observation on the links
between "intellectual wealth" and the wealth of "real
connections", we will proceed with the notion of a gendered
self as a self that is constituted in particular relational
ways. Gender differences, we have seen, turn on different
relational experiences; these experiences produce
"masculinity" and "femininity" as different experiences and
definitions of the self-in-relat ion-to the object world.
On a concluding note, the components of a specifiably
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masculine outlook will be briefly summarized with a view to
filling in the outline of masculinity as a world view that
was initially offered at the start of this chapter. The
elements of a world view, we recall, were said to be "widely
shared", "systematically interconnected", "'central to the
agents' conceptual shceme'", to have a "wide and deep
influence", and to be "'central' in that they deal with
central issues of human life." 77 m the forthcoming
analyses of Hobbes, Marx, and J.S. Mill, I intend to show
that masculine ideology can be located in their work and
that it occupies a central position in their theories. We
will see that elements of masculine theory are "widely
shared" among these three key political and social theorists
who have been more notable for their differences than for
their similarities. This sharing of masculine elements
spans 250 years of social and political theory in the West.
We will also see that these elements of a masculine world
view have a "deep influence" on these political theories and
that they are "central" to the formulation of what these
theorists take to be "central issues of human life." We are
already in a position to appreciate the ways in which the
elements of a masculine ideology are or might be
"systematically interconnected": Heading the list is a
combative brand of dualistic thinking, a persistent and
systematic amplification of the primal Self-Other
oppositional dynamic and the creation of dichotomously
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structured polarities by which to describe and evaluate the
events, objects, and processes of the natural and social
worlds. The need for singular identity and certainty with
respect to one's own identity and that of other "objects" in
the environment, a concomitant of which is panic in the face
of threats to such certainty, would be another perceptual
tendency. The explicit denial of relatedness, to "fellow-
human beings and to nature, would be tied in with an extreme
version of masculine identity. We can also anticipate a
repudiation of natural contingency, including those limits
imposed by the body and the natural surround. in connection
with this, we can expect to find examples of an
identification of contingency with the feminine. We can
also expect to find the (m)other lurking in the shadows of
this discourse, as an invisible and unacknowledged, but
significant presence. Because of the tendencies towards a
radical individualism built into the masculine
differentiation process, we might also search for various
versions of a solitary subject immersed in a hostile and
dangerous world. Autonomy is also likely to figure as a
significant theme and ideal. Recapi tualat ing the earlier
experience of identity through opposition and negation, we
can expect to find versions of knowledge-through-opposition,
-tension and -conflict, an antagonistic and distanced
relation between the subject and object of knowledge.
Finally, we can expect attitudes of fear, denigration and
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hostility towards whatever is identified as female or
feminine, along with its idealization and glorification.
Both sets of seemingly incompatible attitudes would
recapitulate the effects of false differentiation from the
maternal object.
Turning now to the political and social theory of
Hobbe S/ J.S. Mill and Marx, we will see if these claims and
intimations of discovery can be substantiated. If they can,
political theory qualifies (at least tentatively) as a
gendered phenomenon and, as such, ought to be additionally
amendable to feminist inquiry and criticism on new grounds.
If the intersection of gender and political theory can be
established here, we are a little closer to finding and
constructing an answer to Vivian Gornick's poignant question
What, then is the f emaleness of experience? Where are
the compositional elements of a female sensibility to befound? Under what conditions does that experience and
that sensibility become a metaphor for human existence,
thereby adding, as the maleness of experience has added,
to the small sum of human self-awareness? 78
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pp. 1-2 of the Book Review section. There are many ways ofexplaining this pehnomenon, not all of which undermineBenjamin s position. For example, Lisa Orlando suggeststhat s/m may involve a playful re-enactment of women's
experiences of domination. (This recalls Freud's
observation on our compulsion to repeat traumatic
experiences.) Also, we should take note of the genderedlanguage ("butch" and "femme") that is used to designateperpetrators" and "victims". In this case, lesbian s/m maybe understood to be playfully mimicking established gender
roles. In any case, the connection between eroticism and
violation of body boundaries would seem to lie at the
complicated heart of efforts to understand and evaluate thisphenomenon. One thing is certain: strident accusations ofpolitically incorrect" and "anti-feminist" are not going toget us very far. The vigorously nasty responses that have
recently been hurled at lesbian defenders and articulators
of s/m are nearly as provocative as s/m itself. See the
following, also by Lisa Orlando: "Bad Girls and 'Good'
Politics," in the Village Voice
, Literary Supplement 13,
Dec. 1982; and "Coming to Terms with Lesbian S/M, " in the
Village Voice
, 26 July 1983. See also Wendy McKenna, "The
Construction of Desire," rev. of Powers of Desire: The
Politics of Sexuality
, eds. Ann Snitow, et al . (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1983), in The Women's Rev iew of Books
1 (6), pp. 3-5. —
•^ 1This account of human development is meant to be
historically and culturally situated. I do not believe that
an all-purpose norm of human or moral development is either
possible or desirable.
32 See Robert Stoller, Splitting: A Case of Female
Mascul inity (New York: Delta Publishing co., 1973) for a
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ner essay, Love, Guilt and Reparation," esp. pp. 333-43Thanks to the work of Dorothy Dinnerstein, the now-obvfo»«connections between the split maternal i, g nd eBeauvoir's analysis of the contradictory and ambivalentdepiction of Woman in the West have been spelled out in rich
33
"Love, Guilt and Reparation," p. 306.
34None of this, of course, is a simple one-wayprocess between child and parent(s). As Nancy Chodorow
w t^t characte^stic care in the first chapter of
? ...
OC
? .'.
6 ReProduct^ of Mothering
, we must also keepin mind the ways in which parents' attitudes towards theiralready sexually-differentiated children contribute to thedynamics of parent-child interaction. Empirical evidencefor the differential treatment by parents of their children,beginning in infancy, and based on their beliefs andinterpretations of gender, exists. It also seems that thisdifferential treatment often carries the unmistakable tenor
of seduction, usually heterosexual.
35Coppelia Kahn, Man's Estate; Masculine Identi ty inShakespeare (Berkeley: University of California Press
1981), p. 10.
36For empirical confirmation of this argument see
Gilligan's discussion ( In a Different Voice) of
sex-differentiated responses to the Thematic Apperception
Test, where boys tend to be threatened by pictorial scenes
of social intimacy, while girls tend to exhibit the same
feeling in response to pictures of more distanced human
beings
.
37See Ralph R. Greenson, "Dis-Ident i fying From the
Mother: Its Special Importance for the Boy," in the
International Journal of Psychoanalysis 49 (1968): 370-74.
38Robert May makes this point in his important
critique of theories of androgyny in ch. 7 of Sex and
Fantasy: Patterns of Male and Female Development (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 170: "to settle for being a
daddy seems thin stuff indeed when compared with the
concrete realities of gestation, birth and nursing."
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R. Hayes
,
The Dangerous Sex; Thg Myth ofFeiuinxne Evil (New *ork: G.P. Putnam's Sons! 1964)-Wolfgang Lederer, The Fear of Women (New York- Harcouri-Brace, Jovanovich, 1968). For an analys is of
'
the fear ofwomen in the Middle East, see Fatima Mernissi, Beyond theVeil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim So^TeT^(Cambridge, Ma.: Wiley, Shenkman, 1975).
40The missing father syndrome is, of course, notsimply a modern nuclear family phenomenon. That it has beenstatistically correlated with sexually inegal itar iansocieties lends some support to the psychoanalytic approachoffered here, although the correlation (which includes ?heelement of female-dominated childrearing) does not provideany conclusive proof of causal links between the twophenomena. See Peggy R. Sanday, Female Power and MaleDominance, Appendix C, pp. 239-247: See also Eli Sagan,Cannibalism, Human Aggression and Cultural Form (New York-Harper and Row, 1974). For some vivid descriptive accounts
of male initiation rites, see Mircea Eliade, Rites andSymbols of Initiation: The Mysteries of Birth and RPhirt-h(New York! Harper and Row, 1958) .
41ln Man-Made Language (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1980), Dale Spender observes a relevant semantic rulein the English language: masculine terms which have becomegradually feminized through time are never re-introduced asterms of masculine denotation, except when used in aderogatory fashion against males. Similarly, masculine
terms used to describe women are complimentary, whereas the
obverse is never true. The sad fate of the protagonist in
Herculine Barbin
, intro. Michael Foucault (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980) also bears witness to the rule that
that which has been categorized as feminine cannot be
accepted into masculine ranks. Social critics such as
Spender interpret this semantic rule in strictly political
terms. It seems to me that something else is also going on
in the non-trans ferabi lity of feminine to masculine.
Psychoanalytic theory suggests that the masculine category
itself is just too vulnerable to risk "pollution".
4^see Jean Baker Miller's provocative
re-interpretation of this material, which sheds a more
positive light on women's attunement to the nuances of their
environment (otherwise known as "field dependency") and on
their abilities to sustain multiple and complex social ties
in Toward A New Psychology of Women . Her suggestion that
the classically conceived Freudian ego may be more
appropriate as a standard for the masculine subject adds
further grist to the mill. For a comparable argument
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Nancy Chodorow, "On The Reproduction of Mothe ring,A Methodological Debate," i n SignS: Journal of WomelTT^Culture and Society 6 ( 3 ) : 502-503. in
45T.W. Adorno and Max Horheimer, Dialectic ofEnlightenment (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972). sincP Ioriginally wrote this chapter, Isaac Balbus' book Marxismand Domination: A Neo-Heae l ian. Feminist. PsychoanaTvff^Theory of Sexual, Politi cal, and Technological LibeT.1^(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), has come'out. He too finds significant parallels betweenfemale-centered parenting and "modes of symbolizat ion"According to Balbus, the "instrumental mode of
symbolizat ion", which includes the ob ject i f icat ion of
nature, prevails as a persistent modern problematic that
social theory must engage and attempt to transcend.
46Evelyn Keller, "Gender and Science," in
Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 1 (3): 409-53-
Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love". For a critique of the
explantory abuses of gender theory, see Iris Marion Young,
"Is Male Gender Identity the Cause of Male Domination?" in
Mothering: Essays in Feminist Theory
, ed. Joyce Trebilcott(Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 129-46.
47 See Genevieve Lloyd, "Reason, Gender, and Morality
in the History of Philosophy," in Social Research 50 (3):514-536. See also Keller, "Gender and Science".
See Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Mataethics of
Radical Feminism ( Boston: Beacon Press, 1978 )
.
49See Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature
is to Culture?" in Woman, Culture and Society
, eds. Michelle
Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1974), pp. 67-87. For important critiques of
Ortner' s mistaken universal ization of the
f emale-nature/male-culture opposition, see the collection of
134
49 ( cont ' r\ \
Marilvn si-r^v,
S
fTYf
edlted by Caro1 MacCormack andy Strathern, Nature, Culture and Gender (Cambria
essay, Nature, Culture and Gender: A Critique," ddFor a poetic rendition of the woman-nature connection inWestern culture, see Susan Griffin, Woman and S ?heRoaring Inside Her (New York: Harper and Row 1978) See
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ln Freud's Unfinished Journey
, pp.
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e* Ynestra Kin9' "Feminism and the Revolt ofNature," in Heresies #13 4 (1), pp. i 2-i 6 .
Slsee Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost: EnglandBefore the Industrial Age (New York: Scnbner's, 1973):No single man, we must remember, would usually take charge
°Z £?
e
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and
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ny more than a single man would often be foundat the head of a workshop in the city. The master of aramily was expected to be a householder ....
Marriage, we must insist, and it is one of the rules whichgave its character to the society of our ancestors, was
entry to full membership, in the enfolding countryside, as
well as in the scattered urban centres." (p. 12)
52See Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men.Women and Rape (New York: Bantam Books, 1976; Simon 'andSchuster, 1976), esp. ch. 2.
53Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction
.
54See May, Sex and Fantasy
, for the argument that
theories of androgyny reflect men's desires to repudiate and
appropriate for themselves maternal powers. See also Janice
Raymond
,
The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the
She-Male (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) for a similar
analysis applied to the technology of sex-change operations.
55 See O'Brien's provocative and critical analysis of
Hegel's masculine bias, in The Politics of Reproduction, pp.
24-25. '
56 See Sigmund Freud, "On Negation," in The Standard
Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud
, vol. XIX,
trans
.
and ed
.
James Strachey ( London : The Hogarth Press,
1975), pp. 245-239, for his important exploration of this
psycho-intellectual dynamic.
57 See Breger, Freud's Unfinished Journey pp. 22-24,
for a discussion of the world view of the modern state.
Breger argues that this view includes the joint extolling of
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The Politics of Reproduction , p. 62 ..
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Sara Rudd i^'s important essay, "MaternalThinking," in Femini st Studies 6 (2). Ihelpful hints. see also Smith s discussion^ 'her'experience of time and agency in "A Sociology for Women"
-
and Julia Kristeva, "Women's time," in Signs* Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society. 7 (l) s 13-35?
60O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction , p. 184 .
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a fascinati ng example of men's creative,helpful and non-dominating efforts to take part in thebiological process of reproduction, see Mead's discussion ofArapesh men in Sex and Temperament
. According to heraccount, Arapesh men believe that they have an active and
"i i..
r
°^\t0 PlaY in the 9rowth of the fetus: they mustfeed it by having regular sexual intercourse with their
wives for a designated period of time after the women becomepregnant. The most striking example of their involvement in
reproduction is conveyed by Mead's anecdote of an Arapesh
response to her comments on the handsome features of a
certain man: "Yeeeees? But you should have seen him beforehe had so many children." Not surprisingly, Mead's Arapesh
men were also involved in child-care.
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"Masculinity" is being used here in the
historically and culturally specific sense (not necessarilylimited to industrial capitalism) of the outcome of a
process of gender identity formation and acquisition
undergone by males and secured within a social and symbolic
context that includes all or most of the following factors:
primary care of infants and children provided by a single
female mother and/or group of females; general lack of
intimate contact between fathers and young offspring; a
social structure organized in terms of a sexual division of
labor, male dominance in certain key sectors of the economy,
and highly articulated cultural expressions of gender
differences and male superiority. See the following
anthropological works for helpful discussions of the context
for masculinity: Sagan, Cannibalism ; and John Whiting and
Irving Child, Child Training and Personality: A
Cross-Cultural Study (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1953 ) . See also Balbus, Marxism and Domination for his
effort to historicize Dinnerstein ' s analysis of the effects
of female-dominated child care.
136
6 3 It has also, of course, failed to make sense to
certain men, as the Romantic revolt against
post-Enlightenment rationalism suggests. A full accounting
of Romanticism is beyond the scope of this work. At thispoint, I am inclined to argue that much of Romantic thinkingfailed to transcend the dichotomous framework it was
rebelling against. See M.H. Abrams, Natural
Supernat uralism; Tradition and Revolution in Romantic
Literature (New York and London- W.W. Norton, 1971); Perry
Miller, The American Transcendental i sts (New York:
Doubleday, 1957); and Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge:
University Press, 1974), esp. ch. 1.
64.Much of this description is indebted to O'Brien,
The Politics of Reproduction ? and Ruddick, "Maternal
Thinking"
.
65 See Carlos Fuentes, "Writing in Time," in Democracy
2 (1): 61-74, for a provocative treatment, from a Third
World perspective, of Western conceptions of time. See also
Kristeva, "Woman's Time".
66See Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as
Experience and Institution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976).
67Mead's analysis of the Arapesh in Sex and
Temperament suggests that some men, at least, feel much more
connected, biologically speaking, to their offspring. See
n. 61 above.
uoWe might also note that men often seem to harbor
distrust of and jealousy towards newborns as challengers to
their previously undisturbed access to wives as sexual
cohorts. See, for example, David Hunt's Parents and
Children in History: The Psychology of Family Life in Early
Modern France (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) which
documents Henri IV s deliberate distancing of his wife and
newborn son. Hunt's explanation of the elite practice of
sending newborns out to wet-nurses is also compelling in
this respect: "... women were not the prime movers in the
hiring of nurses. In any case, the final authority in
important family matters did not rest with them ....
Almost all doctors who begged women to breastfeed their own
children recognized at some point in their argument that the
paterfamilias was perhaps the more important party to be
persuaded. Putting a baby out to nurse had the effect of
leaving the mother at the disposal of her mate. If the
child remained on his [sic] mother's breast, the husband
would then find himself in the position of competing for the
attention and loyalty of his wife." (p. 106)
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69 aas a general characterization, this argument
neither seeks nor requires an unsympathetic denial of manygenuinely nurturant fathers. Despite their increasing Y
numbers, they continue to be the exceptions which prove,
rather than deny, the existing and prevalent rule. The
argument concerning relative male distance from offsorinq
should not be construed as a denial of paternal love',
either. The important point concerns the qualitativedifferences between the psychological orientations to andforms of parenting engaged by mothers and fathers. SeeDiane Ehrensaft, "When Men and Women Mother," in SocialistReview 49 (Jan-Feb. 1980), pp. 37-73.
70
'^Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love," pp. 148-149.
71Ibid., p. 150.
720'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction
, p. 33.
73For helpful amplifications of this theme see the
following: Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love"; Chodorow, The
Reproduction of Mothering ; Dinnerstein, The Mermaid ancTthe
Mi notaur ; Nancy Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power; Toward a
Feminist Historical Materialism (New York and London:
Longman, 1983) esp. ch. 7; May, Sex and Fantasy ; Sagan,
Cannibal ism .
74This is not to suggest that women have been nothing
but unwitting and passive victims in the historical
elaboration of familial and sexual organization. Women have
often used the family and their sexuality as a source of
covert power. See the discussion in ch. 2 of Margaret
Stacey and Marion Price, Women, Power, and Politics (London
and New York: Tavistock, 1981). On the other hand, an
apparatus of intimidation and physical force has operated to
maintain the domination of men over women. See the
following: G.J. Barker-Benf ield , The Horrors of the
Half-Known Life: Male Attitudes Toward Women and Sexuality
in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Harper and Row,
1976); Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (New York:
Avon Books, 1979); Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will:
Men, Women and Rape ; Cambridge Women's Studies Group, ed
.
,
Women in Society: Interdisciplinary Essays (London:
Virago Press, 1981), esp. sec. 2 "Definition and Coercion"
and sec. 3 "Politics, Sexuality, Choice"; Mary Daly,
Gyn/ Ecology ; Andrea Dworkin, Woman Hating (New York: E.P.
Dutt on, 1974); Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, For
Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women
( Garden Ci ty : Doubleday , 1979 ) ; Linda Gordon, Woman's Body,
Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in
Ame r i ca (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977); Mary
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74 (cont'd) Wollesntonecraft Mari wronqs ofWoman, intto. Moira Ferguson (New *ork: w.W? Norton, [ 9 75 )
.
75My approach here presumes two important
orientations towards the specified relationships betweenknowledge language, and reality. The first is thatknowledge (what can be known and how it can be known) ismaterially situated in particular ways of life. (This isnot to say that it is determined, in a one-way linearfashion, by ways of life.) For an appreciation of this
£°;f indebted to a host of thinkers, including KarlMarx, Karl Mannheim, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Peter Winch.
^
ar
J
lculates th is position admirably in her essay,Mother-Daughter Relationships". The second is that
categories of language do not passively reflect the givens
of an established reality, but help to constitute the
objects of perception and hence, help to constitute
"reality" itself. See Benjamin Whorf, Language, Thought andRealltY (Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956). On this
view, language does not simply describe, it also engages inthe active interpretation and construction of reality. For
a feminist utilization of this conception of language, withimportant implications for questions of feminist politics
and strategy, see Dale Spender, Man-Made Language
. See alsoJean Bethke Elshtain, "Feminist Discourse and Its
Discontents: Language, Power and Meaning," in Signs
:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society 7 (3),: 603-621.
76See the following: Lorenne Clarke and Lynda Lange,
eds., The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and
Reproduction From Plato to Nietzsche (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1980); Mary Mahowald, Philosophy of
Woman: Classical to Current Concepts ( Indianapolis
Hacket Publishers, 1978); Martha Lee Osborne, ed
.
, Woman in
Western Thought (New York: Random House, 1979).
77Guess, The Idea of a Critical Theory
, p. 10.
78Vivian Gornick, "Toward a Definition of the Female
Sensibility," in her Essays in Feminism (New York: Harper
and Row, 1978), pp. 113-114.
CHAPTER III
HOBBESIAN (HU)MAN
He that is to govern a whole nation, must read inhimself, not this or that particular man; butmankind; which though it be hard to do, harder than
? J"
7 l£mgua9 e or science; yet when I shallhave set down my own reading orderly andperspicuously, the pains left another, will be onlyto consider, if he also find not the same in
Y
himself
.
Thomas Hobbes, Introduction to Leviathan
Introduction
Hobbes is most famous, of course, for his Leviathan
, the
grand masterwork in which he sought to provide a
comprehensive scientific theory of civil society for a
radically changing time. 1 He is perhaps best known for
his notorious yet compelling description of the state of
nature, in which life is grimly portrayed as a war of all
against all, where insecurity and fear are the primary
constants. His effort was to deduce a theory of legitimate,
uncontested and stable civil authority from what he saw as a
set of fairly dismal facts of the human condition. In doing
so, he rejected both divine right and majority choice
theories of political authority, arguing instead for a
secular civil authority that would be made capable of
withstanding the vagaries of competing and always private
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interests. The legitimacy of this authority was based by
Hobbes on the quasi
-democratic hypothetical consent of all
rational and right-thinking citizens who, according to
Hobbes, would freely agree to such authority on the basis of
their rational recognition of the requirements for the
satisfaction of their desires for life and security. This
initially democratic basis of civil authority (which
explains Hobbes' s status as a modern liberal political
theorist) could not, however, be renegotiated, since men's
(and Hobbes did mean "men") unruly passions were
untrustworthy. Hence, Hobbes 's civil authority is fully
sovereign and self-generating over time. It must be, since
it rules over an unsteadily harnessed state of nature.
Why do we continue to read Hobbes today? Aside from
historical interest, what makes him an important political
thinker for our time? MacPhereson has argued that Hobbes
provides the first and freshest portrait of bourgeois,
2propertarian man. Others see his principles actively at
work in contemporary American politics, which preserve and
perpetuate Hobbesian notions of ruthless individualism,
transactional relations between individuals and among
interest groups, a civil authority whose sole function is
that of policeman, and a view of politics as nothing but
3conflict management. For some, Hobbes is the crucial
connecting link between the political thought of the
|t i 4Renaissance and that of modern liberal democracy.
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MacPherson has also suggested that we are drawn to Hobbes
because his state of nature lurkes in the horrifying
scenario of nuclear war and its socio-political aftermath. 5
I would add yet another: Hobbes 's thought reflects and
perpetuates a distinctively masculinist orientation to the
realm of politics that continues to be male-dominated and
governed by masculinist presumptions in our own time. To
the extent that this masculinist orientation dovetails with
other aspects of Hobbes
' s contemporary relevance, feminist
criticisms of his work promise to illuminate Hobbesian
features of contemporary social life in politically helpful
ways .
A Male Standpoint
We can begin with a simple question. Was Hobbes writing
about humankind or men? While his theory seems to be
addressed to humanity in general, it is clear that Hobbes
was writing for a male audience and from a male point of
view. Few English women of the 1650' s were literate 6 and
it seems that the occasional queens of the past were the
exceptions which proved the standard rule that women were
either unfit or less fit than men for civil affairs. Hobbes
would have had little reason to imagine that the women of
his time would study and discuss his theory, much less be in
a position to implement it. And while his theory of
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sovereign rule did not exclude female authority, this says
more about Hobbes
' s theory of authority, succession and
obedience than indicating any particular generosity towards
women as citizens and rulers. Hobbes's deliberate
under-description of the sovereign ruler leaves the question
of sexual identity quite open. But this must be understood
as a side effect of his attempt to sever the question of
legitimate authority and obedience due to that authority
from the personal characteristicsof the sovereign authority.
Hobbes's overly facile account of the historical
emergence of paternal authority in De Cive and Leviathan
suggests that he was neither perturbed by nor curious about
women's civil inequality to men. What makes this
specifically noteworthy is his discussion of original
maternal authority and his description of the radical
equality between all persons in the state of nature, where
personal differences in wit and strength are cancelled out
by the simpler and more devastating ability of anybody to
eliminate an opponent through murder. Hence, in his
discussion of the problem of succession of sovereign
authority, Hobbes writes, with no apparent discomfort:
"Among children the males carry the pre-eminence in the
beginning perhaps, because for the most part, they are
fitter for the administration of greater matters, but
7specially of wars." (How males got to be fitter is the
question Hobbes never asks. Given his portrayal of radical
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equality in the state of nature, it is a question we are
entitled to ask him.)
A few scattered remarks in Hobbes's work suggest more
definitively that he did assume a male standpoint as, for
example, in this curious, if not depressing, treatment of
same-sex (between men) and heterosexual (man to woman) love:
Moreover, the love, whereby man loves man, is understoodin two ways; and good will appertains to both. But itis called one kind of love when we wish ourselves well
and another when we wish well to others. Therefore a
'
male neighbor is usually loved one way, a female
another; for in loving the former, we seek his good, inloving the latter, our own. 8
In The Citizen, Hobbes uses subjects, sons and servants in
relation to their respective sovereigns, fathers and masters
to discuss authority, obedience and liberty: ".
. .no man,
whether subject
,
son
, or servant is so hindered by the
punishments appointed by the city
, the father
, or the lord
,
how cruel soever, but that he may do all things and make use
of all means necessary to the preservation of his life and
health." (p. 216) This implicit exclusion of women— as
wives, daughters, mothers, servants or civil subjects— is
recapitulated, incredibly enough, in his discussion of the
family, where we would expect to find females, if nowhere
else: "A father
, with his sons and servants, grown into a
civil person by virtue of his paternal jurisdiction, is
called a family . " (p. 217) Female servants notwith-
standing (we will give Hobbes the benefit of the doubt
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here), where have the daughters and wives gone? Women,
together with children, do get special notice in On Man and
again in Leviathan for their unique propensity for crying,
which Hobbes attributes to the fact tht they "have the least
hope in themselves and the most in friends." 9
(Presumably, women cry in order to elicit sympathy and aid
for themselves.) They are joined by cattle in Leviathan as
those possessions which men in the state of nature stand to
loose in those inevitable skirmishes with other men:
So that in the nature of man, we find threeprincipal causes of quarrel. First, competition;
secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first maketh men invade for gain; the second,for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first
use violence, to make themselves masters of other men'spersons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, todefend them . . . (p. 81)
.
This excerpt in particular betrays the actual meaning
embedded within a supposedly generic use of "mankind". It
leaves little doubt that Hobbes' s "man" is not only
propertarian, but also male.
These last two examples are provocative for what they
suggest about Hobbes 's implicit exemption of women from the
lifeways and standards of a civil order built on the
foundation of a state of nature. However, he never develops
this insight nor does he explicitly consider some of the
ways in which women might force a reconsideration of his
depiction of human nature. Rather, females occupy a kind of
nether zone, a category of persons who can be generally
located under the rubric of humanity and human nature but
who are also excluded, by implicit logic and meaning, as
well as explicitly, in his writings.
Would Hobbes have women look into themselves as a test
and confirmation of his theory of human nature? 10
Probably not. Such a question, it is obvious, would have
made little sense within the context of Hobbes 1 s time.
Today, however, in keeping with the spirit of Hobbes
' s maxim
that we "read mankind in ourselves," such a task is an
important part of the effort to come to critical terms with
the Hobbesian vision of a civil order built on the
foundation of "human" passions and requirements.
The important issue here, of course, is not whether
Hobbes meant to include or exclude women in his studies of
human nature and political life. conceivably, a p_ro forma
inclusion of women would not automatically close the search
for masculinist ideology in his work. Conversely, the
exclusion of women does not automatically imply the presence
of masculinist ideology in his work. However, the evidence
for an uncritically and unref lect i vely assumed male subject
as the standard bearer for all citizens certainly invites
further exploration with a view towards looking for the man
in "man". Such a search must begin with Hobbes
' s account of
the passions.
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The Passions
The temptation to portray Hobbes as a Grand Inquisitor
intent on repressing the dangerous and unruly passions of
men in the interests of a secure civil peace is difficult to
resist. Hobbes himself often contributes to this view
as, for example, when he writes in Leviathan that "the
passions unguided, are for the most part mere madness." (p.
48) Yielding to such temptation, however, generates an
overly facile and misleading account of Hobbes 's political
theory; it does little to advance the quest for a genuine
engagement with the substance and spirit of his work.
Hobbes is a dedicated student of the passions. Not only
does he take them seriously, but he refuses to pass moral
judgement upon them. They are what they are: neither good
nor evil in and of themselves or within the state of
nature. "The desires, and other passions of man, are in
themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed
from those passions, till they know a law that forbids
them." ( Leviathan , p. 83) Of special significance is the
fact that within Hobbes
' s account some of the passions
constitute a tangible foundation for human reason and are
the point of origin for state of nature attempts to secure
peace. The passion for life and a reason motivated in large
part by an instinctual and lusty curiosity about the world
of causes and effects converge in the state of nature to
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men come
produce the enlightened self-interest through which
to appreciate the dictates of right reason and to understand
the requirements for a lasting peace and felicitous life.
If nature has made man unfit for society, it has also
provided the means for man to create an artificial
representation and enforcement of the naturally situated
dictates of right reason which are presumably available to
all rational minds. For though the "perturbations of mind,
"
that is, emotions such as fear, anger and covetousness
,
impede the acquisition of knowledge, "there is no man who is
not sometimes in a quiet mind." (The Citizen
, p. 148)
Hobbes's grand Leviathan is "artificial" only in the sense
of being created by men. It is no more "unnatural" than a
work of art.
Curiosity, defined by Hobbes as "a lust of the mind,"
which "exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal
pleasure," ( Leviathan , p. 35) is, along with reason, what
distinguishes men from animals. We would also do well to
consider Hobbes
' s own self-attributed passion for lustily
conceived intellectual activity, which he described in vivid
and sensuous terms: "... how great a pleasure it is to
the mind of man to be ravished in the vigorous and perpetual
embraces of the most beautiful world." 12
If he calls for a harnessing of the passions in civil
society, such an arrangement is designed to guarantee some
security for a portion of their satisfaction against the
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certitude of their non-satisfaction in a state of nature
characterized by "an incessant war of all against all." He
has no blue-print for the elimination or repression of the
passions in civil society although he does argue for their
artificial control: "... laws were not invented fcQ ^
away, but to direct men's actions; even as nature ordained
the banks, not to stay, but to guide the course of the
stream."
(
The Citizen
, p. 268) It is precisely because he
takes the passions so seriously that his prescriptions for
civil society seem so stringent. Yet, his controls are
purely external; there is no hint in his works of a desire
to tamper with the passions themselves. Of course, this
leads to a purely pragmatic politics and to his vision of a
civil order denuded of ethical or personal discourse. 13
But if Hobbes's ideal society leaves no room for public
discourse on matters of conscience, at least he has the good
grace to leave conscience and the realm of desire alone. 14
Hobbes's work, then, presents an invitation to consider
the passions in their full breadth. It is on this terrain
that we must initially search for hints of an identifiably
masculine outlook. the question that we bring to Hobbes is
this: Is masculinity inscribed within his account of the
passions? Because the passions are the building blocks of
his resolutive-compositive method, contributing to his
extensive treatments of human nature, the state of nature,
civil authority and obligation, they provide the logical
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starting point for any inquiry into his conception of
politics
.
Man is portrayed by Hobbes as a kind of desiring
machine. The relevant point is not so much whether Hobbes
believed that this portrayal was literally true. Rather, it
is that for Hobbes, the language pertaining to the movements
of a desiring machine was the only way to scientifically
apprehend human nature. 15 Hobbes 's attempt to develop a
scientific method of description and explanation for what we
now call the social sciences is made manifest in his
painstaking step-by-step reconstruction of man, which beings
with the smallest bits of usable information which are then
combined into ever more complex formulae. These bits name
the elementary motions of a body towards or away from
various objects. (For Hobbes, what is called "sense" is
nothing but the sensible apprehension of motions to which we
give various names, such as "sight", "sound", etc. If we
want to make linguistic and logical sense out of
perceptions, Hobbes insisted, we must stop talking as if the
qualities of perception actually inhered in the objects of
perception. This was metaphysical gobbledy-gook which he
had no interest in sustaining.) Hence, Hobbes begins his
catalogue of the simple passions with appetite or desire,
and aversion, which designate movement towards or away from
other moving objects which are perceived to cause pleasure
or pain. His subsequent cataloguing and definition of those
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passions which comprised the linguistic fare of his time is
bult on the foundation of aversive or appetitive motion.
Love is but another name for desire when the desired object
is present, approachable, and attainable. Contempt is
"nothing else but an immobility ... of the heart, in
resisting the action of certain things." ( Leviathan , p. 32)
Finally, the more complex passions such as courage,
ambition, the passion of love, jealousy, and admiration
reflect such things as the perceived likelihood of their
attainment, the objects which are loved or hated, the
simplier passions in various combinations, and their various
temporal and spatial relationships to each other and to
their objects. Laughter and weeping, for example, are both
"sudden motions" prompted by sudden "dejection" or "glory"
in the face of unexpected pleasure or pain.
Hobbes's approach to the passions is an analytic one in
which he seeks to give his nominalism full play: he seeks
to provide a rigorous means of defining standard terms of
everyday language such that his subsequent discussion of
human nature and civil society, along with the anticipated
objections of critics, will not be muddled by imprecise
thinking. For "the light of human minds is perspicuous
words, but by exact definition first snuffed and purged from
ambiguity ..." ( Leviathan , pp. 29-30). what is especially
striking about his catalogue of the passions is the attempt
to radically simplify the various emotional yearnings and
torments of the heart and mind.
While Hobbes's subsequent account of human nature is
undoubtedly pessimistic, it is important to bear in mind
that his catalogue of the passions contains a balanced
itemization of passions which we would label as "good" in
the sense of being conducive to sociability. Courage,
benevolence, magnanimity, good nature (good will) and even
kindness find their way into the account of the human
passions which Hobbes lays out in Leviathan. 16 While life
in the state of nature may be "nasty, mean, brutish and
short," human beings are by no means all nasty.
Unfortunately, the nasties, however few, set the pace for
everyone else in a zero sum game where every winner implies
a loser.
Those who would refute Hobbes by pointing out various
features of human behavior or emotion which are conducive to
peace are taking the wrong tack. Hobbes's point is not that
human beings are especially evil or deliberately
anti-social. It is rather that we inevitably get into each
other's way. For appetitive machines that engage
incessantly in the pursuit and maximization of pleasure
cannot help bumping into and impeding the motion of each
other
.
The noteworthy aspect of Hobbes's chronicle of the
passions, for our purposes, is not that it paints an ugly
portrait of human nature. Rather, it is that it presents
152
and requires a view of desire and motivation which is
strictly self-originating and self-controlled within the
bounds of a clearly delineated ego. Objects of desire
derive only from individual will. Commonality of
desire-for example, the universal fear and avoidance of
death-figures only as a sum total of individual desires
bound in external allegiance to a shared object. What is
markedly absent here is the notion of types of desire
constituted socially or intersub ject i vely-for example, the
desire for community which is kindled and explored within a
social context. Objects of desire for Hobbes can only
pertain to individual yearnings for satisfaction. And those
of us who might invoke persuasion, as a counter-example to
Hobbes'
s ultra-individualized conception of desire, which
might open the way towards a recognition of
intersubjectively secured values and desires, will have to
contend with the Hobbesian retort that persuasion is nothing
but the displacement of one will by another.
In the Hobbesian world, desire is a private and
individual affair, some of whose outward effects must be
checked by civil authority. But desire itself has no place
of substance in the political arena of discourse and
law-making. Hobbes
' s egoism "is only the individuality of a
creature shut up, without hope of immediate release, within
the world of his own imagination. Man is, by nature, the
victim of solipsism; he is an indi viduae substant iae
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distinguished by i ncommunicabi li ty . " i7 what communication
there is takes place as a result of agreement on the
definition of terms. Like the "discourse" of a contract,
Hobbes's nominalist notion of communication is remarkably
antiseptic. Hence, Hobbes's nominalist epistemology and his
egoism are fundamentally connected.
Hobbes's approach to the passions generates his
treatment of the human subject in relation to rather than
with others. His rendition of the primary play of
ego-centered desire is recapitulated in his account of
social intercourse, described vividly by Michael Oakeshott:
Between birth and death, the self as imagination and
will is an indestructible unity, whose relations with
other individuals are purely external. Individuals maybe collected together, may be added, may be substituted
for one another or made to represent one another, but
can never modify one another or compose a whole in whichtheir individuality is lost. Every reason is
individualized, and becomes merely the reasoning of anindividual without power or authority to oblige
acceptance by others: to convince a man is not to enjoy
a common understanding with him, but to displace his
reason by yours. 18
At the same time, Hobbes's thoroughly inviolable ego is
threatened by the fear and distinct possibility of ultimate
dissolution— namely, death at the hands of a social
opponent. This stark picture provides the components for
Hobbes's depiction of a civil order which is either governed
by the strong hand of authority (an inviolable ego in the
ultimate sense) or reduced to a state of internal dissension
(signifying death for civil authority as well as for
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Particular citizens.) Clearly evident here is a thorough
going preoccupation with the integrity of a self that is
strictly delineated and self-contained, a potential victim
of similarly constructed egos. Hobbes's own presentation of
his Leviathan as "an artificial man" makes the connection
between a civil order as organism-mechanism and the
individual as organism-mechanism quite evident.
Norman Jacobson has suggested that "We still read
L6Viathan after three centuries
. . . because we have all
experienced the threat to the self implicit in the dread of
personal annihilation." 19 Jacobson's observation could be
further refined by asking whether this threat of personal
annihilation is not also significantly tinged with a
specifically masculine sense of selfhood. I would suggest
that what we find in Hobbes's account is a vital concern
with the survival of a self conceived in masculine terms.
The strict differentiation of self from others, identity
conceived in exclusionary terms, and perceived threats to an
ego thus conceived which will be minimally displaced and
maximally dissolved by an invader all recapitulate issues
encountered and constructed in the securing of masculine
identity vis a vis a female maternal presence. These themes
receive their fullest treatment in Hobbes's state of
nature—that imaginary zone which represents an intermediary
state of reconstruction from the rudimentary building blocks
of human nature to the completed architecture of civil
155
society. In the state of nature, Hobbes' s egoism carries
the day. Furthermore, its masculine dimension is
underscored by a radical atomism built in part on the buried
foundation of denied maternity.
The State of Nature
In The Citizen, where Hobbes first elaborated in a
systematic fashion those aspects of the state of nature
which would make his prescriptions for civil society in
Leviathan so welcome and reasonable, he asks us to "consider
men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and
suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity
, without all
kinds of engagement to each other." (Italics mine, p.
205.) Although Hobbes does not specifically repeat this
imaginative directive in Leviathan
, it is obviously at work
in the shadows of his description of the state of nature
20 _there. The mushroom is a charming and ingenious
21
mataphorical choice; it works in ways that "cabbages" or
"maple trees" would not, conveying a host of images and
associations that are worth extracting for brief perusal.
Mushrooms do seem to spring up overnight; they grow rapidly
in the wild and require no special tending. (Rapid growth
eliminates "maple trees"; no tending eliminates
"cabbages".) In his state of nature conception, Hobbes
wants to eliminate factors such as socialization, education
and other cultural means of "cultivating" human beings,
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removing those "secondary" features of human behavior and
motivation which might be mistakenly attributed to first
nature. His insistence that "nature has made man unfit for
society" requires a careful distinguishing of learned
behaviors appropriate to peaceful social life from man's
innate disposition. 22 Another feature of mushrooms is
that they grow in clusters (not so with maple trees); hence,
Hobbes is able to slip in a picture of human beings in close
proximity to each other. The image of mushrooms, as opposed
to that of solitary and stately trees, reminds us that human
beings will inevitably confront each other in disputes over
desired goods that are always inevitably limited, since gain
and glory require a relative surplus of accumulated goods.
Man in the state of nature may be a radical individual but,
like the mushroom, he is not solitary. Finally, mushrooms
reproduce quietly, invisibly, and asexually: spores are
scattered by the wind and land haphazardly, sprouting up
when temperature and moisture conditions are right. This
feature of the metaphorical image allows us to accept that
much more quietly one of the most incredible features of
Hobbes' s hypothetical state of nature. And it is this:
that men are not born of, much less nurtured by, women, or
anyone else for that matter. In the process of extracting
an abstract man for rational perusal, Hobbes has also
expunged human reproduction and early nurturance— two of the
most basic and typically female-identified features of
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distinctively human life-from his account of basic human
nature. Such a strategy ensures that Hobbes can present a
thoroughly atomistic subject, one whose individual
rights-sparsely concei ved-clear ly precede any obligation
to belong to civil society. With the help of the mushroom
metaphor, Hobbes
' s atomism affirms the self-sufficiency of
man alone in the crowded midst of other men.
The point here is not whether Hobbes 's state of nature
is realistic. No state of nature construct is going to be
realistic if, by "realistic", we mean conforming to the
contours of life as we know and cherish it. for state of
nature constucts are intended to make us more self-conscious
about the unreflectively accepted particularities of our
life-forms. They could not do this if they simply
reproduced social organization as it existed. But we do
need to ask, what is the point of including and excluding
particular features of contemporary life? Is our
understanding of the human condition enhanced or handicapped
by the simplifications provided by the theorist? We are
entitled to query Hobbes on his fully formed and un-mothered
men precisely because his individualism rests securely on
it. And also, because it violates some pretty essential
features of the human condition. Just as a state of nature
populated by immortal creatures would be too off the mark to
be useful in helping us come to grips with our predicaments
in this life, so too does a state of nature populated by
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mushroom-like men throw out too much of distinctively human
requirements and possibilities. Eliminating mothers also
makes it that much easier to read "males" into "men", a
train of thinking that Hobbes has already facilitated by
including wives as part of the property which state of
nature man must struggle to preserve against encroachment
and theft. 23
The mushroom imagery— in its unmistakable denial of
human sexuality, reproduction and nurturance-makes that
much more plausible a central tenet of Hobbes
' s theory of
civil authority, obligation to that authority, and rights.
As Charles Taylor argues, the doctrine of the primacy of
rights relies on an atomistic conception of the individual
in the sense of affirming "the self-sufficiency of man
alone." Self-sufficiency here refers, not to the
ability to survive alone in the wilderness, but rather, to
the denial of the notion that characteristically human
capacities need particular social or life forms in which to
develop. In the state of nature scene being considered
here, which we might subtitle the Case of the Missing
Mother, the issue is not whether infants would survive
25untended in the world; it concerns instead the ways in
which early maternal and parental care provide a social,
intersubject ive context for the development of particular
human capacities in children—emotive, social and cognitive
capacities—which are presupposed in Hobbes 's state of
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nature man who is capable of implementing compacts and
contracts as well as of deducing the dictates of right
reason from his natural circumstances. Hobbes's metaphor,
of course, aims at avoiding any such discussion of the
etiology of such capacities. in providing us with fully
sprung men and tracing out their hypothetical social
exchanges, Hobbes keeps his schedule of rights to a bare
minimum: the right to life, maximum pleasure so long as it
does not interfere with the pleasure or rights of others,
and maximum freedom from pain. He makes social obligation a
purely pragmatic affair, external to the identity of the
subject, one that is derived from natural right and hence,
is secondary to it. Hobbes's bare bones schedule of rights
contributes to his analysis of the right to revolt only in
the case of threats to life and to his curious discussion of
liberty as minimum interference with our movements. 26
The Hobbesian state of nature is a device aimed at
stripping bare the requirements and materials of civil
society so that the political theorist can, by rational
means premissed on the resolut i ve-composi t i ve method (a kind
of political sciency geometry), establish the full force of
the pragmatic need for a civil order governed by irrefutable
authority. Such a civil order, argues Hobbes, is mandated
by Nature, and its role is purely a restraining one. In
civil society, the atomistic individuals of the state of
nature remain unchanged (still mushroom-like) except for
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their contracted allegiance to a singular civil authority
brought about by the sum of their individual fears of
injury, loss of property, and untimely death. Death, that
radical equalizer in the state of nature, is transposed into
the singular power to punish by the sovereign authority.
And fear, which in the state of nature kept men at odds with
each other, becomes the social gluten of the civil order.
In sum, Hobbes's civil society has no transformative
effect on its body politic. His grand artifice consists of
a recombination—clever, but not especially creative—of the
given elements of the state of nature. These essential
elements are natural human beings atomi st ically conceived
along masculine lines. This masculine tenor may be found,
first, in Hobbes's conception of a clearly unified and
discrete ego, one that is unassailable except in combative
terms, and approachable only on the terms of contracted and
nominalist exchanges. It is an ego constituted in strict
either/or terms of total integrity unto itself or total
disintegration at the hands of a similarly constructed
opposing ego. We can also discern masculinity at work in
the fantasy pattern which underlies his state of nature:
men magically sprung like mushrooms, unmothered and
27
unfathered. While such a fantasy deals a blow to
parenthood and the organic notion of generational
continuity, it strikes especially hard at the maternal
contribution, whose denial is uniquely remarkable and
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difficult to implement since it is so biologically and
socially apparent. Hobbes
' s omniscient and self-sprung ego
has no dues owed to others except those which we "freely"
and individually contract. 28
Hobbes' s civil order, where social relations are
formalized and particular roles are assumable by
interchangeable because ultimately similar human beings,
assumes distinctly masculine characteristics. At the heart
of Hobbes' s conception of the civil order is a particular
notion of identity, a particular notion of the human
subject. An identity that is spontaneously conceived and
solipsistically self-constituted requires an all-out
repudiation of organic and interpersonal factors. Hence the
denial of the maternal contribution. Within the
psychoanalytic frame of reference, masculinity is achieved
at the cost of a denial of femininity in oneself. To the
extent that an internalized sense of femininity derives, in
significant measure, from an introjected version of the
mother, the achievement of masculinity may require the
denial of maternal contribution to one's life and identity.
If this is achieved at the individual level of personal
identity, extending it to a generalized view of humanity is
a small step. We cannot be sure that this characterization
correctly or adequately captures the development and origins
of Hobbes ' s thought. On firmer ground, however, we can more
comfortably suggest that Hobbes ' s work may have resonated
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with just such a set of meanings in the minds o£ subsequent
readers; that part of the appeal and sheer power of Hobbes
s
analysis oan be traoed to this psychological dimension of
his theory.
Civil Authority
Hobbes 's denial of the mother, with its unmistakable
ramifications on his portrayal of atomistic identity and
contractual social intercourse, is also refracted in his
theory of legitimate authority and obedience. As the
inaugurator of a liberal tradition which deauthorizes
individuals in the name of an abstract individual, breaking
the more traditional associations between authority, persons
and their unique (divinely ordained) attributes, Hobbes
presented a radically new, and to some, disturbing
interpretation of authority as s imultanaeously arbitrary and
29
absolute. It was arbitrary in the sense that the
question of who might be invested with civil authority was
effectively inconsequential for Hobbes. Legitimate
authority and its proper exercise had little to do with
personal attributes, expertise, or status. what mattered
for Hobbes was only that a strong, central and uncontested
form of authority be identifiably located in some one person
or executive body and that the problem of succession be
abstractly settled ahead of its required implementation. In
throwing out divine right and democratic majority choice
together, Hobbes made enemies out of two opposing
camps-traditionalists and libertarians. Small wonder that
he portrayed himself as a solitary and heroic fighter in the
midst of hostile opponents.
This deauthorization of individuals, pursued by Hobbes
at the expense of divinely and democratically sanctioned
authority, rests squarely on a prior deauthorization of the
mother. The connecting link is the depersonalization of
authority. Maternal authority embodies a view of authority
and obligation to which Hobbes 's scheme is throughly
opposed. Not only is maternal authority indelibly personal,
it also stands in a complex relation to its subjects, one
that cannot be characterized in the simple linear terms of
commandments and prescriptions with merely behavioral
consequences (i.e., consequences that are external to the
identity of the behaving agent). Parental authority is at
least partially introjected. (The strength of such
introjection, of course, is significantly dependent on the
qualitative strength and intimacy of parent-child
relations.) For this reason, our relation to it cannot be
cast in simple contractar ian terms. That Hobbes attempted
to portray parental authority in precisely this fashion
suggests that he understood the significant difficulties
that parental authority posed for his theory of civil
30authority and civic obligation. Hobbes treats the
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relation between parent and child and sovereign and subject
in the same essential way: "the preserved oweth all to the
preserver." The terms of allegiance and obedience are
strictly external to the preconst ituted identities of the
participants
.
The Leviathan is effectively composed of a body politic
of social orphans who have reared and acculturated
themselves, whose desires are situated within and reflect
nothing else but independently generated movement.
Disagreements are likely to erupt and-because there are no
conceivable means for adjudicating between competing
desires— there must be a locus of authority which can
pronounce on such disputes. Such pronouncements must be
obeyed, not because they are correct or in our best
interests, but simply because they reflect the voice of
civil authority. The prime directive, after all, is peace;
and justice refers simply to a correspondence to the written
law. Norman Jacobson's clever and vivid image of the voice
of Hobbes's sovereign authority coming through to us via a
telephone receiver clamped to our ears conveys this
characteristic feature of Hobbesian authority. We are
forced to listen but "free" to obey or disobey (although we
ought to be willing to accept the price of disobedience).
Whatever the response, however, we are essentially unchanged
by the process. Our relation to sovereign authority, like
our relations to fellow human beings, takes place within a
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behavioral panorama peopled by strictly differentiated
individuals whose highest civic achievement is mutual
accomodation.
Having explored the substance of Hobbes's political
theory with a view to uncovering a masculne substructure, we
now turn to Hobbes's style and what Sheldon Wolin has termed
the "informing intention" of Hobbes's work. 31 Not only do
intention and style affect the substance of thought
generally, but in Hobbes's case especially they bear
directly on our exploration of the masculinist stamp of his
work
.
The Heroic Intellectual
In stylistic terms and in terms of the often strained
relation between his "talk" and his " walk "
—between his
avowed philosophy of "right method" and his actual
implementation of that method—Hobbes is a fascinating
patchwork of contrasts. To begin with, we should note that
his sceptical and nominalist epistemology coexists with a
genuine respect for the lessions of experience. When Hobbes
argues that he would learn more about anatomy and physiology
by accompanying a midwife on her rounds than from reading
the texts of physicians, or, as in the opening pages of
Leviathan
, when he entreats his readers to reflect on their
experience as a test of his arguments, he is pursuing a very
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different tack than the one contained in his nominaiist
version of knowledge:
No discourse, whatsover, can end in absoluteknowledge of fact, past or to come. For, as for theknowledge of fact, it is originally, sensefand everm
r°
ry
-
-
And f°r the ^owledge of consequence,which I have said before is called science, it is notabsolute, but conditional. No man can know bydiscourse, that this or that, is, has been, or will be-
Sat shal^bf
0
"
* bS° lute1^ ^ only, that if thL be,that hal be: which is to know conditionally; and that
nZL ;
co^^e of one thing to another; but of oneame of a thing, to another name of the same thing.
( Leviathan
, p. 40) y
An easy, and grossly mistaken interpretation of this
epistemological stance would be to depict Hobbes as a timid
or humble thinker. 32 Forty pages on in Leviathan
, Hobbes
invokes experience as a measure of the soundness of his
argument concerning the distrust that humans harbor against
33
each other. It is a devastating rejoinder to those who
would question his account.:
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well
weighed these things; that nature should thus
dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one
another: and he may therefore, not trusting to thisinference, made from the passions, desire perhaps tohave the same confirmed by experience. Let him
therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey,
he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when
going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his
house, he locks his chests; and this when he knows that
there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge
all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of
his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow-
citizen, when he locks his doors; and of his children,
and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not
there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by
my words? (pp. 82-83)
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Another significant contrast may be located between
Hobbes's own prescription for right method-a plodding,
methodical and rational arrangement of basic definitions and
propositions a la Euclidian geometry-and the sheer power of
his prose, which is characterized by an imaginative and
flamboyant style. Notwithstanding his protests against the
improper use of poetic and rhetorical flourishes in a
philosophical and scientific enterprise that ought to be
soberly dedicated to the careful study of causes and their
consequences, Hobbes himself was often a dazzling
rhetorician and highly adept at flourishing potent
metaphores to convince readers of his right thinking.
(Remember the mushrooms.)
Hobbes's avowed scepticism, which is rescued from a
radical solipsistic stance only by his faith in shared
common sense experience, contrasts sharply with his
argumentative mode, which seeks to demonstrate the air-tight
logic and common-sense truth of his arguments. One of his
intellectual biographers, Miriam Reik, has this telling
observation to offer on the tone of Hobbes's work:
.
. .
one of the most prominent chracteri sties of
Hobbes's philosophic impulse [is] the drive toward
discovering and building on the simplest, most basic
elements of reality, and reasoning about them with such
force and directness that his explanations seem to be
come almost intellectually
coercive . 34
A fruitful means of exploring and accounting for this series
of interesting incongruities in Hobbes's thought is provided
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by Sheldon Wolin' s thesis that Hobbes cast himself in the
role of epic-theorist. As we will see, many of the features
of this epic heroism are also related to masculinity.
Wolin argues that Hobbes had epical intentions in
writing Leviathan, intentions that he shares with Plato,
Machiavelli, Hegel and Marx, whose collective great works
comprise an epic tradition in political theory:
The phrase "epic tradition" refers to a type ofpolitical theory which is inspired mainly by the hope ofachieving a great and memorable deed through the medium
of thought. Other aims that it may have, such as
contributing to the existing state of knowledge,
formulating a system of logically consistent
propositions, or establishing a set of hypotheses for
scientific investigation, are distinctly secondary. 3 ^
Political theories of the epic mold are intended by their
authors as forms of action, where the work itself is the
deed, a thought-deed that will hopefully be translated into
reality. But if it is not actualized, the residual hope is
that the thought, like the written and spoken chronicles of
long dead heroes, will endure through time. Theories cast
in the epic mold reveal "an attempt to compel admiration and
awe for the magnitude of the achievement." As such,
argues wolin, the epic theoriest casts himself in the role
of epic hero rather than that of bard or poet. His aim
extends beyond the relatively humble one of logical
persuasion to that of astonishing his audience by a
remarkable thought-deed. Like the hero of epic poetry, the
heroic theorist is a single individual whose exploits
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surpass those of other men and whose talents and strengths
are strictly human (essentially self-made). 37 j ust as
divine intervention on behalf of the hero has little
substantive room in the tales of epic heroism, so too the
eipc theorist performs his intellectual feats through the
use of his unique and natural human brain power and
imagination. Finally, the hero of epic poetry and the
heroic theorist share another significant trait: their
achievements are bound up with the stuff of manhood. As
CM. Bowra has written:
Heroes are the champions of man's ambition to passbeyond the oppressive limits of human frailty to afuller and more vivid life, to win as far as possible a
self-sufficient manhood, which refuses to admit that
anything is too difficult for it, and is content even infailing provided that it has made every effort of which
it is capable. 38
The theme of self-sufficiency recapitulates one of the
most distinctive psychological features of masculinity. To
the extent that masculine identity is bound up with a
repudiation of the mother, vigorous self-sufficiency emerges
as a kind of defensive react ion- formation against memories
of dependence and the early symbiotic relation. Hobbes's
atomistic individualism also invokes this image of
self-sufficiency, as we have seen, which is strengthened by
the effective displacement of mothers from the state of
nature. We encounter it in yet another form in the figure
of the heroic subject.
The epic hero achieves immortality by surpassing the
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standards of achievement set by others. Thus, competition
is an essential feature of epic heroism. It is this
competitive and individualistic quality of
action-competition directed at the select few who have set
the highest intellectual standards—which marks the style of
Hobbes's approach. We find it in his Autobiography as well
as in Leviathan. Hobbes never argued with any but the most
prominent and formidable recognized intellects: among them
Aristotle and the best mathematicians of his time.
Furthermore, these disputes were cast by Hobbes into some of
the most vivid combative terminology ever written, as this
excerpt from his Autobiography reveals plainly:
• • . I brought out another little book on
Principles
. . . .
Here my victory was acknowledged by
all. In other fields my opponents were doing their best
to hide their grievous wounds. Their spirits were
flagging and I pressed home the assault on my flagging
foes, and scaled to topmost pinnacles of geometry . . .
.
Wallis enters the fray against me, and in the eyes of
the algebraists and theologians I am worsted. And now
the whole host of Wallisians, confident of victory, was
led out of their camp. But when I saw them deploying on
treacherous ground, encumbered with roots thick-set,
troublesome and tenacious, I resolved on fight, and in
one moment scattered, slaughtered, routed countless
foes
.
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We also find an interesting and relevant complaint
inscribed in Hobbes's criticism of too much attention and
respect directed towards the thinkers of antiquity:
"competition of praise, inclineth to a reverence of
antiquity. For men contend with the living; not with the
dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may
obscure the glory of the other." (Leviathan, p. 64) Hobbes
wanted to shine forth in his day. unimpeded by the ghosts of
the past who attracted attention to themselves and therefore
detracted from the attention and glory that Hobbes sought.
As would-be epic theorist, Hobbes himself is in the midst of
the competitions for power, gain and glory which he depicted
so vividly.
Leviathan opens with the image of Hobbes as a Ulysses
figure carefully maneuvering between the Scylla and
Charybdis of liberty and authority: "For in a way beset
with those that contend, on the one side for too great
liberty, and on the other side for too much authority, 'tis
hard to pass between the points of both unwounded."
("Dedication to Francis Godolphin", p. 2) We should bear in
mind that Hobbes
' s characterization of his enterprise here
is not entirely fanciful. Many were the unlucky victims of
the political disputes of his time. And Hobbes himself was
lucky to have survived the political upheavals of
seventeenth century England. 40 However, Hobbes ' s sense of
risk here goes beyond the arena of immediate political
intrigue to that of intellectual risk as well, as he reveals
so engagingly in his Autobiography
. Heroic honor, of
course, is predicated on the pursuit of risk. 41 And the
ultimate risk is loss of life, to which most heroes
inevitably succumb, often prematurely, always bravely and
gloriously, if sometimes from the view of hindsight,
172
foolishly. The casting of heroic honor in these terms,
labelled by Marina Warner as "our necrophiliac culture's
ideology of heroism," 42 has tended to exclude females who,
as the anthropological record suggests, have been less
willing than men to risk their lives in ultimate
confrontations. 43 This is not to say that women have been
historically unwilling to risk their lives. Individual
women have died hereoically, often in political resistance
struggles against oppression. And we also know that mothers
have risked death on behalf of their children. But these
are better understood as last-ditch efforts. The
willingness to risk life would seem to be less a
constitutive feature of femininity and more an instrumental
means of protecting and preserving life.
The strong connections between heroism, masculinity and
the willingness to risk life are unmistakable. 44 These
connections are further strengthened if we stop to ponder
the gender-specific dimensions of the heroic quest for
immortality. As Mary o"Brien has argued, men's alienated
relationship to reproduction, manifested most clearly in the
uncertainties of paternity, is carried over into their
conceptions of time: "Men have always sought principles of
continuity outside of natural continuity." 45 Among the
many cultural forms of temporal continuity instituted by
men, within which we may include patrilineal descent and the
regenerative succession of political authority embodied in
the state, heroic immortality is especially noteworthy. It
defies the biological pronouncements of death, decay, and
ultimate defeat; provides a tangible sense of generational
continuity over time for the male "family" of heroes and
their admirers; and, above all, assures men of an
uncontested role in their "reproduction" through time. Like
Hobbes's state of nature man, the immortal hero is self-made
and lives in a motherless world.
Hobbes's heroism is housed, appropriately enough, within
dangerous territory—the state of nature. This territory
serves to dramatically enhance the heroic dimensions of his
work
:
Epic heores move in a world of dark and occult forces-
they encounter great perils and horrors, sometimes at'the hands of nature, sometimes by the machinations of
malevolent powers; they are constantly in the midst of
violent death and widespread destruction; and yet by a
superhuman effort, which stretches the human will to its
limits, they succeed nonetheless. 46
"Violent death" and "widespread destruction" appropriately
describe the England of the Civil Wars as well as Hobbes's
state of nature. His theoretical "feat" was to rescue us
from an existence that would otherwise be "nasty, mean,
brutish and short." This "salvation" is made possible by
the theorist's courage in exploring the dark and dangerous
terrain of the state of nature, which he makes available for
all to see in its full horror. Against this backdrop of
miserable existence, Hobbes's creation of an "artificial"
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Leviathan out of the very components of state of nature life
is rendered into a remarkable achievement.
Along with his courage, Hobbes wields the hero's
requisite weapon which is both the emblem and instrument of
his power. Hobbes' s special power is knowledge; and his
weapon, as Wolin tells us, is "right method":
Rational method is not a weapon easily fashioned or
easily mastered, especially in political matters. Theprolonged preparation, constant practice, and dedication
which it demands are analogous to the long
apprenticeship and severe trials which a knight had to
undergo before he was declared fit for chivalric
tests. 47
It is Hobbes' s heroic use of a deductive method cast in a
sober, plodding, and ultra-rational terminology which helps
to account for the inconcruity between his avowed philosophy
of method and his implementation of that method. Under such
circumstances, Hobbes-as-heroi c-theor ist and Hobbes-as-
sc ientif ic-phi losopher are bound to be caught in a
paradoxical relationship to each other. When Hobbes 's
political geometry is employed in a battleground
environment, incongruous, as well as exciting, things are
like to result. This is the stuff of Hobbes' s achievement.
If he had been more consistent, enacting his method to the
letter of the law, we would not continue to read him and to
be provoked by his analysis of the requirements of and
possibilities for civil society.
Like the curiously strained yet compelling notion of
'the war to end all wars', Hobbes 's heroic enterprise is
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paradoxically aimed at eliminating future heores by creating
a civil order in which heroism would have no legitimate
space. Strictly bound in allegiance to a central ruler,
citizens of his Leviathan would be effectively stripped of
all heroic motivation, transformed into wimps. Hobbes's aim
is to create the risk-free society. Heroism is necessarily
sacrificed to peace and stability. And the choice as Hobbes
presents it is overwhelmingly tempting:
Out of this state (of civil society), every man hath
such a right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it,
each one securely enjoys his limited right. Out of it,
any man may rightly spoil or kill another; in it, nonebut one. Out of it, we are protected by our own forces;in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no man is sure
of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are.
Lastly, out of it, there is a domain of passions, war,
fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism,
ignorance, cruelty; in it the dominion of reason, peace,
security, riches, decency, society, elegancy, science
and benevolence. ( The Citizen
, p. 222)
For obvious reasons, Hobbes believes he has made us an offer
we can't refuse.
Hobbes's all-or-nothing choice, between a chaotic and
violent state of nature or a predictable and peaceful civil
order which is made so by the unconditional obedience of
citizens to the political sovereign, points to a solution
which conveniently leaves Hobbes as the last hero. The
heroic dismantling of the requisite conditions of heroism is
an altogether remarkable feat, one from which Hobbes could
expect to derive uncontested future praise and admiration.
176
Conclus ion
Hobbes 's political theory has been subjected to a number
of criticisms, many of which center directly on his
treatment of human nature and argue that he failed to
provide a convincing account of generalized humanity. 48
This failure becomes all the more evident when Hobbes is
read as a masculine thinker. Masculinity inhabits his work
throughout a remarkably broad range of levels, from his
unselfconscious adoption of a male standpoint in his prose,
to his depiction of a motherless state of nature, to his
atomistic portrayal of the human subject in that state and
in civil society, to his heroic conception of his own work.
The substance and style of Hobbes' s work, which
significantly includes a specific notion of the human
subject in various capacities—state of nature man, civil
subject, and heroic intellectual—betrays a specifically
masculine cast, one that ignores and debases the female
presence in and contribution to social life. As such,
Hobbes' s political theory is distinctively flawed in newly
apparent ways which are both disturbing and instructive.
The most significant finding involves the denial of the
maternal contribution. This denial, as I have tried to
show, is logically central to and required by Hobbes 's
atomistic account of human nature, social interaction, and
civic life. In other words, the denial of the mother here
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is not an incidental feature of Hobbes's theory; it
saturates his analysis throughout. Al0ng with the denial of
the maternal contribution, the heroic dimensions of Hobbes's
style also point convincingly in the direction of
masculinity. Hobbes's sense of himself as a heroic
intellectual actor and his depiction of the state of nature
have quite a bit in common. Significantly, the threat of
Personal annihilation in the state of nature and the promise
of its elimination in civil society share with the heroic
conception of risk a highly individualized and masculinized
sense of selfhood. A self conceived along such lines is
simultaneously vulnerable to attack and capable of heroic
feats in a dangerous world. Hobbes's feat was to cast
himself as the last hero by proposing a solution to a
predicament that was more masculine than human in tenor.
The external and inviolable authority of the sovereign would
replace the social anarchy of a world populated by
motherless self-sprung men.
A portion of Hobbes's genius thus might be said to
include the unwitting exploration of a masculine politics,
one that is premised on a distinctly gendered and distorted
sense of identity. It is a negative politics that is grim
and instrumentally limited in its abilities to transform the
human condition. Hobbes's abstract man is a creature who is
self-possessed and radically solitary in a crowded and
inhospitable world, whose relations with others are
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unavoidably contractual, and whose freedom consists in the
absence of impediments to the attainment of privately
generated and understood desires. Abstract man thus bears
the tell-tale signs of a masculinity in extremis ; identity
through opposition, denial of reciprocity, repudiation of
the mother in oneself and in relation to oneself, a
constitutional inability/refusal to recognize what might be
termed dialectical connectedness. Hobbes's genius and
courage was to face the momentous and uncomfortable truth of
this masculine revelation. His failure was the inability to
recognize it as a half-truth.
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CHAPTER IV
J.S. MILL: REASSESSING THE LIBERALISM-FEMINISM RELATION
What has been the opinion of mankind, has been theopinion of persons of all tempers and dispositions,
ot all partialities and prepossessions, of all
varieties in position, in education, in
opportunities of observation and inquiry. No oneinquirer is all this: every inquirer is eitheryoung or old, rich or poor, sickly or healthy,
married or unmarried, meditative or active, a poet
or a logician, an ancient or a modern, a man or a
woman; .... Every circumstance which gives a
character to the life of a human being carries withit its particular biases— its peculiar facilitiesfor perceiving some things, and for missing orforgetting others. But, from points of viewdifferent from his, different things are
perceptible
.
John Stuart Mill, "Bentham"
Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life
would not be the less an unceasing struggle against
causes of deterioration; as it even now is.
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representat ive
Government
Introduct ion
In the company of political theorists, John Stuart Mill
is emphatically not among those who make the blood boil; in
contrast to Hobbes and Marx, he neither communicates nor
elicits passion. Neither is he a systems-builder or
self-styled hero. In reading Mill, we can imagine sitting
down to afternoon tea with him in a Victorian parlor and
discussing, ever so calmly, politely and rationally, the
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topic at hand, most probably culled from the recent store of
controversial events. No theatrics, no yelling, minimal
body gestures: in short, a "civilized" conversation.
As a rational and soft-spoken persuader, Mill practices
a style markedly and deliberately different from that of his
direct predecessors Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. 1
Urging the cultivation of "the power by which one human
being enters into the mind and circumstances of another," 2
he invokes a vision of truth made possible only by
"combining the points of view of all the fractional
3truths." Although Mill effectively failed to live up to
this standard, we can still appreciate its humbling
influence on his style and approach. Sometimes it is
tempting to condemn him for his wishy-washiness
, to dismiss
his brand of tolerance as the intellectual stance of the
priviledged and comfortable bourgeoisie, masking significant
political and economic interests. 4 At other moments, one
is prompted to praise him for his humility in the face of
the multifarious complexity of social and political
5life. Under different circumstances yet, some of us
cannot help but be flabbergasted at his own arrogant
presumptions of privileged access to an unproblemat ic
truth. 6 We are less inclined to forgive this intellectual
child prodigy his logical and political lapses into
inconsistency and myopia. Perhaps this is the price he must
pay for his intellectual style and standards, for his
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optimistic advocacy of the powers of rational intellect, for
his own plodding and systematic attempts to preserve logical
rigor
.
As a defender of tolerance and champion of individual
liberty, Mill articulated principles which comprise a
significant portion of the political ideological fabric in
the United States today. 7 As such, he is a less exotic
thinker, more easily taken for granted, and more often taken
to task for existing implementations of his principles than
other political thinkers. On the one hand, we are the
privileged beneficiaries of his carefully worked out
principles of tolerance, democracy and individual rights,
most especially as these relate to freedom of expression.
On the other, we are his troubled heirs, especially insofar
as Mill represents "the heart of liberalism." 8 The crisis
of liberalism, stretching from the regressive turn to
fundamentalist Christianity among Americans who are
desperate for meaning and guidance in a secular age, to
tensions within the feminist movement 9
, to the current
crisis of the welfare state10
, revolves around the
formulation of the relationship between the individual and
society. And it is this troubled relationship which lies at
the heart of much of Mill's inconsistency.
One doesn't have to be antagonistic to Mill's work to
note his often troubling inconsistency. Even his admirer
Hobhouse described him as "the easiest person in the world
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to convict of inconsistency, incompleteness, and lack of
rounded system." 11 since Mill portrays himself as a man
of "no system", as a practitioner of "practical
eclecticism", we are neither obliged nor entitled to fault
him for lack of explicit systemic amplification and
coherence. We are, however, entitled to query his various
works and positions in reference to each other. It is in
this sense only that the issue of inconsistency in Mill's
work can and ought to be addressed. 12
The contradictory strands of elite rule and fully
representative democracy in Considerations on Representative
Government are especially perplexing, although not
necessarily irresolvable. 13 Mill's abstract defense of
liberty, tolerance and self-rule, which coexists with his
disdain for the "ignorance", "deficiency of mental
cultivations" and "degradation" of the masses has a
significant parallel in the inconsistency between Mill as an
epistemological pluralist and monist, with totalitarian
tendencies that accompany the latter. By "totalitarian" is
meant that Mill envisions a singular world of shared
opinions and values which also happen to be his. His
repeated invocations of a world inhabited by the necessary
multiplicity of partial truths, explored most eloquently in
his essay on "Bentham", constrasts sharply with his implied
vision of a future world of rational unanimity where
14
singular Truth will prevail. If we stop to consider
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Mill's empiricism, however, this contradiction fades to a
certain extent. For Mill, truths are partial with respect
to an as-yet undeciphered or only partially deciphered
empirical totality, which is bound to be made eventually
transparent by means of intellectual conflict and
exploration. Mill's truth is not a truth to be created
(like Marx's), but a truth that corresponds to a
pre-discovered reality. Finally, some people (the educated)
are more likely than others (the uneducated) to have access
to truth. Hence, Mill's fears of populist mediocrity and
his defense of tolerance are both predicated on the
optimistic assumption of an attainable and general izable
truth.
While an appreciation of Mill's empiricism helps to
resituate the apparent conflict between his democratic and
elitist, pluralistic and totalitarian tendencies, it cannot
resolve the problems that such inconsistencies pose for the
practical implementation of Mill's principles. Contemporary
disputes over the proper extensions and limitations of
tolerance, concerning how one can simultaneously uphold
tolerance and specific ethical values, are a prime case in
point. Our perplexity in the face of the "right" of the Ku
Klux Klan to hold public parades and meetings and current
disputes over issues of free expression and consumer choice
in the debates around pornography attest to the unresolved
difficulties inherent in many of Mill's principles. Mill's
vigorous stand against relativism and unrestricted tolerance
notwithstanding, he failed to provide the principled means
for the adjudication of competing claims between the
freedoms of individuals and between the freedom of
individuals and the interests of society. This failure,
however, ought to be understood as a larger failure of the
liberal paradigm, rather than as the personal failure of
15
Mill.
Turning our attention to Mill's individualism, we
observe its contrast to his ideal model of public
spiritedness, which is exemplified in his own political and
intellectual activities. Mill himself embodies one among
several instances where his communitarian and individualist
tendencies collide. We see in his retention of a modified
Utilitarianism the effort to simultaneously preserve the
integrity of the self-interested individual and to encourage
the development of a creature capable of understanding his
self-interest in social terms as well. 16 Mill's
prescriptions for civil society in On Liberty aim,
paradoxically, at securing the greatest freedom for the
individual as a self-interested and egoistic creature, so
that he (and I do mean "he") will eventually evolve into a
civic-minded subject. 1 ^ Depending on which of the various
interpreters of Mill we choose to rely, his individualism
1
8
may be veiwed as a logical precursor to socialism , a
sensible blend of diverse tendencies in a complicated human
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subject 19
,
or as the ultimate defense of atomi st ically and
solipsistically conceived subjectivity. 20
These inconsistencies in Mill's thought have led,
understandably, to a wide array of competing and diverse
interpretations. Our task here is not to investigate these
extant studies in depth, nor is it to attempt a new
resolution of Mill's variegated thought. Having taken
notice of some of the critical interpretations of Mill's
work, we will let them serve as a contextual backdrop, so
that we can go on to explore Mill in terms of the gendered
features of his work. Within the frame of this inquiry, we
will return to several themes that have been touched on
here: Mill's epistemology
, his often confusing politics,
and his individualism.
The specific question that informs this investigation of
Mill is the following: Can masculine ideology be found in
his work? This question is especially provocative in the
case of Mill because of his avowed feminism. Mill provides
an ideal testing ground for the proposition that masculine
ideology is not simply a function of or equivalent to overt
21
attitudes towards women. I will argue that Mill's
feminism, although radical for its time, is essentially
flawed, and that this is a direct outcome of certain
masculine dimensions of his theory which, in turn, are
centrally related to some of the basic tenets of
liberalism. In many ways, then, this analysis of Mill is
applicable to liberal theory in general, although we should
be careful not to collapse the two. Mill's thought must be
understood on its own terms as well as being a major piece
of the multifaceted liberal tradition. 22
Finally, I would like to acknowledge and also
distinguish this project from the important work of Bruce
Mazlish, in which he develops a psychohistor ical analysis of
James and John Stuart Mill. 23 while some of Mazlish'
s
insights will be utilized, the analysis of this chapter is
emphatically not a psychohistory of John Stuart Mill.
Certainly, Mill's relationship with his father and his
ambivalent attitudes towards women are fascinating and
suggestive. However, for the purposes of this study, it
would be a mistake to rely primarily or exclusively on
particular aspects of Mill's personality and life-history.
As I will argue, Mill's thought partakes of a much larger
configuration (we have already encountered a portion of it
in Hobbes) than the idiosyncratic compass of his particular
life-experience. And that is precisely why his work merits
critical feminist scrutiny.
Mill's World-View
Buried among the pages of otherwise dry political
analysis in Considerations on Representative Government are
some of the most telling statements Mill has to offer
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concerning his felt experience as social observer and
participant. Here we are given a brief glimpse at Mill's
sense of placement in the overall scheme of nature, history
and society. His Weltanschauung teems with sluggish and
hostile decay threatening without letup against a vulnerable
but vigorous counterforce in the form of human (Western)
civilization. Mill's language in these textual irruptions
is uncharacteristically raw and vivid. Some of the key
terms in these irruptions (which function as a kind of
violent or forceful intrusion on the text, given their
contrasting tone to Mill's usual prose style and especially
insofar as they are not required by the manifest structure
of his argument on representative government) are "decay",
"deterioration", "indolence" and "anarchy"; counterposed to
these is a vocabulary of "activity", "energy", "courage",
and "initiative". Mill effectively depicts a world order
that is horizontally divided between two radically distinct
and opposed dimensions. When read in conjunction with his
essay on "Nature", this material provides crucial insight
24into Mill's thought-world. What we can glean from these
writings illuminates the contours of an emotional
substructure in which gender and cognitive experience are
25intimately linked.
The key passages under consideration take place within
the frame of Mill's discussion of Order and Progress as two
popularly conceived opposed criteria of good government.
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Mill goes to inordinate lengths in arguing that the two
criteria are not really distinct measures of different kinds
of government, but that Order should be a sub-category of
Progress, since "the agencies which tend to preserve the
social good which already exists are the very same which
promote the increase of it." 26 Order and Progress,
comprised of similar qualities— "industry"
, "enterprise",
and "courage"—and differentiated only with respect to their
preservation or advancement of the social good, are then
contrasted to the deadly specter of decay:
If there is anything certain in human affairs, it is
that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by
the continuation of the same energies which gained
them. Things left to take care of themselves inevitably
decay. ( Considerations on Representative Government(CRG ) , p.^L9) ~
And, "the same beliefs, feelings, institutions and practices
are so much required to prevent society from retrograding as
to produce a further advance." (CRG, p. 22) From this
point on, Mill has his excuse or "cue" for the remarkable
passage which follows and merits quotation in full:
... we ought not to forget that there is an incessant
and everflowing current of human affairs toward the
worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all
the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of
mankind; which is only controlled and kept from sweeping
all before it by the exertions which some persons
constantly, and others by fits, put forth in the
direction of good and worthy objects. It gives a very
insufficient idea of the importance of the strivings
which take place to improve and elevate human nature and
life to suppose that their chief value consists in the
amount of actual improvement realized by their means,
and that the consequence of their cessations would
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merely be that we should remain as we are. A very smalldiminution of those exertions would not only put a Stopto improvement, but would turn the general tendency ofthings toward deterioration which, once begun, wouldproceed with increasing rapidity and hence become moreand more difficult to check, until it reached a stateoften seen m history, and in which large portions ofmankind even now grovel—when hardly anything short of asuperhuman power seems sufficient to turn the tide andgive fresh commencement to the upward movement. (CRG,
pp . 2 2 — 2 3 )
Here lies Mill's world-view. Immorality is equated with
passivity, passivity with decay; evil can only be controlled
by constant exertion. All it takes is a diminution of such
exertions for things to fall apart, and quickly at that.
Once civilization begins to unravel, regression will proceed
exponentially. Reversing the tide takes a superhuman
effort; the previous level or intensity of exertion will not
do. Downward movement threatens incessantly; upward
movements can only be maintained through vigilant and
vigorous efforts. There is an unbearable sense of striving
and tension here in Mill's depiction of a dichotomous world
structured in terms of two radically opposed zones. Life is
a constant struggle against the quicksand of regression as
the insistent but invisible forces of decay suck and tug
persistently at our civilized (in Mill's case, Victorian)
hems. A primal, slimy specter of political chaos and social
debauchery seethes and leers from the outskirts of moral
civilized society.
Decay threatens not only from without, but also from
within civilized life, in the form of the passive
personality. Mill divides human beings into two basic
characters: "the active or the passive type: that which
struggles against evils or that which endures them; that
which bends to circumstances or that which endeavors to make
circumstances bend to itself." (CRG, p. 47) Futher on,
intellect stands as the distinguishing mark between the
active and the passive character. For obvious reasons, only
the active-educated should have access to democratic
political power. In the meantime, Mill advocates the
educat ion-act ivi sat ion of the uneducated so that they can
eventually take part in the civilized and rational work of
political decision-making.
Mill's description of "the character which improves
human life" as "that which struggles with natural powers and
tendencies, not that which gives way to them," (CRG, p. 48)
leads us into a consideration of the essay on "Nature".
What, specifically, is it that the improving character is
struggling against?
In the essay on "Nature" Mill establishes his firm stand
against the Romantic notion that human beings ought to
imitate Nature. For Mill, such a doctrine is irrational and
immoral; it is also immoral precisely because it is
irrational. To the extent that we are natural, says Mill,
such a notion is tautological. But to the extent that the
"natural" denotes an arena of pre- or non-human activity
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(i.e., an arena of non-intervention by human agency), it
avoids facing the fact that all worthy human action involves
an altering of nature for the better. "if the artificial is
not better than the natural, to what ends are all the arts
of life? To dig, to plough, to build, to wear clothes, are
direct infringements of the injunction to follow
ii 2 7nature." Our duty, says Mill:
is to cooperate with the beneficent powers, not byimitating but by perpetually striving to amend the
course of nature—and bringing that part of it over
which we can exercise control, more nearly into
conformity with a high standard of justice and
goodness. ("Nature", p. 488)
In this revealing and fascinating essay, one of Mill's
last projects, he invokes an essentially Baconian view of a
nature that must be instrumentally harnessed:
Though we cannot emancipate ourselves from the laws of
nature as a whole, we can escape from any particular law
of nature, if we are able to draw ourselves from the
circumstances in which it acts. Though we can do
nothing except through the laws of nature, we can use
one law to counteract another. According to Bacon's
maxim, we can obey nature in such a manner as to command
it. ("Nature", p. 455)
And it is abundantly clear, from Mill's engrossing and
frightening description of nature, that it must be
commanded. A more horrible account would be hard to come by:
Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel,
casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to
death, crushes them with stones, like the first
Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them
with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of
her [sic] exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous
deaths in reserve. (p. 463)
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This characterization is extended to include animal life and
the realm of human instincts as well. Mill refers to "the
odious scene of violence and tyranny which is exhibited by
the rest of the animal kingdom" (p. 482), and invokes
cleanliness as "a triumph over instinct, one of the most
radical of the moral distinctions between human beings and
most of the lower animals", (p. 476) "The truth is that
there is hardly a single point of excellence belonging to
human character, which is not decidedly repugnant to the
untutored feelings of human nature." (p. 475) "Nearly every
respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of
instinct, but of a victory over instinct ..." ( p . 474) .
Clearly, Mill intends to debunk the pastoral romantic
view of a benign Nature. In his zealous efforts, he goes so
far as to portray Nature as the worst kind of vindictive
criminal. "In sober truth, nearly all the things which men
are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are
nature's everyday performances." (p. 462) But of course,
this is an absurd portrayal, since Nature—as Mill could
well appreciate—has no motives. Mill's explicit argument
that the category of the "natural" should contain no
favorable presumptions is backed up, paradoxically, by the
implicit claim that the "natural" contains a good many
unfavorable presumptions. Mill meant to argue that the
category has no presumptions. But that is significantly not
the actual strategy of the essay on Nature.
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At a latent level, Mill's prose communicates something
altogether different than what he may have consciously
intended as part of his logical argument. "Nature" in
Mill's account is an evil, malevolent and destructive force,
a far cry from a category having no preemptive value. "She"
stands in sharp contrast to the morality and rationality of
the civilized order. And it is in large part because of
this dichotomous contrast that Nature lurkes as such a
devastating threat.
Once we appreciate the full force of Mill's bizarre
depiction of Nature, the portrayal of civilized life in
Considerations on Representative Government as a perpetual
and tension-filled striving against the forces of decay
becomes all the more intelligible. These forces of decay
and destruction are the forces of nature. The "negligence",
"indolence", and "supineness " of human beings is precisely
what we exhibit in the absence of "artificial" discipline.
These are the threatening features of an unfettered human
nature. Discipline and self-control, which figure
prominently throughout Mill's work, represent the harnessing
2 8of nature within the individual. Civilization can only
proceed by means of constant self-control on the part of the
human species.
Given Mill's dichotomous rendering of a world radically
divided between the forces of Nature and Culture, an
essential and unavoidable association is preserved between
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them as well. Hence, the work of civilization involves the
deliberate undermining or harnessing of the powers of
nature. Society is civilized precisely to the extent that
nature is repressed. To the degree that they may be
counterposed to brute nature, activities and societies are
deemed "rational". In short, Mill's conception of nature is
not incidental to his conception of culture and, by
extension, to his conception of politics as cultured
activity.
Finally, we should take brief note of Mill's
presumptions of a singular phenomenal world, one that in
principle would be eventually amenable to a single structure
of explanation. For the time being, we need only note that
Mill's epistemology suggests that he viewed his stance in
relation to the social world as essentially equivalent to
the stance of the scientist-observer in relation to the
natural world. This empiricist stance presumes a strict
differentiation between the subject and object of
knowledge. For obvious reasons, and with further
implications which will be explored in the next section on
Mill's method, this differentiation is vitally enhanced by
Mill's portrayal of a gross and criminal nature which is
thereby all the more easily objectified.
Mill's rendition of nature, then, may be explored on
several levels: 1) as a description which is significant
and fascinating in and of itself; 2) as a key negative
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feature of his portrayal of social and civic life; 3) as a
cornerstone of his epistemology
.
Mill's relationship to nature is characterized in the
terms of distance and horror. Let us also take note of the
specification of nature as a female in Mill's prose. His
relationship to a feminized, vindictive and objectified
nature can be explored in a number of ways. We could
speculate on the quality and conditions of his unusually
bookish and emotionally starved childhood; investigate the
intellectual and personal legacy of his father—who often
sounds like a nasty character straight out of a Dickens
novel—along with the inherited intellectual framework of
his empiricism, which can be clearly traced to Bacon. A
closer examination of his empiricism, which will follow
shortly, goes a long way towards explicating Mill's distance
from nature and the dichotomous pattern of thinking which
accompanies this stance. As for the horror and disgust,
some is clearly attributable to Victorian ideology, while we
can also approach it as a logical, cognitive, and emotional
accompaniment to his empirical standpoint. Both features of
Mill's relationship to nature—the distance and the
horror—are also susceptible to interpretation on the basis
of gender. They clearly embody a masculine version of
experience.
Why should nature be experienced in such threatening
ways? And why should a political thinker's views on nature
be important to the understanding of his political theory?
An adequate answer to these questions must take account of
the complexities of human culture and the creation of
meaning. Anthropology suggests that "nature" occupies a key
place in the cosmologies of many human societies. To some
extent, the characterization of "nature" has to do with the
felt experience of the actual environment: is it harsh, or
gentle? abundant or miserly in its resources? 29 To
another extent, the depiction of "nature" helps to produce a
specific orientation to and perception of that
environment. 30 Finally, the category is often used as a
key symbolic principle of order and differentiation. 31
This is why we should be interested in the political
thinker's treatment and sense of nature. Mill's portrayal of
nature is a paradigmatic element of an overall world-view,
contributing to and constituting his understanding of
distinctively human activity, including categories for
judging the excellence or deficiencies of those activities
which significantly include political practices.
Psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology help us to
understand the psychological origins and social
ramifications of "nature" as a symbolic category which
carries significant import. A society's view of nature and
the environment of infancy are likely to be closely
32
connected. This covers a broad range of linked
phenomena, ranging from adult perceptions of infants as a
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drain on precious few resources, with obvious ramifications
on the feeding of infants and on those infants' subsequent
feelings about "nature", to the discomfort experienced by
adults of certain cultures in the face of unsocialized
33infants. Whatever the specifics may be—harsh or
gentle, flexible or exacting—the infant's experience of his
or her first environment is likely to set the stage for his
or her consequent perceptions of nature. If the first
environment is a female-dominated one, the nature-female
association is also likely to be strengthened. 34
Louis Breger has termed the modern world-view of the
West, "which sees the human species as special, as set off
from the natural world, as constructing its own environment
as a protection against what is felt to be a hostile,
grudging Nature," the "man-against-nature" view. 35 He
contrasts it with the "human-within-nature" world view,
where impulses, emotions and fantasies "are felt as
potentially harmonious with social life." 36 To the extent
that women are linked up with nature and excluded from an
androcentric portrayal of "civilized" Western humanity,
Breger ' s gender-specific terminology is deliberate and
appropriate. He describes the emotional components of this
world view in the following way:
Repeated experiences of frustration, insufficient
nourishment, disrupted attachment, constricted autonomy
and harsh discipline lead to the perception of the world
and of other persons—and the environment more
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generally—as untrustworthy, dangerous, punitive,
ungiving; in short, as enemies with which one muststruggle. A similar orientation towards one's own
Cnr^
S
^
U
i
tS fr°m thS exPerienc e typical of the modernworld. That is, repeated frustrations, punishments andinconsistent gratification create feelings of anxiety
and guilt about one's own hunger, sensual-sexual urges
autonomous strivings and anger at the authority; thesetoo come to be experienced as enemies that one mustcombat in order to survive. 37
What we have here is a world-view that clearly predates
Mill's lifespan even as it took on its most virulent
formulation in the Victorian ideology of Mill's time. We
can also appreciate the ways in which Mill's upbringing at
the hands of his father must have further enhanced Mill's
sensitivity to the components of a world-view fearful of
nature and intent on dominating her. By all accounts, James
Mill was a stern father who himself embodied and articulated
an ascetic, if hypocritical, distaste for 'things of the
flesh' . 38
We have already discussed in Chapter II some of the
psychoanalytic formulations of gender acquisition which are
relevant to this discussion of the gendered features of
Mill's world view, particularly as they concern "nature".
To recapitulate briefly: emphasis was placed on the
pre-Oedipal mother-child configuration and separation-
indi vidua tion dynamics. Special attention was paid to the
ramifications of separation from a mother who is
anatomically and eventually genderedly "like" her female
offspring and "unlike" her male offspring. The negative
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articulation of masculinity vis-a-vis the pre-posited
maternal presence was also discussed. This issues, as we
saw, in a tendency for the masculine neonate to objectify
the mother, to imagine and to treat her as a (m)other.
Dinnerstein's discussion of the primitive identification of
the primal maternal surround with nature will be especially
germane here. Finally, masculine tendencies towards
excessive and objectified, and feminine tendencies towards
underdeveloped delineation from the mother-world are also
significant in the context of this discussion.
The description of reality that Mill's portrayal of
nature offers echoes in many ways distinctive features of
the process of masculine identity formation enacted within
the context of female-dominated childrear ing . A dehumanized
nature becomes, like the dehumanized mother, the very
measure of a civilized "human" identity to which it is
negatively counterposed
. What we have here, as the
psychoanalytic literature amply suggests, is not simply a
3 9series of parallel or analogic dynamics. The
recognizable themes of feminized nature, naturalized mother
and masculinized objective cognitive stance all suggest a
complex web of intricately related dynamics of separation-
individuat ion
.
"Our over-personification of nature," writes
Dinnerstein, "is inseparable from our underpersoni f icat ion
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of women. The quasi-human status of women stems in
large part from our infantile immersion in a mother-world
where the mother is also the first representative of
nature. It is the combination of two things—the various
traumas associated with that inevitably disappointing and
increasingly threatening immersion, and our attempts to
escape that immersion with the help of the father—which
help to constitute women's curious status, along with the
over-personification and ob ject i f ication of nature. Because
the terms of immersion (ultimate bliss and primodial threat
of death to a dependent and emerging self) and escape are
gendered, because the father steps in as gallant rescuer, we
are thereby enabled to maintain certain primitive emotions
and gendered associations. Given the gendered structure of
modern Western culture, we may permanently sidestep an adult
confrontation or mediation with a primordial (m)other whose
human subjectivity is difficult to acknowledge. To the
extent that the primordial (m)other is equated with nature,
feelings directed at each are likely to partake of the same
emotional imagery. For those who are born into cultures
where such imagery is already extant in the social milieu,
such primordial associations are further strengthened and
legitimized. Unconscious feelings about mother (and, by
extension, women) and nature are likely to center around the
dual strands of unresolved desire and horror. Woman, like
nature, poses a terrifying threat to autonomy. And this
threat, experienced by children of both sexes, is amplified
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for the boy child, given the gendered specification of
masculinity as that which is "not-mother "
.
The (perhaps universal) human need for a "quasi-human
source of richness and target of greedy rage" 41 becomes
localized in a gendered-female embodiment. To the extent
that this embodiment is enabled to maintain an apparently
self-sufficient existence; that is, to the extent that it
becomes one of two terms in a dichotomous rendering of
Male/Female, Culture/Nature, Reason/Passion, it becomes
simultaneously more threatening and less amenable to
dialectical query and mediation. The sexual division of
labor in childrearing, along with the genderized dichotomous
symbolic culture of the modern West, allows us to maintain
what Dinnerstein describes as "the murderous infantilism of
our relation to nature" and women. 42
Within this emotional and symbolic frame of meaning,
maternal and natural re-engulf ment become the constitutive
threats to masculinity and "civilization". And the dangers
of re-engulf ment are compounded by the strict boundedness of
masculinity and civilization thus conceived. Here we have
an early intimation of how Mill's individualism and
preoccupation with autonomy are simultaneously masculinist
and intimately related to his portrayal of nature:
The cultural definitions of masculine as what can never
appear feminine, and of autonomy as what can never be
relaxed, conspire to reinforce the child's earliest
associations of female with the pleasures and dangers of
merging, and male with both the comfort and the
cultural anxiety; together they can lead to postures of
and the longing which generates it. 4 3 y
The primal terror of maternal re-engul fment which signals
the "death" of the masculine neonate is recapitulated in
Mill's association of nature with death. This association
is further strengthened in the context of Mill's description
of sex as "that clumsy provision which she [nature] has made
for that perpetual renewal of animal life, rendered
necessary by the prompt termination she puts to it in every
individual instance." ("Nature", p. 463) This is not simply
an instance of quaint Victorian language designed to avoid
the explicit description of sex; it also weds sex to death.
As for the wonders of reproduction: "no human being ever
comes into the world but another is literally stretched on
the rack for hours or days, not unfrequently issuing in
death." ("Nature", p. 463) So much for nature's claim to
the successive reproduction and replenishment of life. 44
As we have seen, the equation of nature with death is
fully evident in Mill's portrayal of nature's threatened
re-engulfment of civilized life. Civilization, like the
masculine ego, must be constantly defended in the form of
vigorous efforts designed to widen the gap between Nature
and Culture. Nature vindictively makes up the distance, and
the deadly race is on. Similarly with masculinity, creeping
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intimations of feminine encroachment will not be tolerated.
The trauma of dependence on the mother takes its
conscious and manifest form in the adult's compulsion to
overcome dependence on nature. "... infantile rage in the
face of the independent will of the mother culminates in the
'adult' drive to annul the independence of, i.e., to
dominate, nature." 45 The domination of nature is an
expression, then, of a denial of dependence on the mother.
Hostility toward the mother is redirected toward the natural
world. As Isaac Balbus writes: "The mother that does not
matter reappears in the form of a nature that is reduced to
46mere matter."
Within Mill's empiricist frame, to which we shall
shortly turn, nature is reduced to mere matter: it is the
objectified substance of the scientist's explorations.
However, in the essay on "Nature", it assumes a stupendously
subjective form. Each version represents the flip side of a
singular coin: nature objectified from a masculine
standpoint. Mill's criminal, sadistic and vindictive nature
may be understood in part as a projection of his own
unresolved feelings toward the mother. These projections,
in turn, serve to justify the domination of external and
internal nature. Mill's corporeal asceticism may be firmly
situated within this scheme (which, we must stress, he did
not invent on his own.) His identification of sex and
sexuality with death underscores the civilized Western
denial of the body. If, as Isaac Balbus has put it in his
re-phrasing of Norman 0. Brown's thesis in Life Against
Death, "To embrace one's own mortality is to be able to
affirm one's own flesh," 47 Mill expresses the
simultaneous and related denial of sexuality and death by
allying them with each other and relegating them to the
foreign and distant reaches of Nature.
We might also pause to consider Mill's insistence on the
malleability of human nature in this context. 48 Nature is
so awful that if human nature were not malleable, all would
be lost. Our malleability is the only hope for a
progressive improvement in the lot of humankind. Secondly,
our abilities to manipulate nature— including our
own—constitute the very mark of our humanity. (We have
already commented on Mill's repeated insistence on
self-control and self-discipline.) It is in this double
sense that the malleability of human nature, a central tenet
of James Mill's theory of associat ionism (an early version
of behaviorism) which his son retained, figures so
prominently in Mill's social theory. Dennis Wrong's
comments on the oversocialized conception of man in modern
49sociological theory are applicable to Mill. Mill's
stress on the malleability of human nature, coupled with his
fear of nature, promotes an image of the human subject who
is disembodied and conscience-driven, and little more.
Ironically, it is this impoverished and disembodied subject
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who both motivates and handicaps Mill's feminism, as we will
see
.
In this opening section on Mill's world view, special
attention has been paid to his vivid description of a
malevolent and intrusive Nature as found in selections from
Considerations on Representative Government and "Nature".
Since Mill does not present a systematic grand design for
his political writings, it makes sense to explore his views
on nature as a way of getting at his view of the larger
scheme of life. Furthermore, given the remarkable paucity
of information concerning the emotional dimensions of his
work, these writings are all the more precious for what they
reveal about Mill's felt experience as an intellectual and
about his sense of place in the order of things.
Mill's depiction of nature and the human struggle
against that nature opens the way for a more selected focus
on the masculinist dimensions of his thought. We have
already discovered several significant clues in his
world-view, the most notable being his dichotomous rendition
of a vile and imposing nature counterposed to rational,
civilized life. As I have argued, this paradigm partakes of
cognitive and emotional imagery which has been identified as
part of the masculine identity securing process. In
subsequent sections of the chapter, which will examine
Mill's intellectual style and epistemology , his psychology
and concept of the individual, his politis and his feminism,
we will find further evidence for the masculinist dimensions
of his work, including the echoes of a Welstanshauunq that
is significantly organized in terms of an unstable and
antagonistic relation between Culture and Nature, Reason and
Pass ion
.
Mill's Style and Method
One of the most outstanding features of Mill's
intellectual style is his rationalism. His praise of
Coleridge notwithstanding, all of his work (including the
essay on Coleridge) is characterized by an abiding
commitment to and optimism concerning the powers of reason.
These powers are often counterposed by Mill to passion and
instinct. Careful comparison between his essays on Bentham
and Coleridge suggests that Mill was capable of criticizing
rationalism in its most virulent and limited form in
Benthan, but unable to enact such criticism in his own
work. 50 Ironically, it is in his essay on Bentham rather
than the one on Coleridge that Mill comes closest to a
passionate refutation of the limits of utilitarian
rationalism:
Knowing so little of human feelings, he [Bentham] knew
still less of the influences by which those feelings are
formed: all the more subtle workings both of the mind
upon itself, and of eternal things upon the mind,
escaped him; and no one, probably, who, in a highly
instructed age, ever attempted to give a rule to all
human conduct, set out with a more limited conception
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either of the agencies by which human conduct is, or ofthose by which it should be, influenced. ( "BenTnam"
, p
.
The essay on Coleridge, to which we turn expecting even
more, is the less revealing. Mill gives a kind of
half-hearted lip service to Coleridge's revolt against the
philosophy of the eighteenth century. His real aim is to
subsume Coleridge's intuitive idealist insights within the
frame of a sensationalist theory of knowledge. The
redeeming intellectual value of Coleridge for Mill turns out
to be his ability to improve and deepen the empirical
resources for the investigation of human nature and conduct.
Mill, then, assumes a critical but reformist stance
towards rationalism only in relation to its most excessive
practitioners. From an adversarial position, he is capable
of detecting the imperfections and limits of a method to
which he is inextricably bound. As a practitioner of that
method, however, Mill fails to embody such a critique. His
best effort is to soften the edges, to round out the
description of the narrowly self-interested individual who
is the calculator of a limited number of utilities.
Ironically, it is in the essay on Bentham that Mill
comes closest to articulating the very sort of criticism
that could be levelled against his own work:
The field of man's nature and life cannot be too much
worked, or in too many directions; until every clod is
turned up, the work is imperfect: no whole truth is
possible but by combining the points of view of all the
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^*1 t^hS ' n° r ' therefore ' ^til it has been
(p 25)
SaCh fraCtional trut* ^n do by itlelf.
There are portions of the essay where Mill's description of
the differing standpoints of different observers (whose
differences consist of differences in life circumstances)
comes perilously close to challenging his presumption of a
singular truth. It would be a mistake, however, to rely
extensively on these and related passages for an adequate
understanding of Mill's style and method. The Mill of
"Bentham" is the nagging but undeveloped voice of a thinker
who was drawn to romantic intuitionism while effectively
managing his distance from it. Coleridge's "oscillation"
was useful precisely to the extent that it could enrich
Bentham' s "slender stock of premises" concerning human
nature. What might have been a genuine dialogue between two
radically different thinkers is rendered into an
accomodation that imposes much more heavily on Coleridge
than on Bentham.
In spite of his avowed appreciation of Coleridge as an
antidote to Bentham' s single-minded pursuit of
"naif-truths", and even though he attributed his mental
breakdown to "the dissolving influence of analysis," 51
Mill never divested himself of a fundamental commitment to
reasoned empirical analysis, which was predicated on an
optimistic appraisal of reason. Reason, not love, and
certainly not instinct or emotion, would conquer all.
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Michael Oakeshott's description of the Rationalist comes
remarkably close to capturing the essential flavor of Mill's
intellectual style:
skepMcal
1 £5 ifc U 4.!!t °nCe ske?tical *nd optimistic:
h.V?ii \£ xhere 13 no opinion, no habit, no°®1?ef ' nothing so firmly rooted or so widely held that
cans
S
hif
-
S t0 qVestion ifc and to judge it by what hell is reason'; optimistic, because the Rationalistnever doubts the power of his 'reason' (when properlyapplied) to determine the worth of a thing, the truth ofan opinion or the propriety of an action. Moreover, heis fortified by a belief in a 'reason' common to all
mankind, a common power of rational consideration, whichis the ground and inspiration of argument .... Butbesides this, which gives the Rationalist a touch ofintellectual equal itarianism, he is something also of anindividualist, finding it difficult to believe that
anyone who can think honestly and clearly will thinkdifferently from himself. 52
Mill is indeed a sceptic, notoriously dismissive of
popular opinion, intuitive knowledge and "irrational"
belief. Like Oakeshott's Rationalist, Mill is both an
egalitarian and an elitist. If reason confers similar
capacities on all human beings (and we need to acknowledge
Mill's inclusion of women here), binding them together into
the fellowship of humanity, it also promotes a kind of
intellectual arrogance in Mill. His world is significantly
divided between the intellectual have's and have-not's. As
Oakeshott has put it, the Rationalist "finds it difficult to
believe that anyone who can think honestly and clearly will
think differently from himself." Mill's description of his
young Benthamite period, where "What we principally thought
of, was to alter people's opinions; to make them believe
according to the evidence, and know what was their real
interest," 53 remains applicable to his later work as well,
despite his repudiation in the Autobiography of the
arrogance of this youthful stance. It is particularly
evident in On the Subjection of Women .
Notably, Mill shares with Oakeshott
' s Rationalist "an
ominous interest in education." As Considerations on
Representative Government makes abundantly clear, this
emphasis on education is tied in with an emphasis on
competence and technique and is closely related to the
Rationalist project of reconstructing society along lines
that are deemed to be 'rational' to the extent that they
provide technical solutions to perceived problems.
Technical, rather practical knowledge wins the day, setting
the stage for a politics of public administration. Mill
advocates a group of bureaucratic implementors
, separated
from (protected from) electoral politics and a democratic
assembly, whose job it is to carry out the preferences of
the voters as they see fit. Considerations on
Representative Government anticipates the practical
separation of politics and technique which we witness in its
full flowering today. (A prime case in point is the extant
opinion, articulated by President Reagan, that the American
people should leave the complicated business of
international arms negotiations policy to the experts.)
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Mill wants the business of government taken out of politics;
the popular assembly should be limited in its functions to
ratifying the proposals of professionals or sending them
back to the drawing board. Mill relies heavily on the
criteria of efficiency and competence to develop the case
54against pure democracy. The "instructed minority",
having access to the knowledge of what counts as "general"
(as opposed to particular and "sinister") interests, is that
group which is entitled to vote.
Mill's rationalism comes to bear most fully on his
politics via the criterion of competence which is an
essential prerequisite of the right to vote. Competence is
achieved through education, which Mill would like to see
extended to as many persons as possible. It is the faith
that all will eventually come to "see the light" already
apprehended by the few— rather than a vision of mutual
transformation among inter-subjectively, but also
differently, constituted human beings—that informs Mill's
education requirement, along with his defense of tolerance.
Democracy, like reason, is in opposition to and is therefore
vulnerable to, challenges from the irrational sphere,
embodied in the uneducated rabble.
To the extent that Bacon and Descartes provide the early
intimations of what, according to Oakeshott, would later
emerge as the distinct Rationalist character, Mill's
empiricist connection to Bacon (a connection that was both
direct and mediated through James Mill and Jeremy Bentham)
is significant and helpful in thinking through the
connections between his attitudes towards nature, his
rationalist style, his empiricist epi stemology
, and his
politics. For Mill, all scientific explanation is
fundamentally of the same kind. Explanation within the
physical sciences and the moral sciences (meaning the study
of the laws of the mind as well as of matter, and not what
we might take it to mean as normative theory) takes on an
effectively similar causal pattern. Explanation in terms of
motives and intentions is equivalent for Mill to the
scientific explanation of physical causation. Free will,
for Mill, is an antecedent or intervening cause. Hence,
human behavior is explicable and still "free". "This .
means," writes Alan Ryan, "that there is no ultimate
difference in the causal status of persons and rocks; in
both cases, things could and would have been different if,
and only if, the antecedent causes had been different." 55
Mill's empiricism in the "moral sciences" took the
specific form of methodological individualism. According to
Steven Lukes, the doctrine of methodological individualism
involves the notion that "facts about society and social
phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts about
individuals." 6 Mill exemplifies methodological
individualism in his repudiation of the law of the Chemical
Mixture of Effects (whereby chemical substances interact to
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produce qualitatively different substances), embracing
instead the scientific model of the physics of his time.
(Mill's use of natural science metaphors is a telling
reminder that his view of the logic of explanation in the
social sciences is that it is not essentially different from
explanation in the natural sciences. While other social
theorists, notably Marx and Freud, share with Mill a belief
in a systematic scientific grand design, their conceptions
of scientific knowledge take different forms.) 57 For
Mill, laws governing society exemplify the principle of the
Composition of Forces. The analogy in physics is that final
effects can be calculated by determining the individual
effect of each contributing force, which adds up to the
final product. Alan Ryan describes Mill's view of social
life as exemplifying "the mechanical interaction of
individuals, not their blending into something new." 58
Mill himself makes his method abundantly clear in these
excerpts from his System of Logic ;
The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be,
nothing but the laws of the actions and passions of men
united together in the social state. Men, however, in a
state of society, are still men; their actions and
passions are obedient to the laws of individual human
nature. Men are not, when brought together, converted
into another kind of substance with different
proper t ies .
^
9
".
. . human beings in society have no properties but those
which are derived from and may be resolved into the laws of
the individual man." 0
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As an epistemological doctrine, this version of
methodological individualism is premissed on a host of
specific assumptions concerning the human being in a social
context. It presumes the integrity of an inviolable ego,
one that cannot be qualitatively transformed through its
relations with others: social dynamics are ultimately
reducible to the behaviors and intentions of individuals.
Methodological individualism effectively denies that
qualitative changes may be produced within an
intersubjective context which, while constituted by discrete
flesh and blood creatures in relation to each other, is not
quantitatively reducible to its constituent and discrete
63parts. We recognize at once the masculine features of
this human subject at the heart of methodological
individualism, with his clearly demaracted ego boundaries
and transactional relations with other men. The "laws of
the individual man" prevail in social interaction and are
the building blocks of social explanation. No "field
dependent" creatures these, to muck up explanations with
questions about quantity-to-quality shifts, inter- and
intra-sub ject i ve nuances and meanings, or the dissolving
subject-object interface. All activity and its meaning is
derived from "the individual", as a discrete subject of
behavior and object of scientific inquiry.
Methodological individualism presumes the cognitive
capacity for ob jecti vi ty as the central defining feature of
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its objects of inquiry (human beings) and subjects of
inquiry (scientists and social observers). The presumptive
ideal at work here is that of an objective cognitive stance
situated in protected relation to an external and
ob jectif iable reality.
Evelyn Keller's inquiry into "the processess by which
the capacity for scientific thought develops, and the ways
in which those processes are intertwined with emotional and
sexual development/' has set a helpful precedent for the
consideration of the gendered features of Mill's
methodological individualism. Arguing that the cognitive
capacity for objectivity is acquired along with the process
of identity formation as a function of the child's capacity
for distinguishing self from not-self, Keller explores the
gendered features of that version of empiricist science
modelled on the presumptive ideal of an objectivized
cognitive stance situated in relation to an alien
64
nature. This version of science, traceable to Bacon,
"bears the imprint of its gender izat ion not only in the ways
it is used, but in the very description of reality it
offers—even in the relation of the scientist to that
description." 65
The description of self and reality contained within
methodological individualism may be traced et iologically to
the earlier process of identity acquisition. (Such an
etiology would presumably exist for any epi st emological
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scheme.) This reconstruction is premissed on the argument
that cognitive and emotional development and processes are
not radically distinct, but vitally related to each other in
mutually constitutive ways. 66 If we pause to consider the
dynamics of separat ion-individuat ion, we notice the seeds of
potential cognitive orientations that exist in that crucial
oppositional dynamic between mother and neonate:
In the extrication of self from mother, the mother,beginning as the first and most primitive subject,
emerges, by a process of effective negations, as thefirst object. The very processes (both cognitive and
emotional) which remind us of that first bond become
colored by their association with the woman who is, andforever remains, the archetypal female. Correspondingly,
those of delineation and ob jectif icat ion are colored bytheir origins in the process of separation from mother:
they become marked, as it were, as "not-mother " . The
mother becomes an object, and the child a subject, by a
process which becomes itself an expression of opposition
to and negation of "mother". 57
Such a dynamic holds a variety of potential consequences,
ranging from various forms of reconciliation with the primal
(m)other, to extreme alienation from her. As a particular
cognitive stance, methodological individualism bears the
tell-tale signs of an unmediated struggle with the mother.
The radical differentiation of subject and object, whose
constituent failure is a disallowance of "that vital element
of ambiguity at the interface between subject and
68
object," survives in methodological indi vidual i sm '
s
strict differentiation between its objects of inquiry and
between those objects and the scientists who study them.
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What makes the ob jectivist-individualist empiricist
stance distinctively masculine? Presumably, children of
both sexes must engage in a self-other struggle with the
maternal caretaker and have similar needs for autonomy. To
some extent, autonomy becomes a gendered term for children
of both sexes who are reared primarily by a female mother
because it signifies a positional stance that is
"not-mother
'
s"
.
Autonomy and objectivity become effectively
masculinized for all children. Even further, this
masculinization of autonomy and objectivity is strengthened
for boys "to the extent that boys rest their very sexual
identity on an opposition to what is both experienced and
69defined as feminine." Hence, "the development of their
gender identity is likely to accentuate the process of
70
separation," as we saw in Chapter II. Unlike girls, who
must re-negotiate their relationship to a mother who is both
"like" and "unlike" them, boys are not as prompted to do
this. The structure of the situation (familial and social
in the broarder sense) effectively gives them the distance
and the incentive to avoid this challenge. The notion of
objectivity which is "rooted in the premise that the object
can and should be totally removed from our description of
71the object," recapitulates the primal subject-object
split and perpetuates latent gendered associations of
masculinized objectivity and feminized object.
Mill's empiricism and his methodological individualism
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partake, along with his fearful and tension-filled account
of civilization's antagonistic relationship to nature, of a
cognitive orientation and corresponding emotional structure
which have been linked to masculinity. 72 That his
Weltanschauung and his method are thus intimately linked
should come as no surprise, particularly insofar as they
share a common version of the human subject. The human
subject thus conceived sets the agenda for an appropriate
methodology for analysis and observation, and vice versa.
That is, methodological individualism helps to constitute
its object of inquiry. This object is undeniably masculine,
most notably in his strict ego boundary differentiation and
in his radical separation from a nature that must be
disciplined within the self and harnessed for the work of
civilization. Mill's version of the human subject is also
masculine by virtue of his horrific vulnerability. The
revolt of nature threatens without respite, reenforcing the
need for clear-cut differentiation, absolute autonomy, and
uncluttered identity. Mill's political theory, to which we
now turn in greater detail, is concerned with precisely
these issues.
Mill's Individual and the Quest for Liberty
The kind of man that liberalism requires, wrote L.T.
Hobhouse, is one who can "discipline himself," whose
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capacities for "the development of will, of personality, of
self-control, or whatever we please to call that central
harmonizing power which makes us capable of directing our
73own lives," have been developed and secured. That
Hobhouse, a socialist, and one of Mill's most generous
interpreters, should reiterate the themes of discipline and
self-control is indicative of the strength and centrality of
these qualities to Mill's conception of the individual.
(These themes are also indicative of the influence of
Victorian conceptions of morality on Mill and Hobhouse.) It
is the capacity for discipline and self-control which, in
fact, makes us moral and individual. Without such developed
capacities, nature would gobble us up into her chaotic and
amoral (or is it immoral?) vortex. We are individuals
precisely to the extent that we stand over instinct, to the
degree that we set the pace and the course for the orderly
progression of our lives. Individuality and morality are
thus inversely related to instinct. 74
This scheme is reiterated in Mill's idealist version of
a history which is propelled by ideas. "It is what men
75think that determines how they act." Those of us who
would respond to Mill by suggesting that it is how humans
live that shapes how and what they think, would be treated
to Mill's partial and qualified agreement with this
argument. The "convictions of the average man are in much
greater degree determined by their personal position than by
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reason," but to this extent they are both inferior and
vulnerable to the ideas of others, notably those of "the
united authority of the instructed." 76 Mill wants thought
to be "freed" from its material bounds. Materially situated
ideas are suspect because they invariably express partial
interests. The particular is bogus; general izable truth is
what we must seek.
Hence, Mill's focus in On Liberty on freedom of thought
and his correspondingly less developed focus on economic and
other practical forms of freedom may be understood in
relation to 1) his conception of the ascetic (disembodied)
individual and intellect, and 2) his account of the
causative relationship between ideas and events of the real
world. Insofar as his sociology of knowledge is concerned,
Mill is not a materialist. This is amply confirmed by his
curious inability to appreciate the possibility that the
ideas of "the instructed minority" might simultaneously
reflect and perpetuate specific economic and political
interests. It is the tyranny of the majority which,
according to Mill, ought to be feared, most notably because
it is an uneducated and uncultivated majority and, by
extension, all too wedded to material and partial and
77therefore "sinister" interests.
Hence, Mill's discussion of "liberty" ranges primarily
over the territory of inner (private) consciousness and its
expression. This consciousness inhabits and defines a
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singular individual who must be "sovereign" "over himself,
over his own body and mind." 78 The only warrant for
intervention in the liberty of this individual is the
threatened liberty of another similarly constituted
individual. "The only freedom which deserves the name is
that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we
do not attempt to deprive others of theirs . . . " 79 Such
a conception of liberty presumes, as Mill acknowledges, that
there is an arena of belief and action which is purely
"self-regarding". "To individuality should belong the part
of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is
interested; to society, the part which clearly interests
society." "Each will receive its proper share if each has
that which more particularly concerns it." 80 Through a
process of circular reasoning which relies on deceptively
self-evident principles, this formulation effectively begs
the question of the public-private distinction upon which it
8
1
rests. Furthermore, "society" may stand for the
collective interests of the whole; but it is always specific
individuals and groups who decide what it is that "society"
should concern itself with.
Over and above issues concerning the specific content of
each delimited sphere, however, is the nagging question of
the division itself which, on closer examination, makes
remarkably little sense. As Hobhouse understood clearly
enough: "there are no actions which may not directly or
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indirectly affect others
. . . even if there were they would
not cease to be matters of concern to others." 82 The
distinction between individual and society, private and
public, also presumes a division within the individual
himself in terms of private and social life, an equally
problematic, if pervasive and generally accepted,
demarcation. While such a demarcation works with fairly
innocent activities (e.g., what varieties of flowers to
plant in my garden), the boundary is easily dissolved by the
issues that matter—sexuality
, consumer habits, and
childrearing practices are only a few. Ironically, it is on
this essentially flawed framework that many feminists
continue to rely, particularly in the area of reproductive
rights. 83
At the conclusion of On Liberty
, Mill leaves us with two
equally unhelpful principles: 1) the individual is not
accountable to society for acts which concern himself only,
and 2) he is accountable for those acts affecting others.
Between the easy extremes on either side of this
formulation—what color shirt I decide to wear on a
particular day; murder— lies a massive area of grey. Most
"private" decisions simply cannot be cast in terms that have
ramifications only for the individual concerned. An
interesting example in this respect concerns the response of
Americans to recent news about birth-control policy in
China. Our response to that enforced policy, often issuing
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in late-term abortions for pregnant women and strong social
sanctions against couples who would like to have more than
one child, is bracketed by the ideological framework with
which we interpret the issue. On the one hand, it is viewed
as a gross violation of "private rights". On the other, the
social consequences of an unenforced population policy are
so gruesome (millions would literally starve) that the
"private rights" of couples take on the appearance of
extreme selfishness. Is this a "private" issue or a
"social" one? Put in these terms, there is just no way to
make sense out of and to formulate judgements about the
Chinese experience. To opt for one characterization or the
other would put us in a position that would all-too-quickly
become indefensible.
It is all too easy to poke holes into Mill's formulation
and defense of tolerance predicated on a public-private
distinction. (This is not to say that a refurbished theory
of tolerance is a clear-cut and easy task.) The same could
be said for his model of the human subject—a strangely
disembodied, hyper-rationalistic, sober maximizer of
interests, ideally a conscience-driven do-gooder. We have
already commented on the contrast between the individualist
and collectivist tendencies in Mill. He was obviously not a
gratification-pursuing utilitarian maximizer of selfish
interests. In fact, he was deeply committed to furthering
the long-term interests of his society. And he urged others
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to do the same. At the same time, we need to keep in mind
that he engaged in this social work as an "independent
center of consciousness." 84 We need somehow to maneuver a
position in relation to Mill which is respectful of his
commitments and labors and critically aware of the necessary
structural components of his theory.
As opposed to the common portrayal of Mill's liberalism
as a paradigm which celebrates the atomistic individual and
judges him to be free to the extent that he is unencumbered
by social relations and uncontracted duties, Graeme Duncan
emphasizes "his conception of man as an essentially social
animal, to whose natural and customary attachment to his
fellows is added, as civilization develops, rational
perceptions of his actual and necessary links with
85them." "Liberty," writes Duncan:
is interpreted by him as a source of social duty and
common enterprise. Mill's version of society may seem,
at times, to be thin . . . but he had no notion of the
individual striding alone, without any sense of social
obligation and concern.
^
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Duncan's sympathetic defense of Mill provides a refreshing
and thought-provoking antidote to simplistic portrayals of
Mill's individualism. However, there is a misleading
tendency on his part to collapse Mill's preferences into the
actual logic of his theory. Mill certainly does interject a
social conception of man in various writings. These
interjections, however, do not automatically resolve the
question of Mill's atomistic conception of the human
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subject. It is difficult to imagine how his prescriptions
for liberty and tolerance in On Liberty could actually work
without such a subject. Mill's preferences could very well
be at odds with his theory. In this case, we would need to
understand him as a tragic intellectual figure. Mill
certainly embodied and advocated social obligation and
concern. But he did this in a strikingly solitary way.
Notably, he gives little evidence for his own sense of deep
embeddedness within a social context. "Social feeling" for
Mill partakes of an essentially prescriptive rather than
descriptive orientation. As such, it may be understood in
one of two ways: 1 ) as an "artificial" component of
de-natured humanity which is added on to an originally
atomistic subject, or 2) as a rational extension of our
original egoism, such that I am able to perceive "my"
interests in the interests of others. 87 In neither case
is Mill's methodologically individualist subject deeply
transformed. His social relations and interests continue to
be predicated on a subject who is essentially atomistic.
In his concern with autonomy, which significantly
mirrored his own sense of autonomous intelligence, Mill
elaborated a series of defensive prescriptions and maneuvers
for the individual besieged by the mediocrity and censorship
of the majority. While we can appreciate Mill's concern
with the integrity of the individual swimming against the
popular tide, we can also marvel at his disregard for the
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components of collective social well-being. We can also
situate such apparent disregard within the frame of the
model of the physical composition of forces. As a
methodological individualist, Mill could well assume that
the guaranteed protection and well-being of the individual
would yield social well being as an automatic and axiomatic
consequence
.
Our task here is not to reformulate a viable theory of
tolerance and liberty for a differently constituted
individual. (If it were, we would have to proceed on the
basis of a much "thicker" and "deeper" understanding of the
individual as a socially constituted subject.) Instead, we
have the more manageable quest for the masculine features of
Mill's individual. There is no need to belabor what should,
by now, be an obvious point. It is one that has received
ample confirmation in our prior exploration of Mill's
world-view and methodology: Mill's defense of tolerance and
definition of liberty rely on a conception of a clearly
demarcated, field-independent subject. Such a subject is
effectively and affectively capable of maintaining a
discrete sense of identity vis a vis fellow human beings and
his society, to whom and to which he is cautiously related.
Such an identity, as Mill understood clearly, stood to be
threatened in the absence of a self /not-self demarcation and
by means of incursion into its "space" by the
undifferentiated mob. On Liberty may be understood to
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provide such a demarcation and consequent protection.
In short, On Liberty is preoccupied with the liberty of
a well-differentiated masculine subject who requires a
protected zone of thought, expression and action for his
survival and well-being as a masculine subject. Within this
zone, the liberal masculine subject is constituted as a
self-sufficient and sovereign entity. It is from this zone
that he ventures into the social world. In the absence of
specific exceptions, this individual must be protected. The
burden of proof effectively falls on those who would curtail
this individual, as Mill's language makes clear: "the sole
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty or action of
any of their number is self-protection." The social
relations of Mill's subject are to be negotiated within the
frame of an abstract morality of rights . At the center of
this moral scheme is an individual who is not to be
encroached on unless he happens to be invading the space of
another individual.
Mill's political morality of rights may be usefully
counterposed to a different moral structure, one that has
been identified as a specifically feminine morality. As the
research of Carol Gilligan suggests, women proceed with a
morality of (sometimes competing) responsibilities to
others, wherein moral decisions are related to the specifics
of situations, and are motivated by the injunction to avoid
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89or to minimize human hurt. When we place Mill against
this context-dependent scheme, his abstract morality of
rights, centering around an antagonistic relationship
between the individual and society, assumes a specif iably
masculine aura. One cannot help but be struck by the vast
differences between a morality predicated on self-
preservation and one that proceeds by means on complex
adjudication between competing relationships and
respons ibilities.
Finally, it is precisely such an abstract morality of
rights which fuelled and limited Mill's feminist project.
Mill's feminism, to which we now turn, is inhabited by a
masculine subject who cannot help but subvert the very
liberation of women which Mill so gallantly fought for.
Mill's paradoxical feminism recapitulates, in a new form,
the tragic features of On Liberty
, whereby Mill's vision of
the just society was effectively bracketed by his deeply
embedded theoretical and methodological assumptions. That
these assumptions partake of a distinctively masculinist
substance and orientation could not help but problematize
his feminism.
Mi 11 ' s Femi nism
Mill's renascent claim to fame as the only liberal
thinker to have applied the tenets of individual rights to
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women is often invoked not only in terms of praise for
Mill's singular achievement 90
, but also in terms of
incredulity. How, we might well wonder, could a political
theory which effectively secularized the ground of human
dignity, made individuals the masters and architects of
their destinies, and developed abstract and general
principles of individual rights have failed to concern
itself with the sexual double standard? Usually ignored,
women occasionally came into view in liberal theory as
subordinate exceptions rather than as equal participants.
Various justifications for the differential treatment of men
and women invariably fell back on reproductive biology, less
developed intellectual and moral capacities in women than in
men, the sexual division of labor, and the marriage
91
relation. To some extent, Mill also fell into aspects
of this pattern, even as he tried to apply the tenets of his
liberalism to women. Mill i_s unique in his attempt to
situate women consistently within the frame of liberal
rights. However, the pre-Mill failure of liberal political
theory to systematically incorporate women should not be all
that surprising to us. This failure attests, in significant
ways, to the androcentric conception of the human subject at
the very heart of that theory, and not simply to men's need
to re-legitimize the social inferiority of women. On the
basis of the analysis of Hobbes offered in the preceding
chapter, we are in a position to appreciate the inherited
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masculinist features of liberal discourse that may well have
insinuated themselves into Mill's feminist enterprise.
We have just explored several of the ways in which
masculinism inhabits Mill's framework at various levels.
This suggests that Mill's feminist endeavor should be doubly
acclaimed and doubly scrutinized, since it is neither the
simple logical fruition of previously undeveloped
possibilities in liberal theory, nor an unproblematic
reformist inclusion of women as a previously excluded
group. We are already in a position to question the 'add
women and stir' formulation, the assumption that women could
be included within the liberal framework without
significantly altering that framework. At a latent level,
Mill's feminism is the tortured outcome of a system of ideas
which was constitutionally unable to accomodate women as
women
,
as sex-specific and gendered creatures. Women are
dealt with in the terms of exceptional and masculine
individualism. Once again, as we will see, Mill's
preferences turn out to be at odds with his theory. His
feminism is a kind of distorted compromise-formation. To
the extent that they are masculinizable, women are
accomodated within Mill's framework. When they are
not—-notably in their embodied capacities as wives and
mothers—Mill's liberal feminism utterly fails them. In a
sense, the price of liberal feminist liberation is
92trans-sexual i sm. Women must be disembodied, de-sexed,
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de-gendered, and made over into the image of middle- and
upper-class men if they are to benefit from the promises of
liberalism as Mill envisions them. They are "free" to the
extent that they are ennabled to emulate men. Mill's
feminism attempts precisely such an ennabling. As such, it
fails women just at the point that female specificity and
"difference" cannot be ignored.
Mill's feminism in On the Subjection of Women is fuelled
by the attempt to resolve the contradiction posed by the
observation that "the social subordination of women . . .
stands out as an isolated fact in modern social
93institutions." Within the frame of market relations, as
Mill clearly understood:
human beings are no longer born to their place in life
and chained down by an inexorable bond to the place they
are born to, but are free to employ their faculties, and
such favorable chances as offer, to achieve the lot
which may appear to them most desireable. (p. 32)
Sexual inequality for Mill is an antique feudal relic in a
modern world where human beings act as the rational
calculators of chosen utilities. Perceptions of women's
nature have legitimated their exclusion from this modern
conception of the subject. Mill is perhaps at his best in
his discussion of women's nature, which, he argues "rests
with women themselves—to be decided by their own experience
and by the use of their own faculties." (p. 43) He
understands that prevalent conceptions of women's nature are
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the products of a male imagination, and that discussion of
that nature in the hands of men can serve no honest
purpose. "What is now called the nature of women is an
eminently artificial thing." (p. 38) Female "nature",
argues Mill, has been produced within a kind of greenhouse
environment where women have been limited by social
conventions and rules such that their consequent behavior
has been used as "proof" of this nature. If nature prevents
women from doing certain things, such limits will emerge in
the course of time. In the meantime, there is no need to
prevent women from doing what they cannot do and no
justification for barring them from what they can:
.
. .
the knowledge which men can acquire of women even
as they have been and are, without reference to what
they might be, is wretchedly imperfect and superficial,
and always will be so, until women themselves have told
all that they have to tell. (p. 42)
What Mill did not anticipate is that what women had to tell
might throw his entire philosophical and political framework
into question.
We can certainly appreciate Mill's politicization of the
marriage relation, which anticipated the later slogan of
Second Wave feminists, 'the personal is political': "no
slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense
94
of the word, as a wife is." (p. 48) Woman's legal
position within marriage, where her legal rights are
subsumed under those of her husband, paves the way for
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bondage as a possibility within every marriage, argued Mill,
although every husband will not necessarily avail himself of
such despotic opportunity. Men's open entitlement to the
exercise of unlimited authority corrupted men as it impinged
on women.
Mill argues for legal reforms so that married persons
will be equal before the law. He argues for the equal and
voluntary association of marriage partners as a substitute
for patriarchal authority and feminized submission to that
authority. However, his discussion of the politics of
decision-making within the marriage relation is seriously
marred by two flaws: his failure to deal with the political
implications of a sexual division of labor and unpaid
housework, and his curious discussion of the frequent
age-differential between husband and wife as a legitimate
reason for the husband's prerogative in decision-making.
Mill's abstract principles dissolve in the face of the
specificities of household and family life.
Although he advocates "ceasing to make sex a
disqualification for privileges," (p. 112) he seriously
impinges on the vocational and professional aspirations of
women by arguing that the woman who marries has effectively
chosen a 'profession' as mistress of her husband's (1)
household
:
Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a
woman marries, it may in general be understood that she
makes choice of the management of a household, and the
man
bringing up of a family, as the firstexertions, during as many years w Upon herreguired for the purpose- and th»5 I lfe as raay be
all other objects^nfo^upationt w Hl^'l "0tconsistent with the requirements if this
"(J?
1
*)"" n°t
The analogy that Mill draws between the housewife and "a
when he chooses a profession" borders on the absurd, given
the limited singularity of "choice" for the married woman.
While Mill understands in one sense that "the power of
earning is essential to the dignity of a woman, if she has
not independent property," (p. 67) this historically-specific
need for an independent source of income suddenly disappears
for the woman who has committed herself to an "equal"
contract of marriage. Mill is unable or unwilling to
guestion the sexual division of labor within the
95household, and uncritically assumes that legal equality
is primary, while economic parity is its derivative. He
tried to preserve an arena of choice for the married woman
when he wrote that "the utmost latitude ought to exist for
the adaptation of general rules to individual suitabilities,"
(p. 68) but such latitude rests, significantly, on "due
provision" being made for her functions as "mistress of the
family". (Such "due provision", of course, would fall
primarily to working-class and single middle-class women
.
)
Since Mill couches this discussion in terms of the
exc eptionally talented woman, we are left with the distinct
impression that most women would opt for the duties of
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housemistress. We must take Mill at his word when he
writes: "If there is anything vitally important to the
happiness of human beings, it is that they should relish
their habitual pursuit." (p. 126) He assumes that most
women will "relish" t-Via-i r- »i n he chosen" profession as housewives.
Without such an assumption, Mill would have had to radically
re-think the social relations of family life, along with the
relationship between family structure and socio-economic
organization.
In response to the popular argument that the family,
like a society, requires a government and some ultimate
ruler, Mill invokes instead the image of a voluntary
association or business partnership. On the basis of the
partnership model, he argues that final decisions do not
automatically rest with the male. However:
The real practical decision of affairs, to whichever maybe given the legal authority, will greatly depend, as it
even now does, upon comparative qualification. The mere
fact that he is usually the eldest, will in most cases
give the preponderance to the man; at least until theyboth attain a time of life at which the difference in
their eyes is of no importance. There will naturally
also be a more potential voice on the side, whichever it
is, that brings the means of support, (pp. 58-59)
Mill's lip service here to the logical possibility that the
wife might be the familial means of support is belied by his
discussion of women's "choice" of housewifely duties. And
his discussion of the wisdom of age totally sidesteps an
engagement with the question concerning why younger women
marry older men. In spite of his sincere attempts to
dislodge male authority, Mill's discussion has actually
strengthened it in a newly legitimate form. Authority is
only apparently de-sexed. Age and income, still clearly
tied to the husband, and unquestioned as gender-specific
attributes, become the new justifications for differential
power within the marriage relation. The underlying logic of
this account is unmistakable: the woman who wants to reap
liberalism's benefits had better not marry. 96
On this account, liberal feminist theory as articulated
by Mill cannot accomodate the wife and mother. When you
apply a theory of individual rights to women, what comes out
at the other end is the corporate feminist, the career woman
who can compete effectively in the world of aspiring middle
97and upper-class men. Contemporary efforts to salvage
the female in the terms of liberally construed "freedom"
have produced the "Enjouli" superwoman, who can bring home
the bacon, fry it up, and still be sexy for her husband at
the end of a double-work day. Not surprisingly, such a
mindset has also created a "post-feminist" generation of
young women, who see themselves as benefitting from the
legal and economic battles of their older sisters, but no
longer required to act the "militant" part of their
forerunners, because the obstacles to their freedom, legally
and economistically conceived, have been removed. 98 These
developments bear witness to the profound failure of liberal
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feminism.
The singular failure of Mill's feminism consists, in
Part, of the larger failure of his political theory, which
effectively ignored the political dimensions of structural
economic inequality and assumed that legal change would
spearhead social change. Such an approach is consistent
with the notion that it is ideas that make history. Working
class women are not helped in Mill's account of bourgeois
family life, although Mill does take yet another opportunity
to disparage working class men, this time in terms of their
treatment of women. Notably missing here is a discussion of
bourgeois male exploitation of working class women in the
rampant prostitution industry of the times, a phenomenon
that Mill could not likely have been unaware of." m a
similar vein, he was unable to appreciate the possibility
that a political history might have preceded the very sexual
division of labor which he took for granted. Finally, it
never occured to him, just as it seems to have escaped the
attention of contemporary "post-feminists", that the
subjection of women might be more than an outdated
anachronism.
Mill's failure to think through these issues could well
be the result of the understandable limits of human
criticism. And yet, he is relentless in his critical
excavation of the taken-for-granted . Over and over, he
entreats his readers to rethink the unref lect i vely accepted
beliefs of their lives. Mill carries an interesting variety
of blind spots himself. Why does his feminism falter in its
specific fashion? Our answer must look beyond an assessment
of the limits of liberalism to a reconsideration of Mill's
thought as a masculine phenomenon.
Simply put, Mill's feminism collapses on the terrain of
"difference". It fails at precisely the point where women's
activities are not directly mediated by the abstract hand of
the market, where their activities consist of an interchange
with the realm of nature. Mill's feminism collapses on the
terrain of the household. Given his terror of nature, he is
unwilling to acknowledge this feature of women's work and
even more unwilling to make men bear any of the messy
responsibilities associated with it. This interpretation of
Mill's feminism is strengthened in the context of his
curiously ambivalent attitudes towards the women in his
life. On the one hand, there is his mother, who is
systematically denied. On the other, Harriet Taylor is
blown all out of proportion as the unheralded genius of the
age. These attitudes, I would argue, underline Mill's
inability as a political theorist to understand the
situation of women.
In the absence of commonly held knowledge about human
biological reproduction, one could read Mill's Autobiography
and assume that his father bore him: "I was born in London,
on the 20th of May, 1806, and was the eldest son of James
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Mill, the author of the History of British India , (p. 2 )
Mill utterly fails to acknowledge his mother's existence,
much less the difficult circumstances of her life. The
lingering question is whether Mill's mother was denied
because she was a mother, or because she wasn't seen as
being mentally brilliant. It seems fair to suggest that the
two perceptions are inextricably linked. it is in On the
Subjection of Women, rather than the Autobiography
, that
Mill provides us with a brief glimpse into his feelings
about his mother:
A man who is married to a woman his inferior inintelligence finds her a perpetual dead weight, or,
worse than a dead weight, a drag, upon every aspiration
of his to be better than public opinion requires him tobe. It is hardly possible for one who is in thesebonds, to attain exalted virtue. If he differs in his
opinion from the mass— if he sees truths which have not
yet dawned on them, or if, feeling in his heart truths
which they nominally recognize, he would like to act up
to those truths more conscientiously than the generality
of mankind— to all such thoughts and desires, marriage
is the heaviest of drawbacks, unless he be so fortunate
as to have a wife as much above the common level as he
himself is. (p. 114)
Mill's abstract description here fits perfectly with
accounts of James Mill's feelings about his wife, which were
not kept discrete. 100 Furthermore, Harriet Mill was a
living reminder of James Mill's failure to live up to his
own ideal of sexual asceticism. The same man who viewed
"the physical relation and its adjuncts" as "a perversion of
the imagination and feelings . . . one of the deepest seated
and more pervading evils in the human mind," 101 managed to
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father nine children. Harriet Mil! must have stQod as a
constant source of mortification to her husband and eldest
son, a pregnant reminder of her husband's human-all-too-
human desires which had little legitimate space within the
frame of his rational utilitarianism. Notice that J.s.
Mill's description leaves us feeling terribly sorry for the
lofty husband and rather peeved with the dead-weight wife.
Notice too the striking parallels between his rendition of
Nature's drag effect on civilization (explored in the first
section of this chapter) and the wife's retardation of her
husband's noble aspirations: "Worse than a dead weight, a
drag." Once again, we encounter the detectable connections
between a feminized nature set in opposition to a
masculinized civilization.
And then there is Harriet Taylor who, conveniently
enough, comes to represent for Mill everything that his
mother was not. To make things even more convenient, she is
married to another man. She and Mill pursued an ascetic and
deep friendship for twenty years before they finally married
after the death of her first husband. Their marriage, from
Mill's point of view, was a marriage of minds, above all
else. They shared an interest in feminism which Taylor, to
her credit, developed more radically and systematically than
he did. Harriet Taylor's feminism and other intellec-
tual accomplishments notwithstanding, it seems clear
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the Mill overrated her gifts. 103 it has also been
suggested that Mill found her easier to worship from
- 104
afar. Harriet Taylor's de-sexual ization and
over-exaggerated intellectual acumen would seem to be
related much in the same way as his mother's unavoidable
sexuality is tied in with her reported simple-mindedness.
To suggest this is by no means to fail to understand or
appreciate the Victorian sensibility of the times. 105
What is of concern here is that Mill seems to have had
some personal difficulties in dealing with women as flesh
and blood and brain creatures combined. Instead, he resorts
to split images, denying a mother that surely existed and
eulogizing a brain that probably did not. The issue here,
of course, is not Mill's personal attitudes towards women.
These observations are little more than icing on the cake.
But they do substantiate our sense of dis-ease with Mill's
feminism as a practical and desirable model of emancipation
for women. And that is because it avoids the lot of most
women. Mill's denial of his mother haunts On the Subjection
of Women while his exaggerated portrayal of Harriet Taylor
reminds us of our average unexceptionalness
.
Mill's feminism is a feminism for the exceptional woman,
as Zillah Eisenstein argues. 106 But I would add that she
is exceptional in terms that go beyond those of class and
educational privilege. The exceptional woman, within the
terms set by Mill, is effectively re-gendered. For the
terms of her exceptional talent and drive are masculine
terms. To the extent that they imply the conquest of inner
and outer nature, an individualized and objective cognitive
stance, a clear demarcation between self and not-self,
between autonomous individuality and collective identity,
the terms of liberal individualism are indelibly masculine.
This is why Mill's feminism, along with the larger body
of his liberal theory, so fails feminists, including those
who would claim, among other things, a maternal identity and
107practice. Such imagery cannot but be problematic for
those women who would prefer not to make the transsexual
switch, for those who understand that the realm of the
banal—of everyday life— is at least as instructive and as
ennobling as that of extraordinary effort and achievement as
defined by masculine culture. 108 Within this frame of
analysis, we might recall the reported statement of an
anti-E.R.A. woman who was quoted as saying, "I don't care to
109be a person." The liberal feminist response to such a
statement would, of course, be one of incredulity. (She
must be kidding.) This statement, however, may carry more
insight than first meets the eye. For this woman's
anti-feminism might well be motivated by her sense of
violated dignity implied by a liberal feminism housing an
abstract Everyman as its subject. 110 Contemporary liberal
feminism is the progeny of Mill's feminisn, an assimilative
feminism which preempts the critical possibilities of a
feminism that would have us re-think the terms of human I
excellence and achievement even as we question the
gender-based allocation of differential burdens and
benefits. Small wonder that it has elicited the hostility
of women as well as of men. 111
Conclusion
Mill's feminisn, not surprisingly, is a paradoxical
feminism. While his theorization of a status for women
based on the liberal conception of individual rights
ennabled him to opposed the kind of thinking which
legitimized female inferiority in the name of their reduced
capacities for reason, his "feminism" effectively writes
women out as sexed and gendered creatures. In extending his
claims for the protection of liberal man to liberal woman,
Mill unwittingly enacts the masculine prerogative of
privileged identity. For the unitary disembodied subject
housed by liberal theory is no abstract subject, appearances
to the contrary. His motivation to separate from nature; to
observe a "methodologically individualist" terrain; to
cultivate a disembodied reason; to protect himself and
similarly constituted others from incursion into private
"space"; to formulate abstract principles of rights which
can be applied, context-blind, to any scene of social
conflict—all of this may be traced to a substratum of
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experiences, fears and needs which are masculine.
For all of his genuine desires to enter into the mind
and circumstances of others, for all of his discomfort with
utilitarian rationalism, Mill could not get beyond the
gendered terrain of his philosophical enterprise. What he
did achieve, however, is not insignificant. He pushed the
liberal enterprise as far as it might go, and perhaps a
little farther. The paradoxes generated by his efforts,
captured most strikingly in the disparity between his
ethical vision of socially concerned individuals working for
the improvement in social conditions of their "fellow-
citizens and his conception of the isolated liberal subject,
are our paradoxes still. To the extent that they are
transcendable, the clues for such a project lie in Mill.
Feminists should neither ignore him nor uncritically adopt
his framework for women's emancipation. To pursue the
former course would be to ignore our political culture; to
adopt the latter would effectively preempt "womanly
thinking". 112
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masculine subject. Furthermore, none have invoked the
maternal experience as a critical counterexample to
atomism. (Significantly, Jaggar does.)
To argue, as I attempt here, that Mill's liberalismpartakes of masculine ideology, is not to suggest that males
are incapable of feeling uncomfortable with and formulating
significant critiques of liberalism. They may well,however, find it more difficult than female critics toidentify gender-specific components of the theory.
63Keller, "Gender and Science", p. 416.
64This version of science has, of course, been
disputed by several scientists and philosophers of science,
including Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970);
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic
Theory of Knowledge (London: New Left Books, 1975); and
Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being (Chicago: University of
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(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983),
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of science and of how the contemporary dissatisfaction with
the logics of justification in science may be a
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Variable in Conceptions of Rationality?" in Beyond
Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy , ed
.
Carol C. Gould (Totawa, N. J. : Rowman and Allanheld, 1984),
pp. 43-63, and "Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible
Only Now?" in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on
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and cognitive development.
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89Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard
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Research 50 (3): Lorraine B. Code, "Responsibility and the
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interpretations of the new conservatism in U.S. politics,
see the following: Zillah Eisenstein, "Ant i feminism in the
Politics and Elections of 1980," in Feminist Studies 7 (2):
187-205; Susan Harding, "Family Reform Movements: Recent
Feminism and Its Opposition," in Feminist Studies 7 (1):
57-75; Rosalind P. Petchesky, "Antiabort ion, Ant i feminism,
and the Rise of the New Right," in Feminist Studies 7 (2):
206-246; Christine R. Riddiough, "Women, Feminism, and the
1980 Elections," in Socialist Review 56 (March-April 1981),
pp. 37-54; and Linda Gordon and Allen Hunter, "Sex, Family
and the New Right: Anti-Feminism as a Political Force," in
Radical America 11 (6): 9-25.
112This term is Sara Ruddick's from "Maternal
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CHAPTER V
KARL MARX: THE POVERTY OF PRODUCTION
thJfr^ fT rea1 ' aCtiVS mSn ' and °n the b^is of
r$ IZ reJ1_llfe Process we demonstrate the developmentof the ideological reflexes and echoes of this lifeprocess. iAi
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology
To regard society as one single subject is ... to lookat it wrongly; speculatively.
Karl Marx, Grundrisse
Introduct ion
There is a bittersweet irony located at the heart of the
attempt to uncover masculine ideology in the theory of Karl
Marx. For the thesis of masculinity as ideology is a
testament to Marx's materialist method and certain of his
categories, even as it calls into critical question the
Marxian framework and world view. Significantly, the thesis
of masculine ideology poses a fundamental challenge to a
theory that failed to take account of its own gendered
standpoint. Proceeding from Marx's and Engels' maxim that
"consciousness [is determined] by life," 1 our critical
exploration of Marx will advance in two ways: an 'external'
feminist standpoint will be brought to bear on a body of
work that will also be assessed within the frame of its own
outlook and terminology; that is to say, immanently.
Marx presented his theory, in contradistinction to the
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productions of the Hegelian idealists and liberal political
economists, as a theory about "real individuals, their
activity and their material conditions." 2 While his
individuals may well be "real", they are not fully
representative of humanity (unless one believes and is
prepared to argue that gender is not a significant
constituent of life experience, identity, consciousness,
knowledge and practice.) What is missing in Marx's social
theory, of course, is an explicit account of gender. The
criticism levelled by Marx against theoreticians of
"society" conceived in the abstract could similarly be
applied to his theoretical and empirical accounts of
class-identified men. Using Marxian terminology, we could
dub this a "speculative" error, one that ignores tangible
and significant sources of differences between human
beings. If capitalist society is no "single subject",
neither is either of its two .(or more) constituent
3
classes. Ironically, women suffer a similar treatment
and fate in the hands of Marx that the proletariat suffered
under the rubric of liberal political economy: they are
rendered falsely, if at all, and are thereby kept invisible
and powerless.
But while it is all too easy, and a bit tiresome at this
point, to charge Marx with grand neglect on the issue of
4 .gender, it is less easy to make the case for a masculine
ideological structure in his work. This has to do with the
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following issues: 1) problems that accompany the attempt to
deal with the full scon, of Marx's work; 2) certain aspects
of Marx's method that have an ambivalent cast, particularly
when considered in relation to feminist critiques of other
epistemologies to which it is also opposed; 3) the
contemporary intersection of Marxism and feminism. Each of
these problems will be examined briefly in turn.
We are by now quite familiar with the complex breadth of
Marx's work. While attempts to cut certain portions of the
published work out of the "essential" Marx seem to do
violence to the relevant complexities and sustained vision
of the man's work (Althusser comes to mind as the grand
culprit here), those who attempt to spell out the unified
structure of Marx's entire thought tidy things up too
5
much. We should be as wary of the attempt to impose a
singular unifying structure on Marx's work as of efforts to
depict a schizophrenic Marx, one who totally repudiated his
youthful analyses of alienation and his debt to Hegel.
Jerrold Seigel's recent biography of Marx alerts us to the
first danger, while careful reading of the Grundr i sse helps
us to maneuver around the second. 6 Like the humanity that
he depicted so vividly, Marx was a creature immured in time
and place. Measured against the often ridiculously inflated
standards of social theory (and we would do well to ponder
the possibility of a relationship between these standards
and the history of male hegemony in Western social
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theory) 7
,
he is either brought tumbling down from his
throne on high for being less than perfect, idolized and
parroted for a totalizing wisdom that no single human could
possibly possess, or given satanic attributes and responsi-
bilities for revolutions gone sour. Each of these treatment:
grants him both too much and too little. 8
Turning to the second set of problems, we are brought
face to face with dialectics. To the extent that dialectics
in the hands of Marx represents an attempt to transcend the
dichotomies which methodological individualism, among other
epistemologies, perpetuates, what does this mean for our
assessment of Marx's method? Initially, it would seem,
dialectics is more closely allied with a feminine
epistemological orientation, most especially in its
relational and dialogic orientation. 9 These issues bring
us directly to Hegel's doorstep. Clearly, a feminist
assessment of Hegel is long due, although it exceeds the
bounds of this particular work. 10 Our focus here will be
on Marx's utilization of Hegel's method as he understood it
and chose to appropriate it. In the hands of Marx, as I
will argue, the dialectic assumes an ambivalent cast,
simultaneously questioning and reproducing masculinist
epistemological assumptions. This will be especially
evident in the dialectical interplay between subject and
object which ultimately fails as genuine Aufhebung.
The materialist aspect of Marx's method is also situated
ambivalently in relation to feminist critiques of idealist
or rationalist methodologies which elevate the brain at the
expense of the body. 11 Once again, it would seem, Marx's
method partakes of a revolt against classically masculine
methodology. While this characterization is true to a
significant extent, we will also see that Marx's materialist
account is seriously flawed through significant errors of
omission, which tend to perpetuate masculinist assumptions
about the "real" world and to exclude female experiences.
Finally, it is plausible to suggest that it is not only
the activist orientation of Marxism, but also its
dialectical and materialist elements which account for the
widespread contemporary attraction of feminists to Marx.
The contemporary intersection of feminism and Marxism makes
difficult, but not impossible, the effort to develop a
critique of Marxism as a masculine theory. Several
significant strands of feminist theory owe Marx quite a
large debt: Socialist-Feminists and Freudo-Marxist
feminists have incorporated wholesale many of his
12
categories. My own intellectual and political formation
within these efforts is inescapable. Furthermore, many of
the female heroines revived during feminism's quest for
active role models came directly out of socialist and
Marxist movements. These activist women furnished rousing
proof of our slumbering potential, even as gradually
emerging intimations of their maltreatment within the ranks
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of "comrades" and their own antipathy to feminism as a
"bourgeois" movement began to initiate a round of
questioning about the relationship between Marxism,
socialism, and feminism that is still going strong. 13
For these, among other, reasons Marx poses difficulties
and challenges not to be found in either Hobbes or Mill.
Perhaps feminist scrutiny of his work offers greater promise
of intellectual and political benefits. Those of us who
identify as radicals in a world of enlarged possibilities
and dangerously amplified threats to human happiness and
14
survival must come to terms with Marx as a thinker who
attempted to understand the inner workings of capitalist
society and thereby reinvigorate humanity's guidance of its
future. In reassessing Marx's legacy to radical social
theory we are also re-thinking our identity and practice as
critical thinkers and radical activists in the present.
Marx's Style
[Communism] is the solution to the riddle of history,
and it knows itself to be this solution.
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
Students of Marx are well aware of the vital relationship
between the substance and style of his work. Marx's style
could be variously characterized as arrogant, aggressive,
ruthless, combative, sarcastic, sneering, relentless, and
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brilliant. While some find his style distasteful and
oppressive, others view it as the appropriate and
complementary voice for the radical critic of a brutal and
dehumanizing capitalism. Perhaps more than any other modern
social theorist, Marx is the inspiration for critics of
"value free" social theory and social science, in spite of
his own claims to empirical scientific veracity. Marx's
achievement in Capital was to imaginatively adopt the
standpoint of the working class and to elaborate an analysis
of capitalism from that standpoint. 15 What he managed to
produce in so doing was a theory that was simultaneously
analytic/descriptive and radically evaluative in an
"internal" sense. Classically Marxian terms such as
"exploitation", "surplus value", "alienation", "private
property", and even "labor" bear witness to this powerful
fusion of description and evaluation. Marx's language opens
up new vistas of insight even as it commits its users to a
critical stance towards the reality revealed behind the
facade of bourgeois relations and appearances.
Critics and disciples of Marx would probably agree that
his characteristic style was an aggressive one. His
typical, polemical mode involved "marking out his own
position by eliminating former or potential colleagues from
it." 1 ^ Such was also his strategy during those intense
periods of private study, research, and note taking that
punctuated his chaotic and diffficult life. Marx's approach
to an issue was invariably one that proceeded over the
toppled carcasses of existing, would-be and sometimes
fabricated opponents. It seems that he needed such
opponents to get himself going. "From his student days to
the time of Capital ," writes Jerrold Seigel, "Marx's
characteristic mode of defining himself was by opposition,
excluding others from the personal space he occupied." 17
We may understand this definitional mode, which is not
simply a polemical mode, in two non-exclusive ways. On the
one hand, the method bears witness to his Hegelian roots.
We could say that Marx's style takes to heart Hegel's
distaste for atomistic intellectuals who denied their
relational historical and social identities. 18
Additionally, this style employs a type of Hegelian
dialectical rationale, whereby Marx developed and finetuned
his concepts through confrontational exchanges with other
thinkers. On the other hand, there is something disturbing
in the style of a theorist who can only create a discursive
space for himself by "invading" and "reappropr iat ing " the
territory of displaced others. Like Hobbes, Marx evinces a
combative, heroic, and hence, masculine style. 19
In speculating on the possible sources of Marx's
aggressive style, Jerrold Seigel has suggested that Marx's
mother may provide a clue. Seigel argues that Marx's style
might have been a reaction against Henriette Marx's
intrusive and dominating nurture style. This interpretation
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is problematic on several counts, although it contains an
important measure of insight.
First, Seigel never manages to convincingly make the
case for a maternal style that is either intrusive or
dominating. The little evidence that we do have (one
20letter) shows a mother who was solicitous of her son's
health and well-being and eventually critical of his
inability to support himself and his family. The record
also suggests that Marx showed little affection for her
during his adult years and visited her infrequently, and
P ithen primarily to request money. We simply do not know
enough about Henriette Marx or her relationship to Karl to
characterize her as an overbearing mother.
However, we might well ask, when is maternal nurturance
within the bourgeois, nuclear family not intrusive and
dominating? Seigel slides into the dangerous and
contestable tendency of "blaming the mother", whereas the
real issue here is a more structural one. That is, the kind
of family in which Karl Marx was reared is precisely that
modern, intensely affective, nuclear configuration where
mothers carry an inordinate amount of responsibility for and
power over the lives of young children. Within such a
setting, children are likely to perceive their mothers as
intrusive and dominating creatures, regardless of the
individual capacities for non-intrusive nurturance that
specific mothers may or may not have. Such perceptions are
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likely to be retained in adulthood, often in unconscious
and/or disguised forms. Marx's estranged adult relationship
with his mother, coupled with his inflated-romantic
courtship to Jenny von Westphalen, suggest that he suffered,
like Mill, from an unresolved ambivalence toward the primal,
pre-oedipal mother. This ambivalence, as we will see,
carries over into his analysis of women's labor under
capitalism. But it has precious little to do with the
actual woman who mothered him.
The second problem with Seigel's analysis of Marx's
aggressive style is that it proceeds as if this style is
simply an individual phenomenon, a personality quirk. In
other words, Seigel pays little attention to the
intellectual tradition within which Marx was embedded. An
adversarial, aggressive style is a significant feature of
the Western philosophical tradition; furthermore, it may
have found in dialectics a particularly hospitable
environment, since its conversational form has assumed
22combative, as well as dialogic features. To
characterize Marx's aggressive style simply as a feature of
his personality is mistaken. This is not to say that Marx
had nothing to do with the matter. But his intellectual
style could more usefully be recast in terms which
acknowledge a pre-existing intellectual stylistic legacy for
23
which he was temperamentally suited, if not gifted.
The aggressive, adversarial mode is also larger and more
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significant than an individual feature of personality to the
extent that it partakes of a masculine cognitive structure
and style. We have already commented extensively on this
issue in the previous discussion of Hobbes's adversarial
style. For Marx, as well as for Hobbes, this adversarial
style may be understood, in part, to recapitulate at the
level of adult intellectual practice and identity the prior
process of struggle for a location and identity vis "a vis
the pre-Odeipal mother. This process, as we have already
noted in more extensive detail, is marked by a greater sense
of opposition, danger and conflict for the boy-child than
for the girl-child. Within the experiential and symbolic
frame of modern western gendered culture, it comes to be
more firmly identified with a masculine identity. In part,
it is constitutive of such an identity. The echoes of this
earlier struggle for identity ramify in distinctive ways on
Marx's intellectual and polemical style, which flourishes in
hostile territory and will brook no contenders. Ironically,
the radical theorist of species-being and envisioner of
communist society embodied an intellectual stance and style
24
which contradicted his ontology.
This problematic, masculinist feature of Marx's style
has also had unfortunate consequences for the political
history of Marxist movements and may account, in part
, for
the undeniable fact that "the texture of Marxist thinking
25degenerates easily into dogma." While we can also cite
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such factors as the subsequent positivist appropriation of
Marx, the progressive teleological historical thrust of the
theory, and the sense of privileged standpoint to account
for the regressive dogmatism of the theory, the fact that
Marx's style often tended to be aggressively monovocal
rather than dialogic should not be dismissed. But the
really important question here concerns the extent to which
Marx's aggressive, masculinist style is bound up with the
substance of his theory.
Seigel's analysis is vindicated, then, with the proviso
that we substitute the mother of Marx's primary process
memory, early experience and specific family structure for
his "real" mother, and that we go on to acknowledge that
mothers of the former sort lurk in the stylistic tradition
of adversarial intellectual discourse and have "helped" (as
projections of the masculine imagination) to shape the
subtext of that discursive style.
On a final note, we might pause to consider one of
Marx's early characterizations of his enterprise in this
excerpt from "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right : Introduction,":
As philosophy finds in the proletariat its material
weapons, so the proletariat finds in philosophy its
intellectual weapons, and as soon as the lightning bolt
of thought has struck deep into the virgin soil of the
people, the emancipation of the Germans into men will be
completed . 26
What we find here is a language of intellectual weaponry and
warfare, a phallic and violent metaphorical rendition of
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thought as a lightning bolt that will turn emasculated
Germans into men, and a latent homosexual imagery which
confirms an androcentric conception of political and
intellectual activities. The fact that this essay is often
held up as the inspirational model for critical social
theorists should give us additional pause for thought.
Marx's Method
The two decisive features of Marx's method are
dialectics and materialism, which issue in Marx's
characteristic and innovative treatment of history and
labor. If labor is the "base" of Marx's theory, history is
its "superstructure". Each is conceived on its own in
dialectical and materialist ways, even as they are similarly
related. Marx's methodological debt to Hegel is as
difficult to ignore as are his differences from him:
.
. .
the greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology and its
final product, the dialectic of negativity as the moving
and creating principle, is on the one hand that Hegel
conceives of the self-creation of man as a process,
ob jectif ication as loss of the object, as
external ization and the transcendence of this
externalization. This means, therefore, that he grasps
the nature of labor, and understands objective man,
true, because real, man as the result of his own
labor. 27
My dialectic method is not only different from the
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the
life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of
thinking ... is the demiurgos of the real world, and
the real world is only the external phenomenal form of
'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is
nothing else than the material world reflected by the
human mind, and translated into forms of thought. 28
The materialist aspect of Marx's method is the core of
his "inversion' of Hegel. Displacing Geist, Marx relocates
dialectics in the laboring activities and relationships of
human beings and re-reads history as a panoply of class
29struggle. What Marx retains after discarding Hegel's
"mystical shell" is a belief that the material social world
is essentially dialectical and that a dialectical mode of
inquiry is best suited to understanding such a world.
Dialectics is thus an ontology with a corresponding
epistemology. Like any other ontology, dialectics cannot be
definitively evaluated in scientific or empirical terms. We
either believe that reality is essentially change, flux,
contradiction; that apparently discrete and disparate
objects could be related; that the identities of various
objects actually derive from and inhere in their
relationships with other objects; that there is a deeper,
dialectical level of reality beneath and within the static
level of appearances; or we don't. In other words,
dialectics either confirms and enriches our experience,
provides us with what we feel is explanatory power, or we
search elsewhere. Those of us who are persuaded that life
is dialectical can attempt to persuade others of the
truthfulness and intellectual power of a dialectical
methodology; but we will never able to "prove" it so. On
this view, dialectics is no more and no less "metaphysical"
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than any other epi stemology
.
Marx's dialectical method would seem to be most
vulnerable in its historical rendition in his hands.
Significantly, he shares with Hegel an optimistic view of a
progressive unfolding of history. While this unfolding
proceeds dialect ically, through processes of contradictions
and newly formed social entities, it assumes along with
Hegel's view a teleological endpoint which is also the basis
for judging how far history has come. For Marx this
endpoint consists of the self-realization of man, rather
than of Geist:
Communism is the positive abolition of private property,of human self-alienation, and thus the r^Tl^propgiat
i
onof human nature through and for man. It is, therefore,the return of man himself as a social
, i.e., reallyhuman, being, a complete and conscious return which
assimilates all the wealth of previous development.Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism
and as a fully developed humanisn is naturalism. It isthe definitive resolution of the antagonism between man
and nature, and between man and man. It is the true
solution of the conflict between existence and essence,between ob jecti f icat ion and self-affirmation, betweenfreedom and necessity, between individual and species.
It is the solution to the riddle of history and knowsitself to be this solution. 30
A measure of the centrality and importance of this optimistic
reading of history as progress, culminating in the "end of
history" may be gained by reflecting on the devastating
consequences for Horkheimer and Adorno of German fascism.
Their ensuing intellectual crisis was provoked not simply by
the horror at hand, but also in their realization that Marx
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had left them totally unequipped to deal with this kind of
massive 'regression'. Significantly, the turn that they
took
'
in Dialectic of Enlightenment. , would have to be
assessed in Marxian terms as "ideological". 31
If we approach dialectics as a theory of process, we see
that it confirms and describes certain types of experience
in the world, those that are often apprehended in intuitive
and preverbal terms. Dialectics speaks to the experience of
intimate social relations, the life of the body, the
panorama of Nature, and pre- or unconscious modes of
thinking, including those found in artistic and religious
modes of expression (what Freud called the "oceanic
feeling".) It offers a model of development that operates
through the conflict of interdependent opposites and whose
earliest surviving description may be found in Heraclitus:
War is the father and king of all things ....
Opposition is good; the fairest harmony comes out of
differents; everything originates in strife .... We
enter and do not enter the same river, we are and are
not .... The way up and the way down are one and the
same . 32
Robert Heilbroner describes dialectics as "at bottom an
effort to systematize, or to translate into the realm of
manageable communicable thought, certain unconscious or
pre-consc ious modes of apprehending reality, especially
33
social reality." As such, dialectics is often
maddeningly elusive in intellectual terms, as well as being
susceptible of intellectual abuse. Heraclitus provides an
early clue in his invocation of "war" on the one hand, and
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"fairest harmony" on the other. Thriving in an atmosphere
of ambiguity, contradiction, and flux, dialectics defies
"the syntaxes of common sense and logic." 34 Hegel
understood this well:
There is absolutely nothing whatever in which we cannotand must not point to contradictions or opposite
attributes; and the abstraction made by understandingtherefore means a forcible insistence on a single
aspect, and a real effort to obscure and remove all
consciousness of the other attribute which isinvolved
.
35
Whose experience is dialectics most likely to describe?
Putting the question a little differently, what kind of
experience is most likely to generate a dialectical view of
things? (These questions presume: 1) that all epistemo-
logies are founded on some version of ontology, and 2) that
ontology recapitulates, in some fashion, particular versions
* • s 36ot experience.) An ontology of essential changefulness
,
flux, struggle, opposition, achieved-yet-vulnerable unities
is, more likely than not, going to express the experience of
those groups of people who are either alienated with a
socio-cultural order and are therefore less likely to buy
into that order's reified and totalizing image of itself,
and/or whose life activities involve qualities and processes
37
of a dialectically described world.
The affinity between a dialectical ontology and the life
of the working class under capitalism was not lost on Marx.
His description of labor is especially rich in dialectical
imagery, drawing on the process of creative interchange
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between laborers and Nature and on the creative process of
labor itself, which is simultaneously exploited and denied
under capitalism. Throughout the Manuscripts
, we see Marx
struggling to substitute a dialectical language of
things-as-relations for the predominant language of
things-as-discrete-objects. This exercise reaches its apex
in his liberatory vision of unalienated labor:
Mph
Suppose that we had produced in a human manner;each of us would in his production have doubly affirmedhimself and his fellow men. I would have: I)
ttl
objectified in my production my individuality and itspeculiarity and thus both in my activity enjoyed anindividual expression of my life and also in looking atthe object have had the individual pleasure of realizingthat my personality was objective, visible to the sensesand thus a power raised beyond all doubt. 2) In yourenjoyment or use of my product I would have had thedirect enjoyment of realizing that I had both satisfied
a human need by my work and also objectified the human
essence and therefore fashioned for another human beingthe object that met his need. 3) I would have been foryou the mediator between you and the species and thusbeen acknowledged and felt by you as a completion ofyour own essence and a necessary part of yourself andhave thus realized that I am confirmed both in yourthought and in your love. 4) In my expression of mylife I would have fashioned your expression of yourlife, and thus in my own activity have realized my own
essence, my human, my communal essence. 38
More recently, feminists have begun to notice a new set
of parallels between women's experience and dialectics.
Such parallels reside in the biological and social experience
of reproduction; the nurture of young children; 40
41
"women's work"; and the experience of women as the
objectified "other" in male dominated society. 42 The
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affinities between this last experience and Hegel's
rendition of developing self
-consciousness in the
Master-Slave relationship have been as significant for
feminists as they have been for theoreticians of
working-class consciousness and liberation. Workers and
women, then, for shared and different reasons, are each
obvious constituencies for dialectics. While Marx was able
to develop a dialectical theory of society and social change
from the vantage point of the male worker, he failed to do
so for women. This failure is most evident in his virtual
non-treatment of women's sex- and gender-specific labor.
But before we turn to a more sustained examination of
Marx's analysis of labor, a final note on his method is in
order. As an ontology and method, dialectics partakes of a
worldview which is simultaneously conflictual and wholistic.
That is, its stress on internal relations can either yield
an "everything-is-connected" view or an "everything-is-
43contradiction" view. Marx tended, on the whole, to
promote the latter formulation, particularly in his
political writings. This is especially evident in his view
of history, including his theory of class struggle. Within
the frame of Marx's utilization of dialectics, the wholistic
view is effectively consigned to the arena of "after-the
revolution"—communist society.
The strength of conflict theory lies in its analytic
simplicity and in its ability to see through the "civilized"
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and "fair" appearance of liberal bourgeois economic
relations. Its weakness is manifested in its diminished
ability to articulate the complex nuances of social
44identity. As a revolutionary theory, Marxism has been
notoriously deficient in coming to terms with the
agonizingly complex features of social change. 45 I would
argue that this is at least partially the result of a
conflict theory which promotes a dichotomous and dualistic
view of social reality. Theoretical oversimplification
along the lines of "us" and "them" has yielded notorious
abuses. Vast numbers of human beings have been "eliminated"
in the interests of "politically correct" policy.
Cataclysmic theories of change fail to appreciate the
embeddedness of beliefs and practices, along with the human
need for stability, familiarity, and continuity. 46
A good part of the problem here may reside with the
dialectical starting point. That is, while dialectics
purports to be ant i-dual ist ic , it is already, significantly,
situated within a dualistic frame which is to be superceded
in terms of a warfare model. Someone wins, and someone
loses. While opposition need not operate along these lines
(see, for example Mary O'Brien's discussion of the
opposition of externality and internal i ty
)
47
it certainly
takes on these contours within the framework of Marx's model
of class relations. Significantly, we will also find it
elaborated in his theory of labor as a dialectic between man
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and nature.
We can detect in Marx's dichotomous, two-class model of
dialectical conflict a masculine cognitive stance, one which
parallels the self-other relational struggle for recognition
and in some ways enacts the desired omnipotence of a
fledgling masculine ego. The notion of privileged
49
standpoint degenerates into a vision of the omnipotence
of an eventually victorious working class and the total
demise of the other. Like Hegel's portrayal of a fight to
the death between two egos who cannot (yet) tolerate
reciprocal acknowledgement, Marx's view of class relations
may be viewed as a developmentally retarded account of
social relations. That is, it may well be part of a
developmental stage of personal identity and socio-political
relations, but it fails utterly as a final, comprehensive
and satisfactory account. The terms of this failure are
both empirical and theoretical. That is, history has not
vindicated Marx's expectations of increasingly dichotomized
class relations in capitalist societies; and theoretical
efforts to understand late capitalism seem to be hampered
50rather than helped by the two-class model. Finally,
there is something in this model that makes many of us
justly uneasy. To the extent that it partakes of and
reproduces a gendered outlook on social relations, it cannot
accomodate alternative conceptions of social conflict and
. 51harmony
.
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Marx's Theory of t.*>^
[T]he first premise of all human existence and
be^n ll%ol
l^ 1
^n°rY ' * ' [i5] that mSS iust
•W t P^ition to live in order to be able tomake history". But life involves before
everything else eating, drinking, a habitation,
clothing and many other things. The first
to'sati^i ^ the Product ^n of the means
life itself ^ production of material
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology
Mothers are no more visible within Marx's account of
fundamental human activity—labor—than they are in Hobbes's
state of nature or Mill's version of liberal civilization.
Given his stress on the laboring activities of human beings
and the material preconditions for certain forms of
distinctively "human" activity, this invisibility is all the
more striking in Marx. It contributes, as we will see, to a
limited and distorted account of labor. The distortions of
this account ramify, in turn, on Marx's conception of
"nature", "necessity", and "freedom".
"Marx's procedure was in fact to set out from men's
labor and to ignore the specificity of women's labor,"
writes Nancy Hartsock. 52 The invisibility of women's
labor ramifies in distinctive ways, as we will see, on
Marx's account of "human" labor, and helps to account for
the difficulties encountered by those who have attempted to
add women's work to Marx's frame. In The German Ideology
Marx and Engels discuss the history of the division of labor
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and locate its first instance in the sexual division of
labor in the family. 53 They go on to categorize familial
relations, including the sexual division of labor, as
"natural" relations. Adding insult to injury, they dismiss
the social significance of the sexual division of labor by
stating that a "real" division of labor only emerges with
the division between manual and mental labor. Given Marx's
insistence that social relations be de-ontologized and
understood in historically specific ways, this is
particularly problematic. what Marx and Engels subsequently
miss in their focus on the division between "brain" and
"hand" is the "heart". 54 For:
Women's work is of a particular kind—whether menial or
requiring the sophisticated skills involved in child
care, it always involves personal service. Perhaps to
make the nature of this caring, intimate, emotionally
demanding labor clear, we should use the ideologically
loaded term "love". For without love, without close
interpersonal relationships, human beings, and it would
seem especially small human beings, cannot survive.
This emotionally demanding labor requires that women
give something of themselves to the child, to the man.
The production of people is thus qualitatively different
from the production of things. It requires caring
labor—the labor of love. 55
The real first premise of human existence is that we are
born; that some woman has "labored" to bring us into the
world. The second premise is that we will be cared for
during our early years of biological and emotional
vulnerability. And this second premise calls on, but is not
exhausted by, Marx's and Engels' first: the production of
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the means to satisfy our needs for nourishment, protection
and (equally important but unment ioned ) , social intercourse.
Strangely enough, reproduction enters the scene as the
third premise of history: "men [sic], who daily remake
their own life, begin to make other men [sic], to propagate
their kind: the relationship between man and woman, parents
and children, the family ." 56 Marx's and Engels ' sense of
historical sequence here is strangely, but familiarly,
skewed. The starting point for their analysis of the
premises of history-making men is the already born and
nurtured human being. Not only do mothers not make an
appearance until the third act, but they are smuggled in via
a partiarchal family. Mothers and fathers enter the Marxian
historical scene simultaneously. History and common-sense
suggest, however, that "mothers" predated "fathers". 57
When we do encounter "reproduction" in Marx's economic
writings, it is reduced to the quantifiable notion of the
value of commodities which we must consume in order to
survive from day to day:
The minimum limit of the value of labour-power is
determined by the value of the commodities, without the
daily supply of which the labourer cannot renew his
vital energy, consequently by the value of those means
of subsistence that are physically indispensable . 58
This formulation, of course, writes out the "use-values"
produced by women's labor and is also incapable of
accounting for the domestic labor of women which is devoted
to the conversion of commodity goods into consummable
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use-values. (Food is the best example of this.) Given the
intimate relationship between women's labor in the
recognized labor force and the labor of reproduction in the
home, this move is doubly problematic. Marx not only fails
to recognize women's work within the home, but he cannot
provide us with the tools for understanding sexually
segregated labor markets. 59
Recent attempts to formulate a theory of women's work
have shifted from prior efforts to accomodate such a theory
within the conceptual framework of Marxian economics,
highlighting instead the activity of "caring" as "a labour
which ensures life, as much as an emotion which expresses
60love." Arguing that the separate analysis of labor and
love (through the disciplines of economics and psychology)
is problematic for a full understanding of women's
caregiving activities, this approach is both
phenomenological and structural. That is, it takes
seriously the lived experience of women's labor, even as it
observes that caring "marks the point at which the relations
of capital and gender intersect." 61 The labor of caring
for elderly parents, helpless children, handicapped family
members, over-worked husbands, etc., is a vital part of
women's work life which also translates into the
notoriously underpaid arena of "pink collar" work. It may
or may not produce use-values, need not entail the
consumption of commodities. But it is part of the
life-blood of our production system. 62 And it has a
powerful effect on the work that women do: from the full-
er part-time housewife, to the secretary, social worker,
nurse, waitress, elementary school teacher, welfare mother,
and prostitute.
Within Marx's economic framework, women's labor vanishes
and we are left with "a gender-biased account of social
production and an incomplete account of the life-processes
of human beings." This account cannot help affecting
Marx's vision of post-capitalist society, where we fish in
the morning, hunt in the afternoon, and engage in social
criticism after dinner. 64 Not only has Marx "made the
tacit assumption that the usually invisible laborer cooks
the meal," 65 but he has failed to remember the children,
relying instead on dependable, invisible female
responsibility for this work.
This issue here is not simply one of exclusion, which
could be rectified by including women in the theory. Marx's
failure to understand and appreciate reproductive and caring
labor directly influences his understanding of "productive"
labor. This understanding was perhaps most artfully
captured by Marx in his comparison of the architect and the
66bee. While this comparison rightfully emphasizes the
creative and self-conscious aspects of human labor, it errs
in postulating an idealized and over-voluntar ist image of
human labor. This image issues in Marx's vision of an
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unalienated labor which can only be so when it has been
emancipated from the realm of necessity. Hence:
lah^t^* ° f freedom actually begins only where
3olsTdeTifTonT
determlne
g &t necessity and mundin^c n i rati s ceases; thus in the very~n^tu7e~3f-thinaS
oro^n^
S
-
bey°nd thS SphSre
° f actual material
9
?o sa?is?v'hif
St
?
S ^ SaVage mUSt Wrestle wit^ Naturet tisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life somust civilized man, and he must do so in all socialformations and under all possible modes of production
expand^a^r^^f '/hiS realm ° f I*yical necessityxpands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time
increasT
3
? ^
oduction which satisfy these wants llsoFreedom m this field can only consist in
J?
6 men
f
the associated producers, rationallyregulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it
as IL £25525 control, instead of bei ng rllel 57 it
IL^t I °lCeS ° f NatUre; and achieving this withthe least expenditure of energy and under conditionsmost favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature.But it nonetheless remains a realm of necessity. Beyondit begins that development of human energy which i s Inend in itself, the true realm of freedom
, wh7ch~h3w"ev^r
,
can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity asits basis
. .
.67 (italics mine.)
Necessity
— that ineradicable foe—must be diminished as much
as possible for a truly "human" history to flourish. Nature
and humanity are thus, in some sense, opposed. 68 On this
level, at least, Marx and Mill share a similar orientation
with respect to nature. This vision of freedom is, of
course, tied in with Marx's sense of history and with his
historical sense of progress as a steadily expanding control
over nature. The conditions for freedom are the conditions
for such control, necessary but not sufficient guarantors of
human self-realization. Marx's anticipated "reconciliation"
of humanity and nature thus takes place at the dialectical
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se
expense of nature controlled.
If Marx had stopped to seriously consider the labor of
mothers, he would have been forced in one of two
directions: either to characterize such labor as
less-than-human because it is bound to nature (i.e., becau
it is not subject to full control and because as biological
reproductive labor it is animal-like); 69 or to re-think
his account of labor to accomodate reproductive labor, which
is influenced by biology and necessity, as well as by
culture. Implicitly, I would argue, the former
characterization prevails in his analysis of labor. Mary
O'Brien's comparison of the mother and the architect
introduces some of the more stubborn and interesting
features of maternal labor which Marx avoided. They are
worth considering in some detail:
To comprehend a self and a world and a task to be done,to work out the way to do it, to act upon this
determination, to make something and know that one has
made it, to 'reproduce' oneself daily by means of thelabour process; all of this is the unity of thinking anddoing, the fundamental praxis of production which is
embedded in socio-histor ical modes of production.
Reproduction is quite different . . . biological
reproduction differs in that it is not an act of
rational will. No one denies a motherly imagination,
which foresees the child in a variety of ways ....
[F]emale reproductive consciousness knows that a child
will be born, knows what a child is, and speculates in
general terms about this child's potential. Yet mother
and architect are quite different. The woman cannot
realize her visions, cannot make them come true, by
virtue of the reproductive labor in which she
involuntarily engages, if at all. Unlike the architect,
her will does not influence the shape of her product.
Unlike the bee, she knows that her product, like
herself, will have a history. Like the architect, she
knows what she is doinq- lilce i-^o k q ,
what she is doing. 70
bSS
'
She Cannot helP
At issue here are questions of control, the human
relationship to Nature, and the characterization of
identifiably human activities as exclusively rational and
self-generative. Stressing the planned, conscious, and
purposive dimensions of human labor, Marx counterposes such
labor to the realm of Necessity (Nature) and so is
constitutionally unable to see women's reproductive labor
and its derivatives as human labor. The fact that
"productive" labor as such would be impossible without
reproductive and caring labor makes this blindspot all the
more problematic. Marx has failed to fully specify the
preconditions for "human" labor as he sees it. At this
point, we could well ask Marx a feminist-inspired version of
the question that he put to psychological theories that
ignored the history of industry and production: "What
should one think of a science [Marxism] whose preconceptions
disregarded this large field of man's [sic] labour [maternal
labor] and which is not conscious of its incompleteness
,,.71
• • *
The differences between productive labor and maternal-
caring labor (understood in historically specific terms)
also issue in different, gender-based historical
consciousnesses. For Marx, congealed labor in the
instruments and objects of production provides the umbilical
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cord through time by which people remember, identify with,
and differentiate themselves from their predecessors.
Productive labor is the living (but Marx calls this "dead"
labor!) congealed link of species continuity. O'Brien
argues that women may be privy to a different sense of
historical identity: "women do not apprehend the reality of
past ages in a mediation on the probable history of a
7 2hammer." Instead, we see it in our children, who
embody, among other things, congealed reproductive labor
(not simply our own, but also that of our parents, their
parents, etc.). "Marx conflated production and
reproduction, analyzes productive labor only, and thus
reduces the awareness of species continuity to an economist
73
construction .
"
Marx's formulation of historical continuity is also
essentially forward-looking and teleological . Hence his
rendering of the past as a "tradition of all the dead
generations" which "weighs like a nightmare on the brain of
74the living." This sense of time, of the relation of the
present to the past, is more likly to emerge out of a
standpoint that has been forced to construct an abstract
formulation of generational continuity. Nature at least
provides an anchoring with the past through the genetic
continuity provided through reproduction. Given the overall
status of Nature within Marx's theory, however, such
continuity must be passed over completely in favor of a
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productive labor which anticipates its eventual liberation
as a complete rupture with past history. 75
We can also begin to see how and why Marx's conception
of labor and time yields an account of man as an essentially
self-creative being: "[F]or socialist man what is called
world history is nothing but the creation of man by human
labor and the development of nature for man . . . 1,76
" [Socialist man
.
. .
has the observable and irrefutable
proof of his self-creation and the process of his
77
origin." "A being only counts itself as independent
when it stands on its own two feet and it stands on its own
two feet as long as its owes its existence to itself." 78
Marx has essentially denied and reappropr iated the labor of
the mother in his account of self-created man.
Graeme Duncan has been especially, although not
critically, sensitive to this voluntar i st-1 iberatory feature
of Marx's portrayal of humanity:
Marx's strong concern for human autonomy or freedom, and
for man's ultimate self-realization in co-operation with
others, underlay his mature as well as his early
writing. He envisaged, as the outcome of history, man
unconstrained by his social environment, active,
versatile, revealing a variety of creative powers,
enriched, a whole man. 7 9
What is wrong with this account? Nothing, so long as it is
not exaggerated and thereby dependent on a denial of women
and Necessity. ("Necessity", it should be stressed, is a
socially- and historically-specific category. It does not
have an invariant or self-evident meaning, aside from some
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of the basic requirements of biological life.) But in the
hands of Marx, it tends to issue in three distinct
problems. First, it relies on an overly plastic view of
human nature. Secondly, it is arrogant in the post-
Enlightenment tradition. Finally, it recapitulates the
denial of mothers which we encountered in his theory of
labor
.
Marx's account of human nature involves 1) the notion
that man "makes himself" and hence, should "revolve around
himself as his own true sun", and 2) the notion that the
human is, and must be, defined solely in relation to his
social, relational setting. Marx provided a significant and
much-needed critique of the pre-social individual monad of
liberal theory who is constituted as a subject prior to the
80society in which he lives. However, his substitute
notion of the individual as "the ensemble of social
relations" creates a good many problems as well. In both
models, furthermore, the individual is "constituted
O -I
abstractly without every being born." Within Mill's
frame, he is constituted as a rational discrete being
entitled to rights and whose social relations are negotiated
in the "space" which is created and administered by such
rights. Within Marx's very different account, the
individual is constituted socially, particularly within the
frame of his laboring activities, which produce him even as
he produces them. But this social construction presupposes
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the unacknowledged prior relation to an earlier laborer-the
mother
.
Robert Heilbroner has been especially acute in
describing the hazards of a plastic conception of human
nature
:
[T]here is a severe price to be paid for a view of thehuman being as without any definition other than thatcreated by its social setting. For the individualthereupon becomes the expression of social relationsbinding him or her together with other individuals who
are likewise nothing but the creatures of their social
existences. We then have a web of social determinatesthat has no points of anchorage other than in our animalbodies
And our animal bodies, within the frame of Marx's analysis,
can't tell us very much about ourselves. Dennis Wrong's
critique of the oversocialized conception of man83 also
anticipates Heilbroner 's discomfort with Marx's failure to
deal with politics in post-revolutionary society. Wrong's
identification of a theortical partnership between an
over-socialized view of man and an over-integrated view of
society is substantiated in the fact that politics has
become, to use Heilbroner' s image, the Achilles' heel of
socialism. Marx's collapsed vision of a complementary and
trouble-free relationship between the individual and
communist society is too seamless to admit political
struggle and dialogue over society's means, ends, limits,
. . 84
and possiblities. That the theorist par excellence of
struggle and contradiction should end up with this kind of
vision is rather incredible. Or is it? Perhaps Marx
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himself embodies the human limit for living with perpetual
conflict
.
An exaggerated emphasis on man's self-creative abilities
is also arrogant. it denies our natural embeddedness and
promotes resentment against a Nature that has not made us
god-like. It pits the "human" essence against the "natural"
backdrop of limiting existence. And it actually anticipates
a state of post-embeddedness
, where "the individual has
ceased to become the object of uncontrolled forces and is
instead entirely self-created
, ceaselessly going beyond its
own limits by means of its creativity, and continuously
participating in the movement of its own becoming." 85
(Italics mine.) In spite of Marx's youthful efforts to
synthesize and transcend the dichotomy between Nature and
Culture, Necessity and Freedom, these efforts are resolved
on behalf of a humanity that appropriates Nature exclusively
for its own self-defined interests. Marx also follows in
the tradition of post-Enlightenment humanists by defining
humanity against animal life:
The animal is immediately one with its vital activity.
It is not distinct from it. They are identical. Man
makes his vital activity into an object of his will and
consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity. He
is not immediately identical to any of his
characterizations. Conscious vital activity
differentiates man immediately from animal vital
activity. It is this and this alone that makes man a
spec ies-being ( Italics mine .")
This issues in an instrumental relationship to Nature:
The practical creation of an objective world, the
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working over of inorganic nature ic •wo ^ * •
man as a conscious species-beina' ILl conflrmation of
producer.
8
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produces only under the pressure of immediate physical
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itself whereas man rj£rjdu^th^^ of nature
imrld^JLJ* ^ — W°rkinq of th* objectivew^d that man first really afHnaTiSMinn
species-bemg.87 (italics mine.)
Not incidentally, these themes are also intimately
related to the denial of the mother. An exaggerated
emphasis on self-creation denies that we were born and
nurtured. It denies the bio-social basis for species
continuity and projects it exclusively onto the arena of
labor. It promotes a view of communism as severing "the
umbilical cord of the individual's natural connection with
88the species." These themes help us to ponder Mary
O'Brien's suggestion that "Underlying the doctrine that man
makes history is the undiscussed reality of why he
89
must." When we deny our first bio-social relationship
we deny our own natural embeddedness as physical,
vulnerable, animal creatures. We also deny the origins and
ground of our sociability as a species. Philosophers such
as Marx who wish to articulate and promote this important
aspect of distinctively human life are forced to ground it
in activities which post-date our first experience of mutual
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sociability. When we deny maternal labor and women's labors
of caring love, which tend to be more aware of a
non-instrumental, cooperative and also difficult
relationship with Nature, 90 we construct a deficient view
of "specifically human labor" and of "species life".
Without a retrospective appreciation for our bio-social
origins, we are all the more likely to join Marx in viewing
the past as a pile of "muck".
This denial of the mother in Marx's theory—which is
also central to the social acquisition and definition of
gendered masculine identity—helps to maintain the
domination of women and the domination of nature. Hence,
Marxist social theory may be perpetuating problems
—
some of which it would like to solve, others of which it is
unaware—that involve not only half of the human species,
but our literal survival as a species. For the domination
of nature, as Adorno and Horkheimer came to argue, also
91
entails its revolt.
Production and the Domination of Nature
[A]ll objects become for him the object i fication of
himself
.
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
In spite of all that has been said thus far, there are
intimations in Marx of a yearning for a genuine, mutually
reciprocal and transcendent relationship between humanity
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and nature. Not surprisingly, this yearning is rendered in
the language of male-female relations. (Not surprising, in
that the female represents herself as well as nature.) if
we can suspend, for a few moments, some of the substantial
problems with this excerpt,* we may appreciate it for its
insight into the complex, enriching and instructive
dimensions of the interface between nature and culture which
post-Enlightenment thinking has steadily sought to
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eliminate :
The infinite degradation in which man exists forhimself is expressed in his relationship to woman asprey and servant of communal lust; for the secret of
this relationship finds an unambiguous, decisive, open,
and unveiled expression in the relationship of man to
woman and the conception of the immediate and natural
relationship of the sexes. The immediate, natural, and
necessary relationship of human being to human being is
the relationship of man to woman. In this natural
relationship of the sexes man's relationship to nature
is immediately his relationship to man, and his
relationship to man is immediately his relationship to
nature, his own natural function. Thus, in this
relationship is sensuously revealed and reduced to an
observable fact how far for man his essence has become
nature or nature his become man's human essence. Thus,
from this relationship the whole cultural level of man
can be judged ... we can conclude how far man has
become a species-being, a human being, and conceives of
himself as such; the relationship of man to woman is the
most natural relationship of human being to human
being. Thus it shows how far the natural behavior
*They include: a prudish distaste for "lust"; a male
standpoint: "he" is the referential subject, "she" is the
object; the assumption that male-female relations are
transparently natural (but we cannot really have expected
Marx to know better); and heterosexist assumptions about
sexuality (once again, this is not to castigate Marx for
what he could not have known, but to remind ourselves.)
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of man has become human or how far his human nature hasf™enneed eof° r ^ ^ S relati^ship aLo sS s Sowar the man has become a human need, how far hisfellow men as men have become a need, how far in hismost individual existence he is at the same time acommunal being. 9 3
This is a remarkable piece of writing, most especially
in its intimation of the relationship between the status of
women and the status of nature in modern western culture.
This relationship was subsequently explored by Adorno and
Horkheimer in the following terms:
Women have no personal part in the efficiency on whichthis civilization is based. It is man who has to go outinto an unfriendly world, who has to struggle and
produce .... The division of labor imposed upon herby man brought her little that was worthwhile. Shebecame the embodiment of the biological function, theimage of nature, the subjugation of which constituted
that civilization's title to fame. For millenia men
dreamed of acquiring absolute mastery over nature, of
converting the cosmos into one immense hunting
ground. y4
Marx seems well aware that the socio-cultural fates of men
and women are intimately related; that the degradation of
women issues in and reflects the degradation of man.
Another way of saying this is that the 'Woman Question' is
also the 'Man Question'. Marx also invokes a vocabulary of
nature and necessity in non-pejorative terms, depicting
social relations between human beings as natural relations
too. (Midgely would approve.) He tells us that the status
of women within a culture is an important indicator of that
culture's health. And he suggests that cultures can be
evaluated in terms of their success or failure in
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integrating nature and culture, i.e., that human progress
requires a genuine accomodation with nature. Finally, he
envisions a harmonious co-existence of individuality and
community which may be understood simultaneously in human
social terms as well as in terms of the humanity-nature
relation. Nowhere in this account do we find nature lurking
as a threat or limit. Nowhere in western social theory do
we find as intense a yearning for reciprocal accomodation
between humanity and nature, men and women.
Unfortunately, this visionary sense of mutual
accomodation slides into one of appropriation, as Marx
begins to equivocate on the meaning of "participation". The
following quote provides a glimpse into the early stages of
such a slide:
Labour is ... a process in which both man and nature
participate and in which man of his own accord,
regulates, and controls the material reactions between
himself and nature. He opposes himself to nature as one
of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head
and hands, the natural forces of the body, in order to
appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to
his own wants. 95
Here we see Marx articulating an equivalence between "human
will over nature" and "human participation in nature":
Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways,
electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are
products of human industry; natural material transformed
into organs of the human will over nature, or of human
participation in nature. 96
Finally, this human will attains pre-eminence over a brute
nature that has been muted: "All production is
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appropriation of Nature on the part of an individual within
and through a specific form of society." 97 m capital
,
Marx tells us that:
The labour-process, resolved
. . . into its simpleelementary factors, is human action with v
?
theproduction of use-values, appropriation of naturalsubstances to human requirements, it is the necessarv
and utl°
n for
v
ef£ectin9 exchange of matter between man
onn^
Ure
'V^
13 thS ever
-lasting nature-imposed
co dition of human existence, and therefore isindependent of every social phase of that existence, orrather, is common to every such phase. 98
But is all of labor the appropriation of nature? Mary
O'Brien, in her assessment of the labor of biological
reproduction, has suggested otherwise. So too does Murray
Bookchin, in arguing that nature also "appropriates" us. He
articulates a view of nature as something other and more
than the brute, passive object of man's labors:
Marx tried to root humanity's identity and
self-discovery in its productive interaction with
nature. But I must add that not only does humanity
place its imprint on the natural world and transform it,but also nature places its imprint on the human world
and transforms it ... it is not only we who "tame"
nature but also nature that "tames" us."
One way of understanding Marx, I would suggest, is to locate
him in the tension between the recognition of nature and its
domination. This suggests that a full assessment of his
social theory must acknowledge the complex contrariness of
his th i nk i ng
.
Marx's social theory is located on what Nancy Hartsock
has called "the epistemological terrain of production."
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This commits him to a particular set of concepts, including
those of "class", "labor", "value", "distribution",
"exchange", "profit", and "surplus-value", among others.
Recently, the Marxian category of "production" (a highly
privileged category) and many of its attendant concepts have
come under serious, if not devastating, scrutiny, from the
charge that these concepts do not enable an adequate
theorization of power and must be resituated within a
broader mode of inquiry, 100 to the accusation that Marx's
concept of production is the "ultimate possible expression
of" "the hubris of domination." 101 I would like to
maneuver a way between these two assessments by suggesting
and attempting to demonstrate two things. First, that the
resituation of Marxism within a different and larger
epistemological terrain is quite problematic; second, that
while Marx's theory is indeed tied in with a dialectic of
domination, it is by no means "its ultimate possible
expression". We begin by exploring some of the ways in
which Marx's category of production contributes to and
intensifies the domination of nature.
The problematic of the domination of nature is
simultaneously elusive and compelling. It is the kind of
problem, like the problem of "alienation" generated by
Marx's youthful theory, which we either "see" because of a
set of values and interests that we have, or don't "see"
because it doesn't fit into our scheme of things, including
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our experience of comfort or discomfort with modern
culture. In a secular age such as this (and I count myself
as a secular thinker; i.e., I do not believe in or
acknowledge any kind of 'higher power'), the domination of
nature enters the discourse of social theory as a type of
theological problem. "Nature" takes the place of "God" as a
kind of independent entity or Subject with which we are also
vitally related; we are part of nature. Marx's critique and
demystification of religion as a falsely objectified
projection of human aspirations (actually, it was Feuerbach
who did this, but it had an important early influence on
Marx) sets the tone for hostile relations between those who
view "man" alone as the originator of meaning and those who
would look elsewhere as well. A typical Marxist response to
the 'domination of nature' problematic would be to ask
sarcastically if that means that one should stop weeding the
garden. This version of the problem reduces it to one of
rational, instrumental policy. Presumably, we avoid
ecological disasters (the revolt of nature), which are
problematic only to the extent that they impinge on us, by
becoming more rational in our utilization of nature. What
is feared is an abondonment to the forces of nature. (Look
what happens when you don't weed.) The mistake here, in my
opinion, is to equate all exchanges with Nature either as
instances of domination or as benign and inconsequential.
On this view, the issue is not simply one of whether to
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weed, but of how to weed. This "how" includes our attitudes
to weeds. (But this is going to sound crazy to my Marxist
friend, who sees the problem in terms of 'to weed or not to
weed'.) Organic gardening, among other practices, provides
a tangible example of an orientation to nature which is
simultaneously respectful and practical. The fact tht it is
appealing to growing numbers of ordinary Americans suggests
that it meets a felt need for a different relationship to
nature than is commonly afforded. in a similar vein, the
recent upsurge of interest in and activism on behalf of
"animal rights" also testifies to popular discomfort with an
ethos that cannot accord nature respect and dignity. Adorno
and Horkheimer were also on to this feature of the problem:
The idea of man in European history is expressed in the
way in which he is distinguished from the animal.
Animal irrationality is adduced as proof of human
dignity .... The antithesis is still accepted
today. The behaviorists only appear to have forgotten
it. The fact that they apply to humans the same
formulas and findings that, without restraint, they
force from defenseless animals in their nauseating
physiological laboratories stresses the contrast quite
adroitly. The conclusion they draw from mutilated
bodies applies not to animals in the free state but to
man as he is today. 102
Nature thus impoverished issues in the self-brutal ization of
humani ty
.
Isaac Balbus argues that Marx's concept of production
necessarily entails the domination of nature because it
requires an "instrumental relationship between humans and
103their surrounding world." As the substance of
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necessity, nature is humanity's adversary in its quest for
self-creative, self-sufficient freedom. "To conceive nature
as that which must be bent or transformed by human beings is
to conceptualize it as the raw material or the instrument of
human labor." 104 When we approach nature on these terms
we must assume that it "has no intrinsic worth, no dignity
of its own," and therefore that it makes no normative claims
on humanity. 105 William Petty ' s analogy—quoted
approvingly by Marx in Capital—that "labour is the father
of the material world, the earth is its mother," reinforces
the notion that nature provides the passive material
substratum for "productive" labor, even as it plays on the
sexist depiction of women as "passive", "natural", and
therefore less-than-f ully "human" creatures. 106 Within
this mode of thinking small wonder that mothers and
caring-laboring females are rendered invisible in Marx's
theory of labor. Like the members of non-objectifying
"primitive" cultures who are viewed as child-like and
less-than-fully rational by Marx, women are excluded from
Marx's account of "human" labor, unless they are working
alongside men in the fields or factories. For these
reasons, the re-accomodat ion of women and nature within
Marxian theory has potentially devastating consequences.
The Manuscr ipts offer some initial hope that Marx's
portrayal of nature is not as instrumental and objectified
as Balbus argues it is. There we find Marx waxing eloquent
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on the "humanization of nature" and the "naturalization of
man", suggesting an eventual reciprocity between two
improperly opposed arenas. While the young Marx was
obviously groping, as we have seen, for some means of
reconciliation, his subsequent vision of communism
effectively renders the "humanization" of nature as its
domination by human beings:
Communism differs from all previous movements in that it
overturns the basis of all earlier relations ofproduction and intercourse, and for the first time
consciously treats all natural premises as the creatures
of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural
character and subjugates them to the power of the unitedindividuals .... The reality, which communism is
creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering itimpossible that anything should exist independently ofindividuals, insofar as reality is only a product of the
preceding intercourse of individuals themselves. 107
( Ital ics mine
.
)
Jeremy Shapiro has described communism (approvingly) in this
fashion, which is quite similar to Marx's version. It
recapitulates the themes of self-created humanity and the
domination of nature, while it introduces the notion of
"post-embeddedness "
:
In the state of post-embeddedness depicted by Marx, the
individual has ceased to become the object of uncon-
trolled forces and is instead entirely self-created
,
ceaselessly going beyond its own limits by means of its
creativity, and continuously participating in the
movement of its own becoming. (Italics mine.)
The dialectic of history is resolved through completion
of the self-transcendence of nature that occurs when
embeddedness in nature is overcome
"
and human beings
bring the historical process under control. 108
( Italics mine.
)
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Post-embeddedness is a dangerous and arrogant fiction. it
is also misogynist and masculinist. It is dangerous because
its blindness elicits the revolt of nature. It is
misogynist because it perpetuates a fear of and consequent
need to dominate naturalized and hence, "dangerous" women.
It is masculine because it issues out of a set of percep-
tions and needs rooted in a gendered identity negatively
fashioned out of opposition to the pre-Oedipal (m)other.
The "revolt of nature" was initially theorized by Adorno
and Horkheimer in their reassessment of the Enlightenment.
It has been subsequently re-invoked and extended by
feminists seeking to articulate a theory of feminist-
, 109
ecology. What Adorno and Horkheimer saw in the
tragectory of Enlightenment thought and practice was a
steady "progress" in the domination of nature that was
necessarily accompanied by social and affective regression.
Paul Connerton provides an encapsulated view of their
argument
:
The exploitation of external nature for the purpose
of freeing men from subjection to it strikes back in the
repression of man's instinctual nature. Nature—his own
as well as that of the external world— is 'given' to the
ego as something that has to be fought and conquered.
This means that, in the interest of self-preservation,
the self is engaged in constant inner struggle to
repress many of its own natural drives. The strain of
holding the ego together in this way adheres to it in
all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always
been present together with the determination to maintain
it. This dread of losing the self, which in its extreme
form figures as the fear of death and destruction is,
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nonetheless, intimately associate • =
exDeripnno , „ «„j . ^ , . -L,- se -Lr oil from sensuousp e ce m order to subiuqate it nm- «
separation inevitably i.poJeS^ta, ' thlS COerClv »
potentialities. 110
Hence, the domination of nature is simultaneously true and
illusory. it is also a dialectic that has been undertaken
primarily on behalf of and by men. Women, as Adorno argued,
were "not yet entirely in the grasp of society." 111 They
were also implicated in this dialectic in a complex way: as
human beings who were thought to be more "natural" than men.
She became the embodiment of the biological function,
l «?%° f natUrS • " * ' Between and man Jherewas a difference she could not bridge-a differenceimposed by nature, the most humiliating that can exist
naturrirfr'r'^ 8°Ciety ' ' ' ' the -st ofature is the t ue goal, biological inferiority remainsa glaring stigma, the weakness imprinted by nature as akey stimulus to aggression. H2 Y
The domination of nature also issues in a longing to return
to it. This return, as Silvia Bovenschen argues, is
negotiated through the female: "The biological-natural
moments of human existence only appear to have been fully
expunged from masculine everyday life: that relationship to
inner nature which has not yet been mastered is projected
onto women, so that women must pay for the dys funct ional i ty
of man's natural drives." 113
The radical pessimism of Adorno
' s and Horkheimer's
account involves their argument that this dialectic of
Enlightenment is inexorable. That is, they pose
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objectification as a given of human cognition and practice
and they relentlessly ally it with domination. Most
attempts to rewrite this dialectic in a less determined and
tragic fashion focus on the link between ob ject i f ication and
domination and try to break it. History and Marx are
invoked to suggestion alternative conceptions. 114 We are
already in a position to understand that Marx is not the
solution (just as Adorno and Horkheimer did). History,
however, still holds clues, particularly if we recall that
the history of the European Enlightenment is a
gender-specific history. The argument that the fantasy of
post-embeddedness is masculine is related to a similar
characterization of the dialectic of Enlightenment. As
Sandra Harding has argued:
Once we recognize that the history of Western thought isthe history of thought by members of a group with adistinctive social experience—namely, men—we are then
led to a new set of questions about the social nature of
that thought and about the justifiability and
reliability of the interpretations of nature and social
life emerging from that thought. 115
This introduces the possibility that Marx's ontologizat ion
of ob jectif ication (along with that of Adorno and
Horkheimer) has a masculine component.
For children of both sexes, the "world" from which
they must differentiate themselves, and in interaction
with which they create their own autonomous identity, is
in one sense the same "world"— the mother-world. But in
another sense it is a very different world for male and
female infants: gender-differentiated experiential
worlds begin at birth. The masculine "objectifying"
personality develops through separation and
individuation from a kind of person whom he cannot
become biologically and against whom he must exercisewill and control not to become socially. A woman and
for th°^
™0t*er-"°rld b6COme for him ^he first modelse bodies and worlds of "others"-of persons who
aTri^f^? d\™ Ctf «ro- him and^nst^nom,
h^ ? i°
osln9. hls . Painfully attained self-identity
Objectification in the hands of Marx is not only
de-problematized. It is held up as the apex of human
achievement and liberation which, in the final analysis, is
a radically impoverished, solipsistic standard of human
possibility and achievement. It is also masculine.
Marx's overall and systematic failure to accomodate
nature may help to explain a central tension at the heart of
his theory, that between humanistic voluntarism ("man makes
himself") and social-structural determinism ("life is not
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life").
While this tension may be artfully combined, as it has been
in Alfred Schmidt's rendition of Marx's capitalist society
as "a self-made prison of uncomprehended economic
117determination," or as we find it in Marx's version of
history in the "Eighteenth Brumaire" 118
, it also threatens
to erupt in one-sided formulations. Witness the wildly
divergent interpretations of Marx, from Eric Fromm's
humanistic appropriation, to Althusser's structural
reading. We can detect something in Marx's approach to
nature which is similar to Mill's fear of an unconstrained
and vindictive nature. In Marx's case, however, he had
higher expectations for its taming. Nevertheless, or
precisely because of this expectation, nature's domination
within the arena of human labor promises a human omnipotence
which is eternally threatened. These threats, for Marx,
take the form of humanly-undetermined, but still-created,
social forms and relations. Not surprisingly, the
capitalist version of these forms takes on vitalistic,
nature-like, and even female capacities, including
dynamically regenerative ones. The banished mother
reappears in Marx's portrayal of a capitalism that
reproduces and augments itself, while his own intellectual
efforts are cast as the contributions of a mid-wife helping
to shorten the "birth pangs" of an incipient revolution. 119
Is Marx's theory the "ultimate" in post-Enlightenment
attempts to dominate nature? This is a difficult question,
one that I am inclined to answer negatively because of
Marx's latent intimations of a different dialectical
interplay between humanity and nature. If we take Marx's
failure to consist of "his inability to extend [and
maintain] his splendid insight into the epi stemological
validity of sensuous experience and the sensuousness of the
"I OA
'man/nature' relationship expressed in labor,"' then the
terms of his failure, at least, are preferable to those of
others. And if we were to actually search for candidates
for the dubious distinction of "ultimate", we would have to
consider others: Hobbes, J.S. Mill, Weber, Freud, Sartre
and Habermas are iu<5f =, f~,,D st a few of the potential notables. How
do we assess who is more "ultimate" than whom? And how will
this help us?
.Ultimate" really counts down on the ground
rather than on the terrain of the text. From here
, we can
see with some sad measure of certainty, that Western
civilization embodies, perpetuates and extends the
"ultimate" (so far at least) expression of the domination of
nature: we are truly unsurpassed.
On the other hand, we had better think twice before we
attempt to transplant Marx to new epistemological terrain,
as Nancy Hartsock suggests. For Marx's epistemological
terrain is bound up with an ontological habitat that is in
some ways a masculine one. And the knowledge which issues
out of this framework is necessarily limited and distoring,
not simply in its inability to "see" aspects of gender-
differentiated experience and knowledge which call it into
question, but also in the very substance of its own
horizon. Marx's epistemological commitment to the arena of
"production" commits him to an ontological perception of
reality which is detectably masculine. As such, it lacks a
self-conscious appreciation of its own roots which, within
the Marxian view, is the prerequisite of a genuinely
critical theory. To a great extent, the "root" that Marx
grasped was gender-specific man. As such, his "real
connections" were attenuated ones. So too must his
"intellectual wealth" be correspondingly diminished.
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Ultimately, however, his greatest fai lure-as a
materialist, critical diagnostician of his age, and
revolutionary-may well have been his inability to
systematically acknowledge the intuitions of his youth,
which concern "that deepest substratum of man [sic]-the
organism's need to establish and celebrate its spiritual
identity with the phenomenal world and the cosmos." 121
Too many of our "sins" and "needs" are still in mute
di sarray
.
Conclusion
To get its sins forgiven, humanity only needs todescribe them as they are.
Marx, "A Correspondence of 1843"
A theory will only be realized in a people in sofar as it is the realization of what it needs.
Marx, "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy ofRight ; Introduction" tL~A
An immanent critical assessment of Marx would bring us
to his sociology of knowledge, which stresses the rich
material and relational substratum of consciousness and
knowledge. While Marx looked to that substratum as the
arena of labor, he failed to appreciate the implications of
the fact that labor is organized on the basis of sex and not
simply class. Marx is not simply unaware of the possibility
that such a substratum might be gender-differentiated, his
own framework of "desirable belief" 122 i s itself
constituted in gender-specific terms. Hence, he has
committed a version of the very sins with which his
intellectual and political opponents were charged and found
guilty: he has generalized a (gender-)specific form of
human cognition and elaborated it into a social theory. In
short, Marx views social reality in specifically gendered
ways. His critique of that reality is correspondingly
gendered and gender-blind.
Marx's "real connections" to his social world reflect,
in part, the introjected connections of the masculine
subject. We find masculine identity at work in his need to
'clear the ground' of intellectual and polemical endeavor.
Marx needed "room to move"~a lot of it. Like the subjects
of Carol Gilligan's research on gender-differentiated
psychological development, Marx joins the ranks with those
male respondents who react to pictures of physical proximity
between humans with fantasized scenarios of violence
designed to widen the space between them. 123 Masculine
subjects are threatened by intimacy and proximity, largely
in virtue of their strict ego boundary construction. On
this view, ground clearing is a type of survival strategy.
We also find the memories of masculine identity
acquisition echoed in Marx's dichotomous model of
antagonistic class relations. Bourgeoisie and proletariat,
like mother and son, are intimately, but antagonistically,
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related. Each survives at the expense of the other.
Ultimately, the health and survival of the latter require
the elimination of the former.
Like Hobbes and Mill, Marx has had to banish the mother
from his account of social reality. This enables a number
of crucial and distinctive turns in his theory: a view of
history as forward moving progress, a cataclysmic theory of
change, and a view of human labor that is ultra-
voluntarist. The first two features of Marx's theory embody
what Mary O'Brien has analyzed as the male attempt to
re-write history without the generational continuity enacted
through mothers. 124 I would tie this in to a more
psychoanalytic and culturally specific account, by situating
these features as the outcome of the masculine turn away
from the mother. The voluntarist account of labor is
enabled and enhanced by the missing mother because it does
not have to take account of her labor as activity which is
not neatly voluntarist. Marx's voluntarist account of labor
is not incidental to his ob jecti f icat ion of nature, for it
promotes a view of nature as the passive substratum of
humanly active efforts. And his objectif ication of nature
plays into the dialectic of enlightenment, which is also
implicated in the nature-female affiliation. But this
affiliation has already had a prior confirmation in the very
securing of masculine identity against a female mother-world
that becomes the prototype for "nature". Hence, the
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objectifieation of women and nature are implicated in a
complex spiral of self-referential and
-confirming beliefs
and feelings.
Masculine gender identity also enables a view of freedom
and necessity as being inversely related. This issues out
of an over-voluntarist conception of labor and parallels the
antagonistic relationship between humanity and nature.
Post-embeddedness is the inevitably "utopian" endpoint of
such a scheme. What it recapitulates at the level of social
theory is a yearning and fantasy embedded in the deep
psychology of masculine identity: clean and ultimate
release from the (m)other.
FOOTNOTES
Ideoloqy
ar
ed
Ma
cVnA l™**1^ En9els - The GermanPubSlrs IVloV, <NeW York! international
2 Ibid., p. 42.
3See Marx . s discussion in fch Qrundrisse-
Afro-American women have alerted white feminists to thedangers and abuses of "color blind" categories which
ftllf^ WhltS middlS ClaSS ^Perience as inclusive ofemale experience. See the following: Toni Cade ed Th*
^rarv°
m
;S/0)^nth" 1nqY ^ Yor * 8 "Srican
'~
Y
n }?
,{
t
i: Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldu'a, This
m L^L
6
m
MY B
!
Ck? Writ1 ^ s Bv g^icaj Women ^flfor(Water town, Ma.: Persephone Press ! 1981); Gloria T. Hull
A^Brave VTw' ^ Smith ' eds * ' But Some of' Usre Brav : Black Wome n's Studies (Old Westbury, N.Y. \ The"feminist Press, 1982),- Judith Kegan Gardiner, Eliy BuikinRena Grasso Patterson, Annette Kolodny, "An Interchange inFeminist Criticism: On "Dancing through the Minefield"," inFeminist Studies 8 (3): 629-675.
4Thankfully, this work has already been done. For a
very early and important formulation, see Zillah Eisenstein,Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and SocialistFeminism, in Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case forSociali st Feminism
, ed. Zillah Eisenstein (New York-
Monthly Review Press, 1979), pp. 5-40. For a recent ' summary
of the gender gaps in Marx's analysis of labor, see Nancy
Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist
Historical Materialism (New York and London: Longman,
1983), pp. 146-152. See also Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 256-284,
for a critical assessment of Marxist-Feminism.
5Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1969). For over-worked attempts to present Marx as a
thoroughly systematic and consistent thinker, see the
following: Carol C. Gould, Marx's Social Ontology:
Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of Social
Reality (Cambridge, Ma. and London: The M.I.T. Press,
319
320
Marx's Wor ld Viei (PrinS?
McM« trV' The Structure of
Tmr, and BerteU f ?L Prmceton University Press.
Man in Capital ist Society' f
lle"atfn = Marx's ConcepUon ~<
Press, 1971)? lor a morl ^ , 9e ' La ">b"dge University"
Marx on the basis o? hTs use lTtiff^T t0 underst^
see Melvin Rader Marx', Tnf
d f erent analogic models,
Vorx: oxford Sniveffft? ^.^I^r §j "^l (NewLaCapra, "Marxism and Inteiilotual H ^ als ° Doml"i^
Relinking Intellectuaj ^I^S^Text ton! ^ f(Ithaca and London: Cornell En verity re M"^"*
"fsefof nonLPcred
Wr
^xt
S
s
t
^at
M
:
rX ' S
-
"
as
times internallylL^gent^verLl" onte^Icory"
3
"* "
mod
n
er?na t
S
-co=e:rtne?j
r
r^:L°rto
ity
'
^
^vcio meir elation to one another t-n <-v«q
S^-Frorin' 1^ 1 gractice '" 330 ) See also John
Marx's'Method ^L ?^^ t0 CaP ital ; ^ ^king of
in Marxist Phil.
Mepham and D-H. Ruben, eds
. IssuesC Pre^ T^9) 3 ^^fic Highlands —JTT
145-173. ^
ss
'
vol. 1: Dialectics and Method , pp.
(PrinJ« S Seigel, Marx's Fate: The Shape of a Life
Saul K Padn
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nc;*on diversity PressT 1978). See als o. over's biography, Karl Marx; An IntimateS^97 NeaWhY°rk and Scarborough, Ontario: Sew AmericanLibrary 1 8; bridged ed
.
) . Despite his professed
wnn t
S/JT\ Pad°Ver ^viously dislikes Marx, whereas Seigel,ho admits to engagement and disagreement with Marx,provides the more balanced and empathetic account.
For helpful discussions of the Grundrisse, see thefollowing: Gould, Marx's Social Ontology ; Terrell Carver,Karl Marx: Texts on Method Iwpw YoTkTHarper and Row,1975; Basil Blackwell, 1975); and David McLellan, TheThought of Karl Marx (London and New York: HarpeF~^nd Row,
7 I believe this has quite a bit to do with the
sexual division of labor in the modern West. Men have been
enabled to spend a lot of time refining theory, thanks tothe work of women. For an acute analysis of the
ramifications of this phenomenon on the woman writer, see
Tillie Olsen, Silences (New York: Dell Publishing Co..
1979).
^For all of its important criticisms of Marx, Isaac
Balbus's Marxism and Domination: A Neo-Hegel ian, Feminist,
Psychoanalytic Theory of Sexual, Political, and ~
Technological Liberation (Princeton: Princeton University
Press
' 1982) is a fascinating and disturbing example of how
criticism against Marx proceeds in the hands of those who
expected too much of him the first place. Balbus's nitpicky
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lOpor some initial forays into this terain, see thefollowing: Balbus, Marxism and Domination- Jessica
SSStei ?! ^ LOVe? gTO^ol^Sa EroticDomination, in Femini st Studies 6 ( 1 ) • 144-174. t=,,Blum "Kant's^and Hegel's Moral Rational i smf ^Femini
2^02 Jo' A "V^ Radian Journa l of Philoso^^2 ( 2 ) ;
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"°n the War Path ^nd Beyond
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Feminist Theory,
"
in Hypatia: A Journal Afilosophy, special issue of Women' s SbudTe"iInternational Forum 6 (6): 565-572; Nancy Hartsock, "TheFeminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for aSpecifically Feminist Historical Materialism," inDiscovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epiat^lnnv
,
Metaphysics, Methodology , and Philosophy of Science. ediT^Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Boston
and London: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 283-310-Mary 0 Bnen, The Politics of Reproduction (Boston, London
and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981); and CharlesTaY±or, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press , 1979 )
.
1]
-For a very suggestive examination of the linksbetween women's experiences and materialism, see Hartsock,
Money, Sex, and Power
,
esp. ch. 10.
12For one of the first attempts to forge a
theoretical Marx-Feminism synthesis, see Eisenstein,
"Developing a Theory". See also Sheila Rowbotham, Woman
'
s
Consciousness, Man's World (Middlesex, England and
Baltimore, Md
. : Penguin Books, 1973). Juliet Mitchell's
Psychoanalysis and Feminism: Freud, Reich, Laing and Women
(New York : Random House, 1975) initiated and contributed
significantly to feminist efforts to forge Marx and Freud.
Nancy Chodorow ' s The Reproduction of Mothering:
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkely, Los
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1978)
also falls into this camp, with less emphasis on Freud and
more on object-relations theory. See also Chodorow ' s essay,
"Mothering, Male Dominance and Capitalism," in Eisenstein,
ed., Capitalist Patriarchy
, pp. 83-106.
•^Alexandra Kollontai's The Autobiography of a
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.
Iring Fetscher (New York-Schocken Books, 1975), published with its previouslyCommunist Party-censored parts included, and Clara Zetkin's
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eCti° nS
° f LSnin: An interview on the WomanQues ion, reprinted in Miriam Schneir, ed
. , Feminism- TheEssential Historical Writings (New York: Random House,19727 provided intimations of the strains between socialismand feminism. An important theoretical article on thisissue was written by Heidi Hartmann and Amy Bridges andcirculated for several years among feminist theory studygroups. It was finally published in altered form underHeidi Hartmann s name as "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxismand Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union," in Womenand Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriaqe~o7~Marxism and Feminism, ed. Lydia Sargent (Boston: South EndPress, 1981), pp. 2-41. For a recent historical study of
socialist women, see Marie Marmo Mullaney, Revolu tionaryWomen
;
Gender and the Socialist Revolutionary Role (Ne"wYork: Praeger, 1983). See also Hilda Scott, Does Social ismLiberate Women?: Experiences From Eastern Europe" (Boston-Beacon Press , 1974) .
"
14What I mean by "enlarged possibilities" is that wehave a wider range of choices than our predecessors did. Ihave more "choice" than my grandmother did. "Dangerously
amplified threats", unfortunately, requires no explanation.
15We are indebted to Georg Lukacs for the first
systematic elaboration of this notion. See "What is
Orthodox Marxism?" in History and Class Consciousness:
Studies in Marxist Dialectics
, trans. Rodney Livingstone
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971), pp. 1-26. For an
excellent recent elaboration of the notion of standpoint in
Marx's theory, see Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power, pp.
115-144.
16Seigel, Marx's Fate
, p. 182.
17 Ibid.
iaSee section 2 of Hegel's Preface to the
Phenomenology of Spirit
, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford, New
York, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1979),
pp . 1 - 2
.
l^Many polemical modes exist. Marx's is a particular
type. Women, of course, are also capable of nastiness,
often referred to as "bi tchiness " . All polemical modes,
however, do not involve the kind of space clearing that we
find in Marx. This is what is especially distinctive about
his style. Finally, for those who would view this
323
19 (cont'd) characterizat . on misunder-standing of Jewish culhuro t'* io ^y uu a
background (southern Italian! 5 *
t0 lnV°ke my °wn ethnic
"o,n-» ?o *
VSOUT:n ) for some support. The British
w'ness^d :round
S
th
eV
S
Stating than an^thi^ I havener
i f m a e dinner table. What Seigel noticesabout Marx is not his "decibel level"; rather it is hisargumentative strategy. And this strategy ts quite similarto Hobbes's description of his own.
20 It may be found in Seigel, Marx's Fate
, p. 49.
21 See Padover, Karl Marx .
22See Janice Moulton, "A Paradigm of Philosophy: TheAdversary Method," in Harding and Hintikka, eds
.
,
Discovering Reality
, pp. 149-164.
23This approach is similar to Marx's non-personal
casting of the capitalist in Capital
. In the 1867 Prefaceto Vol. 1 he wrote: "I paint the capitalist and landlord in
no sense coleur de rose . But here individuals are dealt
with only m so far as they are the personifications of
economic categories, embodiments of particular class
relations and class interests." Similarly, I am approaching
Marx as the personification of a gender category.
24For helpful discussions of Marx's ontology, see
Gould, Marx's Social Ontology and Oilman, Alienation . See
also Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a
Legend (London: New Left Books, 1983) for a recent
critique of the structuralist argument that Marx had no
theory of human nature. Those who argue for the existence
of an operative ontology in Marx invariably focus on the
themes of sociability, collective endeavor, and socially
acquired identity.
25 Robert Heilbroner, Marxism: For and Against (New
York and London: W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 143
.
26
"Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of
Right: Introduction," in David McLellan, ed
.
, Karl Marx:
Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977),
p. 73.
^Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
, in McLellan,
ed
.
, Karl Marx: Selected Writings
, p. 101.
2 ^Capi tal , vol. 1 (New York: International
Publishers, 1967), p. 19.
29It is easy and mistaken to make both too much and
too little of this "inversion". For example, the facile
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°?. We might 9° ab°Ut "tain?ng importante of Hegel's philosophical project without beingrequired to accept his theology. For an interestingdialogue on the differences and similarities between Heqeland Marx, see Richard Norman and Sean Sayers, Hegel? Mal xand Dialectic: A Debate (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey -Humanities Press; Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980) Y
*
30 Economic and Philosophical Manusc ripts. inMcLellan, ed
.
,
Karl Marx: Selected Writings , p. 89.
31Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment (New York: Seabury Press, 1972)7
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ClitUS
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trans
« bY Richard Lattimore in MatthewThomas McClure, The Early Philosophers of Greece, cited inRader
'
Marx's Interpretation of History , p. xvTi i
.
33Heilbroner
,
Marxism: For and Against
, p. 56.
34Ibid., p. 38.
3 S Hegel, Encyclopedia of Logic , sec. 89, cited inSean Sayers, "On the Marxist Dialectic," in Norman and
Sayers, Hegel, Marx and Dialectic
, p. 9.
36This discussion of dialectics and types of
experience is neither empirical, nor historical in a strict,
demonstrable sense. Rather, it is a kind of ideal
reconstruction of an epistemology and its constituency. For
an especially good discussion of the materialist,
experiential underpinnings of epistemology, see Jane Flax,
"Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A
Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics,"
in Harding and Hintikka, eds
. ,
Discovering Reality, esp. pp.
248-250.
37The fact that Hegel fell into neither of these two
groups, sociologically speaking, is a testament to his
sensitivity, perspicacity and courage in addressing the
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39°'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction
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Feminist Standpoint: Developingthe Ground for a Specifically Feminist HistoricalMaterialism;" and Ulrike Prokop, "Production and the Contextof Women s Daily Life," in New German Critique #13 (Winterly/tsj, pp. 18-33.
ii
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l
For accounts of the dialectical experience of the
other
,
see Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (New York
•
Random House, 1974) and Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love:
Rational Violence and Erotic Domination."
For descriptive and explanatory accounts of why
women's psychology has dialectical components which are less
repressed than those of men, see the following: Nancy
Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and
the Sociology of Gender ; Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid
and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise
(New York: Harper and Row, 1976); Jane Flax, "Mother
Daughter Relationships: Psychodynamics
, Politics and
Philosophy," in Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds
.
,
The Future of Difference (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980), pp.
20-40; and Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of
Women (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976).
43 St rictly speaking, these two formulations are by no
means necessarily contradictory. This could be expressed in
the phrase "everything-is-connected-through-contradict ion"
.
A good example of this is Marx's characterization of the
relationship between bourgeoisie and proletariat. While
each entails the other in a necessary fashion, each opposes
the other as well. Here we have a contradictory unity of
opposites. Nevertheless, at a phenomenological level, the
stress on connection and the stress on opposition are often
felt as opposed; each tends to manifest itself in a singular
fashion
.
44See William Connolly, "Personal Identity,
Citizenship, and the State," and "Socialism and Freedom," in
his Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 151-172, 173-193,
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*°h*rt Heilbrone^ Marxism: For and Against., of course, was an astute political analyst. As he was
theorr
a
and'a^y^?nging —ances required changed Tn
*l«n
^i*™ c°nnolly, "Socialism and Freedom". Seea so Sigmund Freud's trenchant critique of Marxism's failureto deal with aggression, in "The Question of aWeltanschauung," New Introductory Lectures . XXV, trans, and
?2o
eS ftrachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), pp.158-182. See also his Civilization and Its Discontents,trans. James Trachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961) for thedisturbing question he raises about future objects of
attachment for the aggressive drive once private propertyhas been abolished. *
47The Politics of Reproduction
, pp. 38-39.
48Cf. Nancy Hartsock's interpretation in Money, Sex
and Power
, pp. 115-144.
49 I am not opposed to the notion that some
standpoints are more privileged than others if "privileged"
is understood to mean being more critical and inclusive than
other standpoints. This is not to say, however, that
standpoints convey or guarantee a singular "truth". (I
believe that Nancy Hartsock would disagree with me, but this
is how I prefer to use the term.) We must also be extremely
careful of the potential abuses of the notion of standpoint.
A privileged standpoint that fails to "listen" to others is
a candidate for totalitarianism. On the other hand, part of
what makes it privileged is its ability to understand and to
accomodate more voices than less-privileged standpoints.
50This is by no means to deny the significance of
class struggle or the reality of antagonistic class
interests. These, however, would be better situated within
a more comprehensive context. Several features of social
reality point us in this direction. First, a two class
model cannot help us to understand the situation of women,
Afro-Americans, persecuted lesbians and homosexuals, and the
treatment of Native Americans and other minority groups.
The voices, interests, and oppressions of these groups
require much more than a two-tiered model to account for and
rectify their situations. Secondly, class theory needs to
come to terms with the internalization by members of the
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_ 11 .
5lFor a sense of the alternatives, see CarolGilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
1982).
S DeVe^^ (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres s,
52Money, Sex and Power , p. 146.
53The German Ideology
, pp. 43-44, 52-53.
54See Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) for an especiallygood elaboration of the separation of mental and manual
work. The heart imagery comes from Hilary Rose, "Hand,
Brain, and Heart: A Feminist Epistemology for the Natural
Sciences," in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society
9 (1): 73-90. ~ — L
55 Rose, "Hand, Brain, and Heart", p. 75.
56The German Ideology
, p. 57. Of course, in the
orignial German rendition of this it would be "menschen",
which carries no gender-specific meaning, as opposed to its
English translation as "men". My correction here is not
addressed to Marx and Engels
.
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61Graham, "Caring", p. 30.
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f
eali ze that this sounds "functionalist". So be
l^iJ^t S functionalism is appropriate to understandingsoc al phenomena. We can say many things about women's
work, including that it helps to keep things running
smoothly. This does not require a view of women as nothingout pawns in the economic system.
6 3Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power , p. 148.
64The German Ideology
, p. 53.
65Rose, "Hand, Brain and Heart," p. 84.
66Capital
, Vol. 1, p. 198.
67Capital
,
Vol. Ill (New York: International
Publishers, 1967), p. 820.
68 Cf. Hartsock 's argument in Money, Sex and Power
that objectif ication "has to do with an affirmation of the
329
125) uJrZZv I eXlstence of material world." (p.
Hi I ™ t ? 5 °6S n0t See Rectification as problematic-this constitutes a significant difference between heranalysis of Marx and that of Isaac Balbus.
n»»
Mar
Y
Mid9ely' Beast and Man; The Roo ts ofHuman Nature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) foran important critique of this method of defining thespecifically human in opposition to the natural-animal world.
70O'Brien / The Politics of Reproduction
, pp. 37-38.
71 Econom ic and Philosophic Manuscripts, p. 93. Seealso n. 56 above.
72The Politics of Reproduction
, pp. 37-38.
73 Ibid., p. 42.
74
"The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louise Bonaparte," in
McLellan, ed
. ,
Karl Marx: Selected Writings
, p. 300.
7 5 rrruThe task of assessing or formulating a female
conception of time is difficult, but intriguing. On the onehand, those feminists whose view of history is fairly
mono-dimensional, where an undifferentiated patriarchy is
seen as the prevailing historical norm, are likely to see
their own time as kind of historical watershed. Seeing
their own activities as a radical rupture with the past,
their view of the past would be one of "pre-hi story " and
their view of time would be essentially forward-looking. We
have all felt like this at one time or another. On the
other hand, many women look to a past inhabited by
"sisters", "mothers", and "grandmothrs " in the effort to
simultaneously learn from them and celebrate them. This
"familial" orientation to the past suggests a very different
view of time, one which occurs on a kinship-based continuum
and which would include a theory of change not nearly as
cataclysmic as the former. While it is difficult to get a
firm handle on this issue, Mary O'Brien's suggestion that
women are privy to a sense of temporal continuity on the
basis of "reproductive consciousness" makes good sense. See
Kristeva, "Women's Time," in Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society 7 (1): 13-35, for a complicated,
fascinating excursion into the question. See also Smith, "A
Sociology for Women".
^Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
, p. 95.
77 Ibid.
330
78 Ibid., 94.
absurdity as is the develop I language wUhouf ° £ "
IfunlTsll * » and talking9 t% e^^L,"
81°' Brien
'
The Politics of Reproduction . p . 184 .
8 2Heilbroner, Marxism; For and Against: . p. 163.
i m ^
3Den"is Wrong, "The Oversocial ized Conception of M*nin^Modern Sociology." American Sociological Review 26 (2):
84Marx of course, did not fully specify hisanticipated post-socialist future. A good part of thisunderdescription was surely deliberate? and
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^' f** he *i* specify, however, is remarkablyu troubled by any tension.
85Jeremy Shapiro, "The Slime of History: Embeddedness
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0 Neill, (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), p. 1 49One of my favorite examples of Marx's stretched imagesof human self-creation is this: "in taking in food .the human being produces his own body." Economic andPhilosophic Manuscripts, p. 90. This simply denies the
autonomous and remarkable functions of the body.
86 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
, p. 82.
87 Ibid.
op
°°Marx, Capital
, quoted in Shapiro, "The Slime of
History". This emphasis on self-creation also contributes
to the overexaggerated claim that under capitalism,
"individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier
they depended on one another." Grundrisse
, p. 164. As if
men and children no longer depend on women; as if women no
longer depend on each other.
Q^The Politics of Reproduction
, p. 53.
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91Dialectic o f Enl ightenment .
9 2r
Harper and Row, 1980). 2 n ( San Franci3CO;
93Economic and Philosophic Manuscript*, p. 88.
94Dialect ic of Enlightenment
, pp. 247-48.
95Capital / vol. 1, pp. 197-198.
96Grundrisse
, p. 706.
97 Ibid., 87.
98Capital, vol. l, pp. 184-4.
"Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom t TheEmergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy ^Pal5~Alt?T"Ca •Cheshire Books, 1982), p. 32. For a devastating historicalaccount of the Western compulsion to "tame" nature,including human beings of non-Western cultures, seeFrederick Turner, Beyond Geography; The Western SpiritAgainst the Wilderness (New Brunswickl Rutgers UniversityPress, 1983). See also the account of Columbus's landing inthe New World in chapter 1 of Howard Zinn's A People'sHistory of the Unit ed States (New York: Harper and Row,
1 980 ) •
100Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power .
101 Balbus, Marxism and Domination
, p. 269. The latter
phrase is Marcuse's.
102 Dialect ic of Enlightenment
, p. 245.
103Marxism and Domination
, p. 269.
104 Ibid., p. 271. See how Freud inverts Marx's
formulation by suggesting that our relation to nature
affects our economic arrangements: "the relation of mankind
to their control over Nature, from which they derive their
weapons for fighting their fellow men, must necessarily also
affect their economic arrangements." In "The Question of a
Weltanschauung", p. 178.
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107Marx and Engels, The German Ideology
, p. 86.
108Shapiro, "The Slime of History," p. 149.
109see Ynestra King, "Feminism and the Revolt ofNature, in Heresies 13 (1981), pp. 12-16.
110 Paul Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment, AnEssay on the Frankfur t School (Cambridge, CambrTdjiUniversity Press, 1980), p. 67.
11:LAdorno, Prisms
, cited in Silvia Bovenschen, "TheContemporary Witch, The Historical Witch, and Witch Myth "in New German Critique 15 (Fall 1978), p. 116.
112Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment,
p. 248. 2
113Bovenschen, "The Contemporary Witch," p. 117.
114See, for an example, Connerton, The Tragedy of the
Enlightenment
, pp. 71-79.
115
"Is Gender A Variable in Conceptions of
Rationality? A Survey of Issues," in Beyond Domination;
New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy
, ed. Carol C.
Gould (Totawa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), p. 44.
116 Ibid., p. 51.
117Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx
(London: New Left Books, 1971), p. 41.
118
"Men make their own history, but they do not make
it just as they please; they do not make it under
circumstances chosen by themselves. . ." In McLellan, Karl
Marx: Selected Writings
, p. 300.
H^See Azizah al-Hibri, "Reproduction, Mothering and
the Origins of Patriarchy," in Mothering: Essays in
Feminist Theory , ed . Joyce Trebilcot (Totawa, N.J.: Rowman
and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 81-93; and Eva Feder Kittay, "Womb
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122Harding, "Is Gender a Variable?", p. 48.
123 In A Different Voice
, pp. 24-63.
124The Politics of Reproduction .
CHAPTER VI
GENDER AND POLITICAL THEORY
: THE RETURN TO DIFFERENCE
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W°man t0ld the truth
The world would split open.
Muriel Rukeyser, "Kathe Kollwitz"
Modern thought is advancing toward that regionwhere man's Other must become the Same as himself.
Michael Foucault, The Order of Things
Hobbes, Mill and Marx Revisited
Our exploration of Hobbes, J.S. Mill and Marx provides
strong support for the thesis that masculine gender is a
detectably significant constituent of the discourse of
modern political theory. Specifically masculine
presuppositions, perceptions, interests and values have
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escaped detection and remark not simply because of the
entrenched pervasiveness of the masculine outlook, but also
because the eyes that beheld it have been unselfconsciously
confirmed by its unart iculated presence and logic. l n
other words, male hegemony in modern Western political
theory has simultaneously produced masculine ideology in
that genre and rendered it unproblmatic and invisible.
While political theory has undergone significant
permutations through time, adding new and often discordant
voices to its various 'conversations' in the face of its
revealed limited abilities to express socio-political
experiences, disappointments, desires and possibilities, it
is still "a landscape in which women are strangers." 1 it
is, in effect, a gendered landscape, whose contours are
beginning to come into view just as, and precisely because,
women are beginning to "speak from the silence" that
heretofore has been ours. 2
The most notable feature of this landscape (one that I
did not initially go 'fishing for', but which presented
itself to me as 1 went through the literature of political
theory) is the grand and contrived absence of the mother.
Given her privileged position in the construction and
attainment of masculine gender identity, this should come
as no surprise. For while she is the key figure in the
articulation of masculine identity, she is the negative and
repressed ground of that identity. Hence, the search for
masculine ideology in .odern western political theory has
turned up a "maternal subtext" 3
, inhabited by a mother
who is both real and fantasized. The real missing mother
is the mother who has birthed us and most probably cared
for us during our early., vulnerable and formative years.
She provided the original ground of our difficult striving
for identity. The fantasized mother is the mother of huge
proportions-terrifying in her wrath and vindicti veness
,
seductive in her promise of a recaptured "oceanic feeling"
The absence of the mother is richly orchestrated; it
can take, as we have seen, a variety of forms. But
whatever the particular scenario, it is always based on a
forcible expulsion which is subsequently denied— i.e.,
"forgotten". Such forget fulness is maintained in the
layers of discourse within which she is wrapped and handed
from theorist to theorist. The forget fulness is so
successful, that no surprise or recognition is registered
when she reappears in a Hobbesian sovereign who is
self-generating through time, or in a capitalism that
reproduces itself with inexorable del iberateness . The
explusion and denial of the mother are handily captured in
Hobbes's suggestion that we imagine ourselves "like
mushrooms". They are presupposed in Mill's conception of a
discrete, abstract individual who is entitled to rights on
the basis of a public-private distinction. They are
embodied in Marx's vision of human beings as essentially
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self-creating producers. Each of these characterizations,
significantly different as they are, shares in a profound
denial of the mother.
Each is also threatened, although differentially so, by
her reappearance on the scene. in the case of Hobbes, she
threatens to turn the mushroom metaphor into an absurd and
even humorous construct. We hear her laughing in the
shadows of the state of nature. For Mill, the return of
the mother threatens to clutter the liberal individual's
carefully manicured identity and to impede his access to
privately-generated rights. She poses a fundamental
challenge to the nature-culture distinction by straddling
it and she threatens to release the lid on the Pandora's
box of repressed nature. In Marx's case, she provokes a
re-thinking of the basic elements of labor, along with the
categories of "production" and "history". She is unmoved
by the communist ideal because she cannot abide a neat and
inverted distinction between freedom and necessity.
The missing and repressed mother is especially
implicated in the portrayal of nature, as we have noted
specifically in the cases of Mill and Marx. The mutually
implicated fates of mothers and nature in western political
theory are the result not so much of ontology but of
post-Enlightenment dichotomies and associations that link
women to nature through the maternal function and set
. . 4
masculinized Reason in opposition to feminized Nature.
This association, I would argue, is not simply an idealist
or ideological one, however. Maternal labor is implicated
in a profound and irreducible relation to nature. 5 But
this relationship has been "stretched" to the point that,
until recently, we have been unable to conceive of maternal
activity as cognitive, rational practice. 6 Mill provides
one of the most extreme and disturbing versions of a mind
set that fails to appreciate the legitimate cognitive
dimensions of materially embedded labor. This is exhibited
in his distrust of "partial" interests, which he counter-
poses to the apparently disembodied rationality of the
educated. His paranoid account of a vile and vindictive
nature set in opposition to civilization ramifies on his
portrayal of the "individual" who is only apparently
genderless. This individual is indelibly marked by
"abstract masculinity" 7
, Mills's feminism notwithstanding.
Marx's portrayal of nature-necessity as the objectified
ground of man's creative impulses and labors also requires
the banishment of the mother. This is most evident in his
portrayal of an architect-like labor which writes out
maternal labor and women's labors of caring. Antipathy
towards nature, virulent in Mill, ambivalently cast by
Marx, issues in effective antipathy to women. This in
spite of the intentions of either theorist.
A masculine orientation and cognitive structure has a
powerful effect on the political theorist's portrayal of
human nature and the subject. In the case of Hobbes and
Mill, an atomistic conception of the individual prevails.
This individual inhabits a terrain populated by self-sprung
persons whose identities are self-generated and
self-contained. Inviolable egos such as these embody the
masculine fantasy of omnipotence and self-sufficiency.
There is, however, a steep price to be paid for the
attempted enactment of this fantasy, for the denial of the
mother "cuts man adrift in an endless search for the origin
that he has effaced in his desire to be self-generating." 8
In Marx, this fantasy issues in a vision of what Charles
Taylor has called "situat ionless freedom". 9 For Mill, it
requires a struggle against a forever threatening nature
(inner and outer). And in Hobbes, it produces a civil
order governed by a self-generating, but arbitrary (because
ontologically ungrounded) authority. (Here we have a
classic instance of 'having one's cake and eating it too':
even as he eliminates the mother, he wants to re-introduce
precisely her own ability to provide generational
continuity.) Hobbes's and Mill's individuals are defined
essentially in terms of rights which are negotiated
contractually. Such rights are the essence of political
life. Marx, on the other hand, invokes a social conception
of the individual. His individual is not pre-const ituted
;
rather, he is a complex ensemble of his social relations.
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Nonetheless, Marx's version of the subject shares with
Hobbes's and Mill's the fantasy of self-creation. In
Marx's hands, the fantasy is more complex and attractive;
nonetheless it is housed within a frame that cannot abide
the complexities of social and carnal vulnerability. This
orientation is given full sway in his vision of communism.
It is also at the heart of his voluntarist conception of
labor
.
We are also in a position to appreciate the ways in
which effaced maternal origins have something to do with a
plastic conception of human nature which we find
significantly developed in Marx and Mill. (Hobbes's
description of human nature, on the other hand, is simply
radically under-described.) While Marx stressed the "man
makes himself" version of this conception, Mill's
behaviorism moved him to focus on social influences as the
significant determinants of human identity, motivation and
potential. Each version promotes an ontological emptiness
that flies in the face of an original securing of the self
vis a vis our primordial caretaker. Each version makes it
particularly difficult to address the question of human
needs . ^
In this study, we have also explored the relationship
between masculinity and intellectual style. Hobbes is the
most virile of the three, having cast himself as an epic
hero fighting dangerous battles. Marx's style is also
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notably combative and aggressive. Mill's aggression is the
more sublimated, cloaked under the veneer of Victorian
gentlemanly rationality. It too, however, tends toward an
arrogant and pre-emptive posture and is employed as a kind
of weapon with which to rout out foes. Within Mill's
scheme, disagreements signal a breakdown in rational
discourse, since rational method presumably points to the
correct solution. Those who disagree with Mill are cast
aside as "unenlightened" or as "irrational", which means
less-than-fully-civilized. This style is perhaps the most
insidious of the three.
Epistemology and method have also been explored with a
view to searching for gender-specific components of
political theory. Mill's methodological individualism is
the clearest and most extreme expression of a masculine
epistemological orientation, since it recapitulates, in
nearly classic form, a stereotypical masculine subject, one
with clearly demarcated ego boundaries and tidy
transactional relations with other similarly constructed
subjects. Within such a world, methodological
individualism makes perfect sense. The reconstruction of
social phenomena as the products of the quantitatively
reduced and simplified processes of cause and effect is
theoretically attainable within an environment populated by
"individual men". Hobbes's geometry-inspired political
science was an earlier version of the same thing, enhanced
and simplified by his nominalism. Marx's method, of
course, is quite different. it is aimed at understanding a
complex system of relations which also constitute the
"objects" within it. This is very different from a
"scientific" approach to pre-cons tituted objects who
subsequently engage in social relations. Like Hobbes, Marx
is a conflict theorist, although the language he uses to
describe and understand conflict is radically different.
Within Hobbes 's scheme, conflict is a necessary by-product
of social relations: human beings bump up against each
other in competitive movement towards necessarily scarce
objects of desire. For Marx, on the other hand, conflict
inheres in social reality itself. The very relational
constitution of human beings presupposes contradictions,
whether latent or manifest. Masculinity is exhibited in
Marx's account via the dichotomous rendition of class
relations that he presents. The self-other opposition of
Hobbes 's state of nature, where every ego is the Self, and
all others are the Other, is transposed in Marx's account
into one grand Self-Other conflict, proletariat on one
side, bourgeoisie on the other. Marx suggested, of course,
that the bourgeois ideologues had it backwards. That is,
that their privileged identity was historically illusory.
His alternative account, however, recapitulates the
dichotomous contrast and anticipates its eventual
resolution as a one-sided unconditional victory.
ironically, Marx's futuristic visioning fails to accomodate
the very dialectical interplay that is so compelling in his
account of capitalism. Between the historical transcendence
of class, politics and necessity, he has left exceedingly
little for the dialectic to get its hands on.
Marx and Hobbes share a distinctive and important
impulse which is rooted in their ultra-conf li ctual accounts
of society. Each projects a future and desirable order
which is remarkably conflict-free. Citizens of the
Leviathan hand over their capacities for conflict to the
supreme civil authority in exchange for peace and
stability. In Marx's vision, future comrades labor
creatively and cooperatively with no State hovering above
them. Their relationship to society is thoroughly
unproblematic. And whatever problematic relationship to
nature still exists, because of "her" recalcitrance, has
been reduced to a minimum. We can understand these
theoretical projections, in part, as a psychological
response to the anxiety produced by incessant conflict. An
indefinite future of Civil Wars or class struggle would be
psychically unbearable for anybody. While Marx and Hobbes
had the "guts" to face up to the conflict of their times,
they were human enough to need and to construct an exit.
But the unreal and impoverished cast of their alternative
solutions suggests that the original formulations of the
problem were skewed. And we are in a position now to
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appreciate the possibility that such distortions might be
based to some degree on gender-specific perceptions.
As the epigrams and quotes which head up chapters III,
IV and V were selected to suggest, each theorist would
appear to be aiming for human comprehensiveness in his
work. Such comprehensiveness, in fact, is invoked as a
criterion for the truth and adequacy of each theory.
Hobbes believes that his theory of human nature can be
cross-checked and verified by any who take time to reflect
honestly on their motivations, desires, passions and
behaviors. Mill criticizes his Utilitarian predecessors
for having an overly limited view of their human subjects
and he suggests that we must be open to the partial and
often hidden views of differently situated individuals. He
invokes, among other things, wealth, age and sex in making
his argument. Marx believes that he has finally founded a
comprehensive social theory by treating class as a
significant constituent of knowledge, interests and power.
His insight into the necessary connections between social
relations and intellectual "wealth" is both compelling and
ironic, given his failure to appreciate the ways in which
women of his time were differentially embedded in social
relations. Yet, none of these theorists seems to be aware
of his sex and his gender as possible constituents of his
thought. They have all failed to fulfill one of their own
criteria for "good" social theory. This is not simply
because women are effectively written out of these
accounts. At a more profound level, the "forgotten self"
of political theory is the masculine self.
Each theorist embodies Freud's description of the boy
who finds it self-evident that "a genital like his own is
to be attributed to everyone he knows." This "phallic
prerogative" serves, in the case of Hobbes, to write women
out of his account of the state of nature and civil
society. In the case of Mill, it assimilates women to
itself in the form of liberal feminism. In Marx, it issues
in a failure to understand labor fully, along with a
replication of a sexual division of labor which will not
and cannot acknowledge "women's work" even as it legislates
it. To the extent that Marx's "materialist" theory fails
to engage with the complex substratum of necessity in human
affairs and relations, it fails dismally both as an account
of extant social reality and as a proposal for revolution.
But the problem here is not simply women's absence as
gendered and sex-specific persons. For this absence is
orchestrated by the silent presumption that masculinity is
the norm. To bring women back in to political theory
requires also that we "bring men back in." To do this is,
as the sociologist David Morgan has written, "to take
gender seriously." 11
Each of the theorists studied here exemplifies the
"problem of difference" explored in chapter I. On the one
hand, each may be charged guilty for having taken it for
granted. That is, each theorist replicates, unself-
consciously, features of his social environment and
intellectual inheritance which are built on presumptions of
sexual difference. On the other hand, each fails to
appreciate the ways in which "difference" puts pressure on
his assumptions and formulations concerning "human"
requirements and possibilities. As the argument in chapter
I was designed to suggest, women's "otherness" is not
simP1Y the false positing of a women's nature which can be
rectified by policy changes, "role" switches and non-sexist
language. It is also a "true" characterization of women's
experiences in male-dominated, gender-differentiated
society, secured by centuries of differential activities
and interests. At this point in Western history,
"difference" is something other and more than an
inconvenient and unwanted skin which "liberated" men and
women can shed with some good old-fashioned will power a la
Mill. It is part of the very fabric of culture, social
structure, subjectivity and identity. Identity itself is
constructed on the terrain and with the materials of gender
differences. I would like to suggest, along the lines of
some of the French feminists (see Appendix B), that
"difference" preserves some critical counter truths. But
this is a difference that must reappropr iated with a
twist. Shoshana Felman has put it this way:
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Defined by man, the conventional polarity of masculineand feminine names woman as a metaphor of man
*
The rhetorical hierarchizat ion-oTt^vSFy-^s i t ionbetween the sexes is then such that woman'affinee
of ?hf bSlng t0tallY subs^ed by the referentthe feminine to masculine identity. 12
On this view, attempts to write difference out of political
theory should be as suspect as efforts to reinvigorate it
as a reflecting metaphor for masculinity. Hence, Mill's
feminism is disturbing not simply because it is a limited
feminism (i.e., it fails to engage with the evident needs
of working class women), but because it offers emancipation
in exchange for female-feminine specificity. Such an
exchange is wildly premature and full of problems. At this
historical point, what it offers is nothing other than the
legitimated imposition of the phallic prerogative.
Masculinity as Ideology
Graeme Duncan's reflections on social theory provide an
especially helpful way of initially situating this
discussion of masculinity as ideology:
My own belief ... is that it is impossible to
produce a substantial social theory which is free of
prejudice, and which does not rest upon a mass of
anticipatory and excluding decisions at different
stages along the way, including the beginning ....
Doubting that men are, or can be, sufficiently
disinterested or omniscient to see the world steadily
and see it whole, I must admit nonetheless that it is
conceivable that things will be different one day. But
hitherto the world has looked strikingly different from
the different places that men [sic] occupy in it. It
looks different from a peasant's hut, a labourer's
tenement, an executive's split-level house, a
348
president s palace, a monk's cell, or from the variousprisons which woman has occupied historically. Thesedifferences of vision, which are not related solely towealth or social positions, should be at least
S i"i*?i
n9 t0 bullies and dogmatists and bureaucrats.And hitherto efforts to establish one true view of theworld have not resulted from argument, persuation andimaginative endeavor, but from the readiness of certain
men--perhaps under the guidance of the gods, or of somepolitical fantasy— to impose their will on the
remainder
.
1
J
Duncan's comments are intended to remind us of two
important things about social theory: its inevitable
partiality and its embeddedness within particular locations
which yield particular outlooks. If the world looks
"strikingly different from the different places that men
occupy in it," it must also look strikingly different from
the different places that men and women occupy in it. And
the "places" that we inhabit are not just (1) the places of
labor, leisure, family life and social relations; we must
also consider the terrain of gender identity itself as
differentiated territory. The very ways in which that
"space" and its inhabitants are constructed and perceived
is different. Masculine space is open and uncluttered;
more often than not, it is structured in linear
hierarchical terms. Feminine space is web-like, inhabited
14by diverse cross-currents of affiliation. The
masculine ego is well-defined and has an interest in
protecting his boundaries from violations. The feminine
ego is more amorphous, complexly embedded in relationships
that tend to obscure a singular sense of self. A final
comment on Duncan's assessment of social theory: thus far,
efforts to establish "one true view" have been the efforts'
of men. This phenomenon may be understood as something
more than a reflection of the fact that up until now, at
least, privileged men have been the only persons in a
position to attempt such an imposition of the will. That
is, masculine gender identity already contains a predis-
position to behave in this way. Acton's characterization
of power— "absolute power corrupts absolutely "
—might
require some gender-specific modification. 15
In Chapter II I made a promissory claim concerning the
notion of 'masculinity as world view' which should by now
have been made good, or nearly so. I have chosen to
utilize and defend this notion for several reasons. First,
I want to argue that masculinity, understood in ideal-type
terms, has a characteristic structure, that it is something
more than a vaguely defined sense of identity with some
kind of unspecified relationship to or effect on political
theory. Secondly, I want to underscore the (potential)
ubiquity of masculinity in modern western political
thought. While that is a claim that extends beyond the
limited scope of this analysis, it is a claim worth taking
seriously for future study. The notion of masculinity as
world view may be of analytic help to those who decide to
explore the question of this ubiquity in greater detail.
The notion of masculinity as world view also raises
some important (although tentative) critical questions
about the historical and thematic per iodizat ion of
political theory. if a masculine world view is found in
the works of political theorists other than those examined
here, what will or should the criteria be for
distinguishing them from each other? If those feminists
working in history have begun to notice that each newly
"progressive" era in West has found more potent means for
dominating women, what does this suggest for our
understanding of the history of political and social
theory? 16 Such questions might also have a significant
bearing on our framing of the "problem of modernity". To
the extent that modernity is tied up with the ethos of
"self-assertion", with the problems of the "self-made man",
is it a problem for women? Do women experience modernity
in this form? Might it be a masculine problematic? Would
thinking along these lines enable us to understand it any
better? 17
Returning now to the issue of masculinity as world
view, we must be able to identity, however crudely, a
subset of beliefs, attitudes and goals which characterize
masculinity as a world view. I offer the following
schemat i zation, with a caveat that must be taken
seriously. It is this: I have argued against the
reduct ioni st ic tendency to presume that gender translates
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automatically into the substance and style of thinking in
political theory. Instead, I have invoked gender as an
irreducible ground of thinking and cognition, but as a
ground which may and has been mediated in a variety of
ways. The prescriptions of gender are also, in many ways,
impossible and internally inconsistent prescriptions. 18
This approach mitigates against any kind of extensive and
neat list-making. When we "look" for masculinity in
political theory, we must proceed with a "feeling for" "the
idiosyncratic vocabulary of the inner man" which has been
translated into public language. 19 This is very
different from proceeding with a checklist of masculine
attributes to match up against the texts with which we are
working. With this cautionary note in mind, I would offer
the following as general attributes of masculine ideology
on the basis of my work with Hobbes, J.S. Mill and Marx:
1) Mothers do not, as a rule, exist for the purposes
of political theory; neither do the activities
associated with biological reproduction.
2) The human subject is a male-masculine (just like
me) subject.
3) Life is a struggle between usually conflicting
persons and goals and in relation to a recalcitrant and
often hostile nature.
4) Thinking is adversarial and takes place in relation
to a resistant reality and fellow adversarial
thinkers. There are many ways of breaking down this
resistance: we can rearrange the parts of reality to
reconstruct cause-effect relations; we can peel away
the levels of appearances to find reality underneath.
Those who fail to see reality as I do are either stupid
or corrupt. In either case, they are dangerous and
must be opposed.
5) The point of life is to minimize human dependence
on nature and fellow human beings. To the extent that
we can achieve this, we are actualizing our humanity.
I have sought to show that these elements are widely shared
between Hobbes, Mill and Marx, although diversely and
specifically articulated by each theorist, and that they
are systematically interconnected. Their common point of
origin is located in the acquisition of a masculine
identity vis a vis the (m)other. I have also argued, in
each chapter and in the opening pages of this concluding
chapter, that these elements of masculine ideology are
central to the conceptual schemes of each theorist, and
that they have a wide and deep influence on their
theories. Finally, there is no need to belabor the obvious
centrality of these elements to important issues of human
life and to metaphysical issues. They are at the core of
Hobbes' s conception of civil society, Marx's view of labor,
and Mill's view of liberal democracy.
In this work, I have tried to demonstrate that the
construction of socio-political problems and their
solutions by Hobbes, Marx and Mill rests on an
anthropological foundation that is identifiable masculine.
Each theorist works with a "cherished conception of the
self which imbibes aspects of masculine identity.
While these aspects are elaborated in significantly
different ways, we can also understand them as elements of
the same multifaceted frame. The point of such an analysis
is not to lump each theorist together into an
undifferentiated collection of "masculine thinkers". Such
a move erases more than it reveals. On the other hand, it
is plausible to suggest that the concept of "masculine
ideology" enables us to understand them simultaneously as
distinct thinkers partaking in a discursive substratum
,
i.e., a kind of pre-consc ious conversation with its own
necessary and limiting horizon. I have attempted to bring
this discourse to the surface of consciousness. In effect,
we can appreciate the uniqueness of each theorist in the
new light that is cast by the suggestion that they also
share a set of similar concerns which evolve out of a
preoccupation with the health and well-being of a masculine
subject who, as such, is located in the world in specific
ways. We can also begin to chart the deficiencies of each
theorist's work with respect to these shared, if
differently elaborated, concerns. Such a critique proceeds
out of a different ontological experience or standpoint,
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that of women.
A. Different Reality 21
The self-other opposition is, as we have seen, central
to the construction of masculine identity and deeply
implicated in the dichotomies of post-Enlightenment Western
philosophical thought. 22 "The construction of the self
in opposition to another who threatens one's very
23being" cannot help but be felt in an intellectual
tradition inhabited predominantly be men. How might
feminine "difference" be invoked in critical contrast to
the intellectual constructs of masculinity? An obvious
starting point is in the process of feminine identity
acquisition where "girls form their self-concepts in large
part through identification with their first significant
other (s) who share the same socially defined possibilities
24of a female body." A likely result of this experience
is that "the self-other distinction is neither symbolized
by a distinction between the sexes, nor does it involve the
assumption that the self and the other possess opposing
25
characteristics." Instead, argues Carolyn Whitbeck,
the daughter-mother relationship unfolds between beings who
are in some important sense analogous. This provides a
very different starting point for cognitive development,
one that is relations-based and which must subsequently be
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concerned with the scope and limits of the analogy between
the self and the other rather than with questions of
identity and difference, strictly conceived. An
understanding of differentiation that does not require
strict opposition could be characterized as "a
multifactorial interactive model." 26
Some would argue that this early psychological
experience provides a different ontological ground, one
that enables a seeing of the Other as "distinct and
different in some respects" without being an opposite. 27
Working such an ontological proposal out is quite
difficult, however:
The difficulty is that the terminology in which the new
ontology is to be articulated is automatically
interpreted in terms of the accepted ontology, so that
one is always at the risk of having one's statements
construed either as nonsense, or as a quaint phrasing
of what are familiar truths according to the old
ontology. 28
If this alternative feminist ontology is taken as a
mirror- image of the masculine one, nothing will have been
gained. A mirror image conception would maintain the
originally problematic masculine cognitive structure;
furthermore, its "alternative" form of cognition and
rationality would be unable to provide limiting or
distinguishing criteria. That is, all differentiation
would become "mushed out" into one giant undifferentiated
agglomeration. A preserving of the notion of
differentiation, along with the introduction of the notion
of analogous thinking processes, provides instead a
dl££erent Process of differentiation, rather than the
"alternative" of no differentiation at all.
To argue for and attempt to delineate an alternative
ontological ground along these lines is by no means to
confine such an experience to women (or to assume that all
women experience it and know it):
Although a certain history of relationships may incline
a person to seek out other relationships and practices
that embody a similar ontological outlook, people maybecome convinced of the superiority of a particular
ontology and seek the relationships and practices
consistent with that view. 29
Sara Ruddick has made a similar point in her discussion of
30
maternal thinking.
Whitbeck's initial effort to explore a "different
ontology" is echoed in Isaac Balbus
' s notion of a
"post-instrumental" mode of symbolization, where our
relations to others and to nature are no longer
objectified, but partake of a mutual recognition of shared
and differentiated subjectivities. Significantly, each
attempt is rooted in an analysis of the unfolding
self-other relation in infancy and early childhood.
"Thinking," writes Jane Flax, "is a form of activity which
cannot be treated in isolation from other forms of human
activity, including the forms of human activity which in
,31turn shape the humans who think." When we consider
such "shaping activities", parenting and early
socialization come immediately to mind.
"Difference" may also be explored on the adult terrain
of reproduction and labor. Mary O'Brien has made a cogent
argument for gender-differentiated reproductive experience
and consciousness, which is implicated in our sense of
time, history and bodily consciousness. 32 Significantly,
the sex- and gender-differentiated aspects of this
experience seem to recapitulate and reinforce the earlier
"lessons" of gender identity acquisition. Hence, male
reproductive consciousness, according to O'Brien, is more
likely to center around feelings of di s-connect ion and
alienation; subsequent efforts to "mediate" this experience
have taken the historical form of compensatory efforts to
insure paternity. Patriarchal versions of paternity, like
masculine gender identity, are bound up with efforts to
deny the original power of women. Female reproductive
experience, on the other hand, partakes of biological
continuity and bodily experiences that mitigate against a
dualistic classification scheme. Sara Ruddick's work on
maternal thinking focuses directly on the activities of
mothering and suggests that this experience generates
particular "interests" and forms of knowledge appropriate
33to those interests. Interests in the preservation,
growth and acceptablity of the child generate a cognitive
orientation that must be flexible, humble, cheerful, and
complexly caring. Maternal thinking is embedded in an
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environment of constant change, generated by the inevitable
growth and maturity of children. This reality is rarely
static or predictable. Control is simultaneously necessary
and impossible. It is exercized within a constantly
shifting environment, made unpredictable by a larger social
order over which mothers have little control, as well as by
the inevitable development of children.
Moving on to the sexual division of labor more broadly
conceived, Dorothy Smith and Nancy Hartsock, among others,
have argued that women's work provides a mediation with
nature, particularity and contingency that is all too often
hidden and presupposed within the frame of men's work:
.
. .
the unity of mental and manual labor and thedirectly sensuous nature of much of women's work leads
to a more profound unity of mental and manual labor,
social and natural worlds, than is experienced by the
male worker in capitalism. 34
Women keep house, bear, and care for children, look
after him when he is sick, and in general provide for
the logistics of his bodily existence. But this
marriage aspect of women's work is only one side of a
more general relation. Women work in and around the
professional and managerial scene in analogous ways.
They do those things which give concrete form to the
conceptual activities. ... At almost every point,
women mediate for men the relation between the
conceptual mode of action and the actual concrete forms
on which it depends. Women's work is interposed
between the abstracted modes and the local and
particular actualities in which they are necessarily
anchored. Also, women's work conceals from men acting
in the abstract mode just this anchorage. 3 ^
These and many other efforts provide an elaboration of
"difference" with the intent not simply of documenting
women's heretofore hidden activities and interests, but of
bringing these to bear on dominant and often male-
monopolized practices and interests. Muriel Rukeyser
provided a poetic intuition of the likely results of such
an interchange. "The world would split open" because, as
it is currently constituted, masculine paradigms
. , 36prevail. These paradigms are called into critical
question by the varieties of expression of the "human
condition" elicited by female experience. But Rukeyser 's
poem also imagines that a woman is able to "tell the truth
about her life". As such, she must have access to and be
able to use the tools of truth-telling: language, of
course, but more specifically, concepts which are capable
of conveying the rich and "messy" complexity of her
experience. "Womanly thinking" requires "womanly
37
concepts." Such concepts, of course, have not been
readily at hand for women entering previously male-defined
and inhabited disciplines. Those of us working in
political and social theory are in the midst of the
difficult and exciting work of re-thinking the conceptual
apparatus we have inherited. An understanding of the
connections between gender and modern political thought
suggests that such a task is simultaneously necessary and
immense.
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Politic al Theory and the Feminist Critic;
What Should Political Theory Really Be Now?
If masculine gender is in fact a significant, but
hidden, constituent feature of the discourse of modern
western political theory, this suggests that efforts to
re-right the sexual imbalance in political theory cannot
and should not be elaborated by simply adding women to that
discourse. For a discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, is
"like a conversation in which utterances are abstracted
from particular participants located in particular
spatio-temporal settings." 38 And men and women, as
gendered subjects, are located in different settings even
as they are differentially located within similar
settings. This is true not simply of the places they
inhabit, but also of the introjected object-settings that
constitute gendered identity itself. Much more than a
simple acknowledgement of women's existence and presence is
called for. For our existence, identity and outlook as
women, as gender-specific subjects, is simultaneously
denied by and threatening to academic discourse.
Women who have or who are attempting to settle on the
academic terrain have tended to do so in one of two ways:
They have repudiated their identities as women, as sex- and
gender-specific subjects, to become 'one of the boys*. Or,
they have settled on the fringes of the territory, as
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rabble-rousers, weirdos, harpies. Such women are often
seen as lacking in "professional" discipline, commitments,
capacities, and "colleagiali ty"
. Those who attempt to
avoid either location often settle on a "line of fault",
marked by "a disjuncture between experience and the forms
in which experience is socially expressed." 39 The
dilemma is this: in adopting the discourse of the academic
disciplines, we are often forced to give up our identities
as women; in failing to adopt the "talk" (along with the
"walk") our identity as intellectuals is threatened.
There was, we discovered, a circle effect
--men attend
to and treat as significant what men say and have
said. The circle extends back in time and as far as
our records reach. What men were doing has been
relevant to men, was written by men about men for men.
Men listened and men listen to what one another say. A
tradition is formed, traditions form, in a discourse
with the past within the present. The themes,
problematics, assumptions, metaphors, and images form
as the circle of those present draws upon the work of
those speaking from the past and builds it up to
project it into the future. From this circle women
have been almost entirely excluded. When admitted, it
has been only by special license, and as individuals,
never as representatives of their sex. They could
share in this circle only by receiving its terms and
relevances. These have been and still are to a large
extent the terms and relevances of a discourse among
men . 40
The impersonal mode of academia simultaneously masks
the gendered voices of its male practitioners as it confers
"abstract" and "impersonal" legitimacy of them. 41 As a
result, women in academia often find themselves on unsteady
ground, threatened on one side by their delegit imizat ion as
intellectuals and on the other by their attempts to work
with a "forced set of categories into which we must stuff
the awkward and resistant actualities of our world." 42
Attempts to articulate female experience take place on this
fault line. It is a mode of inquiry which is
simultaneously hazardous, necessary and promising. The
hazards consist not simply in the threat of intellectual
de-legitimization, but also in the unwary adoption of
disciplinary agendas which already constitute their
_ 43universes of observation. The promises of such inquiry
exist not only for women but also for the critical
self-reflection of men and the disciplines themselves. In
"disrupting the transparency and misleadingly self-evident
universality of its male enunciation, 1,44 attempts to
articulate female experiences are highlighting the
taken-for-granted location of academic disciplines and
discourses in a space of male experience. Hence:
The critic who intrudes into the father-son dialogue as
a female, that unholy ghost who would display the
strategies of the patristic heritage and dispel the
magic of men's naming, necessarily speaks as a
di ss ident . 45
The necessity for such an inquiry, considered in terms
of the dissident female academic in political theory, may
be adduced by reflecting on Norman Jacobson's
characterization of "great" political theory:
. . . the genuis of all great political thinkers is to
make public that which is of private concern, to
translate into public language the more special,
arrTvTn^^
10 ™Cabul* ry
.
of the inner man in hopes ofriving at public solutions which might then beinternalized by each of us. 46 y
cn D
To deal with matters of private concern and experience
which might illuminate political problems and dilemmas,
within the context of a discourse that can not admit to its
own gender-specific texture, is a nearly impossible
47
endeavor
.
One of the foremost obstacles confronting the feminist
dissident in political theory is the likely perception that
her work is illegitimate because it raises concerns and
issues that could not possibly have been available to the
theorists she is reassessing. The methodological appeal to
historical embeddedness is a powerful one, for it cautions
against the violation of the integrity of the political
theorist as a historically and culturally embedded
subject. As feminists, we are (or should be) sensitive to
issues such as these, for they call on the capacities for
empathy, respect and imaginative projection that women are
all too well versed in. On the other hand, to imagine that
we can ever fully enter a strange and different time or
place contains a touch of abstract, disembodied arrogance.
"For we bring ourselves with us wherever we go; we cannot
ever deliberately forget the voices that have become
48internally persuasive'." We cannot, in other words,
deny or dodge the life that we have with various works.
For it is this, along with our preoccupation with
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contemporary political and social issues, that marks the
temper of political theory in the present. In reading the
classics of political theory as women and as feminists, we
need to embrace "the work as a whole— the complete
imaginative offering, the experience the work makes
49possible for us." This is a move beyond the earlier
one of documenting "instances" of sexism. It gets us into
the heart of the political imagination in the West. And we
are entitled to search for and to identify "failures of the
imagination", particularly when such failures continue to
constitute timely ideological differences that carry
significant import for the political fates of human
beings. Certainly, we are entitled to read these works as
women rather than as abstract intellects. The difference
between this activity and what men in the tradition have
been doing all along is simply that, until recently, we
have been eavesdroppers on a conversation that was not
meant for us, even as it affected us.
Freedom from male hegemony, I believe, cannot proceed
without reference to the languages and discourses we have
inherited. Our freedom from the interpretations of the
past depends on our freedom to reinterpret the past."^
The rei nterpretat ion of the Western political imagination
is a vast project. Such a re-thinking will come, in part,
through re-interpretive efforts, along with attention to
human practices, desires, needs and possibilities that have
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been unjustly ignored:
.
.
.little can be contributed by disassociating
ourselves from what have been women's practices, andthe women engaged in them, since we will then eitherignore those practices or inadvertently perpetuate thefalse account that masculinist culture gives ofthem. D1
A simultaneous focus on women's practices and the inherited
discourse of political theory may help us to resist the
prevailing tendency "to deny the existence of the other to
a greater or lesser degree or to make any existing other
into the self." 52 This tendency, of course, ramifies not
simply on women in the West, but on a host of other peoples
and cultures besides our own, as well as on variously
oppressed males in our culture. It is also a tendency that
must be resisted by white middle- and upper-class women who
are less prepared than they should be to listen seriously
to what women of other classes, races, and cultural
53backgrounds have to say. Finally, the denial and
appropriation of the other would also seem to constitute
the destructive and suicidal tragectory of western
modernity itself. To the extent that a vigorous feminist
re-invocation of "difference" in the name of the "other" is
promoted, feminism promises a critical re-thinking of the
post-Enlightenment legacy to which political theory is heir.
If, as Charles Taylor has said, political theory boils
down to efforts to answer the (deceptively simple)
54question, "What is really happening in society?" then
the absence of and failure to acknowledge female voices in
modern western political theory is an issue of fundamental
importance. And the question of whether political theory
can account for existing practices must open even further
to the question of the repertoire of practices that fall
within our field of vision as political theorists. A
recent collection of timely new writings in political
theory, entitled What Should Political Theory Be Now?
contains nothing which is by or substantially about
women.
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"Political theory", it would seem, is not
overly preoccupied with women. Feminists, however, must be
more generous; we cannot afford a reciprocal attitude.
In the immediate short run, the aim of this work has
been to substantiate in greater depth and with more detail
feminist intimations that Western political theory is
masculinist. The longer range aim of this work, one that
requires a fairly thorough interpretive "airing out" before
it can be enacted, is to contribute to efforts to provide a
conceptual home for women— all women, it must be
stressed—within the enterprise of political theory. Such
an effort will be a long time in the making. In the
meantime, we must insist on the vital significance of
"difference". Otherwise we capitulate to a politics of
sameness, which is a capitulation to the politics of
masculini ty
.
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APPENDIX A
GENDER AND PSYCHO-HISTORY
In the absence of vigilant care and critical
discrimination in its application, the interpretive approach
developed here is susceptible to a number of dangerous
abuses and significant criticisms related to such abuses.
The dangers derive primarily from 1) problems attending the
cross-disciplinary application of psychoanalytic theory,
and 2) methodological issues within history and anthropology
concerning trans-historical and cross-cultural applications
of contemporary notions of gender. These problems will be
explored below in the effort to anticipate potential cogent
criticisms of this work and to provide as rigorous a model
of interpretation as possible.
Psychoanalysis has frequently been called to task for
its reductionistic and over-determined view of childhood
experiences, especially those relating to sexuality. One
of the greatest abuses of which the psychoanalytic method
is susceptible is the production of "seamless web" types of
explanation, which purport to account for nearly every
aspect of culture and social life (individual and
collective) in early psycho-dynamic terms. Hence,
revolutions can be characterized as revolts against the
Oedipal father by jealous sons and works of art are
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susceptible to interpretation strictly in terms of their
unconscious or sublimated contents. Because its subject
matter—
a psyche that is neither wholly conscious to itself
nor subject to prevailing standards of rationality— is
simultaneously elusive and widely applicable to a vast
array of human activities and concerns, psychoanalysis
could conceivably be used to account for everything, from
the arena of the bedroom, to those of the battlefield and
economic marketplace. Furthermore, objections to
psychoanalytic interpretations of social phenomena can be
written off in therapeutic terms as instances of "denial".
This, of course, leaves the critic thoroughly boxed in.
Such reductionism is made possible within a frame of
explanation which accords, rightfully I believe, special
importance to early patterns of experience and their
rendering into meaningful but unconscious memories which we
may unwittingly repeat and re-experience. It is
unfortunate that the dangers of reductionism accompany
those features of psychoanalytic theory which also make it
an exciting, expansive, and insight-producing approach. As
in the case of Marx, Freud's theory has simultaneously
provided the tools for expanded critical analysis and
fetishized social theory. Critical social theorists must
learn to appreciate and insist on the difference.
The difference, I would suggest, consists in the claims
made within various explanations regarding the range and
focus of their explanatory power. it is one thing, for
example, to argue that the international nuclear arms
buildup can be thoroughly captured within a frame of
explanation that focuses on little boys' needs to
demonstrate their phallic powers. it is quite another
thing, however, to point out that the arms race may contain
traces of this phenomenon, or that it is partially
constituted in these terms. 1
Recent and important critiques have surfaced with
regard to the current emphasis of object-relations theory
on pre-Oedipal experiences, which are even more elusive,
more likely to be deeply situated in the remoter regions of
the unconscious, than the Oedipal dynamics of orthodox
Freudian theory. Dinnerstein 1 s analysis is especially
susceptible to charges of reductionism and over-determinism
because it moves rather fluidly between different levels
and arenas of social life. Her vivid rendition of the
Kleinian version of the neonate's early relationship to the
mother and of the dramatic breakup of symbiotic unity is
often rapidly transposed into the dynamics of adult
heterosexual relationships, and the anti-ecological and
pro-militaristic posturings of male political leadership.
Critics are correct to be wary of an overly neat
transposition, such that adult life and culture are nothing
but re-enactments of pre-Oedipal dramas. 2 Such an
account is unnecessarily static and pessimistic: it grants
little in the way of active mediation on the part of adults
and children who are clearly more than overgrown infants,
it detracts attention from soc io-structural phenomena, and
it fails to provide a plausible analysis of change. 3
The simiplified excesses of psychoanalyt ically-based
explanations warrant the critical scrutiny and skepticism
they have received. Such criticism, however, should not
detract attention from the important place that
psychoanalysis occupies in social theory. In providing an
entree to questions of latent meaning and complex
psychological processes, psychoanalysis has a unique and
important role in contemporary efforts to understand human
activities as fully as possible. While we cannot abide
psychological reduct ionism, we cannot do without
psychoanalysis as a rich, if partial, source of speculative
and reconstructive efforts to interpret the human drama in
all of its complexity.
For the purposes of this study, which include the
effort to understand a portion of what might be termed "the
unconscious" of political theory, 4 psychoanalysis is an
indispensable tool of analysis. This interpretive effort
is by no means intended to be exhaustive or inclusive. I
do not claim to be offering a preemptive analysis which
supercedes all others. I do, however, argue that gender
can be appropriately invoked as an interest-base and
ideological foundation in the historical elaboration of
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political theory; that it is not incidental to the style
and content of discourses which are materially produced and
situated in genderically differentiated societies. In
short, I argue that the study of political theory can be
usefully enriched through an interpretive effort which is
focused on gender and, as such, requires the conceptual
tools provided by psychoanalysis.
Aside from the critique of psychological reduct ionism,
which I will make every effort to avoid, the analysis of
masculinity as ideology is subject to another major
critical onslought, one that has also been levelled against
psycho-history. Because my analysis includes recourse to a
thinker historically situated in pre-contemporary times,
while it relies on a fairly contemporary version and
understanding of gender identity, I am obliged to assume
the burden of defense against existing criticisms of
psychohi story
.
However, because my study begins with
Hobbes and is therefore situated entirely within the frame
of the modern political theory tradition in the West, the
burden of proof here is not enormous. Nonetheless, many of
the issues at stake in the disputes surrounding psycho-
history bear in significant ways on the methodological
tenets of this study.
The historical troublespots associated with the study
of gender and psychoanalytic conceptions of psychodynamic
processes derive from 1) the fragmentary and incomplete
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nature of historical accounts of pre-industr ial social life
in the West, and 2) epistemological disputes within the
disciplines of history and anthropology having to do with
the study of the "di f f erentness
- of distant persons and
cultures. Each of these problems will be treated in turn.
While Freudian and post-Freudian analyses of modern
versions of gender identity root their material in the
dynamics of contemporary nuclear family life, to which
social analysts have ample research access, many features
of pre-industrial Western life have been lost to historical
scrutiny. 5 The paucity of information regarding the
everyday life of the non-elite and illiterate masses of the
West is astounding. Notably missing are rich and reliable
accounts of the lives of women and children, as well as
illiterate men who, until recently, were in no position to
contribute to the official historical record. That a
historian with the credentials and resources of Peter
Laslett cannot definitively answer the question as to
whether starvation was a significant factor in the lives of
England's pre-industrial masses is illustrative of how much
we do not know about the basic existence of our ancestors
only a few centuries back. The same observation holds for
questions concerning the emotional everyday lives of the
pre-industrial masses. Commenting on the strange
disjuncture between the evidence in paintings of masses of
children and their virtual absence in written accounts of
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pre-industrial life, Laslett writes:
These crowds and crowds of little children arestrangely absent from the written record .... Thereis something mysterious about the silence of all these
in th^V f bf63 in armS ' toddlers »nd adolescents
experience ****
at that time about their °wn
... we know very little indeed about childnurture m pre-mdustrialtimes, and no confidentpromise can be made of knowledge yet to come.
6
One thing we can surmise from Laslett 's awe in the face
of this mysterious absence of children is that literate
males of the elite had little to do with them. This
deduction, however, tells us little about qualitative
features of parent-child interaction within the fabric of
everyday life. One small bit of relevant information,
however, is that women appear to have been the primary
caretakers during the early years of children's lives.
The few explicit accounts that we do have of
pre-industrial child-rearing chronicle the experiences of
the elite. For example, David Hunt's study of the
psychology of family life in early modern France relies
extensively on records kept of the rearing and education of
Louis XIII. In his extensive study of The Family, Sex and
Marriage in England 1500-1800
, Lawrence Stone apologizes
for the weak and circumstantial evidence concerning the
lower classes, most of which he chose to eliminate from the
abridged version of his work. What has been gleaned by
noteworthy historians of the family such as Laslett, Stone,
Shorter, Aries, and Hunt is the result of painstaking
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research, much of it in the form of demographic data culled
from parish registers, and careful, hesitant conjecture.
Indeed, most of what can be confidently attributed to
pre-industrial family life in the West applies to a
miniscule proportion of pre-industrial populations: the
wealthy and literate males of the elite who had the means
and leisure to document life as they saw it. We have
inherited a history of self-constituting verbal activity
which has privileged certain subjects at the expense of
7
others
.
In spite of the obstacles, research on the
pre-industrial Western family has proceeded with some
measure of success due to refined procedures of data
collection, attempts to establish an empathic connection
with the experience of illiterate peoples, 8 and the fact
that many elite practices eventually trickled down to
affect the behavior and aspirations of the emerging middle
classes. Thanks to the pioneering work of Aries, we are
more critically cognizant of the historical specificity of
concepts of childhood and intimate family relations, which
did not even begin to emerge until the seventeenth
century. Stone's efforts have been directed towards
establishing the historical rise of affective
individualism, and Laslett's emphasis is on the contrast
between contemporary life in mass society and the
village-bounded existence of our pre-industrial ancestors.
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Together, these works force a critical appraisal of the
taken-for-granted and cherished concepts of contemporary
everyday life and discriminating care in their
retrospective historical application. Differences between
the medieval household, pre- and early-industrial, and
modern families are now acknowledged as crucial points of
contrast
.
The evidence for the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries in western Europe seems to indicate the women
were the nurturers and rearers of children, at least during
the early years (up to the age of 7), although the quality
of this care was markedly different from contemporary
versions of maternal nurturance. As we know, infant
mortality rates were high and children were not even
regarded as human individuals until they had survived
9
weaning. Childhood, if it existed at all in the
pre-industrial world, was an exceedingly attenuated period,
in contrast to our own version. By the age of seven, most
children were let out as servants and apprentices to new
households. So much for the idyllic misconception of
pre-industrual tightly knit families bound for life to
cottage, land and family. The elite practice of sending
infants out into the countryside under the care of peasant
wet nurses and (if they were fortunate enough to survive)
putting them under the care of female nurses and male
tutors (for sons) on their return home suggests that
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parents and children of the aristocratic classes, as well
as those of the hard-laboring masses, had brief, sporadic
relations in comparison with our own. Finally, the image
of the extended family household has been effectively
debunked as a myth. High mortality rates, the fact that
patriarchal heads of households didn't retire until death
claimed them, and the clear association between getting
married and setting up an independent household conspired
to reduce, rather than to enhance, cross-generational
familial ties. Life expectancy in that time also mitigaged
against the likelihood of adults ever living long enough to
become grandparents. In sum, the intense, affective, and
protracted relations between parents and children, which
are the hallmark of contemporary family life, comprise a
relatively recent phenomenon in the West. 10
The same may be said about affective relations between
spouses. Husband-wife relations within the pre-industr ial
and early modern marriage appear cold and antagonistic in
relation to our own. 11 Among the elite and emerging
middle classes, marriages were arranged on economic, social
and political grounds. The relationship between spouses
was often reducible to the terms of a functional contract
designed to strengthen family lines, holdings, and power.
Expectations for happiness in marriage ran low and divorce
was correspondingly rare, although re-marriage rates were
high among widowers who were first-born sons and widows
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with substantial dowries. Married men and women of the
elite spent little time together. Once the nuptials had
been effected, thereby cementing the economic and political
ties of the families involved, procreation was the only
remaining function meriting serious attention. Here, the
main purpose was to provide a male heir. Given the high
mortality rates of infants, exacerbated by the practice of
sending them out to wet nurses, elite families produced
many children in the hopes that at least one male heir
would survive. Since female children were an economic
liability, reproductive strategy must have been frought
with anxiety, frustration, and resentment on the part of
marriage partners.
In non-elite households that were invariably the sites
of productive activity, spouses probably had more contact
with each other as partners in work. Laslett describes a
typical household of 1619 in England which operated a
bakery business and was comprised of the baker, his wife,
four journeymen, two apprentices, two maidservants, and
three or four offspring:
The only word used at that time to describe such a
group of people was 'family'. The man at the head of
the group, the entrepreneur, the employer, or the
manager, was then known as the master or head of the
family. He was father to some of its members and in
place of father to the rest. There was no sharp
distinction between his domestic and his economic
functions. His wife was both his partner and his
subordinate, a partner because she ran the family, took
charge of the food, and managed the women-servants, a
According to Laslett, these patriarchal familial relations
are "as old as the Greeks, as old as European history, and
not confined to Europe." 13 They involved the
"subordination",
"exploitation", and "obliteration of those
who were young, or feminine, or in service". 14 Within
this historical setting, nearly everyone lived his or her
life within a family—although not necessarily in the
family of origin— that was ruled by a patriarchal
figure. 15 Characterizing the England of 1640 as an
"association between the heads of such families, but an
association largely confined to those who were literate,
who had wealth and status," 16 Laslett also points out
that the "head of the poorest family was at least the head
1
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of something."
If life was largely lived within the bounds of family
and village, we must also bear in mind that "the family"
was not the privatized and emotionally resonant site that
it is today. Situated in and comprising a cultural milieux
radically different from that of our own mass society which
relies on a public-private distinction, household members
lived in a social world commingling labor, recreation,
biological functions, emotional and instinctual yearnings
and religious activities and sentiments in a rich tapestry
of interchange which, to our eyes, appears as confusing,
chaotic and crowded as the roomless dwellings they
inhabited, in and around which they worked, slept,
fornicated, defecated, played and died.
While there is much that is strange and different to
contemporary eyes in this account of pre-industr ial family
life, several features continue to strike an emotional
resonance in our own age. The antipathy to women and
marriage on the part of men, documented most convincingly
by Hunt, persists, along with clear cut distinctions
between male and female arenas of work and social life.
And the social subordination of women to men, while less
strict and ideologically overt today, continues to
structure social organization, family life and ideology in
identifiable ways. While some feminists have been justly
criticized for misusing the term "patriarchy" to describe
political arrangements between the sexes in modern society,
one cannot fail but be struck by what evidently seem to be
some shared parallels between the pre-industr ial and
industrial worlds or, as orthodox Marxists would have it,
the sticky and stubborn residue of now "antiquated" social
and familial relationships.
Similarities in male dominance and the sexual division
of labor notwithstanding, they do not translate clearly
into a historical analysis of gender. Contemporary
theories of masculinity and femininity provide an account
of gender identity acquisition which is secured within the
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complex inter- and intra-psychic relations of an intensely
affective white middle-class modern family life. As the
historical literature previously reviewed indicates, the
private affective family binding spouse to spouse and
parents to children, providing the environment for
projective and introjective psychic dynamics which
constitute the fabric of contemporary identity, did not
emerge in significant numbers among European populations
until the eighteenth century. Also, contemporary
psychoanalytic models of gender acquisition are embedded
within a conceptual framework that presumes a host of
related concepts which are historically suspect, even as
they are precious and central to our way of life. These
include notions of ego, individual identity and
personality, childhood, parenthood, and sexual needs, some
or all of which may not be trans-histor ically applicable.
It is here that the charges levelled against psychohistory
as a method that fails to deal with the unique
"di f ferentness" of distant peoples and cultures, as it
uncritically projects the historically relative features of
modern life onto our images of the past, should be noted
and dealt with.
Psychohistor ians have been criticized for presuming an
immutability of human nature and social forms, a charge
that is similar and related to criticisms of the Freudian
notion of pre-social drives. The extreme version of the
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critique of the immutability assumption leads to a position
which argues the impossibility of historical discovery and
interpretation. A human nature that is presumed to be
thoroughly mutable and totally constitued within culture
has no cross-cultural anchor points by which to usefully
compare, contrast and highlight different verions of this
nature. In its most extreme form, the mutability thesis
yields a starkly solipsistic account that denies the
possiblity of knowing any others aside from the self. Many
critics of psychohistory
, while holding firm to the version
of cultural mutability, are not willing to go the
solipsistic route. 18 Within this frame of analysis,
solipsism is avoided by means of identifying intra-cultural
regularities which constitute and characterize particular
19
ways of life.
Leaving solipsism out of the account, the issue may be
simplified and broken down in the following way: either
cultural differences are significant enough to influence
perceptual tendencies and thereby create human beings in
different cultures and historical periods with notably
different perceptions of themselves and the worlds they
inhabit, mitigating against the assumption of some singular
human nature; or the biological and psychological
homogeneity of culture-learning humans precludes such
differences in the monumental sense. David Stannard
pursues the implications of the former possibility thusly:
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Person, events, or other seemingly
objective phenomenon in the same way as does themodern historian, it would clearly be a mistake to
The question of the cultural variability of perception,
where perception is understood to be a type of dynamic
screening process which both selects and helps to
constitute objects of perception, including the perceiver
as an object in relation to others, is extremely important
and complex. Human beings are born into culture and are
cognitively formed by rule-governed general belief systems
that could be characterized as paradigm-like, much as they
are formed by those language systems which significantly
constitute and express their beliefs and desires. This
characterization need not entail a tabula rasa model of
development, unless one begins with the presumption of a
strict nature-culture division. In this case, culture can
be granted its formative role only in the absence of
natural 'constraints'. If, however, the development of the
human species and of individuals within that species is
understood as the product of a complex and mutural
interaction between natural and cultural factors, which are
vitally interrelated, then the search for pre-cultural
humanity, based on the notion that the rules governing
particular cultures are purely arbitrary artifacts,
impositions and distortions of an underlying human nature,
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is as misplaced as the denial of any substratum of human
nature and its cultural articulation and elaboration. 21
As Clifford Geertz has argued, "what man [sic] is may
be so entagled with where he [sic] is, and what he [sic]
believes, that it is inseparable from them." 22 The
rejection of what he has termed the "uniformi tarian view of
man" has tended to result in extreme posturings within
social science of cultural relativism. It is possible,
however, to maneuver a more sophisticated and appropriate
path through this material which avoids the joint mistakes
and implications of relativism and an overly socialized
account of the human subject. 23 On Geertz' s view, such a
method proceeds "by seeking in culture patterns themselves
the defining elements of a human existence which although
not constant in expression, are yet distinctive in
character." As the link between innate capacities,
general predispositions, actual behaviors and elaborated
meanings, culture provides the means for the study of human
beings who necessarily complete themselves, in varied and
particular ways, through rule-governed interpretive
activity. On this view, the search for "bloodless
universals" or the Everyman is as misplaced as the notion
that cultures stand on their own as discrete entities which
cannot be compared to each other because they have
'produced' human beings who are as different as night and
day
.
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An epistemological and ontological stance such as
Geertz's provides the most helpful and appropriate
orientation to the study of "di f ferentness
" , although it
does not provide a methodological blueprint for the study
of diverse cultures. Such a blueprint, in any case, is not
on Geertz's agenda. We can now return to family history
for an exploratory look at what this suggests for our
interpretation of that history and its implications for the
study of gender.
In reading the historical studies provided by Stone,
Laslett, Aries and others, we are immediately drawn to
their insistent renditions of the essentially di f ferent
sorts of lives lived by humans in the past. But we must
then venture to ask, "how different?" The answer to this
question is not automatically provided in the description
of different cultures. Nor is it simply resolvable in
empirical terms, since it involves recourse to complex
interpretation at two levels. First, the reconstruction of
beliefs from pre-industr ial ages, based on incomplete
records and involving a piecing together of a way of life
which we do not have before us for complete inspection,
could not possibly be engaged in strictly empirical terms.
Secondly, "how different" involves recourse to our own
belief systems (public and private), which are not amenable
to understanding in strict empirical terms. If, in
attempting to answer the "how different" question, we must
be wary of extrapolating our own experiences and
rule-governed cultural logics and applying them to
different eras, we must also be willing to look for similar
or related patterns of experience and interpretation. in
effect, we cannot help doing this. It is one of the
characteristic ways in which we engage in the ongoing
activity of interpretation which marks us as a species.
Having no methodological guarantees or recipes, we must
proceed as rigorously, carefully and empathically as
poss ible
.
If family history has taught us anything, it is that
the family is not simply a passive product of social
structure and that changes in family life do not proceed
neatly and in tandem with other socio-cultural changes.
Indeed, static difference turns out to be relatively easier
to document than dynamic change is to explain. Intimations
of new social relations and attitudes towards family life
often precede their full-scale implementation by one or two
centuries, suggesting that some individuals are prompted to
mediate the disappointments, frustrations or contradictions
25
of their times "ahead of schedule". But how is it that
such nonconforming desires are felt at all? Undue stress
on the fundamental difference of earlier periods and
cultures, along with an over-socialized view of the
inhabitants of those cultures, cannot help us to get at
this sort of question. For example, the rapidity with
which maternal breastfeeding took hold among the elite of
England during the latter half of the eighteenth century
suggests that under the surface of cultural mores and
behaviors that excluded this practice, mothers were
powerfully desirous of feeding and nurturing their children
and that this may have been artificially thwarted by
26 mmen. The work of Shorter and Stone, among others,
clearly suggests that family life evolved in part out of
the desire for more privacy and intimacy between spouses
and that this trend was initiated by the professional
27classes and the gentry. Furthermore, the Marxist link
between industrial capitalism and the nuclear family has
been rendered increasingly problematic by the
demonstrations of family historians that the ideology and
practice of nuclear family life, including concepts of
individualism, clearly pre-date the establishment of
capital ism.
Psychoanalytic theory provides a means of understanding
complex processes of social change through its theory of
instincts which are both pre-social and necessarily shaped
according to cultural norms. The Freudian argument for
basic instinctual drives, somatically organized in terms of
the stages of physical maturation in infants and children,
suggests that humans are not simply plastic creatures who
are completely constituted in terms of the indelible
imprint of their cultures. Culture must also be understood
in terms of its various accomodations—be they repressive,
sublimating or fairly accepting-to drives. Examples of
the appropriate uses to which psychoanalytic theory may be
put by historians are provided by the work of Hunt and
Stone. Hunt makes a convincing argument for the primacy of
the oral stage in the life of the seventeenth century
French child and Stone uses parent-child interaction as a
means of explaining the particular brand of affect
characterizing seventeenth century England. His
speculations on the relationship between extended sexual
latency for young men and England's formidable military
prowess are also compelling.
These historians have demonstrated some of the ways in
which psychoanalysis provides an open-ended model for the
exploration of diverse cultures, one that is simultaneously
attuned to the substratum of human needs and to various
cultural productions of needs and their satisfaction. The
psychoanalytic notion of drives provides substructural
links between various historical periods and cultures. And
these drives must be taken into account when the question
of "di f f erentness " is raised. So too must those aspects of
species-life (not in Marx's specialized sense) which
28characterize homo-sapiens as a biological collectivity.
Situated between the important particularities of
different cultures and those open and closed instincts
which characterize human species-life, is the arena of
Western culture, comprised of various diverse ways of life,
but also unified in some sense as an identifiable
entity. 29 Western culture is comprised of unmistakably
gendered societies which are patterned hierarchically and
so
valuationally in favor of men. 30 It is al
characterized by a man-agains t-Nature view of humanity and
culture which utilizes a sexual imagery linking up women
with Nature. We know this much, even if we cannot
ultimately explain the origins of the domination of women
and Nature in the West. However, care must be taken to
avoid the uncritical and ahistorical linking up of male
dominance in our Western ancestral cultures with
masculinity as we know it today.
For example, with the benefit of hindsight, we can
explore Plato's attitudes towards women and the body and
notice parallels between his imagery and arguments and more
recent versions which are readily identifiable aspects of
3
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masculine gender identity. But a critical question
lingers: Is Plato's somatophobia the same phenomenon we
witness in our time? Or are the links only apparent and
merely fortuitous ones? Is masculine gender in the West a
singular phenomenona? Minimally, can we speak of a
masculine core which is then elaborated in diverse and
32
connected ways? Can we even think in terms of gender
identity, a term that presupposes our own cherished
conception of individualized identity, during those epochs
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that preceded the rise of affective individualism? These
are difficult and important questions. Thankfully, they
have a minimal impact on this study, which begins with
seventeenth century political thought. Nonetheless, I am
going to hazard a few selected remarks on these issues.
In the absence of definitive answers, we can proceed by
way of carefuly maneuvering between some fairly solid
anchor points. The first such point is a biological-
evolutionary phenomenon which merits serious attention.
Homo sapiens share with the higher primates and apes highly
distinguishable and individualized facial features, the
result of those facial muscles which are employed for
expressive and communicative activities. What we share
with the closest of our animal relatives and have
systematically developed in wide-ranging and culturally-
specific ways, is a physiological facial apparatus designed
to exhibit and express individuality. This needs to be
taken into account in our consideration of historical and
anthropological studies of pre-industr ial cultures which
stress the absence of individualism as we know it, along
with highly developed notions of personal identity.
Granting the significance of cultural diversity, we must
nonetheless give our evolutionary heritage its due. As a
species, we have been characterized for thousands of years
by a physiological apparatus designed to express
individuality. Such an apparatus would only have evolved
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and persisted in response to the utilization of such
proclivities.
Minimally, acknowledgement of our evolutionary heritage
forces careful reconsideration of what life in pre- or
non-individualistic cultures must have been like. The
tendency to imagine the human beings of such cultures as
nothing but undifferentiated blobs would clearly be
mistaken. We need a vocabulary that can enable us to talk
about identity in a variety of ways. It may be secured in
the environment of a nuclear family, polis, village, state
orphanage, clan, or matrilocal kinship structure. It may
take on features that range from the ultra-individualized
to the minimally-individualized; be secured in relation to
a few persons or to many. But identity—broadly
conceived—would seem to be an indelible feature of human
life that is biologically based, evolut ionarily secured,
and culturally elaborated in diverse ways. In short,
questions about individualized identities cannot be
resolved in strict either-or terms of presence and
absence. That is, the absence of identity as we know it
and experience it does not automatically imply the absence
of identity per se . Using Geertz's formulation, we might
approach identity as a distinctive although not constant
element comprising the various patterns of human
culture
.
The second anchor point for this discussion is provided
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by "gender" as a distinctive but by no means constant
element of nearly all known human societies. As Salvatore
Cucchiari articulates the summation of anthropological
findings on this issue: "Although the categories—man and
woman—are universal, the content of the categories varies
from culture to culture; and the variation is truly
impressive." 35 Equally impressive is the near-
universality of cultural forms which use the genitals as
the primary criteria for the assignment of human beings
into one of two major gender categories. On the one hand,
then, the "activities, attitudes, values, objects, symbols,
3 6and expectations" associated with the categories "man"
and "woman" vary widely; on the other, nearly all versions
of culture are symbolically and socially organized in terms
of a presumed meaningful ontology of dichotomous sex
differences. To say this is by no means to suggest that
gender functions as a kind of primordial or natural
category. It is no more reflective of brute "natural"
experience than other cultural forms which structure our
experience of nature. As the anthropologist Michelle
Zimbalist Rosaldo has pointed out, the ubiquity of gender
in all forms of collective social life provides a tempting
. . . . . . 37backdrop to universalizing and biologistic explanations.
Such a temptation must be abjured in favor of a focus on
the political and social terrain of its articulation.
Two points which the preceeding discussion has been
aiming at merit direct formulation. I have sought to
establish some plausible grounds for the legitimacy of
invoking gendered identity in transcul tural terms without
violating due respect for those significant differences
which distinguish historical periods, cultures and peoples
from each other. In response to the "how different"
question, I propose that we be willing and prepared to look
for a variety of ways in which identity might be fashioned
and secured and that we take seriously the universal
phenomenon of the categorization of persons in terms of
gender. These two observations also work hand in hand.
For if human beings are inclined and predisposed to fashion
particular identities for themselves, such a process
presumably takes place within a social and symbolic
framework that is gender ized. Such a process need not take
place in a familial or Oedipalized environment. This,
however, does not necessarily minimize the explanatory
potential of gender identity as a constitutive feature of
persons in societies which may be radically different from
our own. Gender, of course, may be more or less important
3 8
within an overall cultural configuration. We cannot
assume that it will always have a privileged and central
location in the social and symbolic frameworks of various
cultures
.
Of the three political theorists studied here, Hobbes
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(1588-1679) would seem to be the one who is most
problematically situated. Whereas Mill and Marx are
located within the modern frame of bourgeois family
relations epitomized by Freud, Hobbes rests in the midst of
a significant watershed in European family history. On the
one hand, he was reared within a sixteenth century family
which has been described by Stone in terms which are
simultaneously chilling and reminiscent of Hobbes's own
state of nature:
What is being postulated for the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries is a society in which a
majority of the individuals who composed it found it
very difficult to establish close emotional ties to any
person. Children were often neglected, brutally
treated, and even killed; many adults treated each
other with suspiction and hostility; affect was low,
and hard to find .... The lack of a unique mother
figure in the first two years of life, the constant
loss of close relatives, siblings, parents, nurses and
friends through premature death, the physical
imprisonment of the infant in tight swaddling-clothes
in early months, and the deliberate breaking of the
child's will contributed to a 'psychic numbing' which
created many adults whose primary responses to others
were at best a calculating indifference and at worst a
mixture of suspicion and hostility, tyranny and
submission, alienation and rage ....
So far as the surving evidence goes, England
between 1500 and 1660 was relatively cold, suspicious,
and violence-prone . 39
On the other hand, Stone detects a sixteenth and
seventeenth century trend of significant changes in the
structure of English middle- and upper-class family life:
Under pressure from the state and from Protestant moral
theology, it shifted from a predominantly open
structure to a more restrictedly nuclear one. The
functions of this nuclear family were more and more
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confined to the nurture and socialization of the infant
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the™ic < emotional and sexualf ction of the husband and wife. 40
According to Stone, the period 1660-1800 witnessed major
changes in child-rearing practices among the squirarchy and
upper bourgeoisie. It is during this time that the
"mother" emerged to become the dominant figure in
children's lives. Hence, the confusing facts of childhood
during Hobbes ' s time would seem to be these. On the one
hand, "up to the age of seven, the children were mostly
left in the care of women, primarily their mother, nurse,
41and governess." On the other hand, a discernible
ideology of motherhood did not yet exist. Although women
bore and raised children:
Mothering was not the prerogative of married women in a
society where high adult mortality and frequent
remarriage meant that many children were raised in
households of neighbors and kin: babies were cared for
by their grandmothers, father's new wife, her widowed
aunt, an older step-sister, a cousin or maid servant,
as often as by their natural mothers. Seventeenth-
century women valued their reputation for chastity,
health and hard work, their integrity as housewives and
traders; the qualities today associated with
'mothering' — tenderness, self-sacrifice, caring— seem
significantly absent as a source of honour and
shame .42
Above all, the social system of child exchange (between
families with too many mouths to feed and those that needed
more labor; between middle- and upper-class families and
child-tenders and schools) mitigated against the intimacy
and corresponding tensions of parent-child interaction that
would be more prevalent during the eighteenth and
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nineteenth centuries.
We have one of either two (or more) possible
interpretations. 1) The fact that children were reared by
women within an admittedly less intense psycho-sexual
family environment is sufficient to make the case for a
masculine identity forged in opposition to the female. 43
2) The "pre-Oedipal" environment is insufficiently
affect-laden to justify the retrospective application of
masculine gender identity in the psychoanalytic sense with
which it is also applied to Mill and Marx.
To make matters even more complicated, 1500-1700 is the
period identified by intellectual historians and historians
of science as the era which witnessed the emergence of
scientific conceptions of nature, rationality, and
44empirical science. Recent retrospective studies of
modern scientific rationality have identified significant
metaphorical parallels between the categories of "women"
and "nature" which psychoanalytic theory roots in
childrearing practices. In some ways, it would seem that
modern conceptions of science, which are also gendered,
pre-date the emergence of the modern family. At this
point, historical knowledge raises more questions than it
can answer. Modern gender relations and conceptions would
seem to be linked in some way with modern science and
rationality, even though there seems to be no way of
getting a handle on the question of origins. These
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outstanding issues must also remain as outstanding issues
in this work, particularly in the analysis of Hobbes that
is developed here.
Minimally, however, we can say this much about Hobbes.
He was embedded within a culture in the midst of changes
that yielded modern family life and whose gendered imagery
is more like than unlike our own. To this extent, we are
entitled to query his work as potentially masculinist. On
the other hand, we are in no position to assess the origins
of this gendered frame of thinking. As I argue in the
chapter on Hobbes, we cannot be sure that the thesis of
masculine ideology adequately captures the actual ground of
his own frame of thinking. But we are entitled to suggest
that his theory was open to such a reading and
interpretation in the minds of subsequent students and
readers
.
My general point is this: Gender identity can be
appropriately invoked as a component or ground of
particular ways of being in and thinking about the world.
It is not an interpretive concept which ought to be
restricted to that period characterized by affective
individualism to which we are the tangible and troubled
heirs. Wherever gender means something in the cosmology
and social organization of culture, we can expect that the
people of those cultures define themselves and their
practices with reference to that system of meaning. While
we do not know nearly enough about the practices of
pre-industrial child-rearing in the West to trace out in
fine detail the various ways in which gender identity may
or may not have been secured in early interpersonal
dynamics, we can nevertheless attempt to reconstruct in an
interpretive fashion the ways in which the overt and
socially sanctioned perceptions of gender entered into the
substance and style of thought in pre-modern times.
Many of the mutually related conceptions and
experiences of masculinity and femininity whose
contemporary origins have been traced to the dynamics of
nuclear family life (most especially its sexual division of
labor which ensures female-dominated child-rearing within a
sphere marked as private) clearly pre-date the historical
rise of the nuclear family. These include: split images
of women which bifurcate sexual and maternal aspects, fear
of female sexual prowess, glorification of male sexual
prowess, insistence on the need for and legitimacy of
subordinating women, the depiction of manhood as an
achieved status which requires independence from and
control over women, and the association of women with the
natural and men with the cultural spheres of human
45
existence. These trans-histor ical parallels ramify on
the prevailing psychoanalytic accounts in one of two ways:
Either 1) the nuclear family has been overemphasized as the
site of a particular process of gender acquisition which
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produces masculine presumptions of superiority over women,
or 2) female-dominated childrearing, a practice which is
not restricted to the nuclear family form, has had
far-ranging effects in and of itself and in tandem with
sexually differentiated and hierarchical social systems,
such that female authority is feared and denigrated in a
variety of familial and social environments. The first
option clearly undermines those psychoanalytic accounts
which identify the nuclear family as the linchpin of gender
hierarchy. The second option, on the other hand,
reinforces those object-relations accounts which stress the
pre-Oedipal significance and wide-ranging ramifications of
female-dominated childcare. It also prompts a
reconsideration of psychological dynamics in non-nuclear
family settings which may produce remarkably similar
outcomes to those of the nuclear family. 46 The fact that
females, although not necessarily biological mothers, were
predominantly responsible for the care of the young in the
pre-industr ial West could serve as a sufficiently tangible
link with the past to justify psychohistor ical efforts to
contribute to solving the riddle of male "superiority" in
47the West.
In any case, the burden of defense for the study of
masculinity as ideology in the Western political theory
tradition is not so large as some of the noted potential
objections to such a study suggest. Such objections are
often rightfully levelled against studies covering a wide
cultural and historical terrain and making broad
universalistic generalizations about human nature and
conduct. m this case, however, the parameters of inquiry
are already located in a historical period when
contemporary versions and experiences of familial and
emotional life were beginning to emerge.
My general argument, that which forms the backdrop to
the interpretation of gender and political theory offered
in this work is this: One way of critically assessing the
Western intellectual tradition is by means of the notion of
gender-diff erentited patterns of experience and
consciousness. Since the Western poltical theory tradition
is overwhelmingly male dominated, we can reasonably expect
that masculine identity will figure as an important
ideological influence on that tradition. Of course, this
would only figure as a reasonable expectation if Western
cultures, cosmologies, and social organization forms were
constituted in terms of gendered imagery and prescribed and
enforced sexual differences. Common knowledge tells us
that this is overwhelmingly true.
FOOTNOTES
* 4-v t f.
anti "arms slogan, "Take the toys awayfrom the boys, ' resonates with meaning for participants inthe arms reduction movement suggests that there is animportant gram of intuitive truth in this characterization,
^See the debate on Chodorow's work in Judith
M°f?
e!'
n
et
.
al " "On The Reproduction of Mothering: AMethodological Debat e," in Signs : Journal of Women inCulture and Society 6 (3): 482-514. See also Jean BethkeElshtam, Symmetry and Soporifics: A Critique of FeministAccounts of Gender Development," unpublished paper, 1982.
This is a striking and poignant feature of
theories of asymmetrical gender development such asChodorow's and Dinnerstein
' s . Much as their accounts
communicate powerful desires for change, their analyses
tend to preclude a believable agenda for social
transformation. Given that boys and girls grow into men
and women with uniquely different yet interrelated
capacities and handicaps for social interaction, men are
likely to continue to be unfit to nurture and women are
likely to continue to nurture in generat ionally repetitive
ways, thereby producing sons and daughters according to the
logic of a vicious cycle. How adults who were once
mothered in the terms posed by Chodorow and Dinnerstein are
ever to change their own parenting practices is an elusive,
although necessary question for women's liberation in the
terms provided by their model. Ironically, the very frame
of explanation which identifies shared parenting as the
singular and major means for change makes the feasibility
of its implementation highly unlikely. For a study which
confirms the pessimism of this account, see Diane
Ehrensaft, "When Men and Women Mother," in Social ist
Review
, 49 (January-February 1980), pp. 37-73.
4jane Flax has also utilized this notion of an
unconscious in political theory. See her essay, "Political
Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psycho-
analytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics,"
in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on
Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of
Science , eds. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka
( Dordrecht , Boston and London: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1983), pp. 245-281.
405
406
f
5For the following discussion of the history of thefamily in the West, I am indebted to these major sources!Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History
SSok^Mf' f. trTu BaldlCk - ^ York: vintage
¥h? SlJtSi * HUnt ' p^ents and Children in HistorvlT e Psychology of Family Lite in Early Modern FranceTn^Harpe
^
a
?
d Row
'
1972 ^ peter Laslett, The World We
lL I
: Eng land Be£ore the Industrial An. < W»M v^v.Charies scnbner's Sons, 1965); Peter Laslett, ed
.
,
Household and Family i n Past Time (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1972); Edward Shorter, The Making of ?he
" ^
milY (NeW York: Basic Books
' 1 977); Lawrence
,5T
°ne
'
The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800(New York: Harper and Row, 1979; abridged ed. )
6Laslett, The World We Have Lost
, pp. 110-111.
7Margaret Miles, "Embodiment, Perspective and
Historical Interpretation," paper presented to the
Department of Political Science, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, 27 October 1983.
8The historian Margaret Miles, for example, has
sought to reconstruct the visual experiences of medieval
women during the time they spent in cathedrals. See also
Elise Boulding, The Underside of History: A View of Women
Through Time (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976).
9This should not be construed as an overly
simplified causal account of the relationship between human
emotions and affections and demographic factors. While
high infant mortality rates do seem to figure as
significant factors in the pre-af f ect ive individualism
ages' s attitudes towards newborns, it is also true that
once affections for newborns, including an acknowledgement
of their individual personhood began to take hold,
fluctuations in infant mortality rates did not undermine
these emotions. See Robert Darnton, "The Art of Dying,"
review of Death and the Enlightenment: Changing Attitudes
to Death Among Chritians and Unbelievers in Eighteenth
Century France
,
by John McManners, New York Review of
Books , 13 May 1982, pp. 8-12.
^According to Stone, intimations and early
developments may be found in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries in England.
H-See Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in
England
, pp. 69-88.
12Laslett, The World We Have Lost, p. 2.
407
13 Ibid., p. 3.
14 Ibid., p. 5.
wnr-v
1
!
S
r/1S ? L°V iSe A * Tilly and Joan w - ^ott, Women,
l^;,
a
pp.
FS (NSW Y°rkl Holt < Rin^-t and Win^nT
16Laslett, The World We Have Lost , p. 20.
17 Ibid., p. 54.
*nri ^!
S
r-?aVid ftannard, Shrinking History: On Freuda d the Failure of Psychohistory < Oxford O^EoTdUniversity Press, 1980) for an elaboration of this position
19For an important elaboration of this position, seePeter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). Winch is actually better
at showing us how difficult this is.
20Stannard, Shrinking History
, p. 133.
21Mary Midgely, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human
Nature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) has an
excellent discussion of the nature-culture relation. See
also Paul Hirst and Penny Wooley, Social Relations and
Human Attributes (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982),
pp. 1-91.
22 Clifford Geertz, "The Impact of the Concept of
Culture on the Concept of Man," in his The Interpretation
of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 35.
23For an important criticism of over-socialized
accounts see Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocial ized Conception
of Man in Modern Sociology," American Sociological Review
26 (2): pp. 183-193. See also Mary Midgely's important
discussion of determinism and freedom in Beast and Man .
For a very helpful recent synthesis of these debates in
philosophy of science and the social sciences, see Richard
Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
Hermenue tics, and Praxis ( Philadephia : University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983 ) , pp. 1-108.
24Geertz, "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on
the Concept of Man," p. 37.
2^See Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage
in England 1500-1800 .
408
26Both Stone's research on England and Hunt's
explorations of early modern French life suggest this.
2 7tLaslett is also emphatic on this point.
28See Mary Midgely, Beast and Man for an especially
compelling argument along these lines.
29For broad scale discussions of Western culture interms of the Judeo-Chr istian heritage see Peggy Reeves
!|
anday' Female Power and Male Dominance: On the Origins ofSexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1981), esp. pp. 215-231; and Frederick Turner, BeyondGeography: The Western Spirit Against the Wide7nt^s~ (NewBrunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983). '
Of) See Sarah B. Pomeroy, Godesses, Whores, Wives andSlaves
( New York: Schocken Books, 1975); and Vern L.
Bullough, The Subordinate Sex (New York: Penguin Books,
1974). See also Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance;
and Turner, Beyond Geography . " "
31See Elizabeth Spellman, "Woman as Body: Ancient
and Contemporary Views," in Feminist Studies 8 (1):
109-132.
J^For an affirmative answer, see Nancy Hartsock,
Money, Sex and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical
Materialism (New York and London: Longman, 1983), esp.
pp. 155-208.
33 I am indebted to Mary Midgely, Beast and Man , for
this point in particular, but also for giving me some
courage in taking another look at biology.
34For helpful critical approaches to the mistaken
universalizat ion of contemporary Western notions of
individualism, see Paul Hirst and Penny Wooley, Social
Relations and Human Attributes
, pp. 118-130. See also
Marilyn Strathern's discussion of her anthropological use
of the terms "person" and "individual" in describing
cultures radically different from our own, in
"Self-Interest and the Social Good: Some Implications of
Hagen Gender Imagery," in Sexual Meanings: The Cultural
Construction of Gender and Sexuality , eds . Sherry Ortner
and Harriet Whitehead (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp. 166-191.
3 ^See Salvatore Cucchiari, "The Gender Revolution
and the Transition from Bisexual Horde to Patrilocal Band:
409
,ov
35 (cont'd
)
The origins of Gender Hierarchy," inSexual Meanings , esp. p. 32. Y
36 Ibid.
38See Jane Monnig Atkinson, "Anthropology," in
39Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage
, p. 80.
40 Ibid., p. 145.
41 Ibid., p. 120.
42Miranda Chaytor and Jane Lewis, "Introduction" to
The Work ing Life of Women in the Seventeenth Century
, byA1 1 ce Clark (London, Boston and Henley: Rout ledge and
Kegan Paul, 1982), p. xxiv.
43Those who have made the case for masculine
identity in these terms include Coppe'lia Kahn, Man's
Estate; Masculine Identity in Shakespeare ( Berkeley
:
University of California Press, 1981) and Evelyn Keller,
"Gender and Science," in Psychoanalysis and Contemporary
Thought 1 (3): 409-433. Keller's analysis is especially
concerned with the work of Francis Bacon.
44See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature; Women,
Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1980 )
.
^Confirmation of these sweeping generalizations may
be found in the following historical sources: Vern
Bui lough, The Surbordinate Sex ; H.R. Hayes, The Dangerous
Sex ; Wolfgang Lederer, The Fear of Women (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1968); Martha Lee Osbourne,
Woman in Western Thought (New York: Random House, 1979);
Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves ;
Rosemary Ruether, New Woman/New Earth: Sexist Ideologies
and Human Liberation (New York; The Seabury Press, 1975 )
.
4^For a commendable and useful effort to trace out
the various implications of different kinship and parenting
410
M .^*f
(c°n
^'
d) configurations in the attempt to
M
C
^H
6 Dinnerstein's analysis, see Isaac D. Balbus,arxism and Domina tion; A Neo-HPnpi^n Feminist- Da,,^«gg^ic^hjg^ .exual, Political ^nd Sl^r"
PP 303-^2/ Cet°n; PrinCeton University Press, 1 982 )
,
See David Hunt, Parents and Children in History, for a
9 aCC °Unt 0t the daUPhin ' s sexualized r^Iatiolnipwith his nurse, remarkably similar to the sexualized
a dif?^
a\10n ° f ^ nUClSar family Settin^ "though with
and fn?imaL
Ca
^ °5
characters: "*he nurse was in constanti timate attendance to the child, caring for him,sharing meals, play, conversation, and often her bed withhim. in some sense, she replaced the mother in his
\10nS ' JhU? WS find L°uis dragging that 'he was not asimpleton: he slept with Doundoun [the nurse] when [herhusband] was away.'" (p. 173)
47Peggy Sanday's work, Female Power and MaleDominance, offers many helpful clues to the question of the
etiology of Western male dominance. Her research indicatesthat male dominance is often the result of a society's
response to stress. Important determinants of maledominance include cosmological views, conceptions of sacredpower, views of the natural environment, and perceived
sources of stress. Her most important contribution, in my
opinion, is the argument that gender, to be properly
understood, must always be situated within the socio-
symbolic framework that it practically inhabits and affects.
For a sobering analysis of the logical pitfalls
involved in identifying male gender identity as the cause
of male domination, see Iris Marion Young, "Is Male Gender
Identity the Cause of Male Domination?" in Mothering:
Essays in Feminist Theory
, ed. Joyce Trebilcot (Totawa,
N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 129-146.
APPENDIX B
DIFFERENCE IN A NEW KEY: FRENCH FEMINIST OFFERINGS
How can I say you, who are always other?Luce Ingaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together"
A new genre within feminist theory known as "French
feminisms" has much to offer the feminist student of sexual
difference. 1 For all of their diversity and heated
arguments between each other, "French feminisms" are
notable on two distinctive counts: Against the political
backdrop of feminist activism in the "base" areas of
reproductive rights, labor reforms, and public policy
legislation as it affects women, many of the French
feminists have increasingly and relentlessly pursued the
"superstructural" aspects of women's social inferiority,
analyzing language, psychology, the arts (especially
literature) and intellectual traditions. Secondly, they
have been willing, if not eager, to take on the theme of
"difference" and to confront the body explicitly.
The concern with language, the symbolic order, women,
and the body intersect most tangibly in the "ecriture
feminine" strain, whose proponents speak and write
specifically as women and communicate their desire to
articulate a female language, usually grounded in female
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sexuality or sensuality. Helene Cixous is one of the best
known practitioners of this genre. Monique Wittig's work
is also similar, although she publically disassociates
herself from Cixous 's "feminized" approach, which she finds
crudely naturalistic and essential! st . In spite of their
significant theoretical and artistic differences, both have
produced works in attempts to "write the body" of women.
The work of Luce Irigaray, which we will also examine in
some detail, is fascinating for its seductive rendering of
the possibility of an analogy between repressed female
sexuality and a heretofore unar ticulated women's language.
With Irigaray and Cixous, Julia Kristeva shares an interest
in and concern with "desire" and the search for/creation of
a language appropriate to its expression. Through their
differences and similarities, which will be treated below,
these four writers bear on considerations raised in this
work in their consensus that "the woman question" cannot be
addressed within the prevailing linguistic, symbolic,
political and intellectual formulas; that "difference" is,
in fact, the lid fastened securely on a Pandora's box of
repressed material that threatens not simply the sexually
uneven social distribution of responsibilities, rights and
benefits, but the symbolic and psychological underpinnings
of culture, broadly conceived.
Getting a firm handle on just what difference is, what
it consists of, and how we ought to approach it and treat
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it is a difficult, perhaps impossible task, captured
strikingly by Jacques Derrida in his observation that: "It
is no longer possible to go looking for woman, or for
woman's femininity or for female sexuality. At least, they
cannot be found by means of any familiar mode of thought or
knowledge— even if it is impossible to stop looking for
her." The difficulty hinges on the phenomenon itself,
the uses to which it has historically been put, and our own
logico-linguistic apparatus. As a phenomenon, "difference"
is simultaneously elusive and tangible. Just when we think
we have laid hold of it we are in the gravest danger of
having fetishized it. Just when it has been buried or
banished, presumably forever, it appears again, Cheshire
Cat-like, to mock our naivete'. Historically, we find
countless examples of the ways in which "difference" has
been used to legitimize oppressive practices against
women. And in logico-linguistic terms, we are inclined to
think about difference in dualistic and hierarchical
terms. Alice Jardine describes this particular facet of
the topic, noting in ways similar to observations posed by
Midgely and Wolgast, that "Western culture has proven to be
incapable of thinking not-the-same-as without assigning one
3
of the terms a positive value and the other, a negative."
Simone de Beauvoir anticipated, and perhaps prompted,
recent feminist theoretical developments in her country
when she wrote enigmatically: "She is the elemental
414
silence of Truth." 4 We might read this to mean: Woman
is the repressed underside of a verbalized and visible
Truth, of that which counts as Truth, even though it is
partial; and it is partial precisely because of her
silence. She constitutes Truth by and through her
silence. She can never— as a woman—articulate this Truth
actively. As symbol and living subject, she bears silent
witness to a hypocritical truth masking as Truth. Here we
have the deep irony of "difference": it entails a
disregard of the Other (who may not speak) even as it
invokes her. In the words of Josette Fe'ral : "The Savage
in the West has always been the Woman: simultaneously
present and absent, present when absent, and all the more
absent when she is there."
Like the state of nature constructs employed by Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau, involving logical reconstruction along
with fanciful projection as a means of highlighting the
possibilities and requirements of civil society, female
difference has invariably been put to logical and political
uses whereby it functions as a simultaneous confirmation
of /counter fact ual to male identity. If little has been
added to the store of knowledge concerning pre-civil or
"primitive" societies through such state of nature
constructs, they often contribute to the social theorist's
analysis of his society's identity and to retrospective
critical studies of social orders and their ideologies.
^
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Similarly with conceptions of sexual difference, we might
say that such constructs, while they reveal little about
women, can tell us quite a bit about the function of the
idea of woman within particular social-symbolic orders, and
more significantly, about how certain conceptions of
difference and of the "feminine" help to constitute
particular versions of masculine identity. "Enmeshed in
man's self-representation, woman exists only insofar as she
reflects back to him the image of his manly reality." 7
It is precisely this feature of difference, as
masculine projection, along with the hierarchical ordering
to which it is subjected such that women invariably lose,
which accounts for the attempts of many feminists to
expunge the term altogether. Undoubtedly, the positing of
female Otherness as consisting of the "denied, abused, and
hidden" other side of man makes the term justly suspect.
What possible use might difference, "as a signature of her
void and mark of his identity," have for feminists
interested in a critical social theory and practice that
seeks to liberate women without subjecting men to the
injuries that have been historically levelled against women?
Many of the French feminists argue one step beyond this
question and the preceding formulation of "difference" that
the problem of difference consists not simply in the false
positing of Otherness from a male perspective, but in the
denial of difference as well:
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,
by man
'
the conventional polarity of masculineand feminine names woman as a metaphor of man
. . . .The rhetorical hierarchizat ion-oTthe-veTy-oipos it ionbetween the sexes is then such that woman's differenceis suppressed, being totally subsumed by the referenceof the feminine to masculine identity. 8
To expunge the term from feminist discourse would amount,
on this view, to a capitulation to the dynamic and politics
of masculine sameness and hegemony. These feminists view
the critical task to be one of re-appropriating rather than
eliminating "difference" as a critical concept. Society
and language, based on the negation of difference and the
presumption of a singular (masculine) identity and logic,
must be criticized from the vantage point of the Other.
Operating in the service of "heterogeneity, alterity,
multiplicity", this difference, theorized and articulated
by Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Monique Wittig, and Julia
Kristeva, among others, has a vital and critical role to
play for women and society at large. Upholding difference,
while rejecting the entrapment of a reverse mirror
conception, many of the French feminists insist on walking
the admittedly fine line between false or fetishized
difference and real, critical difference. Josette Feral
summarizes this impulse in the following way:
Difference, in this context, is not simply defined by
reference to a norm—the masculine norm—whose negative
side it would be while remaining inscribed within the
realm of identity. Rather, difference is to be thought
of as other, not bounded by any system or any
structure. Difference becomes the negation of
phallologocentri sm, but in the name of its own inner
di vers i ty
.
9
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Within this view, " di ff erenow" i n 4.1u rr ce
—in the name of women and,
for some, of a more generealized critical alterity embodied
by other individuals and groups as well-is a crucial and
precious concept that must be preserved, expanded, sought
out, and refined, rather than thrown out as outmoded or
sexist. In the words of Julia Kristeva: "Woman is here to
shake up, to deflate masculine values, and not to espouse
them. Her role is to maintain differences by pointing to
them, by giving them life, by putting them into play
against one another." 10
This reappropriation of difference, invoking a critical
questioning of conceptions of subjectivity and structures
of logic and discourse, takes place within the framework of
a persistent and vexing question whose voicing and
potential solution ramify beyond exclusively feminist
concerns to a broader epistemological terrain. In the
words of Alice Jardine, it goes something like this:
Is there a way to think outside the patr iarchally
determined Same/other, Subject /Object dichotomies
diagnosed as the fact of culture by Simone de Beauvoir
thirty years ago, and, in the process, still include
women as a presence? In other words, do we want to
continue reorganizing the relationship of difference to
sameness through a dialectics of valorization, or is
there a way to break down the over-determined metaphors
which continue to organize our perceptions of
reali ty? 11
Jardine's question provides an initial clue to
understanding why so many of the French feminists writing
in the name of difference invariably deal with the
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Subject/Object relationship and its connection to
identity. In many ways, they are picking up where de
Beauvoir left off.
The reappropriation of difference involves a voicing of
that difference which is negated and denied within social
organization (e.g., the invisibility of women's labor) and
dominant forms of language and thought (including
prevailing forms of "difference".) As the posited
naturalized embodiment of non-culture, women might embody
alternate cultures rather than no culture. Rethinking that
"disloyalty to civilization" of which women have so often
been accused, rather than denying it, and going even
further to rethink "civilization" in this respect, women's
previously empty and masculine-derived negativity (as "that
which is not-male") might be rendered into substantive and
12
critical forms. Such an approach is based on the
proposition that "What is at stake in the woman's struggle
is much more than simply finding a place within the
existing values or discourses. It is the problem of a
whole society, questioning its very foundations and its
13
right to impose its truth as uniquely true."
This broadened and vitally critical task of feminism as
theory and practice, captured by Annie Leclerc in the
observation that 'if we invent our sexuality, they will
14have to rethink their own,' also ramifies on the
conception and study of oppression. For critical feminist
analysis in the name of difference proceeds in the name of
a difference that is hidden, denied, elusive and distorted
because it is repressed. This is precisely why the
unconscious, the body and desire occupy a significant, if
not privileged, focus of inquiry within French feminist
discourse which builds on a psychoanalytic, linguistic and
philosophical foundation. If the articulated woman of the
social order is a false and limited projection—
a
description of man's repressed nature—then where do we
locate her? How can we even begin to think about her? The
answer of some is that we must immerse ourselves within,
re-evoke, and fantasize about the shadowy, pre-rat ional
,
pre-socialized, repressed terrain of the unconscious:
For the woman's unconscious is 'the noise' in the
system, the defect. It is a surplus which patriarchal
society has always wanted to get rid of by denying it
any specificity, thus positing that same society's
right to talk about it in terms of identity with a
resemblance to the male model. 15
This simultaneous search for/creation of a female
discourse, to get at "another thinking as yet unthinkable"
has yielded a rich array of unconventional works
challenging the substance and structure of the
taken-for-granted
. Within the realms of fiction and
literature, Cixous and Wittig strive to write the
pleasures, appetites, agonies and discourses of female
selves, bodies and desire. Kristeva, as a linguist and
literary critic, listens for "the call of the
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unnamable
. . .
issuing from those borders where
signification vanishes." 16 And Irigaray, deported
Lacanian analyst, employes a medley of styles, ranging from
critique and deconstruct ion of the thought of Plato,
Aristotle, Hegel and Freud, to creative imaginary forays
into the languages and sexual it ies of women.
Julia Kristeva's work in linguistics may be roughly
characterized as the attempt to displace a view of language
as a closed, homogenized, and self-evident meaning system
with its correspondingly intact and comfortable subject,
with a more dynamic and tension-filled account. Kristeva
is interested in whatever threatens to upset the complacent
balance of linguistically structured and socially
sanctioned meaning and "truth". Politically situating
herself in opposition to the flow of totalizing and
rationalizing culture, she sums up her political ethics
with the following question: "If we are not on the side of
those whom society wastes in order to reproduce itself,
where are we?" 17 She looks to the "margins of recognized
culture" in search of desires and logics "exceeding that of
1
8
codified discourse." Above all, it is "the free play
of negativity, needs, desire, pleasure and jouissance"
in which Kristeva is interested, for they are the raw stuff
which language attempts to appropriate, if never completely
successfully. Desire, for Kristeva, is both the instigator
and victim of language, much as Mary Midgely reminds us of
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the instinctual components of language. Kristeva views
language as both a prison house and a gateway, and she
weaves a careful pattern between these two accounts. It
would clearly be mistaken to caricature Kristeva as a
primitivist who prefers the natural honesty of grunts,
moans and hysterical speech to the 'artificial'
fabrications and structure of language. Her quarrel with
language is rather in its totalizing tendency: the attempt
to write out what it cannot yet (or ever), or refuses to,
enunciate; the persistent attempt to flatten out the
diversity of human experience within a singular economy of
meaning. Hence, she pushes for a careful searching out of
those counter-cultural locales and texts where:
.
. .
in the face of a want of discourse, there is that
strength that remains wordless or lacks truth when
verbalized, a strength of formidable institutional
contestation, or a strength of voice, gesture, gaze,
sweeping over the psychological requests of speech, and
yet the eternal 'that's not it', 'that's not enouqn'
20 3
• • •
In her approach to the study of language and
literature, Kristeva identifies two major discourses at
work (and at play), the symbolic and the semiotic.
Semiotic discourse is the conceptual articulation of those
bodily drives that elude sublimation and repression,
surviving to surface occasionally in symbolic discourse,
which is enacted on the visible terrain of signification,
sign, and syntax. As the means through which man orders
and objectifies the world, symbolic discourse aims for
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homogeneity, a singular economy of meaning. The
relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic is
fuelled by, and feeds on, the energy and impulses of
semiotic desire even as it must squelch it, by ordering it
into predictable and safe meaning arrangements. Surplus
meaning, that which exceeds and threatens the necessarily
limited logos of symbolic discourse, is relegated to the
distant reaches of the crazy, perverse, inaudible. It may
be allowed expression in poetry. As the repressed,
desiring, perhaps instinctual foundation of symbolic
discourse, the semiotic precedes (temporally and logically)
the institution of the symbolic as sanctioned language. In
the terms provided by the psychoanalytic account of
individual development and socialization, we could imagine
the semiotic as originating in that pre-verbal, pre-ego
stage of identification with the mother's body, prior to
the successful differentiation and establishment of self
against that maternal body, prior to the full
implementation of sexual prohibitions, prior to the
ultimate repudiation of our claims on and identification
with the maternal body.
Kristeva uses a feminized vocabulary to describe the
semiotic, in order to rekindle the primal memory of
maternal presence. The question of women's more direct
access to this discourse, as daughters, as mothers, as
special victims of Oedipal ization, is a separate issue, one
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that Kristeva, unlike Cixous and Irigaray, seems less
willing to address, although her own maternal experience is
sometimes expressed in her writing.
According to Kristeva, the existing systems of
signification are constantly threatened by a simmering
semiotic murmur which occasionally breaks through to the
surface of symbolic discourse. Hence her approach to
language as a dynamic compendium and articulation of
heterogeneous and unstable meaning. This is not to deny
the power of the symbolic edifice, for it is formidable.
It is, however, an important recognition of the possibility
of cultivating its cracks and fissures. The semiotic
provides the ground (shifting and elusive, to be sure) from
which to criticize language in the name of unacknowledged,
unsatisfied, and multiple desires.
Within this framework, the relationship of women to
culture and language becomes an interesting source of study
and speculation, both for what this relationship can reveal
about women, as well as for what it suggests about a
culture from which women are at least partially alienated
and in which they are deeply implicated as the Other.
Invoking the unmistakable parallels between the semiotic
and the feminine, Kristeva writes: "The role of women
strikes me as more interesting when it consists in stating
the right to the difference, the return of the negative,
the challenge to communities, divinities, authorities,
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including that crafty authority, the ego.
.
.
"
21
Interesting, and well worth noting before we proceed
with a more sustained examination of Kristeva's treatment
of sexual difference, is the fact that her most fully
developed treatment of this issue takes place between the
covers of a book ostensibly about Chinese women. Bearing
witness to her careful avoidance of the error of mistaking
the Chinese experience itself for the Chinese experience as
viewed through Western eyes, the book is also a fitting
testament to the difficulty of taking a direct line of
approach to the issue of sexual difference. A large
portion of About Chinese Women is actually about the sorts
of questions about Western women brought to light through
engagement with Chinese women. Kristeva's inquiry takes
the form, deliberately it would seem, of reflective
dialogue rather than linear inquiry. Like the Chinese
Revolution in relation to the West, women in relation to
western male-dominated culture promote "the chance that the
discovery of 'the Other' may make us question ourselves
about what, here and now, is new, scarcely audible,
22disturbing." Like the Chinese Revolution, "woman as
such does not exist." Neither, Kristeva might say, does
"difference". Each must be approached as complex
refractions, products of interchange, contrasts; as surplus
and repressed meanings leaving their traces in scattered
and often undecipherable patterns. "Women. We have the
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luck to be able to take advantage of a biological
peculiarity to give a name to that which, in monotheistic
capitalism, remains on this side of the threshold of
repression, voice stilled, body mute, always foreign to the
social order." 23 Warning against the theology of an
"inverted humanism", Kristeva would have women search for
their voices and identities, but not with an end point
(glorification of womanhood) in mind; the denial of
difference, as well as its instituted and totalizing
reification, result in totalitarianism, defined as the
inability/unwillingness to tolerate difference.
The historical and current burden carried by women in a
society that simultaneously denies and inscribes difference
is powerfully described by Kristeva in a rich panoply of
prose that communicates a uniquely female/feminine
experience of the mind-body split within Western culture:
.
. .
voice without body, body without voice, silent
anguish, choking on the rythms of words, the tones of
sounds, the colours of images, but without words,
without sounds, without images; outside time, outside
knowledge, cut off forever from the rythmic, colourful,
violent changes that streak sleep, skin, viscera:
socialized, even revolutionary, but at the cost of the
body; body crying, infatuating, but at the cost of
time; cut off, swallowed up; on the one hand, the
aphasic pleasure of childbirth that imagines itself a
participant in the cosmic cycles; on the other,
jouissance under the symbolic weight of a law
(paternal, familial, social, divine) of which she is
the sacrificial support, bursting with glory on the
condition that she submit to the denial, if not the
murder of the body ... 24
Woman's apparent choice is either to accede to a language
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and culture which deny her embodied subjectivity, or to
become the repressed specified other o£ carnality. These
limited and mutually exclusive choices are the products o£
a social and symbolic order which Kristeva describes
variously as monotheistic, Christian, paternal, and
capitalist.
Monotheism is the grand symbolic organizing principle
of community which succeeded historically by repressing
paganism (the worship of a variety of gods) and "the
greater half of agrarian civilization and their
ideologies: women and mothers." 25
No other civilization, therefore, seems to have madethe principle of sexual difference so crystal clear:between the two sexes there is a cleavage, an abyss,which is marked by their different relationships to theLaw (religious and political) and which is the very
condition of their alliance. Monotheistic unity is
sustained by a radical separation of the sexes:indeed, this separation is its prerequisite. For
without this gap between the sexes, without thislocalization of the polymorphic, orgasmic body,laughing and desiring, in the other sex, it would havebeen impossible, in the symbolic sphere, to isolate theprinciple of One Law— One, Purifying, Transcendent,
Guarantory of the ideal interest of the community.
There is one unity: an increasingly purified
community discipline, isolated as a transcendent
principle and thus insuring the survival of the group.
This unity that the God of monotheism represents is
sustained by a desire that pervades the community,
making it run but also threatening it. Remove this
threatening desire— this perilous support of the
community— from man; place it beside him: you have
woman, who is speechless, but who appears as the pure
desire of speech. 26
Kristeva identifies monotheism with "the function of human
symbolism: to provide an instance of communication and
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cohesion despite the fact that it operates by dividing
thing/word, body/speech, pleasure/law, incest/procrea-
ii 27tion." The patrilinear function is also firmly
implicated in the monotheistic impulse:
1 Zv/ P
atrilinear descent with transmission of thefather s name centralizes eroticism in the single goalof procreation, in the grip of an abstract symbolicauthority which refuses to acknowledge the fact thatthe child grows and is carried in the mother's body,which a matrilinear system of descent kept alive in themind by leaving certain possibilities ofpolymorphism— if not incest— still available. 28
Invoking a Freudian mode of analysis, Kristeva argues
that the development of productive forces—the
consolidation of economic and political power— is, in
effect, premissed on the centralized, repressed, and
sublimated eroticism that women experience and symbolize
through the maternal body. "Jouissance" is the term that
she uses to get at this repressed feminine eroticism (not
exclusively experienced by women). Difficult to pin down
concretely, the term connotes sensuous pleasure and the
orgasmic experiences associated with sex and maternity.
According to Kristeva, our entire logic of production and
reproduction (what Freud referred to as "civilization") is
based on the radical codification of sexual difference, the
denial of jouissance, and the exclusion of women as women
from knowledge and power. This point is also pursued by
Irigaray and Cixous.
As the particular version of monotheism which
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constitutes the symbolic and social order of the West,
Christianity is
,
for Kristeva, the fantasy of a male
homosexual economy, premissed on a denial of sexual
difference in its denial of maternal jouissance. She
describes The Word as a sublimated version of the fart,
evidence of a deeper lying fantasy of anal penetration and
resulting pregnancy. Only in assuming the role of a male
homosexual, as a virgin anally impregnated by The Word, can
Woman (i.e., Mary) be placed within the symbolic order of
Christianity. (v/hile Kristeva does not mention it, we
might also consider the Church-inspired persecution of
witches in the context of this interpretation. The
sexualized tenor of this brutal assault on women is
unmistakable.) 29 Women's legitimate forms of
participation within the Christian symbolic order are
reduced to two: the ecstatic and the melancholic,
represented by Theresa d'Avila and Catherine of Sienna,
respectively. The price of specifically female sexuality
is masochism or social persecution.
These two limited choices—de-feminized ecstasy or
feminine masochism—characterize the only possible avenues
of a female's access to power, knowledge, and symbolism
within a monotheistic symbolic order organized around the
unitary rule of the Father. It is the mother, figure of an
30earlier and repressed symbolism, who loses out.
Specifically feminine sexuality, described by Kristeva
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as maternal jouissance, is based on the daughter's
relationship to the maternal body. Like other feminist
theorists, Kristeva stresses the significance of the
pre-Oedipal period of psycho-sexual development for
understanding female sexuality and psychology in
contradistinction to that of males. 31 Freud's Oedipal
castration trauma is transposed by Kristeva into the
Lacanian mode of viewing it as a process of learning the
symbolic function: "with the Oedipal phase come language,
the symbolic instance, the ban on auto-eroticism, and the
reorganization of the law of the father." 32 she defines
the symbolic function as "a system of signs (first, rythmic
and intonation differences, then signif ier/signif ied)
organized into logico-lingui stic structures whose goal is
to accredit social communication as exchange purified of
33pleasure." Superego and symbolic order (the order of
verbal communication) are built on the foundation of
prohibitions rendered unconscious:
The symbolic function in our monotheistic West
functions by means of a system of kinship dependent on
transmission of the father's name and a rigorous
prohibition of incest, and a system of verbal
communication that is increasingly logical, simple,
positive, stripped of stylistic, rythmic, 'poetic*
ambiguities. Such an order brings this constitutional
inhibition of the speaking subject to a zenith never
before attained . . . •34
In contrast, the "truth" of the pre-Oedipal, primary
process, mother-dominated realm is "a curious truth:
outside time with neither past nor future, neither true nor
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false; buried underground, it neither postulates nor
judges. It refuses, displaces, breaks the symbolic order
before it can re-establish itself.- 35 Lurking beneath
the surface, all that is repressed "by sign, by sense, by
communication, by symbolic order, in whatever is
legislating, restrictive, paternal 36
-that which is
allied with the pre-Oedipal phase-is capable of "blowing
the whole thing apart." 37 Jouissance, pregnancy ("escape
from the bonds of daily social temporality"), and a
''marginal speech, with regard to the science, religion, and
philosophy of the polis," 38 are identified by Kristeva as
"the means by which this 'truth', cloaked and hidden by the
symbolic order and its companion, time, functions through
39
women.
If a woman cannot be part of the temporal symbolic
order except by identifying with the father, it is
clear that as soon as she shows any evidence of that
which, in herself, escapes such identification
and acts differently, resembling the dream of the
maternal body, she evolves into this 'truth' in
question. It is thus that feminine specificity defines
itself in patrilineal society; woman is a specialist in
the unconscious, a witch, a bacchanalian, taking herjouissance in an anti-Appo Ionian, Dionysian orgy. 40
Women represent the elusive and unconscious truth of
the symbolic order only so long as this 'truth' is not
given tangible form. For once the unconscious passes into
the symbolic order as 'truth', it becomes fetishized. And
here lies the dilemma for feminists, as Kristeva sees it:
assuming an activist, militant, virile, and hence
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masculinized stance as we demand entry into the Symbolic
order, "or else we remain in an eternal sulk before
history," 41 This problem, which might be termed the
"problem of perpetual negativity", is one to which we will
return.
To sum up Kristeva's position with respect to
"difference" I would argue that her overweening interest is
in a counter-theory of the subject/ theory of the
counter-subject, rather than in a theory of woman per se as
counter-subject. "Woman" would seem to represent an
attitude, a position within the symbolic order, rather than
a sex. As idea, attitude, position and sex, "woman" aids
in the displacement of the modern Western notion of the
Subject as an organic and consistent entity. While this
subject may indeed have been conceived in phallic terms,
women do not embody the full range of repressed
alternatives, of those polymorphous manifestations of
negativity, dissidence, and difference. Indeed, biological
sex must not be confused with sexuality if Kristeva is to
be interpreted correctly. Jean Genet, for example, stands
within Kristeva's framework as a good example of a writer
whose texts are suffused with "feminite", along with
Mallarme and Artaud who, she argues, have achieved literary
versions of semiotic discourse. (In fact, Kristeva rarely
analyzes the literature of female writers.) The writer who
can set "jouissance" into play, opposing the rules of
conventional language, enacts that pre-verbal
identification with the .other which necessarily underlines
the logic of "paternal discourse" ( phallologocentrism)
. if
Genet, Mallarme', and Artaud did not have "the luck to be
able to take advantage of a biological peculiarity to give
a name to that which
.
. . remains . .
. foreign to the
social order," they were nonetheless able to invoke the
"feminine discourse" of the semiotic.
Kristeva's version of "difference", then, is not a
strictly sexual one. "Woman" raises the question of
difference because "she" has some foothold within the
symbolic order which enables her and those sympathetic to
her situation (male homosexuals are such a potential group)
to criticize language from within (the symbolic) and
without (the semiotic). The "problem of Woman" is the
problem of all those "who swim against the tide."
Ultimately, it is the problem of the rigidly conceived
subject, who must deny the semiotic/ femi nine, twist it,
simplify it, and dominate it, in order to maintain his
peculiar sense of self and mastery of reality in "this
untenable place where our speaking species resides,
threatened by madness beneath the emptiness of
42heaven." If the long term goal of feminism is "another
economy of the sexes," along with a radically refashioned
cultural order, the more immediate strategy must be to "go
on waging the war of the sexes, without a perverse denial
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of the abyss that marks the sexual difference or a
dissillusioned mortification at its depth." 43 Such a
battle can best be waged, according to Kristeva, if we
assume the critical stance of listening for the barely
perceptible murmurings of the semiotic.
In contrast to Kristeva' s concern with the mute body,
silenced desire, with "the inexhaustible, non-symbolized
impulse," Luce Irigaray focuses more directly on "that
repressed which is the feminine imagery." Irigaray employs
an inventive, complex, and extended rendering of the
related critiques of the symbolic-social order, of
conceptions of a unified and unproblematic (male) subject
and discourse, and of the problem of the domination of
women and Woman to the stylistic outer reaches. If
Kristeva makes for difficult reading, Irigaray leaves
American readers simultaneously dumbfounded and acutely
uncomfortable with her detailed and evocative bodily
imagery. That she has been denounced as a crude biological
reductionist and ontologizer of difference says more about
the limits of the language that she is trying to
di splace/deconstruct than about her position proper. 44
As with the attempt to convey and summarize the work of
Kristeva, it is difficult, if not impossible, to do so in
Irigaray' s case without fairly extensive quoting and
paraphrasing. This is so because the aphoristic and
stylistic use of language in her work is integral to its
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waning. Because she is doing what she advocates through
her mode of writing, her procedure (firmly rooted in the
French intellectual tradition and language) is her
45 —
content. a regrettable, but unrecuperable loss also
attends the translation of her works into English, where
puns, double, ambiguous, multiple and contradictory
meanings are often lost. The extensive footnotes provided
by her translators can only partially make up for the lost
meaning, since the real power of Irigaray's work seems to
depend on the active and immediate engagement of her
readers within the frame of her prose. According to
Carolyn Burke, one of her foremost American translators,
"reading Irigaray is like taking part in a process in which
neither participant is certain of the outcome." 46 in
other words, Irigaray's texts do not aim for singular,
whole, or pre-f ash ioned and detachable meanings: "You
don't understand a thing? No more than they understand
„47you. in spite of these noted impediments to a full
experience, understanding and appeciation of her work,
Irigaray provides sufficient grist for the mill to justify
a tentative, if necessarily diluted, accounting of her work.
According to Irigaray, women are caught in a world
structured by male-centered concepts. Within this system
of signification, women have no way of representing, much
less knowing themselves in any but a masculine fashion. In
her imaginary dialogue for two female lovers (or an
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auto-erotic self), »„hen 0ur Lips Speak Together. •• Ir i garay
writes:
If we continue to speak the same language to eachother, we will reproduce the same story? lf wecontinue to speak this sameness, if we speak to Lotother as men have spoken for centnrJ! . ^ °h
us to speak, we wilf fail ^crSther?
3
'
Words will pass through our bodies, above or heads"disappear, make us disappear.
. . How can I touch'youif you're not there? Your blood is translated into
us
eir
Bu
S
t
n
^s
S
" ? ^ Tak t0 each othe" and about. us ? Get out of their language. Go backthrough all the names they gave you. 9 I'm wai?inq foryou, I'm waiting for myself. 48 t g t
Her sarcastic and reportedly witty (as yet untranslated)
expose' of Plato and Freud's portrayal of women as
irrational and imperfect (because castrated) men ( Speculum
De L ' Autre Femme ) is one feature of her more basic argument
that Western thought is based on a systematic repression of
women's experience/sexuality. Going a step beyond
Kristeva's version of resistance as the listening for,
experience and articulation of " joui ssance" or semiotic
discourse (both necessarily negative with respect to the
symbolic order), Irigaray (and Cixous as well) hones in
directly on the evocative and explicit expression of female
sexuality and the creation of a language capable of
expressing that sexuality, with a view to establishing some
tangible ground from which to critically analyse, demystify
and deconstruct "phallologocentr i sm" . Indeed, these two
projects are vitally connected. "In the face of language,
constructed and maintained by men only, I raise the
436
question of the specificity of a feminine language: of a
language which could be adequate for the body, sex and the
imagination (imaginary) of the woman." 49
Phallologocentrism is responsible for a conception of
the unitary masculine subject who stands at the center of a
symbolic and linguistic universe that orders reality in
accordance with the conjoined rule of the Father and the
Phallus. Extending Derrida's definition and critique of
logocentrism as a 'metaphysics of presence' which obscures
the very differences on which meaning-as-presence depends,
'phallologocentrism' (a term which is also used by Derrida
in Writing and Difference) specifies that this singular
system and the hierarchies which it has established are
rooted in a specifically masculine construction of presence
and identity. In the words of Helene Cixous:
This opposition to woman cuts endlessly across all the
oppositions that order culture. It's the classic
opposition, dualist and hierarchical. Man/Woman
automatically means great/small, superior/inferior
. .
.
means high or low, means Nature/History, means
transformation/inertia. In fact, every theory of
culture, every theory of society, the whole
conglomeration of symbolic systems—everything, that
is, that's spoken, everything that's organized as
discourse, art, religion, the family, language,
everything that seizes us, everything that acts on
us— it is all ordered around hierarchical oppositions
that come back to the man/woman opposition. . . 50
That this opposition has been set up from the vantage point
of the masculine subject makes for phallocentrism. Women
have a specificity, constructed within but also lurking
outside of phallologocentric discourse, that distinguishes
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them from men. Distinguished in this double sense, within
a discourse that sets woman up as counter-identity, and
outside of a discourse that cannot capture real difference
because it threatens the logic of that discourse, female
specificity is inf ur iatingly difficult to specify.
Irigaray does not shrink from the task at hand.
Employing a method of deconstruct ion and creative
writing which evokes erotic and pre-Oedipal imagery, she
attempts to reveal that the presumed neutrality of language
accomodates a masculine subject and sets up the feminine
subject as exception, without giving her voice, thus
denying her specificity:
They neither taught us nor allowed us to say our
multiplicity. That would have been improper speech.Of course, we were allowed—we had to?—display onetruth even as we sensed but muffled, stifled another.Truth s other side— its complement? its
remainder?— stayed hidden. 5 l
Phallologocentrism reduces everything to its own system of
signification. Women are subjected to the principle of
Identity conceived as masculine sameness and (not
surprisingly) found lacking. Turning the tables on
phallologocentric discourse, female difference become the
lack or question within the discourse. Cixous describes
this method as elaborated in her own work:
If woman has always functioned "within" the discourse
of man, a signifier that has always referred back to
the opposite signifier which annihilates its specific
energy and diminishes or stifles its very different
sounds, it is time for her to dislocate this "within",
to explode it, turn it around, and seize it; to make it
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wf?'
C°"tainin9 taking it into her own mouth
for herself
Very °™ teeth to inv4nt
a language to get inside of. 52
Freud's genius was to shake up the notion of a unified
consciousness and subjectivity with his discovery of the
unconscious. Yet he mistakenly persisted in defining
sexual difference in terms of an a priori sameness (in
terms of the penis/phallus) such that female sexuality is
relegated to the status of absence, lack, deficiency. This
type of signification, according to Irigaray, denies female
subjectivity in its own right. Cixous describes it as "the
reductive stinginess of the masculine-conjugal economy." 53
In the face of this limited economy of meaning, women
"can touch each other only when naked." 54
... to find ourselves and each other, we have a greatdeal to take off. So many images and appearances
separate us, one from another. They decked us out
according to their desires for so long, and we adorned
ourselves so often to please them, that we forgot the
feel of our skin. Removed from our own skin, we remain
distant. ^
Women must become the speaking subjects of their
difference, which requires that they break through this
system of thought and signification, critically confronting
a phallic conception of the subject with their embodied and
expressive alternatives:
If we don't invent a language; i f we don't find our
body's language, its gestures will be too few to
accompany our story. When we become tired of the same
old ones, we'll keep our desires secret, unrealized.
Asleep again, dissatisfied, we will be turned over to
the words of men—who have claimed to "know" for a long
time. But not our body . Thus seduced, allured,
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f' ecstatlG over our becoming, we will be
a^ho^f * °eprived of 2!i£ movements : Frozen,lt ough we are made for endless change. 56
Kristeva's attempt to shake up the notion of the
Subject as a singular and consistent entity may be viewed
as a project to which Irigaray's more focused and detailed
evocation of female imagery is parallel. Both would have
us interrogate the rules of discourse in the attempt to
understand the simultaneous production and denial of
meanings which help to constitute the "feminine":
To put discourse into question is to reject the
existing order. It is to renounce, in effect, theidentity principle, the principles of unity and
resemblance which allow for the constitution ofphallocentric society. It means choosing marginality
I with an emphasis on margins ) in order to designate
one s difference, a difference no longer conceived of
as an inverted image or as a double, but as alterity,
multiplicity, heterogeneity. It means laying claim to
an absolute difference, posited not within the normsbut against and outside the norms. 57
Easier said than done, we might reply. For there is a
tightly tangled and unavoidable knot at the heart of any
attempt to articulate difference outside the norms. The
problem is this: Does language translate/describe reality,
or does it create/constitute it? The first option has been
effectively ousted from Irigaray's approach. It is, in
effect, a non-option. She is simply not situated within a
conception of language as mirror of reality. Indeed, the
view that language merely describes the phenomenal world
would not generate the sorts of analyses that we find in
the likes of Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous. Language
itself would not be the focus of such lively, passionate
interest and concern. The emphasis, instead, would be on
"practice", crudely conceived; for language would be
expected to follow suit once appropriate changes in the
base structure (society) had been made. Irigaray's work is
clearly located within the position that language
constitutes social reality, including subjectivity. But in
this case, how, if ever, can we assume a critical position
towards language and our constitution within it? Irigaray
is obviously sensitive to this problem:
How can we speak to escape their enclosures, patterns,distinctions, and oppositions: virginal/deflowered,
pure/impure, i nnocent/ knowing ... How can we shake
off the chains of these terms, free ourselves from
their categories, divest ourselves of their names?Disengage ourselves, alive
, from their concepts? 58
That Irigaray proceeds as if such a critical position
is possible is related to the work of Jacques Lacan and
Jacques Derrida, to which we briefly turn, for a
consideration of Derrida' s deconst ructi ve method and
Lacan' s notion of an asymmetrical sexual entry inuo the
Symbolic order. For while Irigaray's work is uniquely
distinctive and even engages in a forthright challenge to
and critique of the work of Lacan, these two thinkers have
had an unmistakable influence on her work.
Lacan is by now famous for his attempts to document the
simultaneous acquistion of language and subjectivity.^ 9
Within this framework, identity is that position which we
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(are forced to) assume within the Symbolic order. Lacan'
s
work goes so far as to identify the processes by which we
are subjected to the structure of the Symbolic order and
also come to think of ourselves as the point of origin of
our ideas and beliefs. This false sense of subjectivity,
developmental^ following the first period of infantile
omnipotence, is acquired during the Mirror Phase, when the
pre-oedipal child glimpses him/herself in the mirror and
perceives itself simultaneously as subject and object. The
illusion of totality or unity, fostered by the mirror
image, goes underground after the establishment of symbolic
relations, persisting in unconscious formations.
Lacan and Derrida, building on the work of Ferdinand de
Saussure, argue that we are situated within and produced by
language through a set of relationally generated meanings
fixed by our relation to/positions within the Symbolic
order with respect to various signifiers. According to
Lacan, the phallus functions as the privileged signifier in
the child's entry into the Symbolic order, which is also
its passage through the Oedipus Complex. The early dual
imaginary identifications of the ego with itself and the
mother are broken by the introduction of a third term, the
father, in relation to whom the child is forced to assume a
position. Such positioning is initially achieved through
the designation of having/not-having a phallus. Like a
signifier, the phallus fixes difference according to having
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or not having it. It is in this sense that Lacan argues
that women lack access to the Symbolic order, or, as
re-fashioned by several Lacanian feminists, that women's
entry into the Symbolic order is negative
.
60
Here we can
identify an important starting point for a conception of
sexual difference rooted within language and the symbolic
order, which promises the avoidance of the problem of
formulating difference in extra-linguistic or
-symbolic
terms
.
Irigaray proceeds out of this framework by employing
Derrida's tactic of unseating the privileged
• c . 61signifier. She does this initially by attempting to
deconstruct the ascription of 'no sex' (no penis/phallus),
changing it to 'many sexes', and also by attempting to
write female sexuality without reference to the
6 2phallus. In effect, she reverses the phallus/
non-phallus hierarchy, although this is never intended as a
permenent switch. Her creative evocation of a feminine
dialogue would seem to operate simultaneously as a
refutation/critique of the subject/object relationship and
of any attempt to re-insert a hierarchical and dichotomous
ordering of signifiers, be they masculine or feminine:
Open your lips, but do not open them simply. I do not
open them simply. We
—
you/l—are never open nor
closed. Because we never separate simply, a single
word can't be pronounced, produced by, emitted from our
mouths. From your/my lips, several songs, several ways
of saying echo each other. For one is never separable
from the other. You/l are always several at the same
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voiS; her t°anl
d d0minate the other? impose her
w*ichVoe s ST^tK-JS JSlS^* 1^'
(Notice too that Irigaray refashions a meaning from "no
word" to "no single word", playing with the notion that
women lack access to language and the symbolic arena.)
Derrida's deconstructi ve method opens the way for an
immanent critique of language. If we can only exist in
relation to language and never outside it, we can
nevertheless engage in a critical process precisely because
language itself is not as closed and fixed as it appears.
Infinitely complex, meaning—ostens ibly fixed by the
relationship between signifier and signified— is almost
free-floating, due to its constitution within a series of
differences and the inevitable slippage between the
signifier and signified:
The play of differences involves syntheses and
referrals (renvois) which prevent there from being
at any moment or in any way a simple element which ispresent in and of itself and refers only to itself.
Whether in written or spoken discourse, no element'can
function as a sign without relating to another element
which itself is not simply present. This linkage means
that each 'element'
—
phoneme or grapheme— is
constituted with reference to the trace in it of the
other elements of the sequence or system. Nothing, in
either the elements or the system, is anywhere ever
simply present or absent. 64
Irigaray invokes this play of difference in two ways.
First, by invoking a feminine imaginary in contrast to a
phallic one; second, by setting the play of difference into
operation within her rendition of female discourse. "Speak
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just the same. Because your language doesn't follow just
one thread, one course, or one pattern, we are in luck.
You speak from everywhere at the same time." 65 m these
ways, then, Irigaray's approach aids in the identification
of the conditions of thought imposed by phallologocentrism.
This practice is critique, since these conditions, presuming
a universality and self-evident logic, are necessarily
deligitimized when subjected to such scrutiny and confronted
with alternate discourses. "Speak, nevertheless. Between
us 'hardness' is not the rule. We know the contours of our
bodies well enough to appreciate fluidity. Our density can
do without the sharp edges of rigidity. We are not
attracted to dead bodies." 66 Cixous poses the longer
range ramifications of the method in this way:
What would become of logocentri sm, of the great
philosophical systems, of world order, if the rock upon
which they founded their church were to crumble? If it
were to come out.
. . that the logocentric project had
always undeniably existed to found (fund)
phallocentrism, to insure for masculine order a
rationale equal to history itself? Then all the
stories would have to be told differently, the future
would be incalculable, the historical forces would,
will, change hands, bodies, another thinking as yet
unthinkable will transform the functioning of all
soc iety . ^
'
In the transcribed interview entitled "Women's Exile,"
Irigaray introduces us to her critical questioning of
theoretical discourse, including that of psychoanalysis,
which portrays the female sex as a lack, hole, other, in
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relation to the male. This status of female sexuality in
psychoanalysis is the symptom of a more general discursive
function. "Freud's discourse represents the symptom of a
particular social and cultural economy, which has been
maintained in the West at least since the Greeks." 68 The
usefulness (and limit) of Freud and Lacan is that they
describe the consequences of a soc io-cultural system which
they then fail to criticize sufficiently. Lacan'
s
portrayal of woman as a lack in the discourse organized
around the phallus as privileged signifier is, in an
important sense (and here is where American feminists have
been too quick to dismiss Freud), not false at all. "Can
female sexuality articulate itself, even minimally, within
an Aristotelian type of logic? No." 59 The language of
the female, says Irigaray, "has nothing to do with the
syntax which we have used for centuries, namely that
constructed according to the following organization:
subject, predicate, or; subject, verb, object. For female
sexuality is not unifiable, it cannot be subsumed under the
70
concept of the subject."
This female sexuality is precisely what Irigaray seeks
to explore in her creative prose pieces, "When Our Lips
Speak Together" and "And One Doesn't Stir Without the
71Other." "I have tried to find out what the specific
modes of functioning of the female sex and the 'imaginary'
72
could be." (Italics mine.) This is where Irigaray is
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most difficult to understand and most susceptible to
misinterpretation. It is important to bear in mind that
she characterizes her project as one of inventing/exploring
new possible languages rather than of documenting
pre-f ashioned ones:
?W C!2 I it? , That We are women from the start.That we don't need to be produced by them, named by
al«;«^?;
S
^
C
^ °
r profane bv them. That this has
t^T/L tdY ha^ened < without their labors. And
It?s nnVly^l^l constitutes the locus of our exile.
~rfn~^!^ we have our own territory , but that theirnation, family, home, and discourse imprison us inenclosures where we can no longer move—or live as
JZ1 \
proPertv is our e ^ile. Their enclosures,the death of our love. Their words, the gag upon ourlips. /J (Italics mine.)
It must be stressed that her mode is one of deconstruct ion,
rather than naive reconstruction. For example, she plays
on the prevailing notion that woman has 'no sex' (no
phallus), and takes the implication in a new direction,
suggesting that "she does not have 'a sex' [rather than
'any sex'], and that her sex is not visible, or
identifiable, or representable in a definite form." 74
(Italics mine.) This sexual multiplicity, as opposed to
lack, in turn threatens the genital organization of
heterosexual ity
,
along with a phallic conception of the
subject and of identity:
You are moving. You never stay still. You never
stay. You never "are". How can I say you, who are
always other? How can I speak you, who remain in a
flux that never congeals or solidifies? How can this
current pass into words? It is multiple, devoid, of
"causes" and "meanings", simple qualities; yet it is
not decomposable. These movements can't be described
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as the passage from a beginning to an end. These
5"rh °n t flow into one, definitive sea; thelerivers ave no permanent banks; this body, no fixed
tSv
e
i?Avn.
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Un
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easin9 ^ility, this life. Whichhey might describe as our restlesness, whims,
?^!nSr' ?r . U u S - For aJL1 this seeras so strange tothose who claim "solidity" as their f oundat ion. ^
What is understandably confusing for some is Irigaray'
s
often direct appropriation of an anatomical vocabulary to
convey and explore women's language(s). For example, her
image of two lips to simultaneously describe women's
discourse and sexuality:
.
. .
the woman's auto-eroticism is very different fromthat of the man. The latter needs an instrument totouch himself: his hand, the woman's sex, language
. .
.
.
Woman, however, is in touch with herself, and inherself without the necessity of a mediation and priorto any possible distinction between activity and
passivity. Woman 'touches herself all the time,
moreover without anyone being able to forbid her to do
so, for her sex is made up of two lips which embrace
each other continuously. Thus, in herself, she is
already two—but indivisible into ones—which affect,
are affected by, are attached to each other. 76
And yet, she clearly attempts to disengage from an
anatomical interpretation of her method. "We must go back
to the question not of the anatomy but of the morphology of
77the female sex." Her choice of words here is
intriguing, since "morphology" has both a biological and
linguistic definition: "1: a branch of biology dealing
with the form and structure of organisms 2: a study and
description of word formation in a language". (Merriam-
Webster) Invoking an association between language (word)
and structure (organism), "morphology" also lends itself
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to the image of language as a living and dynamic structure;
we also hear the unmistakable linking up of bodies (biology)
with the symbolic order (words) in this term. Pointing out
what others (especially Nietzsche) have noted, Irigaray
argues that "all Western discourse presents a certain
isomorphism with the masculine sex: the privilege of
unity, form of the self, of the visible, of the specula-
rizable; of the erection (which is the becoming in a
form)." 78
If Irigaray is saying that the structure of language
and thought recapitulates the symbolic structuring of the
masculine body ("the body" as we think we know it) and vice
versa, this is very different from an 'anatomy is destiny'
formulation of language expressing anatomical 'truth'. In
other words, Irigaray is far from asserting that raw or
pre-social sexuality dictates our forms of representation.
(The question of influence, however, seems to remain
open.) Pre-social, non-structured, non-symbolized
sexuality is better defined as "drive", "desire", or
"instinct". This is the raw stuff which is channelled,
molded, cut out in definite forms, repressed and sublimated
as it gains representation (a place) within the Symbolic
order. If our knowledge and language of sexuality and
identity invoke anatomical imagery, this imagery itself
(breasts, penis, buttocks, lips), our sense of the
anatomical, has already been organized linguistically and
449
symbolically. This, I would argue, is the framework within
which Irigaray ought to be read; otherwise, she will be
grossly misinterpreted.
On this view, Irigaray' s provocative observation that
"the criteria for a valid sexuality should be the same as
those of a valid discourse, and that the criteria should be
acceptable for a masculine sexuality," 79 should be viewed
as rooted in the Lacanian notion of linguistically
structured sexuality and subjectivity. To say that
Irigaray is addressing the intersection of sexuality and
representation means that she chooses to focus on
linguistically and socially structured sexual meanings
which are themselves embedded in an imagery of 'the
natural'. That these meanings are generated primarily in
reference to an Oedipal phallic signifier in relation to
which men and women are situated and hence, defined
differently and that this difference is constituted
hierarchically in relation to the "rule of the father" and
"presence" of the phallus, is the ground which Irigaray
attempts to dislodge. She does so by introducing the
forbidden and repressed, yet logically implicit notion of
ltiple sexualities, re-evoking the pre-Oedipal
ther-daughter relationship, and using an explicit and
often shocking language of female sexuality and anatomy.
Since conceptions of sexuality and sub jecti vi ty/ identi ty
are integrally bound up within her psychoanalytic
mu
mo
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framework, it is no accident that the subject-object
relationship repeatedly crops up in her work. Contrasting
the phallic conception of this relationship with its
repressed feminine counter-par t ( s ) , she writes:
We live as two beyond images, mirages, and mirrors.Between us, one is not the "real" and the other, herlmitaton; one is not the original and the other, her
copy. Although we can be perfect dissemblers withintheir system, we relate to each other without
simulation. Our resemblance does without semblances:in our bodies, already the same. Touch yourself, touch
me, you'll "see". 80
When she argues that the morphologic of Western discourse
"does not correspond to the female sex," she is situating
herself, appearances to the contrary, within a discourse
that denies women-as-the-f emale-sex access to that singular
and contained sense of identity enjoyed by men, rather than
within "nature" itself. She then attempts to describe-
always metaphorically and tentatively—what such a
morphology of the female sex might be, what sort of
discourse it might entail:
These two lips of the female sex make it once and for
all a return to unity, because they are always at least
two
,
and that one can never determine of these two,
which is one, which is the other: they are continually
interchanging. They are neither identifiable nor
separable one from the other. Besides, instead of that
being the visible or the form which constitutes the
dominant criteria, it is the touch which for the female
sex seems to me primordial: these ' two lips ' are
always joined in an embrace . 8^~~
That Irigary uses an anatomical language to express
these thoughts simultaneously throws the phallus-as-
signifier into critical relief as it seeks to defuse the
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classical anatomical and biological explanations for
women's passivity and inferiority, by giving this discourse
a 'taste of its own medicine'. Furthermore, the explicit
invocation of female sexual imagery breaks the linguistic
and social taboo against an overly explicit rendering of
female sexuality, satisfied vicariously in this culture
through the pornographic industry. What is also striking
about Irigaray's imagery is that it seems largely devoid of
the fecundity which is often associated with the
83feminine. This may be a deliberate attempt on her part
to develop those voices besides the maternal which is,
after all, the main version of female sexuality allowed
within the prevailing sexual economy of meaning that must
insure reproduction (biological and social).
Difference, then, for Irigaray, is sexually specific
because language and the symbolic order organize it along
these lines. Woman is the counter subject; counter-
subjectivity and counter truths are apprehended through a
relentless searching out of the denied feminines lurking
within and threatening the singular phallic-inspired
logic and identity. This assault on the unified and
masculine subject is evident in the works of all four
writers under consideration here. From Kristeva's critical
perusal of "that crafty authority, the ego", to Irigaray's
"How can I say you who are always other?", to Cixous's
"contestation of this solidarity of logocentrism and
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Phallocentrism", to Wittig's explanation of her use of the
split "I" (j/e) in The Lesbian Body_, this theme is striking
in its consistent evocation among writers who disagree
about so many other things. Wittig's self-conscious
rendition of her own experience as a writer towards a
language that has written her out and will only accomodate
her on its masculine terms is instructive:
'I' (Je) as a generic feminine subject can only enterby force into a language which is foreign tolt, thehuman not being feminine grammatically speaking but he(il) or they (ils). 'I' ( Je ) conceals the sexualdifference of the verbal persons while specifying themin verbal interchange. 'I' (je ) obliterates the factthat elle or elles are submerged in il or ils, i.e.,that all the feminine persons are complementary to the
masculine persons. The feminine 'I' (Je) who is
speaking can fortunately forget this difference and
assume indifferently the masculine language. But the
'I' (Je) who writes is driven back to her specific
experience as subject. The 'I' (Je) who writes is
alien to her own writing at every word because this 'I'(Je) uses a language alien to her. This 'I' (Je)
experiences what is alien to her. This 'I' (Je) cannot
be 'un ecrivain'. If, in writing je, I adopt this
language, this je cannot do so. J/e is the symbol of
the lived, rending experience which is m/y writing, of
this cutting in two which throughout literature is the
exercise of a language which does not constitute m/e as
a subject. J/e poses the ideological and historical
question of feminine subjects . . . 8 3
But for all of their similarities on the turf of
criticizing masculine subjectivity and identity, these
writers, once past the critique of singular masculine-
inspired identity, differ enormously on the question of
women and subjectivity. Wittig has publicly situated
herself in critical opposition to the ecr iture feminine
strain, criticizing it for what she perceives to be an
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uncritical and unmediated appropriation of a language of
difference and femininity that is culturally contrived and
useful only for keeping women in their appointed places
relative to men. "The women say that they perceive their
bodies in their entirety. They say that they do not favor
any of its parts on the grounds that it was formerly a
forbidden subject. They do not want to become prisoners of
their own ideology." 84 of the four writers under
consideration here, Wittig is the least inclined to include
"Woman" in her vocabulary. in Les Guerilleres and The
Lesbian Body we find references to "women" and "the women"
only. And in her dictionary for Lesbian Peoples
, "woman",
like "wife" is defined as a term that has been:
Obsolete since the beginning of the Glorious Age.
Considered by many companion lovers as the most
infamous designation. This word once applied to beings
fallen in an absolute state of servitude. Its meaning
was, "one who belongs to another." 85
The abbreviated dictionary version of Wittig' s position is
developed more fully in her essay "One is Not Born a
Woman," where she argues that "woman" and "man" are
political and economic categories, mutually implicated in
each other, and requiring a radical questioning. "...
women will have to abstract themselves from the definition
'woman' which is imposed on them." "'Woman' is there to
Of.
confuse us, to hide the reality 'women'." Arguing that
the categories of sex must be destroyed, she identifies
lesbianism as a concept which transcends these categories,
for "what makes a woman is a specific social relation to
man
... a relation which lesbians escape by refusing to
become or stay heterosexual." 87
Hence, Wittig writes a lesbian-inspired literature,
whose thematic and scenic trajectory has increasingly
excluded the presence of men, from L'Opoponax
, set within a
girls' school and which chronicles the resistance to
feminine socialization, to Les Guerilleres
. an epic myth of
Amazon-like revolution against the patriarchy, to Les Corps
Lesbien, a lesbian re-writing of the Song of Songs, and
Lesbian Peoples; Materials for a Dictionary
, in which
there is no entry for "men" and where we find a playful
recuperation of body, self, language and history for women
only
.
The women say, I refuse henceforward to speak this
language, 1 refuse to mumble after them the words lack
of penis lack of money lack of insignia lack of name.
I refuse to pronounce the names of possession and
non-possesion. They say, If I take over the world, let
it be to dispossess myself of it immediately, let it be
to forge new links between myself and the world. 88
Wittig' s literary rendition of her political call for a
demystif icat ion of the category "woman" is to produce a
literary form that is maximally non-susceptible to a
reading in terms of current definitions of womanhood and
gender identity. Her critique of l'ecriture feminine is
that it falls prey to, and helps reproduce, those meanings
it would seek to destroy. Metaphorically characterizing
her method in Les Guerilleres , she writes:
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turns to the left at
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^
eS no raist^e, if one
not fall into the snakepit. At this stage of the march
zero^l/onf'T Cal^lations "eg?n agai^fero. If one makes no mistake in the calculations ifone bends down at just the right moment, one win notbe caught m the jaws of the trap. At this stage of
laliTlt 89
St
,
interruPt calculations and beginagain a zero. y (Italics mine.)
In spite of her opposition to l'ecriture feminine,
Wittig does not stray from the task of writing the body.
The Lesbian Body is a remarkable, beautiful, terrifying and
disturbing work. In it, Wittig seeks to write the whole
body, and a specified lesbian body at that. The eroticism
of the text is produced by a sensuous descriptive language
that partakes, in brief sketches, of emotional rantings,
strong feelings of attraction and revulsion, violence and
sensuousness, confusingly allied. The most remarkable
feature of the text is Wittig' s journey into the depths,
the interior, of the body:
THE LESBIAN BODY THE JUICE THE
SPITTLE THE SALIVA THE SNOT
THE SWEAT THE TEARS THE WAX
THE URINE THE PEACES THE
EXCREMENTS THE BLOOD THE
LYMPH THE JELLY THE WATER
THE CHYLE THE CHYME THE
HUMOURS THE SECRETIONS THE
PUS THE DISCHARGES THE SUP-
PURATIONS THE BILE THE JUICES
THE ACIDS THE FLUIDS THE
FLUXES THE FOAM THE SULPHUR
THE UREA THE MILK THE
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ALBUMEN THE OXYGEN THE
FLATULENCE THE POUCHES THE
PARI ETIES THE MEMBRANES THE
PERITONEUM, THE OMENTUM
THE PLAURA THE VAGINA THE
VEINS THE ARTERIES THE VESSELS
THE NERVES 90
Wittig attempts to write a body unmarked by any economy of
meaning. Intestines, eyes, blood vessels, even those parts
of the body which are not typical components of erotic or
common discourse (who stops to think about the ociput?)
become objects of desire. Bodies flow, intermingle,
penetrate and sometimes violate one another in nearly
unimaginable and often disturbing ways:
M/y most delectable one I set about eating you, m/ytongue moistens the helix of your ear delicately
gliding around, m/y tongue inserts itself in the
auricle, it touches the antihelix, m/y teeth seek thelobe, they begin to gnaw at it, m/y tongue gets intoyour ear canal. I spit you, I fill you with saliva.Having absorbed the external part of your ear I burst
the tympanum, I feel the rounded hammerbone rollingbetween m/y lips, m/y teeth crush it, I find the anvil
and the stirrup-bone, I crunch on them, I forage with
my fingers, I wrench away a bone, I fall on the suberb
cochlea bone and membrane all wrapped round together
...
This prose is unabashedly disturbing, most especially in
its violation of bodily integrity, even as it partakes of a
powerful erotic dimension.
In contrast to other attempts to write the body,
Wittig 's approach steers clear of a sentimentalizat ion of
the female body. This lesbian passion is not the stuff of
an idealized or typical femininity. It also avoids any
hint of a f eti shi zation of body parts, except in the
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particular moments of particular passions. By the end of
the text, no body part is more privileged than any other,
in clear contrast to Irigaray's celebration of two lips.
Note too that there are no mothers in this discourse. But
like Kristeva, Cixous and Irigaray, Wittig's exploration of
the body provides a marked contrast to the erotic language
associated with the speculari zable penis.
What is notably at stake in French feminisms is the
problem of the subject who is linguistically structured
within social relations. Each of the French feminists
presented here partake, in measurable and significant ways,
of a view of language as a significant constructor of
social relations and identity. Their shared focus on
language bears witness to their common interest in
criticizing and modifying language as a central feature of
feminist theorizing and practice. That all of these
writers turn to a language of the body speaks to their
desperate search for something/anything that might
partially elude existing linguistic structuring.
The question of the extent to which human beings are
constituted by the symbolic orders under, through, and
within which they live is an exceedingly difficult and
important one. For those who would tend to grant language
a preeminent and highly constitutive role in social
organization, human relations, and subjective identity,
"difference" can be posed in two slightly different ways.
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The first is what I would call the escape or marginality
thesis, which argues that women tend to avoid a complete
structuration within the social order because they are
absent from language and denied public accessibility and
representation as speaking subjects. As Cixous has put it,
"There's no room for her if she's not a he." 92 This
would seem to be Kristeva's position. The other approach
looks to women's constitution as the Other within the
symbolic order and then seeks to deconstruct it. This is
the method which Irigaray develops. Cixous seems to be
playfully situated between these two, at times invoking
"the mother
... who stands up against separation; a force
that will not be cut out but will knock the wind out of the
codes," at others asserting that "there are no grounds for
establishing a discourse, but rather an arid millenial
ground to break.
. .
"
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with Irigaray and Kristeva,
Cixous celebrates the multiplicity of difference. The
final option is rendered by Wittig, who would expunge
"difference" altogether as an overloaded term.
For those who would prefer to retain a version of
subjectivity that is not totally constructed by language,
Kristeva seems to provide a tangible critical stance by
establishing a kind of unpredictable holding pattern. That
is, her subject is not entirely constructed within symbolic
discourse. Her evocation of a semiotic realm establishes
some tangible ground for criticism. Unfortunately, an
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inescapable side effect of her method is to cast criticism
in a perpetual stance of negativity. "Woman" is
interesting for Kristeva precisely because of her critical
negative impact on a symbolic order that must deny her.
Within this formulation "Woman as such" is a means for
cultural criticism rather than an end in herself. A clear
implication of Kristeva' s work is that feminism will only
remain critical so long as it remains on the margins.
This, of course, raises serious problems for those
feminists who envision concrete changes and improvements
for women as being of urgent importance. Perpetual
negativity, some might argue, is an unaffordable luxury for
those who have been on the margins long enough, for those
women who are poor, sexually and physically and mentally
abused, for those who are politically disenfranchised.
If Kristeva wants to invoke a language of masculine/
feminine difference to promote critique, but nonetheless
avoids their reification within an instituted discourse,
Irigaray and Cixous, focussing more directly and
unabashedly on female experience and imagery, seem less
fearful of positively invoking those categories which have
been used against women. They are willing to play
difference out for all that it is worth. While their
deconstruct ive method has yielded rich insights, it could
be criticized for taking too much from the symbolic order.
A more important critique of their ultrasexual i zed language
460
is that it reproduces the tendency within modern culture,
brought^to critical light by Foucault, of equating sex with
truth. on this view, those who think they have found
something fundamental when they dig it out of repressed or
forbidden terrain are actually playing right in to the
prevailing construction of truth. In defense of Irigaray
and Cixous, we should note that they deliberately situate
themselves against any singular definition of sex, that
they stress the multiplicity of sexualities and 'truths-
suggested by women's repressed erotic.
In a different key, Wittig, echoing Marx's youthful
call for a "relentless criticism of everything", would have
us dispense with difference altogether. Her argument that
we must repudiate the category "woman" overemphasizes the
closed hegemony of language, while the presumption that we
can do so ignores this power. Less ambitious than Wittig
in this sense, the deconstruct ive methods of Irigaray and
Cixous grant language a significant power, but do not view
it as a thoroughly closed system of meaning. If language
is where we are situated, they might say, this is where we
must struggle to articulate counter-truths and alternate
meanings
.
"Difference" has been stretched to the limits of its
critical applications and implications by these French
feminists, who provide a wealth of indications concerning
the rich suggesti veness of the theme, along with a host of
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problems engendered by its explicit use. For all of its
promise in raising the question of "who is speaking" in
terms that move beyond content to the very organization and
form of language, the problems associated with "difference"
cannot be denied. They include: the problem of accounting
for the critical consciousness of women; the question of
whether "difference" may in fact recapitulate too much of
the old thinking to get beyond it; and the question of
whether "woman" is useful or adequate for getting at the
diverse experiences of women divided in cultural, economic,
racial and economic terms. In the United States, at least,
it is clear that "woman" functions all too often as a
premature and even racist term, one that has substituted a
white female for a masculine stance. 95
Time, practice, and further dialogue will help to
clarify the issues at stake. With careful handling,
"difference" offers the possibility of as yet unarticu-
lated, but potential alternatives to predominant conceptions
of politics. It suggests that these alternatives might be
rendered visible through a sustained focus on female
experiences. And it provides intimations of a critical
method for those of us engaged with male- identi f ied and
-dominated discourses.
FOOTNOTES
availabirt-n
n
A
9163 haVe recentlY ^de this material
AHifSardin. H
1CaVUdienCeS: HeSter Eisenstein and
mv^^, T' t esp * part 2 ' Contemporary Feminist
?V • *
rances Trans ^ting Difference," pp. 71-122-
F?ench
a
F^-
MarkS a
?
d Isabelle de Courtivron, eds
.
New
fffff- lZoV Sm^ (Amherst ! University of MassachusettsPress, 1980). Three especially helpful review articles
! Rosette Feral, "Antigone or The Irony of the Tribe,"rev. of Luce Irigaray, Speculum De L'Autre Femme (1974) rPSexe qui N'En e«* gas n/n,n, SBTjEifj ''Tl ^ ~
l°.,I'°
qU
!
S 197?)
:
ln Diacritic ^ 8 O), PP. 2-14; Ann R.Jones, Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding ofL Ecnture Feminine," in Feminist Studies 7 (2): 247-263-Deborah Melmann, "Feminist Explorations: Life UnderPatriarchy," rev. of New French Feminisms
, in CanadianJournal of Political and Social Theory 4 (2), pp. 64-68.See also Yale French Studies 62 h QflTT. Diacritics 12 (2);and Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Soceity 7 {!)'.
2Jacques Derrida, Spur s/Esperons
, cited in CarolynBurke, Irigaray Through the Looking Glass," in FeministStudies 7 (2), p. 288.
3Alice Jardine, "Prelude: The Future of
Difference," In The Future of Difference
, pp. xxv-xxvii,
esp. p. xxv.
4Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex
, trans. H.M.
Parshley, (New York: Random House, 1974), esp. pp. 157-223.
5Josette Fe'ral
,
"The Powers of Difference," in The
Future of Difference
, p. 88.
6What I have in mind here is C.B. MacPherson's The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (London:"
Oxford University Press, 1964)
.
7 Feral, "The Powers of Difference", p. 89.
8Shoshana Felman, "Rereading Feminity," in Yale
French Studies 62 (1981)
, p. 25.
46 2
463
9 'Feral, "The Powers of Difference," pp. 90-91.
Difference?" pt^xv?'.
"""'^^ ^ FUt«™ ° £
12Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents
See ais^L^- JameS Strachey (New York, Nortofflso Adnenne Rich, "Disloyal to Civilization-Pemnism. Racism, and Gynephobia," in her On Lies Secrets
jgg Silence New York: w.w. Norton, 19797, pp. 275-310-
SLSltaTn^pri^r the Revolt -^S.:^
13Feral, "The Powers of Difference," p. 62.
14Cited in Feral, "The Powers of Difference," p. 92.
15 Ibid., p. 90.
l 6Julia Kristeva, Preface to Desire in Language, ed.Leon S. Roudiez, trans. Thomas Gora, et al . (New York:Columbia University Press, 1980), p. x .
17Kristeva, "The Ethics of Linguistics," in Desirein Language
, p. 31.
1
8
Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue and Novel," in Desire inLanguage
, p. 65. —
19Kriteva, "The Ethics of Linguistics," p. 23.
20Kristeva, About Chinese Women , trans. AnitaD V" V" y—\ I.I** I XT « . . ^ 7" u 1 _ _ T T ' _
American ed
.
,
P- 208.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. PP . 12-13.
23 Ibid., P« 14.
24Ibid., P- 15.
25 Ibid., P- 18.
26Ibid., P- 19.
27 lbid.
,
P- 20 .
464
28 Ibid.
York: Harcourt^Sracf^"' The ofWoggn (New
Ruether,^^an raw3 ' Ear^3^"^^
liberation ?n5w ttorR: Seabury ^s, """^
30
the fol^inflor SLS3 t?r 1 <n ' 29/bove »- ^ong with^luw ng, ror related analyses of pre-ChriqHancosmologxes employing female and specifically maternalsymbolism: Murray Bookchin, The g£oloj£ of Freedom- Ttu.Emergence and Dissolution Hierarchy" i " ~
aTd
Sh e n°° kS ' 1982); P^i7"R^ San , ^1 P wern Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sex^j t ! °W(Cambridge: =>mK,--; a— n_j 7. - u<iequal ityCambridge University Press, 1981)- and
Ig
r
ains
r
t
C
thI
U
wi?,
r
' ^d ^oqrapnv: Th. w^i^^
P ress? 1983) -
t New Br^wick: Rutgers Univer si ty
, hnafl
3
!
Whi
l
e her analysis is in many ways similar tot ose developed by Nancy Chodorow and Dorothy Dinner stein
women-^^
3 ' 3
-^" 6^ ?ey0nd the ^ion of psycSlogy andmen s experiences within the familial and social o?der,to linguistic and symbolic analysis as well. Frenchfeminists often criticize their American counterparts forfailing to extend their analyses to the symbolic andlinguistic arenas, arguing that without such an analysisfeminist criticism is easily accomodated and de-radicalized
within the existing terminology.
. 208.
32 Kri steva, About Chinese Women,
33 Ibid.
,
P- 30.
34Ibid., P« 35 .
35 Ibid., P« 34.
36Ibid., P« 31.
37 Ibid.
,
P- 35 .
38Ibid. PP . 35-36.
39Ibid., P- 36.
40 Ibid., PP . 35-36.
4 llbid. 7 P« 37.
42 Kri steva, Preface to Desire in XI .
465
43Kristeva, About Chinese women , p. 23.
Iriaarav^ !ffortunate American mis-reading of
?
d"' ^"^ion°a°d
0
Di££e?ence
SLand
45Since I am not fluent in French, theseobservations derive from a small dose of intuitive osmosis
?n?roductii
ng
,
thr
?
U?h ° f the man^ ^tailed footnotes^ndi t ons to Irigaray' s work provided by her
ThrnfiS ^
S
'r
eS
?
eCiaUy Carolyn Burke. See her "IrigarayUh the Looking Glass," and "Introduction to 'When Our
o H /? 6^'^"/? Signs: Journal of Women inM^ure and Society 6 (2): Sb - bb . S ee also LouiseMarc ile-Lacoste "The Grammar of Feminine Sexuality," rev.
in rg^H
m
t
6 Autre Femme and Ce Sexe qui N'en pa. im .l Canadian Journal of Poli tical and Social Theory 4T2T.
The Future Sdn?5?na Stanton ' "^guage and Revolution," inin f of Difference
, pp. 73-87.
46Carolyn Burke, "Irigaray Through the LookingGlass," p. 301. a
47Luce Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together,"trans. Carolyn Burke, in Signs: Journal of Women inCulture and Society 6 (1), p. 73. ' *
—
48Ibid., pp. 69-70.
49rLuce Irigaray, "Women's Exile," trans. Couze Venn,ln Ideology and Consciousness 1 (1), p. 62. For an Anglo
approach to male-constructed language, see Dale Spender,
Man-Made Language (Boston, London and Henley: Routledqe
and Kegan Paul, 1980).
50Helene Cixous, "Castration or Decapitation?"
trans. Annette Kuhn, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society 7 ( 1 ) , p . 447"*^
~~ "
51 Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together," p. 73.
52Helene Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa," trans.
Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, in Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society 1 (4), p. 887.
53 Ibid., p. 88.
Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together,", p. 78.
466
55 Ibid., p. 79.
56 Ibid., p. 76.
Feral, "The Powers of Difference," p. 91.
58Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together," p. 75.
59
un(,araf *
m 9 rfteful to the following sources for help in
^acqSes
n
Lacln »
C
in L difficu^ -PProach: Malcolm Bowie?
Sturrook ?n 5' / Structuralism and Since , ed. John
??2 J 0xford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp.
Mat^iaiisr^L^/0^^ and J°hn E1^ is ' language anf
An^vf r ?
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul/ 1977 );ika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan
. trans. David Macey (London-Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977); Jacqueline Rose,
anf ,
r
h
dU
^'
10
i
n in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lan.nnd t e Ecole Freudienne". jlH^tMj^hil] ml
fnn2«
e
f, w°M' tranS * Jacc*ueli^ Rose (New York andLo don: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp. 27-58; Sherry Turkle,Psychoanalytic Politics : Freud's French Revolution (New
°rK;
.
Baslc Books
,
1978)
. See also Lacan' s writings onfeminine sexuality in Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose,
rreudie^"
1 "6 Sexuality: Jacques and Lacan and the "Ecole
f°See Ros Coward, Sue Lipshitz and Elizabeth Cowie,Psychoanalysis and Patriarchal Structures," in Paper s onPatriarchy (Brighton: Women's Publishing Collective,
1978), pp. 6-22. In the same collection, see Cora Kaplan,Gender and Language", pp. 23-37.
61For help in approaching the work of Derrida, I amindebted to the following: Coward and Ellis, Language and
Materialism ; Jonathan Culler, "Jacques Derrida, " in
Structuralism and Since
, pp. 154-180; Guayatri Spivak,
Introduction to her translation of Derrida' s Of
Grammatology (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1977); D.C. Wood, "An Introduction to Derrida," in Radical
Philosophy 21 (Spring 1979), pp. 18-28.
62Irigaray, "That Sex Which is Not One," in
Language, Sexuality and Subversion
,
Working Papers
Collection 1, eds. Paul Foss and Meaghan Morris
(Darlington, Australia: Feral Publications, 1978),
161-171.
PP
63i
"When Our Lips Speak Together," p. 73.
^Jacques Derrida, Pos it ions , cited in Culler,
"Jacques Derrida," p. 164.
467
65
"When Our Lips Speak Together," p. 73.
66 Ibid., p. 77.
and Revfl^iL-'^'F?^ J" Stant °n ' "^uage
The^uture'orDiff^i^r^;!^- Connection," in
68Irigaray, "Women's Exile," p. 63.
69Ibid., p. 64.
70 Ibid.
Othe/^trano^
" AnVhe 0ne Doesn't Stir Without theother, ans. Helen Vivienne Wenzel, in Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Sanity 7 ( 1): 60-6 J.
7 2Irigaray, "Women's Exile," p. 64.
73 Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together," p. 74.
74Irigaray, "Women's Exile," p. 64.
75 Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together," p. 73.
76 Irigaray, "That Sex Which Is Not One," p. 162.
77 Irigaray, "Women's Exile," p. 64.
78Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 66. Nietzsche was also on to this
sexual morphologic of Western discourse. See his BeyondGood and Evil; Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future";
trans
.
R.H. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1973
)
esp. p. 147.
80ovIngaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together,"
pp. 77-78.
81 Irigaray, "Women's Exile," pp. 64-65.
8 2Her mother-infant daughter dialogue, "And the One
Doesn't Stir Without the Other," is fascinating precisely
for the absence of this typical maternal imagery.
83Monique Wittig, The Lesbian Body
, trans. David Le
Vay (New York: Avon Books, 1975), p. x. For a similar
analysis of women's relationship to the generic masculine
468
Spender,
'
Man-Made™",* ? EngllSh see Dale
85
Materials
n
^r
e
a
W
nr,i? ™*
Sa
?
de Zei 9' lesbian Peoples:
p. ill.
Dictionary
( New York
:
~ Avon books, 19 79),
86
Issues fm 9 ' "°n?o iS NOt B°rn a Wo^n," in Feministi 1 (2), pp. 48 and 51, respectively.
87 Ibid., p. 57.
88 • / \
°Wittig, Les Guerilleres
. p. 107.
89Ibid., pp. 63-64.
9QThe Lesbian Body
, p. 26.
91 Ibid., p. 32.
92Helene Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa," p. 888.
93 Ibid., pp. 882 and 875, respectively.
94m • T_Michel Focault, Introduction to Herculine Barbin,trans. Richard McDougall (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980-Editions Gallimard, 1978).
^See Gloria T. Hull, et al
. , eds., But Some of UsAre Brave; Black Women's Studies (Old Westbury: The"Feminist Press, 1982), esp. Alice Walker, "One Child ofOne s Owns A Digression Within the Works," pp. 37-44.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
al ~Hihr
oUn
hZiZ
^' "Reduction, Mothering, and theOrigins of Patriarrhv " t« m •
Feminist Theory on «! «
M°therlnq; Essa Y° '
"
'1'rebilcot
.
Totawa N J~ ' r
dlted
^ J°yCel , . .: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
Althnsser, Louis
. For_Marx^ New York: Pantheon books.
ArieS
'^i^^.juries of Childhood: A»^., g
^Kr-^Houser'lt^rPa^irrSeo"31^ 1"- ^
Atkinson, Jane Monnig.
"Anthroooloav " t„ e
•
QLWo^ in Culture ^S' 8 ( 2 ) r^ ^se^^
AUbre
C\or' efOn iV- '-, Edited by °Uver Lawson Dick. AnnArbor: U iversity of Michigan Press, 1970.
Bakan
'
D
,
aV
^ The Duality of Human Exists Isolationand Communion 1n W^tPrnJton. Boston: Beacon Pres s,
Balbus Isaac. Marxism and Domination: a Neo
-HegelianFeminist, Psvchoan^ g lc Theorv nf s „ Tna1 q l 'Politi ca l, and Technological Liberation
. ~rin. 0 fnn.Princeton University Press, 1982. Princeto
Bamberger, Joan. "The Myth of Matriarchy." m WomenCulture and Society, pp. 263-280. Edited bf^heleRosaldo and Louise Lamphere. Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1974.
Bern, Sandra L. "The Measurement of Psychological
Androgyny." In Journal of Consulting and Cl inicaJPsychology 42 (1974): 155-62. " ~
Benjamin, Jessica. "The Bonds of Love: Rational Violence
and^Erotic Domination." In Feminist Studies 6 (1):
Berg, Elizabeth. "The Third Woman." In Diacritics 12 (?)
pp. 11-20. ~ V
469
470
g5oksr!J"!
Ure
"""^T- New Y°^= Bantam
Bernstein Richard Bevond Objectlvl^ and g .„science, Hermeneutic s
, and PraTTT. Philadelphia-university oi Pennsylvania Press, 1983
fennsylvanialress iln!P
University o£
Blum, Lawrence. "Kant's and Hegel's Moral Rationalism- AFern nist Perspective." In Canadian Journ al ofPhilosophy 12 (2): 287-3027 " S±-2±
Blumberg Paul. Inequality in An Ace of Decline Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1980.
Bookchin Murray The Ecology of Freedom: The Eme ra»nn-
and Dissolution of Hierarchy- Palo Alto, Ca
.
,
Chesnire Books, 1982.
Booth, Wayne C "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin andthe Challenge of Feminist Criticism." in ThePolitics of Interpretation, pp. 51-82. Edited byW.J.T. Mitchell. Chicago and London: University ofChicago Press, 1983.
Boulding, Elise. The Underside of History: A View ofWomen Through Time. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press,1976.
Bovenschen, Silvia. "The Contemporary Witch, The
Historical Witch, and the Witch Myth." In New GermanCritique 15 (Fall 1978), pp. 83-119.
Bowie, Malcolm. "Jacques Lacan." In Structuralism and
Srnce, pp. 116-153. Edited by John Sturrock.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Bowra, CM. From Virgil to Milton . London: MacMillan and
Co., 19 45^
•
Heroic Poetry
. New York: St. Martin's Press,
1966.
471
Braverman, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capital- Th.
^^^^^^^^^
BUll°U
looJ?
r
;974. ^
SUb°rdi
-te S.y
,
New York: Penguin
BUrke
'
To
C
g
aS; /'introduction to 'When Our Lips Speak
anTsocLtv ^(iff^T^ ^^ in ^ure
.
"Irigaray Through the Looking Glass." inFeminist Studio 7 (2): 288-306?
Cade, Toni ed. The Black Woman: An Antholony
. NewYork: New American Library, 1970.
Cambridge Women's Studies Group, ed . Women in Soci ety.Interdisciplinary Essays. London: Virago PresI,'
^^^^"i1, ^ MarX; Texts on Met^ NewYork: Harper and Row, 1975; Basil Blackwell, 1975.
Chaytor Miranda and Jane Lewis. "Introduction" to WorkingLife of Women in the Seventeenth Century
,
by AliceClark, pp. ix-xi. London, Boston and HenleyRoutledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.
Chodorow, Nancy. "Gender, Relation and Difference inPsychoanalytic Perspective." In Socialist Review 46(July-August 1979), pp. 51-70. ~
"Mothering, Male Dominance and Capitalism." in—— , -> - ^- v-a^ Lai blll 1
capitali st Patriarchy and the Case for Soc ialist
Feminism, pp. 83-106. Edited by Zillah Eisenstein.
New York: Monthly Review, 1979.
"°n The Reproduction of Mothering : A
Methodological Debate." In Signs: Journal of Womenin Culture and Society 6 (3): 500-14.
472
CiXOU
VAine«e Kuhf"^^ ° f De«P"ation?" Translated
in Cultur e and Society 1 (4): 875-94.
"
Clark
'centSr; T.*^ ^ ° f W°men in th ^ Seventeenthu y
.
London, Boston and Henley: Routledqe andKegan Paul, 1982; rept. 1919.
96
Clarke Lorenne and Lynda Lange, eds. The Sexism of Soc^T
,
° tCa Theory: Wome n and Reproduction From
Pr^r^^P^ Toronto: University of Toronto
Colletti, Lucio. From Rousseau to Lenin: St udies inIdeology and Society. New York and London: MonthlyReview Press, 1972. y
Connerton, Paul. The Tragedy of Enlightenment: An Essay
on the Frankfurt School
. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1980.
Connolly, William. Appearance and Reality in Politics
.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
"Personal Identity and Political
Interpretation." Paper delivered to the Rutgers
Conference on Public Language and Political
Education, April 1978.
Coward, Rosalind and John Ellis. Language and Materialism
Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the
Subject
. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
Coward, Rosalind, Sue Lipshitz and Elizabeth Cowie.
"Psychoanalysis and Patriarchal Structures." In
Papers on Patriarchy
, pp. 6-22. Brighton: Women's
Publishing Collective, 1978.
Cucchiari, Salvatore. "The Gender Revolution and the
Transition From Bisexual Horde to Patrilocal Band:
The Origins of Gender Hierarchy." In Sexual
Meanings: The Cultural Construction of Gender and
473
Press? 198^
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Culler, Jonathan. "Jacaues nPrn'H a t
Since
, pp. 154-180 pStfL S' t ? Struct ural 1 sm andoTT-; : 7 J iao * Edited by John Sturrock.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
feminism. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978.
Darnton Robert "The Art of Dying." Review of Death andthe enlightenment, Honing ^ttitude| to De^F^oChristians ana unbe lieve rs in Eight eenth Century *France
,
Dy Jonn McManners. New York Review ofBooks, 13 May 1982, pp. 8-12.
°*
de Beauvoir Simone. The Second Sex. Translated andedited by H.M. Parsniey. New York: Random House,
De Leuze, Giles and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedi pus:Capitaism and Schizophrenic. Translated by RobertHuxley, et al
.
New York: Random House, 1977; Paris,
Derrida, Jacques. Spurs/Esperons
. Chicago and London:University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Dinnerstein, Dorothy. The Mermaid and the Minotaur: SexualArrangements and Human Malais e. New York: Harper
and Row, 1976. " *
Di Stefano, Christine. "Legitimation Crisis Reconsidered-
Women, Personal Identity and the State." Seminar
paper, University of Massachusetts, 1979.
"Masculinity as Ideology in Political Theory:
Hobbesian Man Considered." In Hypatia: Journal of
Feminist Philosophy
, a special issue of Women
'
s
Studies International Forum 6 (6): 633-644~I
"Reconsidering Gender Theory: A Reply to the
Lesbian Critique." Paper presented at the New French
Feminisms Panel of the American Philosophical
Association, Boston, 1980.
Douglas, Mary. Natural Symbols: Explorations in
Cosmology
. New York: Pantheon Books, 1982; rept.
1970.
474
Duncan, Graeme and John Grav " The t a
New Essays on JoLg^ ^11 and Sgjig MiU -" InP^0^29— Edi ted by Wesley "^00^ ^^^^"
Duncan Graeme
.
Marx and Mill ; Two Views of Sgcia3
^g^l^^Sg: Cambridge: Cambridge
Dworkin^Andrea. Woman-Hating. New York: E.P. Button,
Ehrensaft, Diane. "When Ken and Women Mother." In
J/-/
3 fc ReVieW 49 (January-February 1980), pp.
Eisenstein, Hester and Alice Jardine, eds . The Future ofDifference. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980." £S~2£
Eisenstein Zillah. " Ant i femi ni sm in the Politics and
187-205
nS 198°'" In Feminist Studies 7 (2):
The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism. NewYork and London: Longman, 1981.
-'
.
ed
* Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case foririal i cf Pomi ^. ; r-rr. m_. . \r i_ —r—: ;—=— . * — " — ^.ny^ uuc v^aac iuisoc is t Feminism
. New York: Monthly Review, 1979.
Ehrenreich, Barbara and Dierdre English. For Her Own
9221: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Womgn.
Garden City: Doubleday, 1979. " ~~
Eliade, Mircea. Rites and Symbols of Initiation: The
Mysteries of Birth and Rebirth ! New York: HaTper
and Row, 1958.
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. "Against Androgyny." In Telos 46(Spring 1981), pp. 5-22.
"Antigone's Daughters." In Democracy 2 (2), pp.46-59.
•
"Feminist Discourse and Its Discontents:
Language, Power and Meaning." In Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society 7 (3): 603-621.
•
"Methodological Sophistication and Conceptual
Confusion: A Critique of Mainstream Political
Science." In The Prism of Sex: Essays in the
475
of Wisconsin Press, till.
MadlS°n: """ersity
Press "
lnceton
=
frxnceton University
"Symmetry and Soporifics: A Critique ofFeminist Accounts of Gender Development."
Unpublished paper, 198 2.
^^^rton?'!^! 1^00" ^ SOC1>^' New York: W.W.
—
rr'
Ide"tity and the Life Cycle; Selected PapersNew York: International Unive rsities Press, 1959.
«• Identity, Youth and Crisis . New York: W.W.Norton, 1968.
Felman, Shoshana
.
"Rereading Femininity." In Yale FrenchStudies 62 (1981), pp. 19-44.
Feral, Josette. "Antigone Or the Irony of the Tribe."
Review of Speculum De L ' Autre Femme and CeSexe SexeQui N'en Est Pas Un , by Luce Irigaray, and
Polylogues, by Julia Kristeva. In Diacritics 8(September 1978), pp. 2-14. ~
,
• '"The Powers of Difference." in The Future of
Difference, pp. 88-94. Edited by Hester Eisenstein
and Alice Jardine. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980.
Ferguson, Ann. "Androgyny as An Ideal for Human
Development." In Feminism and Philosophy
, pp.45-69. Edited by Mary Vett erl ing-Bragg in , et al
.
Totawa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1977.
Finch, Janet and Dulcie Groves, eds . A Labour of Love:
Women, Work and Caring
. London: Routledge and Keqan
Paul, 1983.
Firestone, Shulamith. The Dialectic of Sex . New York:
Bantam Books, 1972.
Flax, Jane. "Mother-Daughter Relationships:
Psychodynamics
, Politics and Philosophy." In The
Future of Difference
, pp. 20-40. Edited by Hester
Eisenstein and Alice Jardine. Boston: G.K. Hall,
1980.
476
uHconsc!ous^
a
i r
U
e
S°Phy and the Patriarchal
saggy A^KSSts 'g-^gEgai*iPiii^^
xyau, Editions Gallimard, 1978.
K-'i| The HistorY of Sexuality Vol. 1. New York-Pantheon Books, 1978. K *
Freud Sigmund. Standard Edition of the Cnmpi^o
Translacea ana edited by James Strachey. London:The Hogarth Press, 1975.
f--
Ci ^lization and Its Discontents. Translated byJames strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1961.
~—
~P?.' 225-243?
SeXUalitY *" Standard Edition
, vol. 21,
—
"
"Femininity." In New Introductory Lectures.Translated and edited by James Strachey. New York-W.W. Norton, 1964, pp. 112-135.
-gr" ^
he Future of An Illusion. Translated by Jamesbtrachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1961.
.
"On Negation." Standard Edition, vol. 19, pp.235-239. ' — ^p
•
" The Question of a Weltanschauung." in New
Introductory Lectures
. Translated and edited~by
James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1965. dd
158-182. PP
•
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
Standard Edition
, vol. 7, pp. 125-243.
Freidan, Betty. The Feminine Myst ique. New York: Dell
1974.
477
New
Journal o f Feminist Phi To*™* Y\ Hypatia: A
FUente
p;.
C
^; "Writ1^ in *» Piracy 2 (1),
Fuller Margaret. Woman in the Ni neteenth Century*ork. W.W. Norton, 19/1; rept. 1855.
Criticism: On 'Dancing Through the Minefield' " mFeminist Studies 8 (3): 629-675.
z ^ • In
Gaudin
,
Colette, et al
. "Introduction." Yale FrenchStudies 62 (1981), pp. 2 -18.
Gearh6
p^:
S
?
lly
*
The Underground. Watertown, Ma.:Persephone Press, 1979.
Geertz Clifford The Interpretation of Culture . NewYork: Basic Books, 1973. '
Geras, Norman. Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of alegend. London: New Left Books, 1983. ~~
GeUSS
',nH
Y
rr
d
; ™Z Ide* of a Critical Theory: Habermasa d the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981.
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: PsychologicalTheory and Women's Development" Cambridge, Ma. andLondon: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Gordon, Linda. Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Soc ialHistory of Birth Control in America? Middlesex-
Penguin Books, 1977. "
Gordon, Linda and Allen Hunter. "Sex, Family and the New
Right: Anti-Feminism as a Political Force." In
Radical America 11 (6), pp. 9-25.
Gordon, Suzanne. "The New Corporate Feminism." in The
Nation
, 5 February 1983. ~
—
Gornick, Vivian. Essays in Feminism . New York: Harper
and Row, 1978.
478
ty and
CgmbHdit Ma. and Londonl The M . I . T . Press ,' 1978.
wTT™
Beyond Domination: New Ppr.p^i.... _ nWomen and Philosophy^ Totawa m~t T s "
Allanheld, 1983.
P Y ' N ' J ^ Rowmanand
G°Uld
'
Stephen J. "Triumph of a Naturalist." Review of AFeeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of ~Wbara McCUntock; by hvelyn Keller. New YorkReview of Books. 29 March 1984, pp. 3 - 7
Graham Hilary. "Caring: A Labour of Love." In A Labourof Love: Women, Work and Carina
, PP- 13-30. Edited
aL'K
116
"
F
i
n
^ ^ DUiCiS Grove «« London: Rout edgend Kegan Paul, 1983. y
Greenson, Ralph R. "Dis-Identi fying from the Mother: ItsSpecial Importance for the Boy." in the
International Journal of Psycho-Analys is 49 (1968):
Griffin, Susan. Woman and Nature: The Roar ing Inside
M££- New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
Gunnell, John. Political Theory: Tradition and
Interpretation
. Cambridge, Ma.: Winthrop
Publishers, 1979.
Hanmer, Jalna and Pat Allen. "Reproductive Engineering-
The Final Solution?" In Feminist Issues 2 (1), dp.53-74. ~ PP
Haraway, Donna. "We Think, Therefore We Are." Review of
Discovering Reality
, edited by Sandra Harding and
Merrill B. Hintikka. In Women's Review of Books 1
(2), pp. 3-5. ~~~~
Harding, Sandra. "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of
Rationality? A Survey of Issues." In Beyond
Domination: New Perpectives on Women and Philosophy
,
pp. 43-63. Edited by Carol C. Gould. Totawa, N.J.:
Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
•
"Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible
Only Now?" In Discovering Reality: Feminist
Perspectives on Epistemology
,
Metaphysics
,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
, pp. 311-24.
479
Edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill n H<Dordrecht, Boston and London: "^eidV 1^-
Hardi
^d SrtriPPZ^^ n ?° f°™ "°ve»ents: »~«*
57-75. ^
osltlo
-
In Feminist Studies 7 (l) :
"""Sis£/."5ysK8 ?sactti-5ssr—
Pe s I;
In Dxscoverina Reality »~< n1 -,
Err:.
Mone7> s e x and Power: Toward g Feminist
Hayes H.R. The Dangerou s Sex: The Myth of Feminine5211- New G. P. Putnam's Sons? 1964
He9el
'Mmer
F
* ito
Q
d
men0
n°?Y °
f SP irit
--
translated by A.V.Mille . Oxf r : Oxford University Press, 1979*
"
-7-* PMlp.sophy of Right. Translated by T.M. KnoxLondon: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Heilbroner Robert. An Inquiry Into the Human ProspectNew York: W.W. Norton, 1974. ^
—
'
Marxism; For and Against
. New York andLondon: W.W. Norton, 1980.
Heilbrun Carolyn G. Reinventing Womanhood
. New York-W.W. Norton, 19797
Heller, Agnes. The Theory of Need in Marx . London-Allison and Busby, 1 974 . '
Herculine Barbin. Translated by Richard McDougall. NewYork: Pantheon Books, 1980.
Heresies #12 . "Sex Issue" 3 (4), 1981.
480
Hirschman, Albert f> t-k^ n
Argument Fo r
' Cailfafffl^ ^ the Intere^":
TTTnr.L.1 f .
pi
^
a1 ism BeforR Triumph:
—
n ceton. Princeton University Press, 1977.
Hirst, Paul and Penny Wooley. Social Ro1af ;Attributes
. London ? I
Relations and Human
_
^u a . TavistocK Publications, 1982?
Hobbes, Thomas.
"Autobiography" In Th 0 p *
•
^yorj^. T?an^ted by
^^^r
.
warden City: ^dayf^72^
-"^orSF4» B^ — shott.
GiTdiS Cityi DoubledayT ^972 ^
Bernard Gert '
Hobhouse,
sL .T.
96
Uberalism. New York: Oxford UniversUy
Horkheimer Max and T.W. Adorno. Dialectic ofEnlightenment. New York: Seabury Press
, 1972.
H°rneYK^ ren ' ,/eminine Psvcholnov. Edited by Haroldelman
-
New York: W.W. Norton, 1973.
n ia
HOWS
'
Books" fS??;
PinK C°llar W°^s. New York: Avon
HUl1
' edr'BurSome^fn ^ SCOtt ' and Barbara Smit*<
?
dS
:.
B t S e o Us Are Brave: Black Women'sStudies. Old Westbury, N.Y.: Feminist Press, 1982.
Hunt, David. Parents and Children in History; ThePsychology of Family Life in Early Modern France ,New York: Harper and Row, 1972. ~
Irigaray Luce. "And The One Doesn't Stir Without TheOther. Translated by Helene Vivienne Wenzel. In
^?ns: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 7
( 1 ) : 60-67 .
— •
"That Sex Which Is Not One." In Language,Sexuality and Subversion , pp. 161-171. Working
Papers Collection 1. Edited by Paul Foss and Meaghan
481
Morris. Darlington. Australia: Feral Publications,
Carolyn^r^ 1^%^ T°9 e«—" Translated by
CultuL aZ ks^l%^nS - J°"" a1 " f g°aes in
.
"Women's Exile." Translated by Couze Venn T„Ideology and Consciousness i (1). 62-76?
Jacobson, Norman. Pride and Solace- The Functions a nrf
Miitt^n^^
Jag9ar
Totawa°
n
N
Femi " iat Cities and Human W.,„„
l^rSJil^fL^ ^6mi;ni !t The-y= SexualEqua ity Reconsidered." Inleyond Do^inatPerspectives on Women and Ph ilosophy. pp o?g^r^
S^e^, Lt^." GOUid ' -tawa^.a- LiJan and
aahoda
;o
Marie.
as
Preu1and the^ile^ of P^n lnq,, New
Jardine, Alice. "Prelude: The Future of Difference." InThe Future of Difference, pp. xxv-xxvii. Edited by
Hall
Sr
i980
enStein ^ AUCe Jardine * B°ston: G.K.
Jones, Ann R. "Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding
°4/bJ
ltUre Feminine." In Feminist Studies 7 (2):
Kahn, Coppelia. "Excavating 'Those Dim Minoan Regions':
Maternal Subtexts in Patriarchal Literature." In
Diacritics 12 (2), pp. 32-41.
•
Man's Es tate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare— — — ~-~ ^- ' ~- -*- «-JT ^" miarv tBerkeley: University of California Press, 1981
Keller, Evelyn. "Gender and Science." In Psychoanalysis
and Contemporary Thought 1 (3): 409-33 .
Kelly-Gadol, Joan. "The Social Relations of the Sexes:
Methodological Implications of Women's History." In
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1
(4) : 809-24.
the Academy. The niff Feminist Perspective -i n
Edited by LizIbeth Lano! h ^Qjgg PP- 86-i OQ^
Chicago and London^ ?he n
*nd Walter Gove.
1981.
°
-
T ^^ersity of Chicago Press,
King, Ynestra# ..Feminism and
Heresies #13 4 (1), pp . 12 _16>
0t Nature
' In
h!l .
The Psvchoana1 Y«- - f ^. r - n New York: Dell
Kollantai, Alexandra. The Autobiography of a Sexually
^r PaIditeTD n:,i : Sf - W0^ n - F°""« Sy-jj^e
Salvor a\\ ^ IrVlng Fetscher ' Translated byalvato Attanasio. New York: Schocken Books, 1975.
Kristeva, Julia. About Chinese Wn,Pn . Translated by AnitaBarrows. New York: Urizen Press, 1977. Y
T^ans lated
e
hy
n
T^
anqUa
r - Edited by Le°n S ' R°udiez.lr b homas Gora, et al . New York-
( f^il limn i -n Tlv^ 4 ' i t-v ____Co umb a University Press,' 1980.
"
^rrv"t°^'
S
^t'" Translated ^ Alice Jardine andHar y Blake. In Signs: Journal of Women ^ Cultureand Society 7 (1): 13-35. ' " ULTLUi
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structur e of Scientific Revolutions.Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1 962 .
LaCapra, Dominick. Rethinking Intellectual History.
Texts, Contexts, Method. Ithaca and London: CornellUniversity Press, 1983.
Ladner, Joyce. Tomorrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman.Garden City: Doubleday, 1971. '
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By .Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1 980 •
sons, 1965. Charles Scribner'i
Ledere
H; rcgurf
n
l;acr
e/ear of »•« «>rt ,Itourt
'
Br e, Jovanovich, 1968.
^
GUi
Ace
U
B;oK;,
K
I 9 6r ^ -L CarKness. NewYork:
Lemair
M;c^
ka
;o H
aCqU6S LaCan
-' Translated by David
Linton Rhoda and Michele Whitham. "with Mourninq Rao.Empowerment and Defiance- The iQfti w™»fl!t A 9 'Action " Tr, • i • I Z . 1981 Women's Pentagon. in Socialist Review 12 (3-4), pp. 11-36?
Lloyd Genevieve. "Reason, Gender and Morality in theHistory of Philosophy." m Social Resear ch" £
LOrb6r
A m^x',^.*
1
;
"°n ^ Reproduction of Mothering.Methodological Debate. In Signs: JournTTnT1^'Women in Cul turel and Society 6 (3): 482-5?4T21
Lukacs, Georg. History and Class Consciousnessi Studiesin_ Marxist Dialectics. Tlirxslated by RodlTiy^ 1Livingston. Cambridge, Ma.: The M.I.T. Press, 1971.
Lukes Steven "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered.
"
.
Phllos
°PhY of Social Exp lanation. pp .119-129. Edited' by Alan Ryan/ London: OxfordUniversity Press, 1973.
MacCormack, Carol and Marilyn Strathern, eds. Nature,
5
Gender
-
Cambridge: Cambr idie~UnT7ers i tytress, 1980.
MacIn
XtMi
A
AlTilte.
h Short History of Eth<- New
484
ESI~»ltrgSn7 1962.
tn
-^£ ! l°ndon:^Hord
"hler
~S^Wk= Basic BooCI, ?973. Mlvldmh"2 ' New
^^C^ceptr ^t° ,0phr ° f W°man: g^agsicaj to C
lf%j?p ° '
ina"naP°lis: Hackett PubHshing Co., "
Maitland Sara. "Penelope." In Tales I Tell Mv m^-w . ACollection of Feminist Shor t StBHSi rr I VS Xe^J talrbal«s - «t Lona°tand46WestiNyack: The Journeyman Press, 1978.
Mannhe
i"'
*arl \ Geology and Utopia: An Introduction to
Method* yS
h0l
S9yi
Phil°s°P*Y and Scientific, 1936; New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
Marcile-Lacoste, Louise. "The Granunar of Feminine
S Si n'- *eview of Speculum de L' autre Femme andCe Sexe Qui N'en Pas Un. hv r.nrp t^^. f^—Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 4(2), pp. 69-74. L
Marcus, Steven. The Other Victorians: A Study ofSexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth CenturyEngland
. New York: Basic Books, 1974. '
Marcuse, Herbert. "Repressive Tolerance." in A Critique
of Pure Tolerance
. Boston: Beacon Press, 1965.
—
Marks, Elaine and Isabelle de Courtivron, eds . New French
Feminisms
. Amherst, Ma.: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1980.
Marx, Karl. Capital
, vol. 1. New York: International
Publishers, 1967.
Capi tal
,
vol. 3. New York: International
Publishers, 1967.
•
Economic and Philisophic Manuscripts
. In Karl
Marx: Selected Writings
. Edited by David McLellan
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
"The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
485
ra
*
Ox ford University Press, 1977.
— iM?
r
rrT,: ft:::;t" "i 111 r " 1
&«w *or k: RanS
-
Ho^rr97l. g Martl " B1 °°l"»-
University Press, 1977?
ellan> Oxford: Oxford
Marx
' ^elW^r^^?61^ ^kGer;-"T'^;Publishers, lain W Yor * International
May, Robert. Sex and Fantasy: Patterns of M,i fl ^ „
^eveloc^tT-^,,, ggrtf W^rfgfenT 1980."' r
'"" 1
-'-
Mazlish, Bruce. James and John Stuart Mill: Father anri
MCCall
Sex
D
?
r
^
yjLan fp:u; SarlrT" V-voir The Second&_in Culture Uand So^^y ^^f5^^ 1 ° f
McKenna Wendy "The Construction of Desire . - Review of
^Pgl^c^fDe^ire, edited by Ann SnitovJ et a .In ^ Women s Review of Books 1 ( 6 ), pp. 3-5.
McLe11 *"' Dav * d
- ^e^houaht of Karl Marx . London and NewYork: Harper and Row, 1971 :
McMurtry, John. The Structure of Marx's World-ViewPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Mead, Margaret. Sex and Temperament in Three PrimitiveSocieties
.
New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1963.
Melman, Deborah. "Feminist Explorations: Life Under
bfn^n^" /eVieW ° f Ne" French Feminism* , editedy Elai e Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron. InCanadian Journal of Political and Social Theorv 4(2), pp. 64-68. " ' ' *
Mepham, John. "From the Grundrisse to e-ni* , ™.of Marx's Method " in Cap tal: The Making
i
"*y«uonus, in. J.: Humanities Prpcc i a-7r>V01
*
1: Dialectics and Method pp l 4l-l 73 '.
Mepham, John and D-H. Ruben Pdc T «
Philosophy. 3 .ul ..m .
USS ln Mary^
Harper and Row, 1980. — Francisco:
Mid9e1
---- Cofn^^^
""'*
= « asss
Amhe'rsi:^^ ° f MassachLett^
1
Mill, Harriet Taylor.
"Enfranchisement of Women." m
kossT °rv
eX Bffilitg. pp. 89-122. E by Alice
P?esS ; 1970?
a9
° LOnd°n: ^-ersity of Chicago"
MiU/
Ed^JT^V ^tobiograohy of john Stn,^ Mn,
Col umL y„ ?hn ^° S^ NeW York and L°ndonbia University Press, 1924.
MiU."
B
Ethin^" i
The PhilosophY of John —
Marshall Coheir New York: Random House, 1961.
-MTn
."
C
?^rid?e, n In ^e Philosophy of John Stna rl-E^, ^1"1 ' PglltjC;dl Mik? Edited-b7Marshall CohelH New York: Random House, 1961.
.
Considerations on Representat ive Government .
Mfrrm?yi958
r
:
in ShielSs
« Indianapolis: Bobbs
mTI 1 • * i ^
The Philosophy of John Stua ri-
ft : ?
al/ Polltl cal and Religions
. Edited"*yMarshall Cohen. New York: Random House, 1961.
.
On Liberty. Edited by Currin V. Shields.
Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1956.
487
^^PublT^fe^^ Greenwich, Ct. :
Utilitarianism. Edited by Oskar Pip^Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 195?
Peters. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972.
MitChe
ReIch
Ul
^i* ^^"alvsi. and remind- p^„,i , Lamg
„„,] I „n. New York: Random House
;
•
Woman's Estate. New York: Random House, 1973.
Mitchell, Juliet, and Jacqueline Rose ed, Ta n
and "L'Ecole Frn«i2—*
^nslated b^f^"T^Kuse. New *ork: W.W. Norton! 1982 Y JaCqUellne
Moraga Cherrie and Gloria Anzaldua, eds . This BridgeCalled My Back, wa itings by Radicaj i^'l
*acertown. Ma
.
: Persephone Press, 1981?
Morgan David. "Men, Masculinity and the Process of
PP
C1
83 ?^
al
^Uiry '" ln D°inq Femin?st
M°rriS
l974?'
C°nUndrUm
-
NeW York: Ne
" American Library,
^^^thod'^'ln'D/^^ 19" ° f Philos°Phy: The AdversaryMethod. I Discovering Reality: Femini st YPerspect ives on Egj stemoloqy
, Metaphvs ic7
~
°i0qY ' and PhilosQPhy of ScieTfe—^p. 149-164waited by Sandra Harding and Merrill B . Hintikka
Co!?
r
i983:
EOSt °n ^ L°ndon: D ' Reide l Publishing
Mullaney Marie Mario. Revolutionary Women: Gend.r * n*the Socialist Revolutionary Role. New York-Praeger, 1983.
Murphy Yolanda and Robert. Women of the Fore st. NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1974.
My Secret Life. Introduction by G. Legman. New York-Grove Press, 1966; abridged ed
.
488
T98TT
A1Dany
-
State University ot New York Press,
Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books, 1972.
dd lfti om cij • x. , as says on Joh n Stuart MillPP. 181-201. Edited bv We<=;l e>v p FT^T ° "U1 '
HUmanities p"«» Sussex: The Harder Press.' 1980
t— * Rational ism in Politics and Other Essav.London and New York: Methuen, 19fo2 Y *
O'Brien Mary. "Between Critique and Community." Reviewof Money, Sex and Power, by Na Hartsock. In TheWomen's Rev iew of Books 1 (7), pp. 9-n —
.
"Feminist Theory and Dialectical Logic. " In
lii?
S
\^-o/?
al
° £ W°m^n i n culture and Society 7
— : ||
Th
f
Politics of Reproduction. Boston, Londonand HiTileTl Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
Okin, Susan Moller. Women in Western Political Thn.^ ..Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. —
Oilman Bertell Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in
Press? 1971
Y-' Cambrid9e; Cambridge University
Olsen, Tillie. Silences
. New York: Dell, 1979.
Orlando, Lisa. "Another Love That Dare Not Speak ItsName. Review of Coming to Power: Writi ngs andGraphics on Lesbian s/m
, edited by s,^ c . t~ QayCommunity News 9 (3377^13 March 1982, pp. 1-2 oftheBook Review.
489
—
.
"Bad Girls and Good Politics " viiu^ tt •Literary Supplant. 13 December ^982 ^ V°1C"
.
"Coming to Terms with Lesbian S/M. " VillaaeVoice
, 29 July 1983. v g
0rtner
Culture?"
B,
T "w
S" t0 NatUre as Man
-
to
™ rJ 5 2
Woman, Culture and Soc iety, pp. 67-88Edited by Michele Kosaldo and Louise Lamphe^e
.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974?
Osbourne, Martha Lee. Woman in Western Thought . NewYork: Random House, 1979. a
Padover, Saul K. Karl Marx: An Intimate Biography New
1978
k
f1ST 11 ' Untari° ! ^ A^ricpLibra^y
,
Papers of the Second Sex Conference
. New York UniversitySeptember ly/y. New York Institute for the
6 Sl
'
Humanities, 1979.
Petchesky, Rosalind.
" Ant iabort ion, Ant i feminism, and the
206-46!
Right." In Feminist Studies 7 (2):
~
-r-* "
RSP1
;
0
M
UCtive Freedom: Beyond 'A Woman's Rightto Choose
.
In Signs: Journal of Women in Cultureand Society 5 (4)1 661-85 .
Pomeroy Sarah B. Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves.New York: Schocken Books, 1975. ~~
Prokop, Ulrike. "Production and the Context of Women'sDaily Life." In New German Cri tique 13 (Winter
1978), pp. 18-33.~ —
Rader, Melvin. Marx's Interpretation of History . New York-Oxford University Press, 1979
.
Raymond, Janice. The Transsexual Empire: The Making o f
the She-Male
. Boston: Beacon Press, 1979.
Reik, Miriam. The Golden Lands of Thomas Hobbes .
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977.
Relyea, Suzanne. "None-Of
-The-Above : Gender Theory and
Hetero-Sexual Hegemony in Recent French and American
Thought." Paper delivered to the New French
490
Bo^n
S
T980?
ne1
'
^^^^ Philo
-P^cal Association,
Rich
' /tos? a-—
and Society 5 (4 )»
9
631-eg
1n r "u "r n
Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience anHInstitution. New ^ork: W.W. Norton^! 976
Tofifi °^.^
ieS
:
Secrets and S ilence: Selected Prose1966-1978. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976.
Riddiough, Christine. "Women, Feminism, and the 1980
SSJh°»: 37-g4!°
CialiSt R6VieW 56
«
Ma
-^Pril
Rohrbaugh, Johanna. Women: Psychology's Puzzle. NewYork: Basic Books, 1979. "
Rosaldo, M.Z. "The Use and Abuse of Anthropology:
Reflections on Feminism and Cross-Cult uralUnderstanding." In Signs: Journal of Women inCulture and Society 5 ( 3 ) : 389-417 . "
Rose, Hilary. "Hand, Brain, and Heart: A Feminist
Epistemology for the Natural Sciences." In Siqns-Journal of Women in Culture and Society 9 (1 ) : 73-90.
Rossi, Alice. "Sentiment and Intellect: The Story of JohnStuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill." In her Essays
on Sex Equality, pp. 1-64. Chicago and London!
University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Roszack, Theodore. "The Hard and the Soft: The Force of
Feminism in Modern Times." In Masculine/Feminine
,
pp. 87-106. Edited by Betty and Theodore Roszack.
New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
Rowbotham, Sheila. Woman's Consciousness, Man's World .
Middlesex, England and Baltimore, Md.: Penquin
Books, 1973.
Rubin, Lillian. Worlds of Pain: Life in the Working Class
Family
. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
Ruddick, Sara. "Maternal Thinking." In Femi nist Studies 6
(2): 342-67. ~
491
.-E^, 8"" 1 -
^;eres?fof Place
6
•
F
"nli onsDra£tT in9 W°" n in th*
Culture and s£?"y 8 (3) ! ^i-m!"™1 ° f ^
Ruddick, Sara and Pamela Daniels, eds. Workina It rwNew York: Pantheon Books, 1977. ~ 9
Z
Ruether, Rosemary. New Woman /New Earth- Sexist •and Human Liberate. fa Y^ rgSelfsr^f^
.
Rukeyser Muriel "Kathe Kollwitz." In Voices of Women- 3Critics on 3 Poets on 3 Heroines pp. 12-21 M?^-
^sr?9ir ta - New -
Ryan
' KegS; P~!f-fMi:
London and Bosto
-
Routi^ -
Sagan
'^* Cannibalism: Human Aggre ssion and CulturajForm
-
New York: Harper and Row, 1974. ~
Samois, ed. Coming to Power: Writings and Graphic, onL|sbjan_SZM. Boston: Alyson Publications, inc??
Sanday Peggy Reeves. Female Power and Male Dominance: Onthe Origins of Sexual Inegualjt^ CambHdgelCambridge University Press, 1981.
Sandel, Michel J. Liberalism and the Limits of JusticeCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Schibanoff, Susan. "Comments on Kelly's 'Early FeministTheory and Querelle des Femmes, 1400-1789'." in
f
lqns : Journal of Women in Cultur e and Society 9(2): 320-26 . " L
Schmidt, Alfred. The Concept of Nature in Marx . London-New Left Books, 1971. ~
Schochet, Gordon. Patriarchalism and Political ThoughtNew York: Basic Books, 1975. —
Scott, Hilda. Does Socialism Liberate Women? Experienc esFrom Eastern Europe
. Boston: Beacon Press7 1974.
492
Seigel, Jerrold. Marx's Pate- <v^~ c-u
T97?: 97
ot capitalism
.
New York: Random House,
-
PP. 145-fi^ p^q-i-t-^^ t 7 v-ri cical Theory.
t£=vT « Edited by John O'NeiHT New York-Seabury Press, 1976. K "
Shield
ln h^-y- Political Thought of J.S. Mill -I is edition of Considerations on RepresentativeGovernment, by John Stuart Mill, pp. 7A-Ti ~Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1958^
Sh°rte
Y;rk
dWa
n
d
*-
Thf MaKinq ° £ the Moder" Fa mi i
y
. Newo : Basic Books, 1977. —L
^^"AutSmn^ei!^ *" ^^ 7 U>.
Smith Dorothy E. "A Sociology For Women." m The Prismof Sex: E s says in the Sociology of Rnnw!^55
Beck m ^
lted bY JUlia A
*
Sh^man and Evelyn T? ton. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979?
Spellman, Elizabeth. "Woman as Body: Ancient andContemporary Views." In Feminist Studies 8 (1):iuy—132. " "
Spence, Janet T "Changing Conceptions of Men and Women: APsychological Perspective." In A Feminist
P
l
rSpeCt
il
e *" Academv; The Difference It Makes
,pp. UU-4b. Edited by Elizabeth Langland and WalterGove. London and Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1981. *
Spender, Dale. Man-Made Language. London: Routledge andKegan Paul, 1980. *
Spivak, Gayatri. "Preface" to her translation of OfGrammatology, by Jacques Derrida, pp. ix-lxxvTi.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
Stacey, Margaret and Marion Price. Women, Power and
Pol it ics
. London and New York: Tavistock, 1981.
493
Stack, Carol. All Our Ki n: Strategies for c*. • ,
Black C^jUt. „.„ Yorkf ^"and"^^
Stannard David. Shrinking History; on Fr.n d and thallli^of^sychohrs^ry olford: oxtord Unwfrsity
Stanton, Domna
.
"The Fiction o£ Preciosite and the Fear of
X0~134 . ^
Yale French st"^" 62 (1981), pp.
° f
£ZZ20£ ?nd T _Re™^ u"°n = Franco-AmericanTTs-Connection." In The Future fVZ?™ 1™
73-87. Edited by Hester Eisenstein and AliceJardine. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1980.
u
In
^
roductlon to his edition of The Early Draftof John St uart Mill's Autobiography
. Urbana
•
—
University of Illinois Press, 1961.
Stillinger, Jack, ed
.
The Early Draft of John StuartMill s Autobiography
. Urbana: University of
—
Illinois Press, 1961.
Taylor, Charles. "Atomism." In Power, Possessions andFreedom: Essays in Honor of C.B. MacPher son. onT39
r
-61
-
Edited by Alkis Kontos. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1979.
He9 el • Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1975 .
*
Hegel and Modern Society
. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979.
•
"Political Theory and Practice." In Social
Theory and Political Practice
, pp. 61-86. Edited by
Christopher Lloyd. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
Thompson, Dennis. John Stuart Mill and Representative
Govenment
.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976. 1
Tilly, Louise and Joan W. Scott. Women, Work and Family .
New York: Holt, Rineheart and Winston, 1978.
Trebilcot, Joyce, ed
. Mothering: Essays in Feminist
Theory
. Totawa, N.J. : Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
494
Turkle, Sherry. Psychoanalytic Politics- Pre„fl.= .Evolution. fa ggrkt Basic Books, fffgf '
Fr ' n "h
Turner, Frederick Beyond Geography
,y
"^"^rk:"^ 1?"^ PffM^j? SSg Bttg >™. »ew
Warner
-^0?k; ^"^.^ir-'— to
Westkott Marcia. "Feminist Criticism in the SocialSciences." In the Harvard Educat
i
^afjggg'jg (4):
Whitbeck, Caroline. "A Different Reality: FeministOntology." m Beyond Domination: jj^tiveson Women and Philosophy,, pp. fo4 -88. Edited^ Caro lC. Gould. Totawa, N.J. : Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
Whitin
vioffnof
iCe
;
,',SeX Identitv Conflict and PhysicalV le ce: A Comparative Study." m Ameri canAnthropologist 67 (6): 123-40. "
Whiting, John and Irving Child. Child Training andPersonality: A Cross-Cul tural Stud^ ECS u~en ,Yale University Press, 1953.
Whorf, Benjamin. Language, Thought and Reality
. CambridgeMa.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956. ' 9
William Juanita. Psychology o f Women: Behavior in Socia ,Context
. New York: W.W. Norton, 1977. —
Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society 1780-1950
. NewYork: Columbia University Press and London: Chatto
and Windus, Ltd., 1958; reprint ed
.
, New York
•
Harper and Row, 1966.
Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science . London-Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.
Winnicott, D.W. Maturational Processes and the
Facilita ting Environment
. New York: International
Universities Press, 1965.
•
Playing and Reality
. New York: Basic Books,1971.
495
Wittig, Monique. Les Guerilleres Tr.nd,. * u
Vay. New York: Avon"»"
; Parts tilt**^ Le
The Lesbian Bod 1
siw mi ; P^sr1?!^.^ David Le
Wittig Monique and Sande Zeig. Lesbian People-
Eaitiog;
t
:-^:/r4^i--^z^^^n - ™»
Critique 13 (1978), pp. 113-31.
Wolf, Deborah Goleman. The Lesbian Community Berkeley-University of California Press, 1979.
* K i .
Wolff Robert Paul. The Poverty of Liberalism . Boston-Beacon Press, 196*T "
—
^ n^
T
V
ere ' S Nobody Her e But Us Persons." In Womenand Philosophy
, pp. 128-144. Edited by Carol
Sons? 1976^"
Wartofsk^ New ^or ^ : G.P. Putnam's
™ol(3ast > Elizabeth. Equality and the Rights of Wnnu» n.Ithaca and London! Cornell University Press, 1980.
Wolin, Sheldon. Hobbes and the Epic Tradition o f PoliticalTheory. Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress, 1970.
Wollestonecraft, Mary. Maria: Or the Wrongs o f Woman.Introduction by Moira Ferguson. New York- W~WNorton, 1975; rept. 1792.
—
*
—
Vindication of the Rights of Women . Edited by
r^fS1 H * Poston - New York: W.W. Norton, 1975; rept.1 79 2 •
Wood D.C. "An Introduction to Derrida." In Radical
Philosophy 21 (Spring, 1979), pp. 18-28. ~
Woolf, Virginia. Three Guineas . New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1966.
496
^'mS^'socS^'S^11^ C—tion Of Man in
26 (2): ?83-?93:
American Soc iological R,vi flw
Yale French Studies 62 (1981).
Young Iris Marion. "I s Male Gender Identity the Cause ofMale Domination?" m Mothering: Essays^ FeministThep^, pp i 29 46. Edited by Joyce ^Aclt "lotawa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
Yudkin Marcia.
"Transsexualism and Women: A CriticalPerspective." In Feminist Studies 4 (3), pp! 97-IO6.
^^on^r; "My Recollect ions of Lenin: An Interviewon the Woman Question." m Feminism: The Essentia]Historical Writings, pp. 335 -43. Edited by MiriamSchneir. New York: Random House, 1972.
Zinn
' NeTvn^
A People's History of the Un ited States .ew York: Harper and Row, 1980. "


